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Abstract 
 
 
The term ‘international antitrust’ is a convenient yet inaccurate means of describing the 
national rules, bilateral agreements, and multilateral initiatives that attempt to fill the 
vacuum created by the failure to agree upon international antitrust rules. The ‘stillborn’ 
International Trade Organisation (ITO) would have integrated international antitrust rules 
into the multilateral trading system and provided a twin track to trade liberalisation, but 
was never ratified. The three faces of international antitrust – unilateralism, bilateralism 
and multilateralism – have developed in parallel to the increasing globalisation of trade, 
removal of state-imposed barriers and economic integration and interdependency. 
International cooperation and convergence efforts in antitrust are essential in order to 
safeguard the benefits that should flow from trade liberalisation. Cooperation and 
convergence also diminishes the risk of conflict between antitrust authorities, which 
would otherwise increase due to: the extraterritorial enforcement of national antitrust 
rules; the growing number of antitrust regimes; and ‘ripple effects’ due to globalisation of 
trade. In analysing the activities that comprise the international antitrust dialogue, this 
thesis suggests that the primary objective of the dialogue is to support and supplement 
trade liberalisation. There is doubt however, as to whether the operation of the 
international merger control framework (which consists of a plethora of national merger 
control regimes, bilateral engagement, and multilateral convergence efforts) is consistent 
with the primary objective.  
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are important means of foreign direct investment and 
can create cross-border synergies, which should help realise the benefits to be reaped 
from trade liberalisation. While anti-competitive M&A jeopardise those benefits, and are 
correctly scrutinised (and occasionally blocked), multi-jurisdictional merger review must 
balance the need to intervene in anti-competitive M&A, with the desire to facilitate all 
other M&A. A paradoxical position arises however, if multi-jurisdictional merger review 
unduly hinders those M&A which would further the cause of trade liberalisation, whilst 
attempting to control the anti-competitive mergers. Hence the operation of multi-
jurisdictional merger review is potentially inconsistent with the primary objective of the 
international antitrust dialogue. This thesis focuses upon the international merger control 
framework in chapter 5, and evaluates whether reforms are needed to ensure greater 
consistency with the primary objective. This thesis concludes by offering several 
recommendations regarding the international antitrust dialogue, particularly with regard 
to the international merger control framework, but recommends against the creation of an 
international merger control regime (IMCR), or a common pre-merger notification 
system at the current time. This thesis is intended to be up to date as of 1 May 2007. 
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1 
Introduction and methodology 
 
 
1.1 In search of a parallel approach to trade liberalisation 
1.1.1 Article 46(1) of the Havana Charter for the creation of the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO) sets forth: 
‘Each Member shall take appropriate measures and shall co-operate with 
the Organisation to prevent, on the part of private or public commercial 
enterprises, business practices affecting international trade which restrain 
competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control, 
whenever such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of 
production or trade and interfere with the achievement of any of the other 
objectives [of the ITO].’ 
 
The provision highlights a safeguard that was built into the ITO framework in 
1948; a requirement that states engaging in the trade liberalisation process provide 
parallel rules protecting against restrictive business practices (more commonly 
referred to as competition or antitrust laws). In the intervening near-60 years, 
many states, international bodies, practitioners and academics have grappled with 
this parallel approach to trade liberalisation, and debated how best to fill the 
vacuum left by the failure to ratify the ITO in 1950.1 The trade liberalisation 
process has continued steadily in the ITO’s absence, initially under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) framework, and more recently under the 
auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), yet neither includes antitrust 
provisions. The imbalance between increasing globalisation of trade and the lack 
of counterpart international antitrust provisions threatens the realisation of the 
benefits that should flow from free trade policies. Commercial behaviour can 
                                                 
1 For a concise commentary on the failure to ratify see discussion infra at 2.2.2. 
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create or reinforce distinct geographic markets, adopt discriminatory practices and 
engage in other forms of anti-competitive behaviour that undermine the removal 
of state-imposed barriers to trade. Most observers would acknowledge that there 
should be some form of international antitrust, yet agreement as to the form, 
substance, and forum for such rules has been elusive.  
 
1.1.2 In the absence of an international antitrust agreement, three distinct approaches 
have gradually developed to provide some form of antitrust at an international 
level. The unilateral approach was first developed by the United States’ judiciary 
and antitrust authorities in the 1940s, which was supplemented by bilateral 
engagement between principal antitrust jurisdictions in the latter half of the 20th 
century, and there have been various multilateral initiatives concerning 
international antitrust since the failure of the ITO. The three approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, but have tended to evolve incrementally at separate points in 
time. Unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism represent the three faces of 
international antitrust, and it is the combination of these activities that form the 
international antitrust dialogue, which is discussed in later chapters. US 
unilateralism manifests itself as the extraterritorial application and enforcement of 
US antitrust laws, on the basis of the ‘effects doctrine’.2 The US second Circuit 
Court of Appeals Judge Learned Hand proclaimed: ‘any state may impose 
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its 
                                                 
2 Which was recognised in: United States v. Aluminium Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F, 2d 416 (2nd Circuit 
Court of Appeals, 1945). 
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borders which the state reprehends’ in the 1945 Alcoa case.3 Judge Learned Hand 
held that there was an infringement of the Sherman Act on the basis of effects 
within the US, notwithstanding that the firm involved in the case was Canadian 
and the effects resulted from activity based in Switzerland. Extraterritoriality is 
inherently controversial and can be logically regarded as encroaching upon the 
sovereignty of other states, and has often been described as contrary to 
international law.4 Unsurprisingly therefore, there has been a lot of criticism of 
the use of extraterritoriality in US antitrust, although over time the criticism has 
given way to pragmatism. Two factors likely prompted the shift towards bilateral 
antitrust engagement from the 1970s onward: the increasing number of 
jurisdictions adopting and enforcing antitrust laws; and the increasing acceptance 
of extraterritoriality to ensure effective enforcement. 
 
1.1.3 The number of antitrust jurisdictions has dramatically increased from the mid-20th 
century: from 24 in 19645 to in excess of 100 today,6 and this has challenged the 
efficacy of unilateralism. Notwithstanding the increasing number of antitrust 
regimes, there are many potential sources of divergence between jurisdictions, 
which can include policy, procedural and substantive differences. The underlying 
differences can cause ‘system friction’7 when extraterritoriality becomes the norm 
                                                 
3 Ibid. at 443. 
4 See discussion of the arguments surrounding the legality of extraterritoriality infra at 2.7.1-2.7.2. 
5 M.R.A. Palim, ‘The worldwide growth of competition law: an empirical analysis’ (1998) 43 Antitrust 
Bulletin 105. 
6 See A.B. Lipsky, ‘The Global Antitrust Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Commerce or Runaway 
Regulation?’ (2002) 26-FALL Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 59 at 60. Also, R. Whish, Competition Law 
(5th Ed, London, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) at p.782. 
7 See discussion in: A. Ezrachi, ‘Merger Control and Cross Border Transactions – A Pragmatic View on 
Cooperation, Convergence and What’s in Between’ University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and 
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for international antitrust, in the absence of ITO-type rules, and raises the prospect 
of conflict between antitrust authorities. Conflicting decisions clearly cause 
enforcement difficulties for the authorities involved. Nonetheless, the bigger 
concern is that conflict in multi-jurisdictional antitrust enforcement could  hamper 
the trade liberalisation process and damage trading relationships, ironically the 
policies that international antitrust was meant to support within the ITO 
framework. Bilateral engagement seeks to diminish the risk of conflict in 
international antitrust, and several key principles have developed through 
cooperation agreements, and more recently by informal case cooperation, that 
engender trust and mutual understanding between counterpart authorities. In light 
of the large number of antitrust jurisdictions however, and the increasing 
economic inter-dependence of market economies, bilateralism is an incomplete 
solution to problems caused by multi-jurisdictional antitrust enforcement.  
 
1.1.4 Multilateral engagement in the international antitrust dialogue has many clear 
benefits, such as involving a larger number of jurisdictions in cooperation and 
convergence efforts, as well as the sharing of best practice, and the involvement 
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), practitioners and academics in the 
process. Nonetheless there are inherent limitations upon the role and future 
direction of multilateral activities since the failure of the ITO, and in light of the 
dominance of a number of ‘core’ antitrust jurisdictions in the international 
antitrust dialogue. Multilateralism also poses potential threats to the sovereignty 
                                                                                                                                                 
Policy Working Paper (L) 11/05. Available at: http://www.competition-
law.ox.ac.uk/competition/portal.php. See discussion of ‘system friction’ in the context of merger control 
infra at 5.3. 
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of national/regional antitrust regimes and this issue has constrained the 
development of multilateral approaches in antitrust. Arguably, the objectives of 
the international antitrust dialogue are unobtainable in the absence of a more fully 
developed multilateral framework. This thesis seeks to investigate that argument. 
 
1.1.5 This thesis will explore the above issues in detail and attempt to identify whether 
there is a de facto primary objective of the international antitrust dialogue, i.e. 
whether the three faces of international antitrust are working in common towards 
an identifiable goal. The latter part of this thesis will then focus on merger control 
in the international sphere, and will assess multi-jurisdictional merger review 
against the objective(s) of the international antitrust dialogue. The focus is upon 
jurisdictions/authorities that have been most involved in the international antitrust 
dialogue, as a comprehensive study is unlikely to be feasible by one person. This 
thesis also focuses upon international antitrust relations mostly to the exclusion of 
the intra-EC situation regarding the European Commission and national 
competition authorities of EC Member States. The sui generis nature of the 
internal EC antitrust regime8 would skew conclusions, and the relationship 
between the EC’s antitrust authorities is generally not suitable for comparison 
with the relationships between other international authorities.  
 
                                                 
8 Comparisons are however possible with other regional blocs such as the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU/UEMOA) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), discussed infra at 
4.2.10 and 4.2.5 respectively, but do not detract from the unique position of the EC with regard to its 
internal antitrust framework, discussed infra at 2.6 and 4.3. 
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1.1.6 In essence the second, third and fourth chapters explore the history and 
development of international antitrust and the relationship between unilateralism, 
bilateralism and multilateralism with international trade. Chapter 2 focuses upon 
the antitrust regimes within two key antitrust jurisdictions, namely the US and the 
European Community,9 but does so while charting the development of 
unilateralism in international antitrust.  
 
Chapter 3 explores the first efforts at bilateral engagement and the reasons for 
moving away from unilateralism, and engages in a detailed comparative analysis 
of current bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements. The aim of the comparative 
analysis is to ascertain the degree of convergence achieved between the 
agreements, and whether they have common objectives. The chapter also 
considers the rationale for jurisdictions to negotiate and agree upon bilateral 
agreements, and this is continued at the beginning of chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 4 principally explores the contribution of multilateralism to the 
international antitrust dialogue, but initially links this closely with discussion at 
the end of chapter 3. There are numerous and diverse activities that fall under the 
ambit of antitrust multilateralism, and these are discussed before hypothesising as 
to the de facto primary objective of the international antitrust dialogue. 
 
                                                 
9 Note that the terminology adopted will generally refer to the European Community as the antitrust 
framework is based upon the Treaty of Rome, and also because the EC has legal personality distinct from 
its Member States, where as the EU is primarily considered to be the political entity (hence why the EU is 
often the appropriate terminology for discussing the external relations with third countries, infra 4.3). 
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Chapter 5 represents a significant portion of the work undertaken in the thesis, 
and focuses upon mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to the exclusion of other types 
of commercial behaviour. The fifth chapter explains the focus upon M&A, and 
identifies a potential paradox for multi-jurisdictional merger review if the 
international merger control framework is inconsistent with the primary objective 
identified at the end of chapter 4. The chapter also briefly considers proposals for 
reform of the international merger control framework, as a precursor to the final 
conclusions and recommendations in chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion to the thesis and links recommendations with 
discussion throughout the thesis. Several conclusions and recommendations are 
highlighted regarding the bilateral and multilateral approaches to international 
antitrust, although the key recommendations build upon chapter 5 and focus upon 
potential reform concerning multi-jurisdictional merger review. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
1.2.1 The thesis has relied predominantly upon primary and secondary literary sources, 
whilst also undertaking some small scale empirical research of a qualitative nature 
in the latter stages of the research. Early literature reviews identified key sources, 
such as the seminal International Competition Policy Advisory Committee final 
report (February 2000), which enabled the formation of a working hypothesis and 
design for the research. The hypothesis suggested that the international antitrust 
dialogue (i.e. all of the activities concerning antitrust at the international level) 
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was an inadequate means of addressing the purpose of international antitrust, and 
that research should be able to identify suitable recommendations for reform. The 
hypothesis necessitated a detailed analysis of international antitrust activities, 
which were readily categorised into three separate approaches: unilateralism; 
bilateralism; and multilateralism. The analysis, which forms the large bulk of the 
thesis in chapters 2 – 4, was necessary to test the hypothesis and identify whether 
there was a primary purpose/objective of international antitrust. Primary sources 
were used extensively in the course of researching and writing the subject matter 
of chapters 3 and 4 in particular, and were supported by further reference to 
secondary sources where possible. Bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements and 
multilateral agreements are the primary sources for the analytical and comparative 
discussion in chapters 3 and 4, and texts, articles and other secondary sources 
provide supporting authority for the analysis. In light of the origins of 
international antitrust within the ITO, and the developing research design, it was 
clear that the thesis would have to consider and discuss multi-disciplinary issues 
such as trade statistics and figures,10 as well as political and trade relationships 
between states.11 It is hoped that the thesis represents a more complete and 
realistic study of international antitrust and potential reforms as a result of these 
additional sources. 
 
The research design was altered after completing the first substantive chapter 
(chapter 2), in the realisation that suggesting recommendations for reform may be 
                                                 
10 See e.g. 2.2.2 and 4.1.1 infra. 
11 See e.g. 4.2 and 4.3 infra. 
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vague or unsubstantiated without refocusing upon a particular area of antitrust. 
Therefore the latter part of the thesis focuses upon international merger control. 
The specific focus in chapter 5 enabled a more detailed study of the extent of 
international activities than would otherwise have been possible, including an 
analysis of international cooperation in practice at 5.4 infra. After the decision to 
focus upon a particular area of antitrust in the latter stages of the thesis, merger 
control was selected in light of the tendency to focus upon cartels in existing 
literature, and the likely usefulness of further research focused on merger control. 
The research design facilitated a very clear structure to the thesis, and enabled 
clearly defined literature searches to take place before writing began on new 
chapters. 
 
1.2.2 The literature searches that formed the predominant means of research for the 
thesis used internet databases, search engines, electronic journals, and key 
websites,12 as well as more traditional means of identifying relevant sources from 
references in hard copies of texts, articles and cases. The internet was invaluable 
in tracking and identifying key electronic materials, particularly international 
references. Legal databases, such as Westlaw and HeinOnline, facilitated 
literature searches and article retrieval and Lexis-Nexis has been particularly 
useful in accessing the full-text of US court judgments.13 Generic internet search 
engines, such as Google were helpful for locating key websites, particularly when 
undertaking research relevant to chapter 4, and tracking down primary sources of 
                                                 
12 The key websites accessed in the course of research, particularly those not referenced elsewhere, are 
noted in the bibliography, infra.  
13 US court judgments are particularly important sources in Chapter 2. 
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information concerning the trading blocs, such as CARICOM and COMESA. The 
increasing availability of legislative instruments and further materials on the 
websites of antitrust authorities has also been helpful to the research and has 
facilitated a more comprehensive study at times, than would otherwise have been 
possible. Note that all World Wide Web addresses and hyperlinks provided in this 
thesis are accurate and operational as at 26 June 2007. Notwithstanding the 
increasing accessibility of information electronically, the United Nations 
Yearbooks of International Trade Statistics proved to be the most authoritative 
and reliable source of global trade figures, which are more accessible in hard copy 
than via the internet, and were relied upon in chapters 2 and 4. Finding reliable 
statistics and figures regarding international mergers and acquisitions, discussed 
at 5.2 infra, proved to be more difficult given that many resources are not publicly 
accessible, and different sources tend to suggest different figures. The Financial 
Times and Thomson Financial quarterly reports were the most consistent and 
reliable sources of information regarding M&A activity. The materials already 
discussed, and indeed the literature reviews in general, were inadequate resources 
for the analysis of multi-jurisdictional merger reviews in chapter 5. Existing 
literature in this area fails to provide a clear sense of the extent of cooperation 
possible between antitrust authorities when conducting concurrent merger 
reviews. Antitrust authority press releases and speeches by officials provide case 
examples of close cooperation, but do not fully convey the frequency and 
commonality of cooperation, neither do they convey the practical difficulties and 
concerns that arise as a result of close cooperation. In light of the limitations in 
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the current literature, and the desire to gain more of a practical insight into this 
area of legal practice, a small empirical research plan was devised to develop a 
better understanding of the subject matter, by contacting leading antitrust 
practitioners and officials. 
 
1.2.3 The empirical research plan was of a qualitative nature and essentially involved a 
research trip to Brussels in September 2006 to meet with leading practitioners and 
officials for informal interviews. There has also been subsequent communication 
with interviewees by email and telephone when further information was required. 
The research involved eight interviewees during the Brussels trip, as well as a 
subsequent telephone discussion/interview with Professor Hawk (Skadden, Arps, 
Slate, Meagher & Flom, and Fordham Law School). The aim of the research was 
to acquire a better appreciation of the operation of multi-jurisdictional merger 
review, and the burden upon merging parties, in order to supplement existing 
literature in this area. Potential interviewees from private practice were identified 
on the basis of their known practice area and employer. Leading law firms were 
identified with assistance from pre-existing contacts with Arnold & Porter LLP, 
and partners involved in merger control were initially approached by email. All 
six interviewees from private practice were assured that their anonymity would be 
protected, although it is possible to state that all interviewees from private practice 
were either partners, or associates with considerable experience, at one of the four 
leading antitrust law firms that participated in the research visit. Meetings were 
also held with European Commission officials from the competition directorate-
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general. Initial contact with all interviewees was made by email, outlining the 
research aims and objectives and querying whether the individual would be 
willing to participate and was available for a meeting during the Brussels visit. 
Once interviewees confirmed their willingness to participate, they were sent a 
questionnaire for guidance on the type of issues likely to arise during the meeting. 
The questionnaire is included as an appendix to this thesis. The empirical research 
aims and objectives allowed flexibility in the conduct of the interviews, and while 
the questionnaire provided a structure for discussion, it was unnecessary to adopt 
a rigid and formal approach to the interviews, although notes were taken to record 
the content of the discussion. The empirical research successfully facilitated a 
fuller understanding of multi-jurisdictional merger review, and undoubtedly 
influenced the analysis within chapter 5. References to this independent research 
have been made within chapter 5, where relevant and appropriate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24
2 
The foundations of ‘international antitrust’:  
trade liberalisation and extraterritoriality 
 
 
2.1 Trade liberalisation at a cost 
2.1.1 Globalisation and trade liberalisation are two distinct concepts that evolved to a 
new level during the 20th century, albeit neither originated from this period in 
time. The late 1940s are regarded as a watershed for international trade with the 
signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), yet the rationale 
underlying that Agreement was understood and pursued over 100 years prior to 
the international consensus and political will that led to the GATT being viable.  
 
The concept of trade liberalisation or free trade was clear as early as 1819, it was 
a controversial notion in an overwhelmingly colonialist world with power 
stemming from Western Europe. In an act that has affected world trade ever since, 
Thomas Stamford Raffles’ foundation of Singapore as a free port in 1819 upset 
his employers, the East India Company. Despite losing its monopoly in India in 
1813, the East India Company refused to adapt to changing times and made 
various attempts to reverse Raffles’ declaration, being defeated only by the port’s 
overwhelming success.1 The success attracted the interest of the British 
government, which championed the cause of free trade2 in spite of French and 
Portuguese resistance; in the 1820s both countries regarded protectionism as a 
                                                 
1 W.G. Clarence-Smith, ‘The modern colonial state and global economic integration, 1815-1945’ at p.123, 
in D. Smith, D. Solinger & S. Topik (Eds), States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (London, 
Routledge, 1999). 
2 J. Foreman-Peck, A History of the World Economy: International Economic Relations Since 1850 (2nd Ed, 
London, FT Prentice Hall, 1994) at p.115. 
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way to protect their dwindling empires.3 The benefits of free trade gained greater 
recognition between the 1850s and late 1870s, even the French were persuaded of 
the benefits, and used free trade to further their military endeavours during this 
period.4 The situation would reverse however as political support for free trade 
dwindled during periods of industrialisation. Lower prices and competitive third 
world producers prompted the US and much of Western Europe to return to tariffs 
and protectionist policies in the 1880s.5 Policies on international trade altered 
little in the 40 years that followed, with tariffs reaching 40% around 1915. There 
was little enthusiasm for pursuing free trade, or any significant multilateral 
initiatives in the aftermath of World War I. On the contrary, fierce protectionist 
campaigns took place in the late 1920s and early ‘30s, initially in response to a 
post-war recession, then partially in response to economic turmoil in the US.6 The 
Second World War followed, and its aftermath created great opportunity for 
multilateralism. 
 
2.1.2 The existence of a political consensus to enter into a multilateral trade agreement 
led to the creation of the GATT, the aim being to advance free trade policies and 
lessen tariffs and other protectionist activities that discriminate against foreign 
goods and services.7 Parallel provisions to prevent commercial entities frustrating 
the aim of trade liberalisation were notably excluded from the GATT, although 
                                                 
3 Op. cit. note 1 at pp.123-124. 
4 W.G. Clarence-Smith, op. cit. note 1 at pp.124-125 and J. Foreman-Peck, op. cit. note 2 at p.32. French 
military endeavours specifically refers to those under Napoleon III, such as the war with Austria in 1859. 
5 Op. cit. note 2 at p.115. 
6 Op. cit. note 1 at pp.129-130. 
7 See A.D. Mitchell, ‘Broadening the Vision of Trade Liberalisation: International Competition Law and 
the WTO’ (2001) 24 World Comp. 343, for a discussion of principal aims of trade liberalisation. 
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efforts to introduce rules of this nature were made in 1948 by different means. 
The Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation (ITO) was intended 
to provide for an international set of antitrust provisions within an institutional 
structure, which had investigatory and arbitration powers. The antitrust code 
focused on restrictive trade practices. The ITO is described as having been 
‘stillborn’8 as the Havana Charter was not ratified. States that had been 
instrumental in its inception, such as the US, abandoned it thereby causing its 
failure.  
 
The parallel track lacking from the international stage can be seen within a 
regional setting by the example of the European Community (EC). The 1957 
Treaty of Rome, which laid the foundations of the European Community (ex-
EEC) and the internal market, contains a set of provisions intended to remove 
barriers to trade between Member States (i.e. the provisions on free movement of 
goods9), as well as provisions addressed to ‘undertakings’, i.e. commercial 
entities.10 The latter are antitrust provisions and encompass prohibitions against 
anti-competitive agreements,11 and abuses of a dominant position.12 There are also 
state aid provisions,13 and provisions creating a merger control regime were 
                                                 
8 B. Zanettin, Cooperation Between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, 
(Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002) at p.234. 
9 Primarily Articles 23 – 25 and 28 – 30 EC Treaty. 
10 See Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v. Macrotron [1991] ECR I-1979, and Commission Decision in 
Polypropylene [1986] OJ L230/1, for a basic definition of ‘undertaking’ according to EC antitrust law. 
11 This is a summarised version of the prohibition laid out in Article 81 EC. 
12 Article 82 EC. 
13 Articles 87-89 EC. 
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introduced in 1989.14 There is no doubt that the original objective of EC antitrust 
law was primarily that of market integration,15 i.e. to ensure that commercial 
activities could not undermine the free movement provisions within the Treaty of 
Rome. It is clear the parallel sets of provisions complement each other. By 
comparison, the lack of parallel multilateral antitrust provisions to complement 
the GATT in the late 1940s can be seen as an impediment to realising the goal of 
trade liberalisation. It is surely beyond doubt that commercial activities, as well as 
state-implemented protectionist measures, can frustrate the pursuit of trade 
liberalisation. As Mitchell highlights:  
‘…even if all barriers to international trade were removed, in the absence 
of complementary competition regulation, some markets would still be 
closed to new entrants because of anti-competitive conduct. These private 
barriers would replace the public barriers to market access removed by 
multilateral trade agreements’.16
 
Exclusive distribution, marketing and sales agreements and territorial restrictions 
exemplify the ability to hinder trade and foreclose markets. The lack of a 
multilateral framework to control commercial activities, so as to further advance 
                                                 
14 A European Community Merger Regulation (ECMR) was adopted in 1989, Council Reg. 4064/89/EEC, 
[1989] O.J. L393/1, corrected version published [1990] O.J. L257/14. The ECMR has been revised and 
Reg. 4064/89 was replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [2004] O.J. L24/1, which entered into force on 1st May 2004. While Article 66(7) of 
the former ECSC Treaty provided for a merger control mechanism with regard to the coal and steel 
industries, the Treaty of Rome has no provisions on merger control. Whish has described the absence of 
merger control provisions from the Treaty of Rome as a ‘lacuna’, R. Whish, Competition Law (5th Ed, 
London, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) at p. 793. The European Commission and ECJ had attempted to 
adapt Articles 81 and 82 to deal with anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions (or ‘concentrations’), with 
some success. Cases 142/84 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v. Commission [1987] ECR 4487, endorsed the 
application of Article 81(1) to address anti-competitive effects stemming from the acquisition of certain 
shareholdings. Case 6/72 Continental Can v. Commission [1973] ECR 215 established that Article 82 can 
apply to prevent a dominant ‘undertaking’ acquiring a competitor, which could substantially diminish 
competition; regarding such an acquisition as an abuse of that dominant position. The ECMR removed the 
need to adapt the application of the core prohibitions to deal with M&A activity. 
15 This is particularly evident from the early case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), e.g. Case 
26/76 Metro SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG v. Commission [1977] ECR 1875 at paragraph 4. 
16 Op. cit. note 7 at p.343. 
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trade liberalisation therefore requires to be filled by alternative means. Notably a 
GATT decision acknowledged the potentially detrimental impact of commercial 
behaviour in 1960: 
‘…business practices which restrict competition in international trade may 
hamper the expansion of world trade and economic development in 
individual countries and thereby frustrate the benefits of tariff reduction 
and removal of quantitative restrictions, or may otherwise interfere with 
the objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’.17
 
2.1.3 The wider antitrust context within which the ITO failed and the GATT did not 
include antitrust provisions may help to explain such an apparent vacuum. In 1947 
the US was one of few jurisdictions with a comprehensive antitrust regime, 
certainly no other jurisdiction had the same level of enforcement vigour. Thus it 
proved difficult to establish the requisite international consensus to implement 
parallel multilateral antitrust rules alongside the GATT. Other jurisdictions were 
either unconvinced of the need for such rules, or wished to pursue a variety of 
objectives through such provisions. The latter was simply unacceptable to the US 
which tends to view antitrust as having a narrow purpose. The range of views was 
disparate and entrenched, and agreement proved unattainable.  
 
The US had a mature federal antitrust regime on 30th October 1947 when 22 
nations signed a ‘temporary’ agreement on tariffs and international trade, which 
later became known as the GATT.18 The US federal antitrust legislation was 
intended to protect the principle of free trade between the US states, the process of 
                                                 
17 The 1960 GATT Decision on Arrangements for Consultations on Restrictive Trade Practices, GATT 
Resolution, BISD 28 (9th Supp, 1961). 
18 For further information regarding the circumstances in which the GATT was signed see J.H. Jackson, 
The Jurisprudence of GATT & the WTO, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) at p.15. 
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competition, and perhaps primarily the interests of the consumer, all from 
potentially damaging anti-competitive commercial behaviour. In retrospect it is 
unsurprising that a clash would occur between domestic US antitrust law, which 
could curtail commercial behaviour to avoid anti-competitive market effects, and 
the opening up of US markets to foreign goods and services through the process 
of trade liberalisation (significantly boosted by the GATT). In the absence of trade 
liberalisation, the enforcement of US antitrust law would penalise US firms for 
causing anti-competitive effects within US markets, yet post-GATT there was 
clearly a greater likelihood of US antitrust enforcement penalising non-US firms. 
The choice was simply whether to apply a different legal standard to domestic and 
foreign firms, or enforce US antitrust against non-US firms where appropriate. US 
antitrust adopted the latter approach, and propelled its enforcement bodies into 
legal and political disputes and the realms of extraterritoriality. 
 
2.1.4 The US federal antitrust authorities were in a difficult position in international 
affairs for a long period. The US established federal antitrust laws in the 1890s, 
sparked controversy and criticism by extraterritorial enforcement in the 1940s, 
and appeared isolated when advocating antitrust policies in the late 1940s and 
1950s, and yet over 100 jurisdictions now have some form of antitrust laws.19 The 
question arises as to why the US developed an antitrust regime with a clear 
enforcement record so long before most other jurisdictions. There are a few 
                                                 
19 See A.B. Lipsky Jr, ‘The global antitrust explosion: safeguarding trade and commerce 
or runaway regulation?’ (2002) Summer/Fall Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 59 at p.60. 
Also R. Whish, op. cit. note 14, at p.782, stating that: ‘more than 100 countries now have 
competition law’. 
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possibilities, yet it is arguable that as a union of 50 states with its own internal 
market of sorts, the US required a parallel approach, encompassing both internal 
free trade and antitrust rules, before most other jurisdictions. In 1947 the US was 
a union of 48 states,20 and the continental US had been an established union for 
some time. The situation was, however, different when Congress passed the 
Sherman Act in 1890 with only 42 states, two of which joined in 1889. The need 
to protect free trade within US borders from both state legislatures and 
commercial activities was recognised and ensured by the US Constitution21 and 
antitrust laws respectively. There is clearly a parallel approach. Nonetheless, in 
the 1940s there was a lack of international consensus on the need for a twin-track 
to trade liberalisation, with the resulting absence of multilateral antitrust 
provisions. 
 
2.1.5 The difficulty encountered by US antitrust authorities in the 1940s is therefore 
clear. The international community was quickly embracing trade liberalisation, 
which could only lead to increasing levels of cross-border trade and greater 
economic dependency, yet the US was committed to furthering the goals of 
antitrust, laws that by nature are intertwined with markets and trade. Most 
jurisdictions at this time had no such laws or policies, and the jurisdictions that 
                                                 
20 Alaska and Hawaii joined in 1959. 
21 The power of individual States with regard to trade appears to be controlled by: Article 
I: Section 8, Clause 1; Section 9, Clauses 5 & 6; and importantly Section 10, Clause 2 of 
the US Constitution. The latter of which states ‘No State shall, without the Consent of the 
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be 
absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties 
and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury 
of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of 
the Congress’. 
 31
regulated trade and markets either pursued no such policies or did so without 
effective enforcement or in conjunction with other objectives. As a result of the 
failure of the ITO, there were no international antitrust provisions that could apply 
when anti-competitive behaviour stemmed from non-US firms and/or activity. 
The US therefore applied domestic antitrust legislation against foreign firms that 
were active, or whose behaviour had effects, in US markets. The extraterritorial 
approach has had enormous consequences for the development of international 
antitrust ever since. 
 
 
2.2 The impact of cross-border trade 
2.2.1 The respective goals of US antitrust and international multilateral trade 
agreements can easily be regarded as differing: one seeks market efficiency and 
protection of consumer welfare,22 while the other is concerned with trade 
liberalisation, the prohibition of tariffs and protectionist measures. The differing 
use of language masks the common underlying aim of increasing consumers’ 
standard of living as well as achieving optimum use of resources. Mitchell 
concludes that ‘free trade is merely a means to the end of greater global economic 
                                                 
22 Although note that the precise policy objectives of US antitrust were far from settled at the time of the 
passing of the Sherman Act, had Senator Sherman’s original draft Bill been passed by Congress with 
discussion of ‘full and free competition’ and ‘cost to the consumer’, the protection of consumer welfare and 
concern with efficiencies would have been implicit within the Act. As it was the common law language of 
‘contract…in restraint of trade’ and ‘monopolize, or attempt to monopolize…trade’ ensured the Bill 
ultimately had a very quick passage into law, yet resultantly blurred the balance to be achieved by the 
courts between freedom of contract and freedom from market power; the two countervailing propositions of 
liberty that were advanced by the respective factions within the Senate. See chapter 1 of R.J.R. Peritz, 
Competition Policy in America, 1888 – 1992: History, Rhetoric, Law, (2nd Ed, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2000) for a fuller discussion. The balance between the two propositions changed several times in 
light of new legislation in 1914 and policy pursuits during the 1920s and 1930s until the Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice, under Thurman Arnold and President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal 
signalled the advancement of consumerism at the heart of antitrust policy. 
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welfare and efficiency’.23 Surely both trade liberalisation and consumer welfare 
strive towards a common result: efficient use of resources and a higher standard of 
living. Trade liberalisation is a proven method of achieving that result. Indeed, 
Mitchell has also stated that:  
‘Trade liberalisation is based on the theory of comparative advantage 
…The rationale is that if each state focuses production on the particular 
goods and services in which it has a comparative advantage, the global 
output of goods and services will increase. With trade between states, 
consumers can access more goods and services and thus increase their 
standard of living. Efficiency improvements are also likely to result from 
the increased competition that domestic producers face from foreign goods 
and services’.24
 
2.2.2 The US government presumably agreed with the theory of comparative advantage 
when it signed the GATT, sharing the view that international trade liberalisation 
would create greater efficiency and raise the standard of living within the US. 
Furthermore the initial US support for the ITO suggests that the US believed the 
realisation of these benefits would be furthered by multilateral antitrust rules. 
Nonetheless, when President Truman decided against submitting the ITO Charter 
to Congress for ratification in 1950,25 due to dilutions in many of the 
prohibitions,26 he did so knowing that US antitrust could prevent commercial 
behaviour from undermining the objectives of trade liberalisation and antitrust in 
US markets. It was also already clear at this time that the source of the anti-
competitive behaviour (i.e. whether domestic or foreign firms were involved) 
could not inhibit antitrust enforcement, as the US judiciary had already recognised 
                                                 
23 Op. cit. note 7 at p.343. 
24 Op. cit. note 7 at p.344. 
25 J.H. Jackson, op. cit. note 18, at p.23, note 37. 
26 J. Foreman-Peck, op. cit. note 2 at p.242. 
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the legality of extraterritoriality. The failure of the ITO could therefore be said to 
have had a minimal impact on the scope of US antitrust at the time.27  
 
The level of world trade was increasing during the same time period, as shown by 
the following table exhibiting the value of world imports and exports:  
Table 2.128
 World Imports World Exports 
1938 
1948 
1955 
$23.2 billion 
$58.4 billion (+ 152%) 
$87.8 billion (+ 50.3%) 
$20.65 billion 
$52.70 billion (+ 155%) 
$82.55 billion (+ 56.6%) 
 
 
These figures suggest that international trade increased considerably in general 
terms during the late 1940s/early 1950s. Yet, if we are to consider these figures as 
indicating average increases then the three tables below highlight the US as an 
increasingly important participant in international trade, experiencing mostly 
above average increases, particularly in imports. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Note that Eleanor Fox suggests: ‘Had US jurists not pioneered the effects doctrine, which is now 
accepted throughout the world in one form or another, world antitrust would long since have emerged. For 
more than half a century, availability of the effects doctrine, combined with the near consensus of nations 
to apply antitrust law non-discriminatorily to foreign as well as domestic firms that harm the domestic 
market, has taken the pressure off the need for international antitrust’ in E.M. Fox, ‘Can we solve the 
antitrust problems of globalization by extraterritoriality and cooperation? sufficiency and legitimacy’ 
(Summer 2003) The Antitrust Bulletin 355 at pp.356-357. 
28 Figures for Tables 2.1 - 2.4 during 1938, 1948 and 1955 are sourced from the United Nations Yearbook 
of International Trade Statistics 1955, Table A.  
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Table 2.2 
 US Imports US Exports 
1938 
1948 
1955 
$2.18 billion 
$7.163 billion (+ 229%) 
$11.401 billion (+ 59%) 
$3.064 billion 
$12.545 billion (+ 309%) 
$15.412 billion (+ 23%) 
 
Table 2.3 
 UK Imports UK Exports 
1938 
1948 
1955 
$4.285 billion 
$8.125 billion (+ 89.6%) 
$10.557 billion (+ 30%) 
$2.446 billion 
$6.362 billion (+ 160%) 
$8.135 billion (+ 29.7%) 
 
Table 2.4 
 French Imports French Exports 
1938 
1948 
1955 
$1.331 billion 
$3.442 billion (+ 159%) 
$4.688 billion (+ 93.6%) 
$0.880 billion 
$2.011 billion (+ 129%) 
$4.798 billion (+ 139%) 
 
It is therefore likely that foreign commerce and firms would be having a greater 
effect upon the US economy and markets, and have greater potential to be the 
subject of antitrust scrutiny in the years following the end of World War II and the 
pursuit of trade liberalisation.29 The dangers of trade liberalisation, specifically 
                                                 
29 While the thesis does not suggest increases in world trade are wholly as a result of the pursuit of trade 
liberalisation, and recognises in particular the influence of the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, the 
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regarding the impact of commercial behaviour stemming from foreign firms, were 
recognised quickly by the American courts. 
 
 
2.3 The long arm of US antitrust (1): the ‘effects doctrine’ 
2.3.1 Judge Learned Hand’s ruling in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 
(Alcoa)30 is the basis for the current US antitrust enforcement strategy as it 
endorsed the use of the ‘effects doctrine’. Alcoa concerned a cartel of aluminium 
producers based in Switzerland that was limiting production in order to raise 
prices. The case was a prosecution for violating the Sherman Act against a 
Canadian company, which had participated in the cartel. Judge Learned Hand 
stated: ‘it is settled law that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons 
not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders which the state 
reprehends’.31 Regarding the position as ‘settled law’ was somewhat controversial 
in light of the Supreme Court decision in American Banana.32 American Banana 
concerned the monopolisation of banana production and exports in Costa Rica by 
the United Fruits Company, in respect of which the Supreme Court held: ‘the acts 
causing the damage were done outside the jurisdiction of the US and within that 
of other states. It is surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the Act 
of Congress’.33 Furthermore, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated: ‘the general 
                                                                                                                                                 
point is made that multilateral agreements such as GATT certainly facilitated the post-WWII sharp 
increases in world trade. 
30 148 F, 2d 416 (2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, 1945). 
31 Ibid. at 443. 
32 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 US 347, 29 S. Ct. 511 (1909). 
33 Ibid. at 355. 
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and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must 
be determined by the law of the country where the act is done.34
 
The Supreme Court slightly retreated from the strict American Banana position on 
jurisdiction in subsequent cases, such as United States v. Sisal Sales 
Corporation.35 Sisal Sales concerned alleged antitrust violations by a company 
involved in the export of sisal from the Yucatan region to the US. In 
distinguishing American Banana and asserting jurisdiction, Mr. Justice 
McReynolds held:  
‘The circumstances of the present controversy are radically different from 
those presented in American Banana….The Banana Company sued for 
treble damages under the Sherman Act, basing its claim upon acts done 
outside the United States and not unlawful by the law of the place…[Here] 
the conspirators were aided by discriminating legislation [enacted by the 
Mexican and Yucatan governments], but by their own deliberate acts, here 
and elsewhere, they brought about forbidden results within the United 
States. They are within the jurisdiction of our courts and may be punished 
for offences against our laws’.36
 
In spite of the ruling, Sisal Sales clearly did not overrule American Banana. The 
fact that the Supreme Court declined to overrule American Banana on subsequent 
occasions is what makes the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Alcoa all the 
more notable. When Judge Learned Hand ruled that: ‘both agreements would 
clearly have been unlawful had they been made within the US; and it 
follows…that both were unlawful, though made abroad, if they were intended to 
                                                 
34 Ibid. at 356. 
35 274 US 268, 47 S. Ct. 592 (1927). 
36 Ibid. at 275-276, or 593-594. 
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affect imports and did affect them’,37 there was a clear inconsistency with 
American Banana. Indeed Hawk suggests that: 
‘Three distinct periods mark the expansion of Sherman Act international 
jurisdiction…First from 1909 to 1945 there was a gradual erosion of 
American Banana’s narrow interpretation of the Sherman Act as limited to 
the territory of the United States. The second period began in 1945 when 
Learned Hand announced the effects doctrine in Alcoa’.38
 
2.3.2 In spite of the apparent judicial irregularity, the ‘new’ approach to jurisdiction 
gained greater recognition within the US, exemplified by the Supreme Court 
decision in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington39 in the same year as 
Alcoa. Clearly, extraterritorial application of domestic law will be controversial as 
it can be regarded as infringing upon the sovereignty of other states. It is for that 
reason that jurisdictional rules exist, albeit ill-defined, under international law. In 
order for any court to assert authority over persons, natural or legal, it must be 
able to seize jurisdiction on the grounds of either nationality or territory. Under 
the principle of territorial jurisdiction, the Supreme Court extended the scope of 
subject-matter jurisdiction with the theory of ‘minimum contacts’ in International 
Shoe. Mr. Chief Justice Stone held:  
‘Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is 
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person. Hence his 
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its 
rendition of a judgment personally binding on him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714, 733. But now…due process requires only that in order to subject 
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice”…Since the corporate personality is a fiction, 
                                                 
37 148 F, 2d 416 (2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, 1945) at 445. 
38 B.E. Hawk, ‘The Sherman Act: The Second Century: The International Application of The Sherman Act 
in its Second Century’ (1990) 59 Antitrust L.J. 161. 
39 326 US 310, 66 S. Ct 154 (1945). 
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although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact…it is 
clear that unlike an individual its “presence” without, as well as within, the 
state of origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf 
by those who are authorised to act for it’.40
 
The judgment had the effect of alleviating potential jurisdictional difficulties 
under international law for US antitrust suits. Alcoa and International Shoe jointly 
signalled a strong judicial abandonment of the position in American Banana, 
which coincided with US foreign policy shifts away from isolationism.41
 
The definition of ‘minimum contacts’ was perhaps surprisingly broad, allowing 
economic and trade relationships in themselves to constitute the minimum contact 
required to assert jurisdiction. There was no requirement for an established 
presence of the defendant within the territory of the forum. Indeed for Mr. Chief 
Justice Stone the question of presence in the state appeared to be the key, yet his 
assessment of presence was somewhat unconventional: ‘the terms “present” or 
“presence” are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation’s 
agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the 
demands of due process’.42 Once jurisdiction has been established, standard US 
rules of civil procedure could act to limit the ability to subject a foreign defendant 
to a particular federal court’s jurisdiction.43 However there are specialised 
antitrust rules with regard to corporations under § 12 of the Clayton Act, which 
provides that an action can be brought and process served wherever the 
                                                 
40 Ibid. at 316, or 158. 
41 See B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 8 at p.10. 
42 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington 326 US 310, 66 S. Ct 154 (1945) at 316-317, or 158. 
43 See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 which limits the service of process from a federal district court to 
persons who have had the requisite minimum contacts with the State itself. 
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corporation ‘is an inhabitant’ or wherever ‘it may be found or transacts 
business’.44 Hovenkamp observes that this provision has been interpreted widely 
by some federal courts to enable process to be served ‘world wide’, and to enable 
the court to assert jurisdiction provided ‘minimum contacts’ are found anywhere 
within the US, and not necessarily within the particular state where the relevant 
federal court is sitting.45 Thus the requirements of due process do not impede 
upon the extraterritorial application of US antitrust as ‘process’ may be served 
‘worldwide’. Note however, that preventing service of process is one method by 
which states can and have obstructed US extraterritoriality, often implemented as 
a provision within a so-called ‘blocking statute’.46 By 1945, with International 
Shoe and Alcoa, there was the potential for widespread and unqualified 
extraterritorial application of US antitrust law. 
 
2.3.3 A process of refining/developing the effects doctrine, perhaps in an effort to 
assuage some of the concerns regarding extraterritoriality, began four years after 
Alcoa by the lower courts. In United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.47 the 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio justified jurisdiction for an 
antitrust violation prosecution (regarding a European based trade agreement 
between US and European firms) on the ground that European activities had ‘a 
                                                 
44 15 U.S.C. § 22. See H. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice 
(3rd Ed, St. Paul, Thomson West, 2005) at p.776, and also particularly L.R. Velvel, M.W. Pennak & R.F. 
Ruyak, ‘Litigating in an International Context: Venue and in personam Jurisdiction Involving Alien 
Corporations’ (1981) 50 Antitrust L.J. 599 for further discussion. 
45 H. Hovenkamp, ibid. at pp.776 - 777. 
46 See discussion at 2.7 infra. 
47 83 F. Supp 284 (Northern District of Ohio, 1949). 
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direct and influencing effect on [US] trade’.48 Notably a ‘direct and influencing 
effect’ was not required by Judge Learned Hand in Alcoa, when jurisdiction was 
asserted solely on the basis of effects with intent. The company decided not to 
argue against jurisdiction when it appealed to the Supreme Court on the finding of 
a violation of the Sherman Act.49 The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
supplied a more authoritative opinion marking the refinement of the effects 
doctrine in Spears Free Clinic50 in 1952. Although the facts of the case concerned 
an alleged conspiracy within Colorado in order to prevent Spears Hospital gaining 
a license, with all parties either incorporated or based within Colorado, the effects 
test was required in order to ascertain whether the ‘combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy’ was in fact ‘in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several states, or with foreign nations’ in order for federal antitrust law 
to apply. Chief Judge Phillips held that ‘the restraint of commerce or the 
obstruction of commerce must be direct and substantial and not merely incidental 
or remote’.51 The Supreme Court then revisited the effects doctrine in Continental 
Ore52 in 1962. The case concerned a private treble damages action53 for alleged 
violation of §1 and §2 of the Sherman Act in the market for production and sale of 
vanadium (a chemical element used to make alloy steel). The claim was largely 
                                                 
48 Ibid. at 309. 
49 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 US 593, 71 S. Ct. 971 (1951). 
50 Spears Free Clinic and Hospital for Poor Children v. Cleere et al. 197 F.2d 125 (10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals, 1952) Trade Cas. (CCH) P67, 276. 
51 Ibid. at p126. Note that the relevance of the opinion in Spears Free Clinic to cataloguing the refinement 
of the effects doctrine is recognised in R.S. Schlossberg (ed.), Mergers and Acquisitions: understanding the 
antitrust issues (2nd Ed, Chicago, Amercian Bar Association, 2004) in which the case is referred to when 
discussing the application of US merger control laws to multinational transactions (at p.390). 
52 Continental Ore Co. et al. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. et al. 370 U.S. 690; 82 S. Ct 1404; 8 
L.Ed.2d 777 (1962). 
53 By virtue of §4 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). 
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based upon the elimination of the petitioner’s subsidiary company from the 
Canadian market, allegedly as result of the actions of the respondent’s subsidiary 
company, operating under the control and direction of its parent (Union Carbide). 
Mr. Justice White wrote in the Court’s opinion:  
‘Respondents say that American Banana…shields them from liability… 
But in light of later cases in this Court respondents’ reliance upon 
American Banana is misplaced. A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain 
the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States is not outside the 
reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained of 
occurs in foreign countries’.54  
 
The Supreme Court declined the opportunity to rule on the precise territorial 
scope of the Sherman Act, and thus failed to clarify the requirements of the effects 
doctrine.  
 
2.3.4 In addition to ongoing doctrinal refinement, there was intense debate as to 
whether the notion of international comity should be a factor in determining 
questions of jurisdiction, a matter previously undecided by the courts. The 
sensitivity of the debate was heightened in light of hostile international reaction to 
US extraterritoriality in antitrust cases.55 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
weighed up these considerations in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America56 
in 1976, and while the effects doctrine was endorsed, its application was curbed in 
light of consideration for international comity. The case concerned a civil suit 
raised by Timberlane (US firm) against companies it alleged were conspiring to 
                                                 
54 Ibid. at 704, or 1413. 
55 See discussion infra at 2.7.4. 
56 549 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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foreclose the Honduran lumber market, which it wanted to enter in order to export 
goods to the US. Judge Choy ruled: 
‘There is no doubt that American antitrust laws extend over some conduct 
in other nations. There was language in the first Supreme Court case in 
point, American Banana, casting doubt on the extension of the Sherman 
Act to acts outside United States territory. But subsequent cases have 
limited American Banana to its particular facts, and the Sherman Act – 
and with it other antitrust laws – has been applied to extraterritorial 
conduct…That American law covers some conduct beyond this nation’s 
borders does not mean that it embraces all, however. Extraterritorial 
application is understandably a matter of concern for the other countries 
involved. Those nations have sometimes resented and protested, as 
excessive intrusions into their own spheres, broad assertions of authority 
by American courts…Our courts have recognized this concern and have, 
at times, responded to it, even if not always enough to satisfy all the 
foreign critics…In any event, it is evident that at some point the interests 
of the United States are too weak and the foreign harmony incentive for 
restraint too strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction’.57
 
Judge Choy’s ruling that US Courts should engage in a balancing exercise, thus 
weighing up the respective merits of US interests with the respect for international 
comity, had the potential to become an historic judgment.58  
 
In assessing jurisprudence to date Judge Choy then gave a damning verdict: ‘The 
effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider the other nation’s 
                                                 
57 Ibid. at 608-609. 
58 See B.E. Hawk, ‘Litigating in an International Context: Special Defences and Issues, Including Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction, Act of State Doctrine, Foreign Government Compulsion and Sovereign Immunity’ 
(1981) 50 Antitrust L.J. 559, J.P. Griffin ‘North American Competition Policy: The Impact on Canada of 
the Extraterritorial Application of the US Antitrust Laws’ (1988) 57 Antitrust L.J. 435, and in particular 
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Sherman Act international jurisdiction, and suggests ‘Judge Choy ushered in the third period in 1976 when 
he announced in Timberlane that effect on US commerce is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
antitrust jurisdiction, and that, in addition, comity requires a balancing of foreign and US interests before a 
court can exercise antitrust jurisdiction’. Note also that Timberlane is cited as a ‘leading contemporaneous 
lower court case’ supporting the Supreme Court’s rejection of the Respondents arguments in F. Hoffmann-
La Roche Ltd. et al. v. Empagran S.A. et al. 542 U.S. (2004), 124 S. Ct 2359, 159 L. Ed. 2d 226, p.16 of 
opinion, discussed further infra. 
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interests…’.59 Furthermore he went on to suggest an appropriate test to determine 
whether to assert jurisdiction:  
‘…A tripartite analysis seems to be indicated…the antitrust laws require in 
the first instance that there be some effect – actual or intended – on 
American foreign commerce before the federal courts may legitimately 
exercise subject matter jurisdiction... Second, a greater showing of burden 
or restraint may be necessary to demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently 
large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs, and therefore, a civil 
violation of the antitrust laws. Third, there is the additional question…of 
whether the interests of, and links to, the United States – including the 
magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce – are sufficiently 
strong vis-à-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of 
extraterritorial authority’.60
 
The first stage of this tripartite test can be regarded as the basic effects doctrine 
espoused by Judge Learned Hand. The second stage appears to be a development 
of the ‘direct and influencing effect’ discussed in Timken Roller Bearing Co., and 
the ‘direct and substantial and not merely incidental and remote’ requirement 
from Spears Free Clinic. The third stage however is a further step on the part of 
Judge Choy to include comity considerations as part of the effects doctrine.  
 
2.3.5 The notion of international comity gained further recognition in lower courts as a 
factor in determining jurisdiction, illustrated by following three judgments. In the 
1979 Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corporation case (Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals),61 Judge Weis observed: ‘In Timberlane…the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit adopted a balancing process in determining whether 
extraterritorial jurisdiction should be exercised, an approach with which we find 
                                                 
59 Op. cit. note 56, at 611-612. 
60 Op. cit. note 56, at 613. 
61 595 F. 2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979). 
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ourselves in substantial agreement’.62 Indeed Judge Weis further developed the 
case law by identifying 10 factors to be considered when balancing whether to 
assert jurisdiction: 
‘1 Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; 2 Nationality of the 
parties; 3 Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here 
compared to that abroad; 4 Availability of a remedy abroad and the 
pendency of litigation there; 5 Existence of intent to harm or affect 
American commerce and its foreseeability; 6 Possible effect upon foreign 
relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief; 7 If relief is 
granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to 
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting 
requirements by both countries; 8 Whether the court can make its order 
effective; 9 Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country 
if made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; 10 Whether a 
treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue’.63  
 
 
The Timberlane approach was then endorsed by Judge Logan in the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc.64 In this case 
it was the foreign corporation, Canadian Montreal Trading Ltd., which was 
seeking to utilise the US federal antitrust laws to claim damages arising from 
alleged anti-competitive behaviour by Canadian based subsidiaries of US potash 
producers. Judge Logan commented: 
‘The principal purposes of the antitrust laws are protection of American 
consumers and American export and investment opportunities. If 
American interests are at stake we may impose liability for conduct 
outside our borders that has consequences within our borders…When the 
contacts with the United States are few, the effects upon American 
commerce minimal, and the foreign elements overwhelming, however, we 
do not accept jurisdiction’.65
 
                                                 
62 Ibid. at 1297. 
63 Ibid. at 1297-1298. 
64 Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., Amax Chemical Corp., Duval Corp., Duval Sales Corp., Ideal 
Basic Industries, Inc., and International Minerals & Chemicals Corp., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981) at 869. 
65 Ibid. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also endorsed this approach in 
Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.66 The case involved an 
action by Industrial Investment (US firm) against Japanese and Indonesian 
corporations for alleged antitrust violations by conspiring to foreclose the market 
for harvesting trees in Borneo, Indonesia, and from exporting logs and lumber 
from Indonesia to the US. Judge Reavley delivered the court’s opinion and held: 
‘A district court should not apply the antitrust laws to foreign conduct or foreign 
actors if such application would violate principles of comity, conflicts of law, or 
international law’.67 Judge Reavley also noted: ‘Several recent court of appeals 
decisions have proposed a conflict of laws analysis for determining whether the 
district court should entertain an antitrust claim involving extraterritorial conduct. 
See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America…We commend their analysis’.68
 
2.3.6 In spite of compelling judgments in both Timberlane and Mannington Mills 
endorsing a balancing exercise as part of a tripartite test before asserting 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust cases, there were also some noteworthy US 
Court of Appeals rulings questioning and even rejecting such an approach during 
the same time period. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit questioned the 
Timberlane tripartite test in National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card 
Association69 and refused to follow the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Griffin 
                                                 
66 Industrial Investment Development Corporation, et al. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et al., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 
1982). 
67 Ibid. at 884. 
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highlights the split that was developing between the federal circuits in response to 
the Ninth Circuit precedent in Timberlane: ‘Subsequently, the Third, Fifth, and 
Tenth Circuits (referring to Mannington Mills, Mitsui, and Montreal Trading 
respectively) adopted similar balancing tests, while the D.C. and Seventh Circuits 
(referring to Laker Airways70 and Re: Uranium Antitrust Litigation71) questioned 
their validity’.72   
 
In Re: Uranium Antitrust Litigation the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
presided over an action raised by Westinghouse Electric Corporation against 17 
US and 12 foreign based uranium producers alleging antitrust violations.73 When 
nine of the foreign based producers did not appear before the district court, 
Westinghouse was granted final judgment against the defaulters and sought a 
preliminary injunction from the court to prevent the removal of assets in excess of 
$10,000 from the US without providing 20 days notice. In light of evidence 
indicating the defendants were preparing to move US assets, the district court 
initially granted a temporary restraining order, followed by a preliminary 
injunction granting Westinghouse’s request. Within hours of being served with 
the temporary restraining order, one of the defaulting defendants transferred 
approximately $3.2 million from a US to a Canadian bank account through a 
subsidiary without notice, and thereafter gave the court notice of several more 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Issues, Including Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Act of State Doctrine, Foreign Government Compulsion 
and Sovereign Immunity’ (1981) 50 Antitrust L.J. 559, and J.P. Griffin, op. cit. note 58. 
70 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982) at 948-949. 
71 In Re: Uranium Antitrust Litigation Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., et al., 617 F.2d 1248 
(7th Cir. 1980) at 1255. 
72 J.P. Griffin, ‘Extraterritoriality in US and EU Antitrust Enforcement’ (1999) 67 Antitrust L.J. 159. 
73 For case comment see J.P. Griffin, op. cit. note 58. 
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transfers about to take place. The district court responded by issuing more 
preliminary injunctions, and the case before the Court of Appeals was mainly to 
challenge those injunctions. One of the key considerations in the appeal was the 
district court’s grounds for asserting jurisdiction. Australia, Canada, South Africa 
and the UK submitted amicus curiae briefs to the Court of Appeals questioning 
that jurisdiction. Writing for the court, Judge Campbell stated: ‘We view the 
jurisdictional issue as two-pronged: (1) does subject matter jurisdiction exist; and 
(2) if so, should it be exercised?’.74 The UK argued that in light of Timberlane the 
Alcoa effects test was incomplete, to which Judge Campbell responded:  
‘This amicus curiae contends the critical discussion of the Alcoa effects 
test has undermined its continuing viability as the standard of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. We do not read 
Timberlane so broadly. The “jurisdictional rule of reason” espoused in 
Timberlane is that while an effect on American commerce is the necessary 
ingredient for extraterritorial jurisdiction, considerations of comity and 
fairness require a further determination as to “whether American authority 
should be asserted in a given case.” The clear thrust of the Timberlane 
Court is that once a district judge has determined that he has jurisdiction, 
he should consider additional factors to determine whether the exercise of 
that jurisdiction is appropriate’.75  
 
Thus in Re: Uranium Antitrust Litigation the court took the view that the tripartite 
test in Timberlane was not intended to be a prerequisite to the court determining 
whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. On the contrary, Judge Campbell 
contends the tripartite test merely suggests that once it had been decided that 
jurisdiction could be asserted on the basis of the Alcoa effects test, the court could 
then consider the second and third stages of the test in order to determine whether 
subject matter jurisdiction should be asserted in the case. This approach contrasts 
                                                 
74 Op. cit. note 71 at 1253. 
75 Op. cit. note 71at 1255. 
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with that in Mannington Mills, Montreal Trading and Mitsui, and does not 
logically follow from a literal reading of Timberlane. Commenting upon the 
district court’s decision not to consider the Timberlane test when ruling that 
jurisdiction should be asserted, Judge Campbell then noted:  
‘The amici suggest that the District Court abused its discretion by not 
considering the factors set out in Mannington Mills in reaching this 
determination. While the considerations recommended in that case 
certainly provide an adequate framework for such a determination, we can 
hardly call the failure to employ those precise factors an abuse of 
discretion’.76  
 
While the court was not openly critical of the Timberlane approach, it undermined 
the rationale and momentum that was building up in favour of recognising comity, 
in a similar fashion to the Second Circuit in Interbank. The proponents of the 
Timberlane approach suffered a further setback when the issue arose before the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 
 
2.3.7 Similar jurisdictional questions arose before the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit in Laker Airways. The well argued judgment in this case and its 
international implications merits detailed comment. The liquidator for Laker 
Airways filed a civil antitrust suit against four US and four foreign based airlines, 
including British Airways, in the D.C. District Court for violation of the Sherman 
Act. In response, the four non-US defendants sought injunctions before the High 
Court in the UK to prevent the liquidator from continuing the US antitrust action. 
Laker’s liquidator responded by seeking and obtaining a temporary restraining 
order from the US district court against the four US companies from initiating 
                                                 
76 Op. cit. note 71. 
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similar proceedings in the UK. While the English High Court ruling was pending, 
Laker commenced secondary actions in the D.C. district court against KLM and 
Sabena, and also obtained temporary restraining orders preventing Sabena and 
KLM from initiating any foreign action that could impair the district court’s 
jurisdiction. A direct conflict then developed between the English High Court, the 
English Court of Appeal and the D.C. district court as the former granted an 
injunction preventing Laker Airways from taking any further steps to prosecute its 
US antitrust claim against the two British airlines. The US district court then 
issued a preliminary injunction against Sabena and KLM barring the two 
companies from joining the ongoing British litigation. The case before the Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was an appeal by Sabena and KLM against the 
district court’s order for preliminary injunction.77 Judge Wilkey, writing for the 
majority in a 2-1 decision, considered the principles of international law under 
which a court can claim jurisdiction:   
‘The prerogative of a nation to control and regulate activities within its 
boundaries is an essential, definitional element of sovereignty. Every 
country has a right to dictate laws governing the conduct of its inhabitants. 
Consequently, the territoriality base of jurisdiction is universally 
recognized. It is the most pervasive and basic principle underlying the 
exercise by nations of prescriptive regulatory power. It is the customary 
basis of the application of law in virtually every country… In the context 
of remedial legislation, prohibition of effects is usually indivisible from 
regulation of causes. Consequently, the principles underlying territorial 
jurisdiction occasionally permit a state to address conduct causing harmful 
effects across national borders. Territoriality-based jurisdiction thus allows 
states to regulate the conduct or status of individuals or property 
physically situated within the territory, even if the effects of the conduct 
are felt outside the territory. Conversely, conduct outside the territorial 
                                                 
77 Note that the facts of the case are far more detailed and complex than the brief summary provided. The 
case also involved the UK Secretary of State for the Department of Trade and Industry invoking the 
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980. The statute protected the injunction granted to British Airways 
and British Caledonian Airways against Laker Airways. 
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boundary which has or is intended to have a substantial effect within the 
territory may also be regulated by the state’.78  
 
Judge Wilkey offered an explanation of why there may be concurrent jurisdiction, 
and thus potential conflict when seizing jurisdiction on the basis of ‘effects’:  
‘Just as the locus of the regulated conduct or harm provides a basis of 
jurisdiction, the identity of the actor may also confer jurisdiction upon a 
regulating country. The citizenship of an individual or nationality of a 
corporation has long been a recognized basis which will support the 
exercise of jurisdiction by a state over persons. Under this head of 
jurisdiction a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law governing the conduct 
of its nationals whether the conduct takes place inside or outside the 
territory of the state. Because two or more states may have legitimate 
interests in prescribing governing law over a particular controversy, these 
jurisdictional bases are not mutually exclusive. For example, when the 
national of one state causes substantial effects in another state, both states 
may potentially have jurisdiction to prescribe governing law. Thus, under 
international law, territoriality and nationality often give rise to concurrent 
jurisdiction’.79  
 
While the court accepted that most of the actions giving rise to the private action 
took place outside the US, the economic consequences of those actions were such 
as to ‘gravely impair significant American interests’, not least American 
consumers within the relevant market. Notably the court was of the view that US 
interest in the case increased as a result of Laker Airways being in liquidation, as 
any damages owed to Laker would pass to its creditors, and the principal creditors 
were American. After confirming the district court’s right to issue preliminary 
injunctions protecting its jurisdiction in the case,80 the Court of Appeals then 
considered the concept of international comity and its role in the case. Judge 
Wilkey initially gave strong support for the principle of comity:  
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‘We approach [the Sabena and KLM claims that the US injunction violates 
the principles of comity] seriously, recognizing that comity serves our 
international system like the mortar which cements together a brick house. 
No one would willingly permit the mortar to crumble or be chipped away 
for fear of compromising the entire structure’.81  
 
Nonetheless, the court also highlighted there were limitations to its willingness to 
apply the principle:  
‘No nation is under an unremitting obligation to enforce foreign interests 
which are fundamentally prejudicial to those of the domestic forum. Thus, 
from the earliest times, authorities have recognized that the obligation of 
comity expires when the strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by 
the foreign act’.82  
 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the principles of comity could not prevail in 
Laker, not least because it felt that the British court had not considered the 
principle. The court did however offer its views on the balancing test espoused by 
Judge Choy in Timberlane:  
‘The suggestion has been made that this court should engage in some form 
of interest balancing, permitting only a “reasonable” assertion of 
prescriptive jurisdiction to be implemented. However, this approach is 
unsuitable when courts are forced to choose between a domestic law 
which is designed to protect domestic interests, and a foreign law which is 
calculated to thwart the implementation of the domestic law in order to 
protect foreign interests allegedly threatened by the objectives of the 
domestic law. Interest balancing in this context is hobbled by two primary 
problems: (1) there are substantial limitations on the court's ability to 
conduct a neutral balancing of the competing interests, and (2) the 
adoption of interest balancing is unlikely to achieve its goal of promoting 
international comity’.83  
 
Judge Wilkey can also be seen to be fairly sceptical of the balancing test, and 
scathing in his assessment of its practical use in US law:  
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‘the usefulness and wisdom of interest balancing to assess the most 
“reasonable” exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction has not been 
affirmatively demonstrated. This approach has not gained more than a 
temporary foothold in domestic law. Courts are increasingly refusing to 
adopt the approach. Scholarly criticism has intensified. Additionally, there 
is no evidence that interest balancing represents a rule of international law. 
Thus, there is no mandatory rule requiring its adoption here…When push 
comes to shove, the domestic forum is rarely unseated’.84
 
The court further elaborated on its view that such a balancing exercise is 
unsuitable, and suggested it was inappropriate for domestic courts in general:  
‘Despite the real obligation of courts to apply international law and foster 
comity, domestic courts do not sit as internationally constituted tribunals. 
Domestic courts are created by national constitutions and statutes to 
enforce primarily national laws. The courts of most developed countries 
follow international law only to the extent it is not overridden by national 
law. Thus, courts inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing 
foreign interests. When there is any doubt, national interests will tend to 
be favored over foreign interests. This partially explains why there have 
been few times when courts have found foreign interests to prevail’.85
 
The view of the D.C. circuit is not only inconsistent with Timberlane and aligned 
cases, but also represents a departure from the approach adopted in the Second 
and Seventh circuits in Interbank and Re: Uranium Antitrust Litigation 
respectively. The Second and Seventh circuits appear to accept the competence of 
the court to conduct a balancing exercise, although question its practicality and 
held such an exercise was not mandatory. It is notable that the D.C. Court of 
Appeals decision was divided, and in Judge Starr’s dissent, he opined that 
‘principles of comity among the courts of the international community counsel 
strongly against the injunction in the form issued here’.86 After the rulings in the 
Seventh and D.C. Circuits in particular, and in spite of the majority of federal 
                                                 
84 Op. cit. note 70 at 950-951. 
85 Op. cit. note 70 at 951. 
86 Op. cit. note 70 at 956 onwards. 
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circuits adopting some variant of the Timberlane approach, there was clearly 
judicial confusion and conflict in the US on the status of foreign interests in 
antitrust cases. At the time Griffin said ‘our courts are in a state of disarray on the 
issue…The best, perhaps most charitable thing that can be said about the current 
state of the case law, is that it is somewhat confused’.87 The issue was clarified in 
1993 when the US Supreme Court issued its controversial decision in Hartford 
Fire Insurance Co. v. California.88
 
 
2.4 The long arm of US antitrust (2): what role for comity? 
2.4.1 Hartford Fire concerned whether London-based re-insurers could be liable for 
violating the Sherman Act for refusing to offer insurance to certain groups, in 
agreement with US competitors. The case is remarkable for two reasons: first, it 
re-examined the effects doctrine, and confirmed the post-Alcoa refinement; and 
secondly, it ruled on the weight that should be attached to international comity 
considerations. Timken Roller Bearing Co. alluded to a requirement for more than 
mere effect in order to assert jurisdiction, and this view was endorsed and further 
developed by lower courts, including Timberlane, in the 44 years89 before 
Hartford Fire. The US Congress also intervened in the debate with the Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA) of 1982 establishing that, with regard 
to foreign commerce other than imports, the Sherman Act would only apply if the 
                                                 
87 J.P. Griffin, op. cit. note 58. 
88 509 US 764, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993). 
89 As other cases such as United States v. Swiss Watchmakers Trade Case, 1962, ¶ 70600. 
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foreign conduct ‘has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’90 on 
US commerce. Hartford Fire confirmed the position in common law by stating 
‘Although the proposition was perhaps not always free from doubt…it is well 
established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was 
meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United 
States’.91 The Supreme Court also considered the issue of international comity, 
which the London re-insurers argued should be the basis for the Court declining 
jurisdiction, and observed: ‘When it enacted the FTAIA, Congress expressed no 
view on the question whether a court with Sherman Act jurisdiction should ever 
decline to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international comity’.92 The 
majority decision in the case essentially ruled on the facts at hand, but similarly to 
the Congress and the FTAIA, expressed no view on whether a court should 
decline jurisdiction on grounds of international comity. The following discussion 
illustrates the manner by which the majority 5-4 decision, written by Mr. Justice 
Souter, effectively stunted judicial consideration of international comity:  
‘The London re-insurers contend that applying the Act to their conduct 
would conflict significantly with British law, and the British Government, 
appearing before us as amicus curiae, concurs…They assert that 
Parliament has established a comprehensive regulatory regime over the 
London re-insurance market and that the conduct alleged here was 
perfectly consistent with British law and policy. But this is not to state a 
conflict…No conflict exists, for these purposes, “where a person subject to 
regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both.” Restatement 
(Third) Foreign Relations Law § 403…’ 
 
                                                 
90 § 402 of the FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. §6a. 
91 Op. cit. note 88, at 796, or 2909. 
92 Op. cit. note 88 at 798, or 2910. 
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It is noteworthy that many US academics believe the majority misunderstood and 
misapplied the passage from the influential Restatement of Foreign Relations 
Law, including the principal author of the relevant provisions.93 Arguably, for the 
Supreme Court to decide the point contrary to that which the British Government 
advised as amicus curiae, constitutes a conflict of itself, from which comity would 
suffer. Notwithstanding that view, the Supreme Court continued and held: 
‘Since the London re-insurers do not argue that British law requires them 
to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the United States, or claim 
that their compliance with the laws of both countries is otherwise 
impossible we see no conflict with British law’.94
 
Clearly, if international comity can only be a consideration when the laws of two 
jurisdictions are irreconcilable, thus preventing companies from complying with 
both, then instances will be very rare, and courts will seldom take international 
comity into consideration. Furthermore, the factors such as effect upon foreign 
relations if jurisdiction is exercised, outlined by Judge Choy in Timberlane95 and 
Judge Weis in Mannington Mills,96 were given no consideration by the majority in 
Hartford Fire. Mr. Justice Scalia delivered a compelling dissenting opinion, 
however, and stated:  
‘The “comity”…is not the comity of the courts, whereby judges decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over matters more appropriately adjudged elsewhere, 
but rather what might be termed “prescriptive comity”: the respect 
sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws. 
That comity is exercised by legislatures when they enact laws, and courts 
assume it has been exercised when they come to interpreting the scope of 
laws their legislatures have enacted…Considering comity in this way is 
                                                 
93 See A.F. Lowenfeld, ‘Conflict, Balancing of Interests and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: 
Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case’ (1995) 89 Am. J. Int’l. L. 42. 
94 509 US 764, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) at 798-799, or 2910-2911. 
95 549 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) at 614. 
96 595 F. 2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979), discussed above. 
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just part of determining whether the Sherman Act prohibits the conduct at 
issue’.97
 
Thus the differing view of the British Government could represent a conflict, and 
thereby require comity to be considered, in Justice Scalia’s opinion.98 
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s powerful dissent the 5-4 majority decision 
operated in a fashion predicted by Hawk three years earlier, such that the: 
‘Purported balancing of US and foreign interests à la conflict of laws analysis and 
Timberlane will eventually be rejected’.99
 
2.4.2 The real question of when and to what extent comity could be taken into account 
was not answered by the Supreme Court, although the importance of the ruling is 
beyond doubt. The approach to considering comity adopted by US courts, while 
varied, illustrates that comity can be viewed in two basic ways, particularly 
apparent from the Re: Uranium Antitrust Litigation decision, when distinguishing 
Timberlane, and the split in the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire. The first 
approach is to consider comity as a matter of, or element in, determining 
jurisdiction: i.e. if a court should decline to hear a particular case on the grounds 
of comity, then the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under this approach. 
The tripartite test in Timberlane signified this approach, in spite of Judge 
Campbell suggesting the test was otherwise in Re: Uranium Antitrust Litigation. 
This approach is that endorsed by Justice Scalia in Hartford Fire. The second 
basic approach is to contend that comity is a matter of discretion, normally in the 
                                                 
97 Op. cit. note 88, at 817-818, or 2920. 
98 For a critical account of Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire, see H. Hovenkamp, op. cit. note 44, at 
pp.770-771. 
99 B.E. Hawk, op. cit. note 38. 
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hands of the Judge and thus only a consideration once subject matter jurisdiction 
has been seized. A consequence of the second approach is that comity is not a 
matter of law, and hence strictly not a matter for appellate courts to consider. This 
latter approach was adopted in Re: Uranium Antitrust Litigation and importantly 
appears to have been endorsed by Justice Souter writing for the majority in 
Hartford Fire. The Supreme Court ruling therefore has significant consequences, 
particularly if coupled with the compelling arguments presented by Judge Wilkey 
in Laker Airways regarding the proper role of the judiciary with regard to 
comity.100 In rejecting the argument that the court should decline jurisdiction on 
account of comity, the majority in Laker Airways held: ‘Although, in the interest 
of amicable relations, we might be tempted to defuse unilaterally the 
confrontation by jettisoning our jurisdiction, we could not, for this is not our 
proper judicial role’.101 The question then arises as to whose role it is to consider 
comity if not the courts. A useful starting point is to consider the distinction 
between litigation brought by private plaintiffs and that by the US Government.  
 
2.4.3 The 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations issued 
jointly by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission detail the 
extent to which the two antitrust authorities will take account of comity 
considerations:  
‘The Agencies also take full account of comity factors beyond whether 
there is a conflict with foreign law. In deciding whether or not to challenge 
an alleged antitrust violation, the Agencies would, as part of a comity 
analysis, consider whether one country encourages a certain course of 
                                                 
100 See discussion supra at 2.3.7. 
101 Op. cit. note 70 at 953. 
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conduct, leaves parties free to choose among different strategies, or 
prohibits some of those strategies. In addition, the Agencies take into 
account the effect of their enforcement activities on related enforcement 
activities of a foreign antitrust authority…The Agencies also will consider 
whether the objectives sought to be obtained by the assertion of US law 
would be achieved in a particular instance by foreign enforcement’.102  
 
In light of the guidelines and Hartford Fire it is apparent that the authorities may 
undertake a different comity analysis from that of the courts, which is not 
necessarily a problem as the authorities and courts have different functions: one 
exercises prosecutorial discretion in the US interest; and the other enforces 
national and international law. Hence it is plausible that the respective comity 
analyses are not mutually exclusive and the courts’ comity analysis in a 
government action could take place after that of the antitrust authorities’ analysis. 
Nonetheless the Joint Guidelines challenge whether the courts should undertake 
their own comity analysis once either agency has already done so:   
‘In cases where the United States decides to prosecute an antitrust action, 
such a decision represents a determination by the Executive Branch that 
the importance of antitrust enforcement outweighs any relevant foreign 
policy concerns. The Department does not believe that it is the role of the 
courts to “second-guess the executive branch’s judgment as to the proper 
role of comity concerns under these circumstances”’.103  
 
The decision in Hartford Fire decreases the likelihood of a US court conflicting 
with the DOJ or FTC in the manner outlined, i.e. by declining to assert 
jurisdiction on the basis of comity once either authority has pressed ahead with 
antitrust litigation, although the purported discretion of the antitrust authorities is 
                                                 
102 Joint Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, issued by the DOJ and FTC (April 
1995) at 3.2. 
103 Ibid. at 3.2, latterly quoting United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 731 F. Supp 3, 6n.5 (D.D.C. 1990), 
aff’d, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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nonetheless startling and controversial. Griffin’s comment on these matters is 
particularly insightful:  
‘The 1995 International Guidelines take the position that courts should not 
engage in comity analysis in antitrust actions brought by the US 
Government…Other than a general reference to the separation of powers 
doctrine, the…International Guidelines cite no precedent for applying one 
jurisdictional standard to government prosecutions and another to private 
suits. Nor is there any indication that courts would accept the argument 
that they are constrained from reviewing prosecutorial decisions on the 
basis of comity or from taking account of foreign relations 
considerations…Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history of the 
Sherman Act to indicate that the Congress intended different standards to 
apply to government prosecutions and private suits’.104  
 
While Griffin questions the competence of the US antitrust authorities to remove 
comity considerations from the jurisdiction of the courts, a view supported by the 
American Bar Association,105 Hovenkamp offers a distinctive view on the area:  
‘…to the extent the federal antitrust laws represent the public economic 
policy of the United States, there may be little room for considerations of 
comity at all. Although the courts have seldom articulated the problem in 
this way, it is generally consistent with the outcomes’.106
 
Considering antitrust as ‘public economic policy’ may offer some justification for 
executive, instead of judicial, control over the role of comity. If indeed, the US 
executive branch does have the exclusive competence to determine the weight of 
comity considerations, it appears that this would lead to different standards being 
applied to public and private antitrust actions. Certainly there has been no 
suggestion that antitrust authorities should also be able to have such a decisive 
influence in private actions, e.g. by attaching greater weight to an amicus curiae 
                                                 
104 J.P. Griffin, op. cit. note 72. 
105 Ibid. specifically see note 142. 
106 H. Hovenkamp, op. cit. note 44, at pp.766-767. 
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brief submitted by the authorities.107 There is also precedent for suggesting that 
differing antitrust standards can be applied to public and private actions. The 
Supreme Court has confirmed that different standards apply regarding remedies in 
Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran.108 Mr. Justice Breyer, writing for the court, 
observed:  
‘A Government plaintiff, unlike a private plaintiff, must seek to obtain the 
relief necessary to protect the public from further anticompetitive conduct 
and to redress anticompetitive harm. And a Government plaintiff has legal 
authority broad enough to allow it to carry out this mission. 15 U.S.C. § 
25; see also, e.g. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 
316, 334 (1961) (“[I]t is well settled that once the Government has 
successfully borne the considerable burden of establishing a violation of 
law, all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved in its favour”). Private 
plaintiffs, by way of contrast, are far less likely to be able to secure broad 
relief. See California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295 (1990) 
(“Our conclusion that a district court has the power to order divestiture in 
appropriate cases brought [by private plaintiffs] does not, of course, mean 
that such power should be exercised in every situation in which the 
Government would be entitled to such relief”)’.109  
 
 
Hence arguments presented by the US government will clearly carry greater 
weight in antitrust actions than arguments presented by private plaintiffs, although 
it is unclear whether the double standard regarding remedies implies judicial 
acceptance of a double standard regarding comity. While the issue of competence 
to consider comity remains unresolved, the Hartford Fire ruling does not support 
the view that courts are unable or ill-equipped to undertake such an analysis, 
                                                 
107 In any case the function of an amicus curiae (literally ‘friend of the court’) brief is intended to bring 
matters not already done so to the court’s attention to help the court. While the brief is intended to influence 
the court’s decision, the court is certainly not bound by the position of the parties to the brief. See Rule 37 
of the Supreme Court of the US and American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 US 219 (1995), for further 
discussion. 
108 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. et al. v. Empagran S.A. et al. 542 U.S. (2004), 124 S. Ct 2359, 159 L. Ed. 
2d 226. 
109 Ibid. at p.14 of judgment.  
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irrespective of whether it is a public or private action. The result of such 
uncertainty only serves to diminish the impact that the principle of comity can 
have in cases before US courts, it is likely that comity can only have significant 
influence in US cases with regard to prosecutorial decisions made by the antitrust 
authorities. 
 
2.4.4 Since Hartford Fire, which instigated a lively debate amongst many 
commentators,110 there have been several further important developments in US 
antitrust of relevance. From a practical standpoint, the joint DoJ and FTC 
International Guidelines, as discussed above, stated that the principle of 
international comity would be a factor when conducting investigations and 
launching prosecutions for violations of US antitrust laws, and afforded greater 
weight to the principle of comity than in Hartford Fire. Interestingly, the comity 
factors taken into account by the authorities are listed in a similar manner to that 
within Timberlane and Mannington Mills.111 However, the Joint Guidelines must 
be placed in context, noting the prevalence of private enforcement in the US. With 
the majority of antitrust cases concerning private enforcement, the FTC and DOJ 
will often be unable to directly influence the civil suits,112 and thus have little 
impact on much of the development of antitrust jurisprudence.  
 
                                                 
110 See A. Robertson and M. Demetriou, ‘“But that was in another country…”: The Extraterritorial 
Application of US Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court’ (1994) 43 ICLQ 417; W.S. Dodge, 
‘Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Laws Theory: an Argument for Judicial Unilateralism’ (1998) 39 
Harvard International Law Journal 101; S.W. Waller, ‘From the Ashes of Hartford Fire: the Unanswered 
Questions of Comity’ (1999) Fordham Corporate Law Institute 33 (paper); and J.P. Griffin, op. cit. note 
72. 
111 Op. cit. note 102, see the ‘listing’ of factors at 3.2. 
112 Their ability to contribute as amicus curiae is noted above. 
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The second development since Hartford Fire stems from the Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit decision in United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co.113 The 
case concerned a criminal prosecution by US authorities against Japanese 
corporations for violation of the Sherman Act. The violations were in respect of 
price-fixing activities, all of which were conducted in Japan. The Court held that 
as criminal and civil liability for breach of the Sherman Act arose as a result of 
the same language, in the same section of the same statute, and that Hartford Fire 
had already established beyond doubt the extraterritorial application of that 
section in civil cases, it followed that criminal liability existed on the exact same 
basis. This decision is notable as a precedent for criminal actions, and has again 
created international tension due to the disparate approach between jurisdictions 
as to whether antitrust violations should incur criminal penalties. The final 
development worthy of note and comment at this stage concerns the 2004 
unanimous Supreme Court decision in Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran. 
 
2.4.5 Empagran concerned a private action raised following a US DOJ investigation 
into the manufacture and distribution of bulk vitamins by domestic and foreign 
firms. The antitrust investigation targeted participants in an international price-
fixing cartel, and Hoffmann-La Roche had been one of the main companies under 
investigation. Hoffmann-La Roche, and others, negotiated a plea agreement with 
the US antitrust authorities,114 and many of the cartel conspirators also settled 
                                                 
113 109 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). 
114 On 20th May 1999, Hoffmann-La Roche pleaded guilty to violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act by 
engaging in illegal collusive practices in the international vitamin industry. The Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division fined the company $500 million. Three former senior Hoffmann-La Roche executives 
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civil suits with US purchasers. The facts of the case explain why Hoffmann-La 
Roche would not settle out of court, Empagran is a South African company and its 
dealings with Hoffman-La Roche took place outside the US. Hence Hoffmann-La 
Roche doubted the jurisdiction of US antitrust, and challenged the ability of 
Empagran to raise an action in US courts. At issue was whether a foreign plaintiff 
that sustained harm as a result of a cartel, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, could sue that cartel within the US. The crucial question was whether there 
could be jurisdiction even though the harm sustained arose from the effect of the 
cartel elsewhere, and not from the effect on US trade. Thus, the claim was for 
damage sustained abroad as result of foreign activity by foreign perpetrators. The 
case essentially revolves around the interpretation of the FTAIA providing for 
Sherman Act jurisdiction. While the Act provides a general rule that ‘[the 
Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than 
import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations’,115 the Act also stipulates 
an exception when ‘such conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably 
foreseeable effect’116 on either US domestic or import commerce, or American 
exporters (i.e. there is a US domestic-injury exception to the rule). Therefore it is 
unclear whether the claim must arise as a direct result of such an effect within the 
US, or whether the claim can arise as result of the conduct, albeit not a result of 
the effect on US trade.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
have been charged with the same offence, including Andreas Hauri (Swiss), who agreed to serve a four 
month jail term in the US, and pay a $350,000 fine for his participation as Chemical and Vitamin Division 
Marketing Director. See Antitrust Division Press Release on 6th April 2000. 
115 96 Stat. 1246, 15 U.S.C. §6a. 
116 Ibid. at §6a(1)(A). 
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While the D.C. District Court ruled against Empagran and found it lacked 
jurisdiction,117 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit overturned that decision 
in Empagran S.A. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.118 on 17th January 2003. In a 
majority 2-1 decision the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of Empagran, allowing 
the case to continue to a full hearing. The ruling on jurisdiction threatened to set a 
precedent and further extend the extraterritoriality of US antitrust. From a 
practical stand point the ruling was particularly concerning given the potential for 
forum shopping, and the incentives to do so due to the existence of treble damages 
in the US. Indeed the existence of treble damages was likely a factor in 
Empagran’s original decision to sue in US courts. The decision on jurisdiction 
was the subject of the appeal to the US Supreme Court, and the significance of the 
case was highlighted by the number of amicus curiae briefs submitted, mostly in 
support of the petitioners, Hoffmann-La Roche.119  
 
The amicus curiae brief jointly submitted by the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands 
outlined the main criticism of the Court of Appeals ruling:  
‘[We] are committed to the rule of law as essential to a global trading and 
investment system and to an international civil society. However, the 
Governments in general are opposed to assertions of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in private antitrust cases where claimants seek to recover from 
foreign defendants solely for foreign injuries not incurred in the country in 
which the private suit is filed. Such litigation contravenes basic principles 
of international law and may impede trade and investment as well as 
undermine public enforcement by the Governments of their competition 
                                                 
117 Empagran S.A. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 2001 WL 761360, D.D.C. June 7, 2001. 
118 315 F. 3d 338 (District of Columbia Circuit, 2003). 
119 At least 16 amicus curiae briefs were submitted to the court. Among the parties submitting briefs were: 
the Government of the United States, Canada, Germany, Japan, a joint brief by the UK, Ireland and the 
Netherlands, and a joint brief by Harry First and Eleanor M. Fox. 
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law. It also would interfere with a sovereign nation’s right to regulate 
conduct within its territory’.120  
 
The Brief went further and highlighted the dangers of permitting the claim: ‘such 
a rule potentially would permit virtually any significant commercial transaction to 
be the basis for private United States treble damages claims…This decision would 
provide substantial encouragement for widespread forum shopping’.121 In 
commenting on the attraction of the treble damages system to claimants the 
Governments then stated:  
‘Expanding the jurisdiction of this generous United States private claim 
system could skew enforcement and increase international business risks. 
It makes United States courts the forum of choice without regard to whose 
laws are applied, where the injuries occurred or even if there is any 
connection to the court except the ability to get in personam jurisdiction 
over the defendants. Lord Denning best captured these anomalies when he 
observed: “As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the 
United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win 
a fortune.”…’.122
 
Indeed the US Government also submitted a brief supporting the reversal of the 
Court of Appeals ruling, although it focused on the practical consequences of an 
affirming Supreme Court judgment stating: ‘The United States is concerned that 
the court of appeals’ holding will substantially harm its ability to uncover and 
break up international cartels and undermine law enforcement relationships 
between the United States and its trading partners’.123  
 
                                                 
120 No. 03-724, Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as amicus curiae in support of the 
petitioners, at p.2. 
121 Ibid. at p.6. 
122 Ibid. at p.14. 
123 No. 03-724, Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., Brief for the US as amicus curiae supporting 
petitioners, at p.1. 
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2.4.6 The Supreme Court passed down a unanimous decision on 14th June 2004124 that 
concurred with many of the amicus curiae briefs, and reversed the Court of 
Appeals ruling. The Court held that the primary question had two parts:  
‘First, does that conduct fall within the FTAIA’s general rule excluding 
the Sherman Act’s application? That is to say, does the price-fixing 
activity constitute “conduct involving trade or commerce…with foreign 
nations”? We conclude that it does. Second, we ask whether the conduct 
nonetheless falls within a domestic-injury exception to the general rule, an 
exception that applies (and makes the Sherman Act nonetheless 
applicable) where the conduct (1) has a “direct, substantial and reasonably 
foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce, and (2) “such effect gives rise 
to a [Sherman Act] claim.” §§6a(1)(A), (2). We conclude that the 
exception does not apply where the plaintiff’s claim rests solely on the 
independent foreign harm’.125  
 
The Supreme Court was influenced by another aid in determining that the 
domestic-injury exception under the FTAIA did not apply:  
‘The rule of statutory construction cautions courts to assume that 
legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other 
nations when they write American laws. It thereby helps the potentially 
conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony—a 
harmony particularly needed in today’s highly interdependent commercial 
world. No one denies that America’s antitrust laws, when applied to 
foreign conduct, can interfere with a foreign nation’s ability independently 
to regulate its own commercial affairs. But our courts have long held that 
                                                 
124 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. et al. v. Empagran S.A. et al., 542 U.S. (2004), 124 S. Ct 2359, 159 L. Ed. 
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application of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is 
nonetheless reasonable, and hence consistent with principles of 
prescriptive comity, insofar as they reflect a legislative effort to redress 
domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has 
caused’.126  
 
The court rejected argument presented by Empagran that ‘comity does not 
demand an interpretation of the FTAIA that would exclude independent foreign 
injury cases across the board’127 and held:  
‘We conclude that principles of prescriptive comity counsel against the 
Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the FTAIA. Where foreign 
anticompetitive conduct plays a significant role and where foreign injury 
is independent of domestic effects, Congress might have hoped that 
America’s antitrust laws, so fundamental a component of our own 
economic system, would commend themselves to other nations as well. 
But, if America’s antitrust policies could not win their own way in the 
international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must assume, 
would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal imperialism, 
through legislative fiat’.128  
 
Thus the Supreme Court judgment was fairly robust in reversing the Court of 
Appeals ruling, something with which the dissenter in Hartford Fire, Justice 
Scalia, concurred. Perhaps the Supreme Court ruling in Empagran merely 
reinforces the status quo post-Hartford Fire, nonetheless its true significance lies 
in the consequences that would have followed had the Court of Appeals ruling 
been upheld. It is noteworthy that post-Empagran, the US Antitrust 
Modernization Commission (AMC) has recommended that: ‘as a general 
principle, purchases made outside the United States from a seller outside the 
United States should not be deemed to give rise to the requisite effects under the 
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128 Ibid. at p.12. 
 68
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act’129 to ensure total clarity on the issue. 
Furthermore, six of the AMC Commissioners recommended an amendment to the 
FTAIA to reflect its recommendation.130 The Empagran judgment also illustrates 
that while US antitrust is unhindered by would be ‘territorial firewalls’,131 its 
raison d’être is to protect American consumers and commerce,132 and actions too 
far detached from that purpose are unlikely to succeed – surely offering some 
comfort to foreign governments and their antitrust authorities. 
 
 
2.5 International mergers and acquisitions in the US 
2.5.1 The foregoing discussion of the development of extraterritoriality in US antitrust 
would be incomplete without some consideration of the law and judicial treatment 
of mergers and acquisitions in this context. A discussion of US extraterritoriality 
in merger control will follow, accompanied by a necessary, albeit brief, outline of 
the US merger control regime. While the latter part of the thesis will focus 
exclusively upon merger control in the international arena,133 its role in the 
development of international antitrust has historically been overlooked in favour 
of focusing upon cartels and unilateral anti-competitive behaviour. There is some 
justification for such an approach, however, given that cartels in particular are 
                                                 
129 Antitrust Modernization Commission Final Report (April 2007), recommendation 42. See discussion at 
pp.225 – 230, available at: www.amc.gov. 
130 Ibid. 
131 As phrased by Judge Selya in United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co, 109 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) at 
8. 
132 As noted in the US amicus curiae brief at p.6; ‘The focus of the FTAIA, and the fundamental purpose of 
the Sherman  Act, are the protection of American consumers and commerce. To provide antitrust relief to 
respondents, even though their injuries have no connection to a conspiracy’s effects on United States 
commerce, would divorce antitrust recovery from the central purposes of the antitrust laws’. 
133 Infra at chapter 5. 
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recognised as severely damaging to consumers, economies and notions of fair 
play. As Whish states:  
‘if competition policy is about one thing, it is surely about the 
condemnation of horizontal price fixing, market sharing and analogous 
practices: on both a moral and practical level, there is not a great deal of 
difference between price fixing and theft…pursuit of the hum-drum cartel 
ought to lie at the heart of any competition authority’s agenda’.134  
 
Whish also characterises merger control as ‘an important third component of 
most, though not all, systems of competition law’135 emphasising that the focus 
for most antitrust regimes is clearly elsewhere. Merger control is also 
distinguishable from other areas of antitrust in that the benefits to be gained from 
merger activity are visible and readily accepted,136 whereas justifying potentially 
anti-competitive unilateral or collaborative behaviour can be very difficult. 
Furthermore, mergers and acquisitions take place in public view137 whilst the 
other types of commercial activity that are subject to antitrust scrutiny, especially 
cartels, are often more opaque and cause difficulties for the investigating 
authorities. All of these factors have traditionally accumulated to create a greater 
focus within national antitrust regimes upon non-merger activity. The non-merger 
focus within national antitrust regimes has also tended to transfer onto to the 
international stage. The apparent historical prioritisation of non-merger activity in 
the US is supported by a number of factors. Notably there is an absence of 
specific merger control provisions from the Sherman Act. Furthermore the 1914 
                                                 
134 Op. cit. note 14 at p.454. 
135 Op. cit. note 14 at p.779. 
136 The benefits of M&A activity for global trade and trade liberalisation policies are discussed in detail 
infra at 5.2. 
137 While merger negotiations are often secretive and commercially sensitive information is not made 
public, the actual merging or acquisition of entities are visible transactions. 
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Clayton Act (dealing with mergers in Section 7) was clearly an ineffective 
antitrust enforcement tool, until an amendment in 1950,138 and perhaps even the 
further amendment in 1980.139 Note the significant period of time before 
amendments in spite of the FTC recognising the Clayton Act’s flaws in 1928.140 
One result of this focus in US antitrust is that more recent merger case law under 
the Clayton Act has tended to analogise with and adopt established jurisdictional 
doctrines and precedents developed under §1 and §2 of the Sherman Act.141  
 
2.5.2 US merger control consists of federal statutes that enable M&As to be blocked 
should a court rule that the requisite legal standard has been satisfied. The 
principal standard is encompassed in §7 of the Clayton Act.142 Section 7 prohibits 
the direct or indirect acquisition by one person of all or any part of the voting 
securities or assets of another person when ‘in any line of commerce or in any 
activity affecting commerce in any section of the [US], the effect of such 
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly’.143 There is, however, no bar to challenging a merger under either §1 
or §2 of the Sherman Act. Indeed, the narrow ambit of the original 1914 Clayton 
Act §7 encouraged the antitrust authorities to resort to the Sherman Act to cover 
                                                 
138 The  Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). 
139 Act of Sept. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1157 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 
(1994)); H.R. Rep. No.871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1980, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2732, Apr. 11, 1980. 
140 For discussion see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 314 and n.25 (1962). 
141 See Brown Shoe Co v. United States, 370 US at 319 (1962). 
142 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). 
143 Ibid. with an exemption for acquisitions made ‘solely for investment’. 
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certain transactions which the Clayton Act could not.144 Amendments to §7 
between 1950 and 1980 largely obviated the need to resort to the Sherman Act for 
merger control. This was presumably a welcome development for the antitrust 
authorities at the time in light of difficulties in proving an unreasonable restraint 
of trade as a result of the merger, as required under §1 of the Sherman Act.145 The 
alternative and equally daunting prospect was that of trying to prove the merger to 
be ‘a vehicle for monopolization, attempted monopolization, or a conspiracy to 
monopolize’ as required under §2 of the Sherman Act.146 Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) is another important statutory provision in US 
merger control, which enables the Federal Trade Commission to challenge ‘any 
unfair method of competition or deceptive act or practice’.147 Section 5 has been 
held to grant the FTC authority to challenge any conduct that would constitute a 
violation of the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act,148 thus giving the FTC a 
significant role in US merger control.  
 
2.5.3 While the jurisdictional limits of the Sherman Act have been considered in depth 
already, there has been no similar consideration of the Clayton Act and FTC Act, 
and their application to non-US firms and M&A activity. There are two issues that 
arise: does the merger control standard under §7 of the Clayton Act apply to a 
                                                 
144 Such as asset acquisitions as they were not covered by the original section 7; which prohibited stock 
acquisitions only. Given the initial weakness of the original section 7, the case law developing under the 
Sherman Act may have appeared to offer greater prospect of a successful challenge to the merger. 
145 As noted in R.S. Schlossberg, op. cit. note 51 at p.8. 
146 Hovenkamp comments ‘As a result [of the Clayton Acts widened scope] Sherman Act treatment of 
mergers to monopoly has become all but superfluous’, op. cit. note 44 at p.293. 
147 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). 
148 See FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1952), FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 
683, 691 (1947), and discussion in R.S. Schlossberg, op. cit. note 51 at pp.9-10. 
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proposed merger between non-US firms; and can the FTC raise a challenge 
against such firms under §5 of the FTC Act. Neither issue requires a substantial 
analysis. The prohibition of a merger or acquisition which would substantially 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly under Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act, is judged by whether the acquisition would have such a negative effect upon 
‘any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in the [US]’.149 The 
jurisdictional scope of Section 7 is apparent by referring to Section 1 of the 
Clayton Act, which states that: ‘“Commerce,” as used herein, means trade or 
commerce among the several states and with foreign nations…’ and also: ‘The 
word “person” or “persons” wherever used in this Act shall be deemed to include 
corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either 
the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any state, or the 
laws of any foreign country’ [emphasis added].150 Note that in spite of the 
apparently wide statutory scope of §7 of the Clayton Act, the American Bar 
Association suggests: ‘More recently, the courts and federal enforcement agencies 
have applied the direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable standard of the 
FTAIA to merger challenges under the Clayton Act’.151 It is therefore clear that 
§7 of the Clayton Act can apply to M&A involving non-US firms. The US 
Congress clearly intended for merger control under the Clayton Act to be 
applicable to all mergers and acquisitions capable of effecting a substantial 
lessening of competition, or monopolisation on US commerce, whether that be on 
domestic commerce or commerce between the US and other nations. In practice 
                                                 
149 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). 
150 Ibid. 
151 R.S. Schlossberg, op. cit. note 51, at p.395. 
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however, it may also be required for the substantial lessening of competition, or 
monopolisation to be direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable before the US 
antitrust authorities seek to intervene in the merger or acquisition. 
 
The remaining issue regarding the scope of §5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act is answered by a closer examination of the detail of the section as contained 
within § 45 of the antitrust section of the US Code. Section 45(a)(1) states: 
‘Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful’,152 
section 45(a)(2) then empowers and directs the FTC to prevent persons, 
partnerships, or corporations ‘from using unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce’. The pertinent section is then §45(a)(3) providing that:  
‘This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition 
involving commerce with foreign nations (other than import commerce) 
unless - (A) such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect [on US domestic or import commerce, or 
American exporters], and (B) such effect gives rise to a claim under 
[§§45.(a)(1) and (2)]’.153  
 
Thus the territorial scope of the Clayton Act has an almost identical legal standard 
to that of the FTAIA, confirming that the FTC can challenge mergers involving 
non-US firms under §5 of the FTC Act. It is therefore clear that the jurisdictional 
scope of the Clayton Act and the FTC Act, and thus US merger control is the 
same as that of the Sherman Act. 
 
                                                 
152 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1) (1994). 
153 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1994). 
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2.5.4 Interpretations of the Clayton and FTC Acts clearly mirror the law developed 
under the Sherman Act and the FTAIA, yet one further element requires 
consideration to gain a fuller picture of the jurisdictional scope of US merger 
control. The most visible element of US merger control is the pre-merger 
notification regime which is established in the US by virtue of §7A of the Clayton 
Act, introduced by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 
(HSR Act). The HSR Act154 facilitates an ex ante system of merger control155 by 
requiring that parties to certain mergers and acquisitions notify the FTC and the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice with certain information. It also 
obliges the parties to suspend consummation of the reportable transaction until the 
expiry of specified waiting periods.156 Thus the HSR Act maintained the legal 
standard embedded in §7 of the Clayton Act, and its purpose is to facilitate 
efficient and effective merger control. US antitrust authorities are provided with 
sufficient information and time to determine whether to challenge a proposed 
merger or acquisition prior to its consummation, by virtue of the notification 
mechanism. Indeed Miller and Baker have noted the limited impact of the HSR 
Act upon the substantive merger control rules:  
‘the HSR Act does not preclude the government agencies from 
challenging a reportable merger even after statutory waiting periods have 
expired and the merger has been consummated without objection by the 
Government. Moreover, the HSR Act does not preclude a government 
challenge to a non-reportable merger’.157  
 
                                                 
154 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994). 
155 Note that most merger control regimes adopt an ex ante review mechanism, see discussion infra at 5.1.2. 
156 The implementing rules are found at 16 C.F.R. Parts 801-803. 
157 W.T. Miller and D.I. Baker, ‘Chapter 64: United States of America’ at p.64-48, 64.090 in J.W. Rowley 
& D.I. Baker (Eds), International Mergers - The Antitrust Process (3  ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2001).rd
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2.5.5 While the substantive rules are largely unaffected by the HSR Act, its significance 
to the US merger control regime is beyond doubt. The parties to a merger or 
acquisition whereby either ‘the acquiring person, or the person whose voting 
securities or assets are being acquired, is engaged in commerce or in any activity 
affecting commerce’158 must file pre-merger notification if the transaction results 
in the acquirer holding in excess of $239.2 million of the voting securities and 
assets of the acquired person.159 There are also secondary notification 
thresholds.160 Merging parties that satisfy the notification thresholds must provide 
the requisite information to both the FTC and DOJ, which triggers a standard 30-
day waiting period before the acquisition may take place, and during which time 
the authorities will conduct a first phase review.161 The 30-day waiting period can 
be terminated early by request of the parties, and with the consent of the antitrust 
authorities should they determine within that period that the reportable transaction 
has no antitrust concerns.162 The waiting period can also be extended by the 
antitrust authorities for a further 30 days163 by issuing a ‘second request’ for 
documents and information, which marks the beginning of the second phase of 
merger review.164  
 
                                                 
158 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(1). 
159 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2)(A). See the FTC Notice on Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of 
the Clayton Act, Federal Register, Vol.70 No.13, 22 January 2007 at pp.2692 – 2693. 
160 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2)(B). 
161 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b), note that for cash tender offers the waiting period is only 15 days. 
162 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(2). 
163 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(2), although the extension for a cash tender offer is only 10 days. 
164 There is a fuller discussion of the different stages of the merger review process, as well as further 
discussion of the US second request infra at 5.5 and 5.6. 
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The second request ‘acts as both a subpoena for documents and a set of 
interrogatories, seeking (amongst other things) sales and capacity data, 
information about potential entrants, documents about pricing, costs, competition, 
and strategic plans and analyses’,165 and is a necessary step before the FTC or 
DOJ can decide whether to seek a preliminary injunction against the proposed 
transaction. While second requests have been noted to be ‘extraordinarily 
burdensome’,166 the whole system of pre-merger notification clearly imposes a 
significant burden upon parties to reportable transactions,167 irrespective of 
whether they are incorporated or otherwise based within the US. The acquiring 
party in all such transactions also incurs sizable filing costs that are adjusted 
annually: $45,000 for transactions with a value between $59.8 million and $119.6 
million; $125,000 for transactions between $119.6 million and $597.9 million; 
and $280,000 if the value of the transaction is $597.9 million or greater.168 It is 
clear from examining US merger control laws that the antitrust authorities have a 
broad jurisdiction over non-US companies, not only by virtue of the wording of 
section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 5 of the FTC Act but also due to the 
operation of the HSR pre-merger notification system. It is also clear that the ex 
ante system can impose a significant notification burden upon non-US firms. 
From a practical standpoint, the broad legal jurisdiction conferred upon US 
antitrust authorities heightens the benefit to be gained from considering the 
                                                 
165 N.R. Koberstein and J.J. Hegarty, ‘US Antitrust Law: Enforcement of Laws Governing Mergers and 
Acquisitions’ [2003] 2 Comp Law J. 361 at 366. 
166 Ibid. 
167 The burden of multi-jurisdictional merger review is a key issue that is considered infra in chapter 5, 
particularly see 5.5 and 5.6. 
168 § 605(b) of title VI of Public Law 101-162 (15 U.S.C. 18a note). Also see the updated filing fee 
information, published in the FTC Notice, op. cit. note 159.  
 77
exercise of discretion by the authorities, in order to appreciate the scope of US 
merger control. 
 
2.5.6 The American Bar Association suggests that ‘the Division [DOJ] has vigorously 
enforced compliance with the HSR Act notification requirements by foreign 
firms’169 and provides notable examples. The joint FTC and DOJ International 
Guidelines also confirm that US antitrust authorities will assert jurisdiction over 
non-US firms when applying the merger control laws.170 In spite of having 
jurisdiction however, the US authorities have indicated a willingness to take 
comity considerations into account when deciding whether or not to challenge a 
proposed merger or acquisition. The ABA suggests that: 
‘The Division followed principles of comity in deciding not to challenge 
an acquisition by John Deere & Co. of North American agricultural 
equipment operations of the Canadian company, Versatile Corporation. 
The parties contended that the acquisition should be permitted to proceed 
because Versatile qualified as a “failing firm” under US antitrust law and 
would be forced to shut down its Canadian agricultural equipment 
operations if the acquisition were blocked. The Canadian competition 
authorities accepted this argument, while the Division, at least initially, did 
not. After extensive discussions between Canadian and Justice Department 
competition officials, however the Justice Department decided to defer to 
the “substantial Canadian interests” in the matter and did not challenge the 
transaction’.171  
 
Comity considerations may also influence decisions beyond whether or not to 
challenge a proposed transaction, and certain cases might suggest that comity has 
influenced whether the antitrust authorities seek to prohibit a transaction outright, 
or seek to impose a remedy upon the parties. In spite of the ABA citing examples 
                                                 
169 R.S. Schlossberg, op. cit. note 51 at pp.402 – 403. 
170 Op. cit. note 102, at 3.14. 
171 R.S. Schlossberg, op. cit. note 51, at p.406. 
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of cases where comity has had an impact,172 it is difficult to distinguish between 
cases where the application of comity altered the outcome of a merger review, and 
those cases where the review was conducted in cooperation and coordination with 
international counterparts. It may be there is no difference between the two, yet as 
antitrust authority cooperation is becoming more prevalent in multi-jurisdictional 
merger review it would be inaccurate to suggest that every case of cooperation is 
an example of comity considerations altering the outcome. Indeed it may even be 
argued that the John Deere case cited by the ABA is an example of where the 
DOJ benefited from cooperation with international counterparts, to build a better 
understanding of the case. The DOJ may have been convinced by the Canadian 
argument, rather than deciding against enforcement due to comity considerations. 
In spite of the different possible interpretations of the DOJ action in John Deere 
and other cases, it is clear that the US antitrust authorities, acting as the executive 
branch of the US government, have stated a willingness to take comity 
considerations into account throughout the merger control process in relevant 
cases. 
 
After having considered the development of US extraterritoriality, which likely 
represents the first semblance of ‘international antitrust’, the further development 
of antitrust in the international sphere can be ascertained by examining another 
principal antitrust jurisdiction: the European Community. 
 
 
                                                 
172 R.S. Schlossberg, op. cit. note 51, at pp. 407 – 409.  
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2.6   EC competition law 
2.6.1 When extraterritoriality received judicial recognition in US antitrust in the 1940s, 
the US was probably the only jurisdiction with a comprehensive antitrust regime 
in place, and already had over 40 years of policy-making and enforcement 
experience. It was during the period of judicial refinement of the effects doctrine 
in the US, following the end of the Second World War, that the foundations of 
antitrust in Europe were being laid. The term antitrust, however, that attached to 
the laws arising from the Sherman Bill debates and the wider effort combating US 
industrial might in the late 19th Century, was inappropriate for the provisions, 
loosely termed counterpart laws, that were taking shape in Europe. Amongst the 
first of these ‘counterpart’ laws to formulate in Europe were within the 1951 
Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
between Belgium, France, (West) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and The 
Netherlands. The ECSC was created with the task: ‘to contribute, in harmony with 
the general economy of the Member States and through the establishment of a 
Common Market…to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising 
standard of living in the Member States’.173 In furtherance of the objective for a 
common coal and steel market, was the requirement in Article 4(d) of the Treaty 
of Paris to abolish and prohibit restrictive practices: ‘which tend toward the 
sharing or exploiting of markets’, as well as the requirement in Article 5 to: 
‘ensure the establishment, maintenance and observance of normal competitive 
conditions’. In order to satisfy these requirements the Treaty included provisions 
to maintain competitive conditions in relevant markets in Articles 65 and 66. 
                                                 
173 Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Paris. 
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Articles 65 and 66 can therefore be regarded as amongst the first European 
‘counterparts’ to Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Nonetheless it was clear 
that the prohibitions within Article 65 and 66 were very different from those of 
the Sherman Act, both in terms of wording and intended purpose. The ECSC 
provisions were primarily seeking to maintain ‘normal competitive conditions’, 
and thus they were therefore far more appropriately labelled ‘competition laws’, 
rather than antitrust as in the US.174 For reasons of convenience and consistency 
however, this thesis generally adopts the term ‘antitrust’ to refer to laws and 
policies that may be labelled ‘competition laws’ within their own jurisdiction. 
 
2.6.2 The antitrust provisions included in the 1957 Treaty of Rome were only loosely 
based upon those in the ECSC Treaty, and arguably brought European antitrust 
closer to that of US antitrust, particularly by refocusing the second core provision 
(Article 82) on conduct that abused positions of market power. In the ECSC 
Treaty, the second core provision (Article 66) focused on concentrations, i.e. 
mergers, within relevant markets. The EC antitrust provisions are necessary to 
fulfil the objective laid out in Article 3(1)(g) EC Treaty, which provides that the 
EC shall include ‘a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not 
distorted’. EC antitrust provisions were unenforceable until the Council adopted 
Regulation 17/62,175 which provided an enforcement framework and granted 
necessary investigatory and decision-making powers to the European 
                                                 
174 There was, however, undoubtedly US antitrust influence on the drafting of Articles 65 and 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty, not least as the drafter was a US antitrust lawyer, Robert Bowie. See D.G. Goyder, EC 
Competition Law (3rd Ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) at p23, note 10 referring to F. Duchêne, 
Jean Monnet, the First Statesman of Interdependence, (Norton, 1994) at p.213. 
175 Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles [81 and 82] of the Treaty [1962] O.J. 13/204. 
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Commission. The Commission is undoubtedly the principal EC antitrust authority 
and is commonly regarded as a ‘mature’ authority alongside the US DOJ, FTC 
and other international counterparts. Regulation 17/62 had provided for a 
centralised enforcement mechanism for Articles 81 and 82, but has since been 
replaced by Regulation 1/2003,176 which entered into force on 1st May 2004 and 
involved national competition authorities (NCAs) in the enforcement of Articles 
81 and 82. Note that the thesis tends to focus upon international antitrust, to the 
exclusion of the uniquely intra-EC situation. 
 
2.6.3 The main EC antitrust provisions, namely Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of 
Rome, are often compared with §1 and §2 of the Sherman Act,177 which primarily 
target coordinated and unilateral anti-competitive behaviour respectively. Both 
jurisdictions also contain distinct provisions for merger control. The core 
provisions establishing US merger control stem from the Clayton Act, which was 
enacted 24 years after the Sherman Act. The EC also has distinct provisions for 
merger control, initially by virtue of Regulation 4064/89,178 which has been 
replaced by Regulation 139/2004.179 The Treaty of Rome, unlike the Treaty of 
Paris, does not include explicit rules providing for merger control. In spite of 
some prima facie similarities between the US and EC antitrust regimes however, 
there are notable policy and procedural differences between the jurisdictions. A 
                                                 
176 Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty [2003] O.J. 1/1. 
177 15 U.S.C. §1 & §2. 
178 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [1989] O.J. L395/1, corrected version in [1990] O.J. L257/13. 
179 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] O.J. L24/1. 
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particular source of tension between the jurisdictions, and indeed between the US 
and many other jurisdictions, appears to have been the appropriate objectives for 
an antitrust regime. While a full assessment of the respective policies and 
procedures is unnecessary and better left to other researchers and projects, a brief 
consideration of the policy differences is useful. A short discussion of possible 
divergences between the US and EC enables a better appreciation of the tensions 
and conflict that can arise in international antitrust, particularly in light of the 
increasing use of extraterritoriality, discussed infra. 
 
2.6.4 The primary motivational factor for the US congress instigating antitrust 
legislation in 1890 appears to have been the growing power and market strength 
of US railway trusts in the late 19th century. Bork highlights Senator Sherman’s 
discussion regarding the legality of the predatory pricing strategies of the 
Standard Oil Company, and of cartel agreement and monopolistic horizontal 
mergers more generally, during the passage of the Sherman Act.180 The Sherman 
Act was likely a reactive attempt to restore free trade when anti-competitive 
activity was damaging the general consumer interest. The inclusion of antitrust 
                                                 
180 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself (New York, Free Press, 
1993) at p.20, Senator Sherman’s proposition appeared to be that the Sherman Act would 
merely be a codification of the existing common law within the US at that time. Yet Bork 
suggests a lot of the cases at the time suggests the Sherman Act in fact did not accurately 
reflect the common law position. R.J.R. Peritz, Competition Policy in America, 1888 – 
1992: History, Rhetoric, Law, (2nd Ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) appears to 
be less sceptical of Senator Sherman highlighting the Act’s historical context and 
common law language in chapter 1 (although Sherman’s draft bill did not contain much 
of the common law language present in the final Act, Peritz states that ‘we now take for 
granted that there are, or should be, no significant differences between the two versions’ 
at p.14).  
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provisions within the Treaty of Rome was not, however, in response to damaging 
anti-competitive activity ongoing in the late 1950s,181 nor was it a direct attempt 
to protect consumer welfare. The rationale behind including antitrust provisions in 
the Treaty of Rome, as well as outlining the objective in Article 3(1)(g), was 
clearly to facilitate and further market integration, but also more generally to 
further all the goals of the European Community. These wider goals and 
objectives of EC antitrust appear to be a source of divergence with US antitrust 
authorities, with US commentators occasionally suggesting EC law strays into 
protecting competitors instead of the process of competition.182 As the EU 
represents a political aspiration of harmonisation across many spheres of society, 
the policies can reflect more than that of ‘pure competition’. A US argument 
would likely suggest that antitrust regimes should operate independently from 
‘non-competition’ policies and objectives. Nonetheless it is clear that ‘non-
competition’ objectives have always influenced the application of EC antitrust,183 
although there is strong evidence that this influence has been in gradual decline 
for some years. It is likely that there has been significant convergence between the 
two jurisdictions in recent years as the European commission affords greater 
priority to economic theory and analysis when implementing EC antitrust law. 
                                                 
181 Although it is arguable that the competition provisions within the Treaty of Paris, and indeed the ECSC 
itself, were part of a reaction to the belief that anti-competitive activities had aided Hitler’s power base in 
pre-World War II Germany, see e.g. P.J. Slot, ‘A view from the mountain: 40 years of developments in EC 
competition law’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 443 at p.445, and generally chapter 3 in D.G. Goyder, EC 
Competition Law (3rd Ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998). 
182 See e.g. E.M. Fox, ‘We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors’ (2003) 26 World Comp. 149, 
and W.J. Kolasky, ‘What is competition? A comparison of US and European perspectives’ (2004) Spring-
Summer The Antitrust Bulletin 29. 
183 See discussion in J. Galloway, ‘The pursuit of national champions: the intersection of competition law 
and industrial policy’ (2007) 28 ECLR 172; and J. Tunney, ‘Is the emerging legal concept of culture the 
cuckoo’s egg in the EU competition law nest?’ (2001) 22 ECLR 173. 
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The former Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti highlighted the 
convergence by stating: 
‘We can confidently say that we share the same goals and pursue the same 
results on both sides of the Atlantic: namely, to ensure effective 
competition between enterprises, by conducting a competition policy 
which is based on sound economics and which has the protection of 
consumers as its primary concern’.184
 
Nonetheless, the view that the protection of consumers represents a primary 
concern for both authorities ironically highlights a potential point of continuing 
divergence in policy. Many years of US policy statements and speeches help 
confirm this point, e.g. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kolasky’s speech 
stating:  
‘Misguided competition policy, designed to maintain fragmented markets 
or protect small business, retards growth and undermines faith in free 
markets. We [that is the US and other antitrust authorities] need to agree, 
therefore that the sole objective of competition policy is consumer 
welfare’.185  
 
For the US, there can be no other legitimate goal for antitrust than consumer 
welfare, hence this may always remain a point of divergence between both 
jurisdictions and indeed between the US and many others also. There is therefore 
clear potential for conflict in international antitrust stemming from policy 
divergence, in addition to potential conflicts stemming from procedural or 
substantive divergence. 
 
2.6.5 To further understand the development of ‘international antitrust’ it is important 
to consider the approach of the European Commission and EC judiciary (the 
                                                 
184 Speech at the ABA General Counsel Round Table, 14th November 2001, entitled ‘Antitrust in the US 
and Europe: a History of Convergence’. 
185 Before the American Bar Association Fall Forum in Washington DC on 7th November 2002. 
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European Court of Justice, ECJ, and Court of First Instance, CFI) towards non-EC 
firms when enforcing EC antitrust laws. It is important to consider whether the 
European Commission has a similar approach to non-domiciliary antitrust 
violations to that of the US antitrust authorities. Additionally, it is important to 
investigate whether EC law has adopted some form of the US effects doctrine in 
order to protect EC markets from anti-competitive behaviour stemming from non-
EC firms. 
 
Given that Germany is one of the founding EC Member States, it is useful to note 
that Section 130, paragraph 2 of the German Act Against Restraints of 
Competition provides: ‘This Act shall apply to all restraints of competition having 
an effect within the area of application of this Act, also if they were caused 
outside the area of application of this Act’. The provision has been in place since 
the Act was passed in 1958, and was probably foreseen while the Act was in draft 
form since 1952. Nonetheless, perhaps surprisingly, there is no similar provision 
in the EC Treaty and hence there is little guidance on the intended territorial scope 
of Articles 81 and 82. In contrast to the German position on territorial jurisdiction, 
the UK government, prior to being an EU Member State, submitted an aide-
mémoire to the European Commission186 following the Commission decision in 
Dyestuffs.187 The aide-mémoire criticised the extraterritorial reach of EC antitrust 
law, and laid out the criteria, according to the UK government, by which 
authorities should be able to seize jurisdiction in antitrust. The UK asserted that 
                                                 
186 The text of which is set out in I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th Ed, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1998) at p.317. 
187 Re the Cartel in Aniline Dyes [1969] O.J. L195/11. 
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jurisdiction must be based on the territoriality or nationality principle under 
international law, a point to which all jurisdictions would likely agree. Divergence 
can arise however, in the interpretation of the territoriality principle. The UK 
government also provided its view of the correct interpretation of the territoriality 
principle in order for there to be jurisdiction. The UK argued that offenders must 
have carried on the anti-competitive activity, in whole or part, within the seizing 
territory. Hence the UK government believed seizing jurisdiction when the anti-
competitive activity was conducted beyond the territorial borders of the EC was 
an ultra vires act by the Commission and also argued that the effects doctrine, or 
variations, had no place in EC law. It is likely that the UK action was prompted 
by the Commission’s decision to fine ICI, given ICI’s status as a company 
incorporated under UK law and based within the UK. 
 
ICI appealed against the Commission decision to the ECJ, arguing on the same 
rationale as that of the aide-mémoire. In ICI v. Commission188 (the ‘Dyestuffs’ 
case) the Commission primarily argued for the express recognition and 
application of the effects doctrine under Community law, although it was their 
secondary argument that led to the dismissal of the appeal. The case concerned an 
alleged cartel operating in the market for aniline dyes. None of the alleged 
conspirators were based within the EC and all offending activity originated from 
outside the EC’s borders. The Commission’s second argument focused on the 
relationship between ICI and its Belgian subsidiary company, which ICI had been 
directing on how to act. The Commission successfully argued that the ECJ should 
                                                 
188 Case 48/69, [1972] ECR 619. 
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ignore the separate legal personality accorded to ICI and its subsidiary, as the 
subsidiary was under the control and direction of ICI. Furthermore ICI should be 
regarding as operating within the Common Market through its subsidiary, and on 
that basis jurisdiction could be seized. In spite of Advocate General Mayras 
advising the Court to recognise the effects doctrine, the ECJ endorsed the 
Commission’s argument linking a parent to its subsidiary in order to seize 
jurisdiction.189 This has since become known as the single economic entity 
doctrine.  
 
2.6.6 While the single economic entity doctrine enabled the ECJ to circumvent the issue 
of the effects doctrine in Dyestuffs, it merely delayed the need to rule on its 
possible existence in EC law. In Dyestuffs Advocate General Mayras 
recommended that the Commission decision should be upheld on the basis of the 
effects doctrine which was controversial as there had not been any previous 
express or implicit recognition of the doctrine’s existence in EC law. The 
Advocate General laid out three conditions that if satisfied, should entitle the 
authorities to assert jurisdiction. In the context of Article 81, if the agreement or 
concerted practice: created a direct and immediate restriction of competition in the 
jurisdiction; if that effect was reasonably foreseeable; and if the effect produced in 
the jurisdiction was substantial, then jurisdiction could be seized.190 Advocate 
General Mayras foresaw a limitation upon the use of the effects doctrine however, 
as he did not believe ‘enforcement jurisdiction’ could be seized by the 
                                                 
189 Ibid. at paragraphs 132 – 140. 
190 Op. cit. note 188. 
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Commission or EC Courts. It was thought that enforcement jurisdiction would 
infringe the territorial sovereignty of the state in which the offender was either 
based or carrying out their activities, and thus the Advocate General doubted the 
ability to enforce the penalties imposed for infringing EC antitrust law, against 
non-EC firms. It took a further 16 years before the question of the effects doctrine 
again arose before the ECJ.  
 
2.6.7 The Wood Pulp191 case concerned a cartel of 41 producers and two trade 
associations apparently price fixing in the wood pulp industry, all firms had their 
registered offices outside the European Community. The European Commission 
relied upon Advocate General Mayras’ opinion in Dyestuffs and asserted 
jurisdiction on the basis that the price fixing created a direct and immediate 
restriction of competition within the EC. Additionally that effect was reasonably 
foreseeable to the wood pulp producers, and the effect within the Community 
could be regarded as substantial. This direct, reasonably foreseeable and 
substantial test espoused by Advocate General Mayras is the same as that in the 
US FTAIA, discussed supra. The Commission decision fined 36 of the wood pulp 
producers for breach of Article 81(1) EC Treaty, and many of the firms appealed 
the decision to the ECJ on two grounds. The first ground was on the basis that the 
Commission had no jurisdiction to impose penalties in the case, and the second 
ground was regarding the substance of the Commission decision and definition of 
concerted practice. Initially the ECJ heard the appeal on the first ground and the 
                                                 
191 Commission Decision Wood Pulp [1985] O.J. L85/1. 
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resulting decision is known as Wood Pulp I,192 and the decision on the second 
ground of appeal is known as Wood Pulp II.193  
 
In Wood Pulp I, as in Dyestuffs, the Advocate General advised the Court that the 
Community was entitled to and should seize jurisdiction on the basis of the effects 
doctrine. AG Darmon reviewed relevant international and US law on the subject 
and concluded the EC would be better served by the express recognition of the 
effects doctrine. The ECJ decided against using the phrase ‘effects doctrine’ in its 
ruling, although gave some form of endorsement of extraterritoriality. The ECJ 
ruled: 
‘If the applicability of prohibitions...were made to depend on the place 
where the agreement, decision or concerted practice was formed, the result 
would obviously be to give undertakings an easy means of evading those 
prohibitions. The decisive factor is therefore the place where it is 
implemented. The producers in this case implemented their pricing 
agreement within the Common Market. It is immaterial in that respect 
whether or not they had recourse to subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents, or 
branches within the Community in order to make their contacts with 
purchasers within the Community. Accordingly the [EC’s] jurisdiction to 
apply its competition rules to such conduct is covered by the territoriality 
principle as universally recognised in public international law.’194
 
It is therefore clear that the ECJ has developed the theory of ‘implementation’ to 
enable the extraterritorial application of EC antitrust laws. It is debatable whether 
this theory significantly differs from the effects doctrine. Some academics195 have 
suggested that ‘implementation’ could not extend to cases involving refusal to 
supply as the suppliers, based outside the EC, would have no positive effect 
                                                 
192 Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125-129/85, A. Ahlström Oy v. Commission [1988] ECR 5193. 
193 Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125-129/85, A. Ahlström Oy v. Commission [1993] ECR I-1307. 
194 Op. cit. note 192 at paragraphs 16 – 18. 
195 See for example: W. Van Gerven, ‘EC Jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters: The Wood Pulp Judgment’ 
[1989] Fordham Corporate Law Institute 451 (paper), at 471. 
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within the internal market by refusing to supply an undertaking within the EC. 
The effects doctrine, by comparison, appears capable of applying to positive and 
negative effects within the seizing jurisdiction. 
 
2.6.8 The question of extraterritoriality must also be briefly considered within the 
context of EC merger control. The relevant provisions are encompassed within the 
revised ECMR.196 Similarly to Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome, the 
ECMR makes no explicit provision as to its territorial reach, although it 
establishes an ex ante review mechanism comparable in principle to the US Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act. The ECMR requires merging parties to submit pre-merger 
notification to the European Commission in the event that the proposed 
‘concentration’, or transaction, has a ‘Community dimension’. The legal test of 
‘Community dimension’ is satisfied, and hence notification is required, if turnover 
thresholds are met. The principle threshold is satisfied if the aggregate worldwide 
turnover of merging parties is more than €5,000 million, and the aggregate 
Community-wide turnover of each firm is more than €250 million.197 There are, 
however, further exceptions to the thresholds as well as a secondary test.198 
Recital 10 of the ECMR provides some further guidance on the extraterritorial 
applicability of EC merger control by stating: 
‘…where the aggregate turnover of the undertakings concerned exceeds 
given thresholds; that is the case irrespective of whether or not the 
undertakings effecting the concentration have their seat or their principal 
                                                 
196 Op. cit. note 14. For a comprehensive discussion of the EC merger control regime see 
M. Furse, The Law of Merger Control in the EC and the UK (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2007). 
197 Article 1(2) Regulation 139/2004, op. cit. note 14. 
198 Article 1(2) and (3) of Regulation 139/2004, op. cit. note 14. 
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fields of activity in the Community, provided they have substantial 
operations there’. 
 
In practical terms, it is clear that the ‘Community dimension’ test provides the 
Commission with broad jurisdiction to investigate and render decisions with 
regard to all types of proposed concentrations, irrespective of their national base 
of operations. EC merger control prohibits the consummation of the merger 
during the period of review,199 and has a comparable two phase review period to 
that of US antitrust. International convergence on the differing stages of merger 
control is considered in detail infra at 5.5. 
 
2.6.9 The interaction of domestic merger control regimes on the international stage is a 
particularly interesting area of international antitrust for several reasons. Firstly 
perhaps due to the large sums involved, there is often media coverage and 
unusually high public awareness of the commercial behaviour that is subject to 
antitrust scrutiny. Secondly, international mergers have the potential to involve a 
‘national champion’ dimension, which can complicate the legal and economic 
process and assessment with public interest considerations and political 
intervention.200 If undertakings become regarded as national representatives on 
the international stage, it creates tension and scepticism between antitrust 
authorities as to the rationale underlying clearance or prohibition decisions. 
Clearly the international merger control framework, i.e. the interaction of 
domestic merger control regimes, creates a great potential for conflict between 
                                                 
199 Op. cit. note 14 at Article 7. 
200 For a discussion of the interaction between merger control and industrial policy see J. Galloway, op. cit. 
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authorities, perhaps due to the juxtaposition of international markets and national 
interests.  
 
It is these considerations that led to the notoriety of many Commission decisions 
such as the conditional clearance of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger,201 
the prohibition decision and subsequent court case involving the proposed 
Gencor/Lonrho merger,202 and the controversial prohibition of the merger 
between General Electric and Honeywell.203 While some of these cases will be 
considered in further detail at later stages of this thesis, it is the decision of the 
Court of First Instance in Gencor204 that completes the discussion of 
extraterritoriality in EC antitrust. 
 
2.6.10 Gencor concerned a proposed merger between the platinum and rhodium mining 
interests of Gencor and Lonrho Platinum Division (LPD) in South Africa. Both 
Gencor and LPD were incorporated companies under South African law, although 
LPD was a subsidiary of Lonrho, a UK incorporated company. These companies 
already had significant market shares in the platinum metals market, and would 
effectively form a duopoly with the market leader, Anglo-American, post-merger. 
The South African antitrust authorities cleared the transaction and stated a 
preference for a post-merger duopoly, to the pre-merger situation of single-firm 
                                                 
201 [1997] O.J. L336/16. 
202 Case IV/M 619, [1997] O.J. L11/30, [1999] 4 CMLR 1076 and subsequently Case T-102/96 Gencor Ltd. 
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First Instance rulings on 14 December 2005 in Cases T-209/01 Honeywell v. Commission [2005] ECR II-
5527 and T-210/01 General Electric v. Commission [2005] ECR II-5575.  
204 Op. cit. note 202. 
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dominance, i.e. Anglo-American was dominant. The European Commission then 
reviewed the proposed concentration and ruled that the resultant duopoly would 
have a negative and anti-competitive impact upon sales within the EC, and that 
the concentration would lead to the strengthening of a collective dominant 
position and it was thus incompatible with the common market. The Commission 
prohibited the merger. On appeal before the CFI, Gencor argued that: i) the 
Commission had no jurisdiction under the ECMR as the activities involved took 
place in South Africa, and thus did not meet the ‘substantial operations’ 
requirement outlined in Recital [10]; also that ii) if the Commission could seize 
jurisdiction under the ECMR, then that should be declared unlawful due to its 
incompatibility with the territoriality principle under public international law. The 
Court was unconvinced by Gencor’s assertions.205 The CFI upheld the 
Commission prohibition, and unexpectedly addressed the question of 
extraterritoriality directly, in spite of the possibility of asserting jurisdiction on the 
basis of LPD being a subsidiary of Lonrho, which was based within the 
Community. In general terms, the CFI held that the Article 1 Community 
dimension test was sufficient to assert jurisdiction, and stated that by satisfying 
the turnover thresholds due to sales within the EC, the merging parties satisfied 
the ‘substantial operations’ requirement of Recital 11 of Regulation 4064/89 (now 
Recital 10 of Reg. 139/2004). Additionally, the sales formed the basis for finding 
that the ‘implementation’ test established by the ECJ in Wood Pulp I,206 had been 
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satisfied in this case. In responding to Gencor’s plea regarding compatibility with 
the territoriality principle under public international law, the CFI held: 
‘Application of the Regulation is justified under public international law 
when it is foreseeable that a proposed concentration will have an 
immediate and substantial effect within the [EC]…It is therefore necessary 
to verify whether the three criteria of immediate, substantial and 
foreseeable effect are satisfied in this case’.207
 
The CFI concluded that the tripartite criteria was satisfied, and declared the 
application of the ECMR to be consistent with principles of public international 
law.208 The ruling again highlights similarities between the EC implementation 
doctrine and the US effects doctrine, particularly the test within the FTAIA. 
Clearly, the EC and US both recognise the legitimacy of extraterritoriality in 
antitrust as a means of protecting domestic markets from anti-competitive 
behaviour, and ensure that the globalisation of trade cannot circumvent the 
application of domestic antitrust laws.209  
 
 
2.7  Combating effects 
2.7.1 The general notion of extraterritoriality in antitrust has always tended to receive 
criticism with claims that there can be no basis for jurisdiction under international 
law. Such claims have consistently been dismissed by the US judiciary since the 
Supreme Court decision in International Shoe210 in 1945, which facilitated the 
                                                 
207 Op. cit. note 202 at paragraphs 90 and 92. 
208 Op. cit. note 202, at paragraph 101. 
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development of the effects doctrine along with the Alcoa211 case in the same year. 
Nonetheless, the legality of extraterritoriality under international law is not as 
beyond doubt as the US court rulings suggest. It becomes necessary to draw a 
distinction between jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce (the latter 
was highlighted as problematic by AG Mayras in Dyestuffs), and while the notion 
of extraterritoriality can encompass both types, its legality under international law 
can depend upon which type of jurisdiction is being exercised. The reason for the 
distinction is that a state’s ability to assert jurisdiction has restrictions imposed by 
international law, and in exercising enforcement jurisdiction there can often be a 
disregard of these restrictions. The Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) discussed the restrictions upon a state when exercising jurisdiction in its 
judgment in the case of the S.S. ‘Lotus’ in 1927: 
‘the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a 
state is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – it 
may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state. In 
this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a 
state outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from 
international custom or from a convention. It does not, however, follow 
that international law prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction in its 
own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken 
place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of 
international law…this is certainly not the case under international law as 
it stands at present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the 
effect that states may not extend the application of their laws and the 
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their 
territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which 
is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, 
every state remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and 
most suitable…In these circumstances all that can be required of a state is 
that it should not overstep the limits which international law places upon 
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its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in 
its sovereignty’.212
 
The judgment clearly allows for the possibility of a judicial decision seizing 
jurisdiction on the basis of effects within a territory emanating from outside, 
under international law Although it is less certain whether the judgment allows for 
the enforcement of such a decision against persons and/or property based outside 
the territory, i.e. enforcement jurisdiction, it may be that attempting to assert 
enforcement jurisdiction would be to ignore the limitations upon a state’s 
jurisdiction as envisaged by the PCIJ.213
 
2.7.2 In the absence of authoritative comment to the contrary, focus again shifts to the 
PCIJ judgment, which suggests enforcement jurisdiction can only be exercised on 
the basis of the territoriality principle. The US would presumably argue that the 
effects doctrine is based upon the territoriality principle, and hence when 
enforcing judgments rendered by virtue of that principle, there is no conflict with 
international law. The problem however, is not how the US regards application of 
the effects doctrine, but how other states regard the extraterritorial application of 
US domestic law, again requiring the distinction between prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction. The exercise of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction 
by the US was certainly criticised by many and met with hostile amicus curiae 
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briefs, yet it was only when the US tried to exercise extraterritorial enforcement 
jurisdiction that there was a fierce defensive reaction by many states, causing 
legislative responses, known as blocking statutes. 
 
2.7.3 Extraterritorial assertions of enforcement jurisdiction are obviously couched in 
different terminology. Zanettin provides clear examples: the discovery of 
information; notification and service of process; and enforcement of sanctions and 
remedies214 are all well established facets of the domestic legal process, but which 
can nonetheless cause international disputes when involving a foreign subject. 
These activities, the first and third in particular, are distinct from extraterritorial 
assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction in the sense that while the latter may in 
principle infringe the sovereignty of a foreign state, no physical act encroaches 
upon the territory of another. The three facets above can, however, represent 
assertions of jurisdiction by one state within the territory of another, and thus the 
potential for diplomatic confrontation. The discovery of information is clearly an 
essential stage in investigations by any state body, and particularly important for 
antitrust authorities given the need to gather information on commercial activities 
and market effects. The US courts allow for formal requests for information to be 
served on firms since Alcoa. It is important to note that such requests are made by 
virtue of a court ruling in the investigative state, and without any formal or 
implied recognition in the state where the information is located. Such formal 
requests, when served on foreign firms that are the subject of antitrust 
                                                 
214 Op. cit. note 8 at pp.42-49 where Zanettin discusses the problems of these stages in a case with an 
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investigations, have resulted in many states passing blocking legislation in order 
to prevent the firms being compelled to disclose information by the US judiciary.  
 
2.7.4 The first blocking statute was likely passed in Canada. The Business Records 
Protection Act was passed by the Province of Ontario in 1947, and was in 
response to a US court ruling.215 The US court ordered Canadian newsprint 
companies to produce documents in compliance with grand jury subpoenas, which 
were issued in a US antitrust investigation into the Canadian paper industry. The 
defensive nature, i.e. protection of territory and sovereignty, of the 1947 Act is 
clear from the following extract:  
‘No person shall, pursuant to or under or in a manner consistent with 
compliance with any requirement, order, direction or subpoena of any 
legislative, administrative or judicial authority in any jurisdiction outside 
Ontario, take or cause to be taken, send or cause to be sent or remove or 
cause to be removed from a point in Ontario to a point outside Ontario, 
any account, balance sheet, profit and loss statement or inventory or any 
resume or digest thereof or any other record, statement, report, or material 
in any way relating to any business carried on in Ontario…’.216
 
The Act provided for exceptions to the general prohibition in s.1, although these 
were of a strict nature and did not detract from the strong protection for business 
in Ontario from US court rulings. The rationale behind the legislation was clear 
when Premier Drew of Ontario highlighted concerns regarding the implication 
that the US government has the: ‘…right…to invade the territorial integrity of 
Canada without application to the Canadian Government, to any Canadian Court, 
or to any established channel of international representation in regard to 
                                                 
215 In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian International Paper Company, 73 F. 
Supp. 1013 (1947). 
216 Extract sourced from A.V. Lowe, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction; an annotated collection of legal 
materials, (Grotius Publications, 1983) at p.101. 
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international business’.217 Although the 1947 Act may have been the first statute 
passed to prevent foreign discovery, it was certainly not the last. Subsequent 
legislative measures included: the Dutch Article 39 of the Economic Competition 
Act in 1956; the Quebecoise Business Concerns Records Act 1964; the Australian 
Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976; the South 
African Protection of Business Act 1978; the New Zealand Evidence Amendment 
Act 1980; the Philippines Presidential Decree No.1718 of 1980;218 and the UK 
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980. The magnitude of international unrest at 
US extraterritorial assertions of enforcement jurisdiction during this period is 
clear. 
 
2.7.5 The third facet of the legal process mentioned, enforcement of sanctions and 
remedies, in international cases also produced retaliatory measures. The 
particularly controversial aspect of enforcement in this context is not the judgment 
itself but the sanction, i.e. fines or awards of damages against the foreign firm. 
The controversy is heightened due to the existence of treble damages in US 
antitrust, which is of course of a punitive nature. The response by certain states to 
assertions of enforcement jurisdiction by the US in this context, i.e. awards of 
multiple damages against non-US firms, represented a deepening of the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction dispute. Certain blocking statutes, notably s.6 of the 
                                                 
217 Quoted in April, ‘Blocking Statutes as a Response to the Extra-territorial Application of Law’, in C.J. 
Olmstead, op. cit. note 213, at p.225. 
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UK Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980,219 provided for the recovery of 
awards of multiple damages by a foreign court against a company incorporated in 
the legislating state. These ‘clawback’ provisions drew an unusually high level of 
criticism from the US Government and US legal scholars commenting that the 
provisions enabled ‘clawback’ without an assessment of the jurisdictional basis 
upon which the ruling awarding multiple damages was based.220 That particular 
point does not appeared to have been adequately rebutted, although the 1980s 
ushered in a period of less controversy and greater cooperation in international 
antitrust, and the blocking statutes quickly diminished in importance. 
 
 
2.8 Flawed unilateralism 
2.8.1 The number and scale of the diplomatic disputes as a result of US 
extraterritoriality can be easily under-estimated, indeed a US antitrust 
enforcement official once noted that: ‘there have been five diplomatic protests of 
US antitrust cases for every instance of express diplomatic support, and three 
blocking statutes for every co-operation agreement’.221 On reflection the hostile 
foreign reaction to US extraterritoriality did not accomplish a great deal. Neither 
the 1947 Ontario blocking statute nor later legislation can be said to have altered 
the direction of US antitrust, nor the development of the effects doctrine to a 
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significant extent. Referring to 2.3.5 - 2.4.4 supra, while the Timberlane222 and 
Mannington Mills223 cases adopted a balancing approach taking international 
comity concerns into consideration, the Supreme Court decision in Hartford 
Fire224 reversed this approach and exemplified two points. Firstly, comity 
concerns do not have a significant bearing upon the outcome of US antitrust 
cases, and secondly the US government and antitrust authorities are somewhat 
limited in their ability to alter the development of the effects doctrine by the 
judiciary.225 Therefore, even if the US government took account of foreign, and 
indeed some domestic, criticism, it would require legislation to alter the 
extraterritorial effect of antitrust given the prevalence of private enforcement in 
the US. By the 1970s it was obvious that in order to alter the unilateralist antitrust 
approach adopted by the US since the mid-1940s, another factor with the potential 
to harm US interests would have to emerge. 
  
For a long period the US was the sole jurisdiction adopting extraterritoriality in 
antitrust enforcement, as other states either had no antitrust regime or did not 
adopt an extraterritorial approach. Thus, US firms were not subject to foreign 
antitrust enforcement. The US authorities were the only authorities subjecting 
international markets to antitrust scrutiny and could ignore foreign protests as no 
other state presented a challenge to US interests. However, once other states 
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adopted antitrust laws and altered their position to apply those laws with 
extraterritorial effect, US firms became subject to both US and foreign antitrust 
laws. Multiple antitrust authorities created the clear potential for ‘regulatory 
overlap’ and surely represented a threat to US interests. Arguably it is the growth 
of antitrust, and the increasing acceptance of extraterritoriality that forced the US 
to abandon its unilateralist approach to antitrust. 
 
2.8.2 Trade liberalisation pursued through the GATT, and linked increases in the 
globalisation of trade effectively brought about the circumstances whereby states 
other than the US had to reconsider their view on the legality of extraterritorial 
application of antitrust law. In light of rises in cross-border trade since the late 
1940s, certain states probably feared for the effectiveness of their enforcement 
regimes and the sovereignty of their territorial borders by the 1970s. World Trade 
import values rose from $63.275 billion in 1948 to $286.9 billion just 20 years 
later, and doubled to $591.244 billion a mere five years after that in 1973.226 Rises 
in cross-border trade, coupled with increasing foreign investment, lead to greater 
economic dependency and integration in the industrialised world. These 
consequences highlight the practical limitations of antitrust when jurisdiction was 
strictly limited to territory. As Yergin and Stanislaw state: ‘Borders – fundamental 
to the exercise of national power – are eroded as markets are integrated’.227 Hence 
in order to effectively scrutinise cross-border trade, the antitrust authorities could 
                                                 
226 Trading figures sourced from the 1976 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 
Volume 1, Special Table A 
227 D. Yergin and J. Stanislaw, ‘The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the 
Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World’ in F.J. Lechner and J. Boli (Eds), The Globalization 
Reader (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2000) at p.220.  
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no longer be strictly confined to national borders since the commercial behaviour 
was not. The subsequent recognition and use of extraterritoriality by antitrust 
authorities such as the European Commission was significant as it ended the 
‘monopoly’ the US had held whilst presiding over international antitrust for 
decades.  
 
2.8.3 The US perhaps initially welcomed some foreign acceptance of extraterritoriality 
in the 1970s, although this may have diminished with the realisation that foreign 
application of extraterritoriality in antitrust cases resulted in foreign jurisdiction 
over US firms. The US cannot criticise the means of asserting jurisdiction by 
extraterritoriality, and thus cannot prevent its firms and interests being subject to 
investigation by foreign antitrust authorities for the first time. In terms of the 
development of international antitrust, the concern was not the damage to US 
interests, but it was the potential and increasing likelihood of ‘regulatory overlap’ 
in international antitrust. Furthermore in the absence of a multilateral framework 
there was no mechanism to resolve any resulting conflict between the 
extraterritorial applications of domestic antitrust law. In this context it is readily 
apparent that a unilateral approach to antitrust is flawed and destined to fail, or at 
least result in ongoing conflicts between jurisdictions. Regulation of a global 
market can be neither effective nor efficient when pursued unilaterally, and 
Evenett, Lehmann and Steil have succinctly commented: ‘As markets integrate 
 104
across national borders, the logic of purely national antitrust policy breaks 
down’.228
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
228 S.J. Evenett, A. Lehmann & B. Steil, (Eds), Antitrust Goes Global: What future for transatlantic 
cooperation? (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2000) at p.13. 
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3 
Increasing the risk of conflict and the advent of bilateral agreements 
 
 
3.1 The growth of antitrust 
3.1.1 It can be convincingly argued that the increased acceptance of extraterritoriality as 
a necessary tool for effective antitrust enforcement is a corollary to the increasing 
globalisation of trade. Antitrust authorities are willing to apply their rules with 
extraterritorial effect due to an awareness that commercial behaviour (including 
that with anti-competitive effects) taking place beyond their jurisdiction’s 
territorial borders can be implemented and have effects upon markets and 
commerce in the jurisdiction. Perhaps reinforcing the willingness of antitrust 
authorities to intervene in de facto external activity are the clearly visible ‘ripples’ 
felt as a result of the integration of market economies. The ability of activity in 
one jurisdiction to adversely impact upon a geographically distant and detached 
jurisdiction is no longer a disputed and unfamiliar concept. The endorsement of 
extraterritoriality as a tool for antitrust enforcement can be characterised as a 
pragmatic development in light of the globalisation of trade and the visible ripple 
effects stemming from integration of market economies. Indeed Zanettin 
exemplifies this point when discussing the Canadian view of extraterritoriality, 
noting that it became obvious to antitrust officials ‘that the refusal of the effects 
doctrine was no longer consistent with economic realities’.1 There is also 
evidence2 suggesting that globalisation of trade and market integration have been 
                                                 
1 B. Zanettin, Cooperation Between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, (Oxford and Portland, 
Hart Publishing, 2002) at p.23. 
2 Much of which is outlined in discussion of empirical analyses below, analyses that are supported by 
comparative study of the increasing ‘globalisation of trade’ (measured in this thesis by monetary values of 
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and remain important factors when a jurisdiction, previously without antitrust, 
decides to adopt rules of such a nature, i.e. both have contributed to the increasing 
acceptance as to the need for antitrust. 
 
3.1.2 Following an extensive empirical analysis, Palim comments that the shift from 
centrally managed economies to market based economies was ‘by far the most 
cited reason for the growth in competition law around the world’.3 This 
explanation is certainly pertinent when considering the adoption of antitrust rules 
in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, following the collapse of the USSR. The 
explanation does not however, offer a complete picture of the growth of antitrust 
beginning with the end of the Second World War onwards. Palim cites the 
international study by Corwin Edwards, ‘Control of Cartels and Monopolies: An 
International Comparison’, in 1967 as the ‘classic’ study of antitrust, where 
Edwards found that there were 24 jurisdictions in 1964 that made a ‘serious 
attempt to control restrictive practices by law’.4 Strangely Edwards did not 
include the (then) European Economic Community in his research. In a later 
article, according to Palim, Edwards concluded that from 1964 to 1973, only 
India, Pakistan and Luxembourg had joined the 24 jurisdictions with antitrust 
                                                                                                                                                 
national and global imports and exports) and the increasing use of antitrust (both in terms of the number of 
regimes and also its increasing application/enforcement in jurisdictions with antitrust). 
3 M.R.A. Palim, ‘The worldwide growth of competition law: an empirical analysis’ (1998) 43 Antitrust 
Bulletin 105 at p.112. 
4 Extract from C.D. Edwards, ‘Control of Cartels and Monopolies: An International Comparison’ (1967), 
cited in M.R.A. Palim, ibid. The 24 countries with antitrust in 1964 were: Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, South Africa, the UK, and the US. 
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rules.5 Information provided to the Global Competition Forum suggests that 
Lebanon made a prima facie attempt to regulate monopolies and protect against 
excessive prices in 1967,6 and it may be that there was insufficient substance in 
the provisions for Edwards to include Lebanon in his second study. There was a 
steady increase in the number of antitrust regimes between Edwards’ second study 
and the rapid growth of the 1990s discussed by Palim. Chile established rules for 
the defence of free competition with Decree Law No.211 of 1973, South Korea 
enacted the Price Stability and Fair Trade Act in 1975, and Greece passed 
legislation controlling monopolies and protecting free competition in 1977. El 
Salvador promulgated Article 110 of its Constitution prohibiting monopolistic 
practices in order to guarantee free enterprise and protect consumers by Decree 
No.38 in 1983. The Philippines included prohibitions upon certain monopolies 
and combinations in restraint of trade by virtue of s.19 of Article XII of its 1987 
Constitution, although Palim suggests that the Philippines had antitrust provisions 
as early as 1956,7 conflicting with Edwards. Sri Lanka established a Fair Trading 
Commission, also in 1987. Cyprus adopted The Protection of Competition Law 
No. 207 in 1989.8 Including the (then) EEC, these jurisdictions raised the number 
of antitrust regimes to at least 35. In addition, Palim points out that Guatemala 
adopted antitrust rules in 1970, Thailand in 1979, Portugal in 1983, Kenya in 
                                                 
5 Edwards, ‘The Future of Competition Policy: A World View’, (1974) 14 Cal Man Rev 112, cited in 
M.R.A. Palim, op. cit. note 3. 
6 Law No. 31 for the year 1967 granting the Government authority to combat high prices and monopolies 
by Promulgating Decrees, followed by Promulgating Decree No.32 of 1967 on anti-monopoly and high 
prices. See the Global Competition Forum website: www.globalcompetitionforum.org, which was created 
and is maintained by the International Bar Association. 
7 M.R.A. Palim, op. cit. note 3 at p.109, footnote 15. 
8 Information on this sporadic growth of antitrust through the 1970s and 80s has been primarily sourced 
from the Global Competition Forum website, op. cit. note 6. 
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1988 and Gabon in 1989.9 This would suggest that there were at least 40 antitrust 
regimes in existence before the antitrust explosion in the 1990s. 
 
3.1.3 The 1990s antitrust explosion is demonstrated by the number of regimes 
exceeding 70 by the end of 1996,10 an increase of 84% in the 7 years from 1989 to 
1996 and remarkable given that the increase in the previous 25 years was 58%. 
Current estimates suggest that the number of antitrust regimes now exceeds 100.11 
Not every antitrust regime includes provisions for merger control, although the 
number with merger control is still high at around 80 jurisdictions, discussed infra 
at chapter 5.12 The significant number of antitrust authorities, creates a similarly 
significant ‘regulatory’ problem. The modern nature of the commercial activity 
that can concern antitrust authorities is borderless, particularly since the gradual 
breaking down of trade barriers through the GATT and then the WTO. 
Additionally, with the increasing acceptance of extraterritoriality and greater 
number of antitrust regimes, there is clear potential for overlap of enforcement 
activities. Merger control is a particularly sensitive area of overlap, where there is 
potential for conflicting decisions and significant burdens upon merging firms as a 
result of multi-jurisdictional merger review. In light of industrial policy 
                                                 
9 Op. cit. note 3. 
10 See M.R.A. Palim, op. cit. note 3, and information of the Global Competition Forum website, op. cit. 
note 6. 
11 A.B. Lipsky Jr, ‘The global antitrust explosion: safeguarding trade and commerce or runaway 
regulation?’ (2002) Summer/Fall Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 59 at p.60. Also, R. Whish, Competition 
Law, (5th Ed, London, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) at p.782. 
12 R. Whish, ibid. at p.782, referring to J.W. Rowley and A.N. Campbell, ‘Multi-jurisdictional Merger 
Review – Is It Time for a Common Form Filing Treaty?’ in Policy Directions for Global Merger Review 
(Global Competition Review, 1999). Also, see speech by D.P. Majoras, former Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, Antitrust Division, US DOJ, to the BIICL 2nd Annual Merger Control Conference, 2nd December 
2003, London. 
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implications that can often stem from M&A, there can be additional political and 
trade-related dimensions to merger review, which can further complicate the 
matter. The international enforcement overlap in all areas of antitrust, which 
potentially increases in size and significance with each new antitrust regime, has a 
direct bearing on the effectiveness, efficiency and logic of adopting a unilateral 
approach to antitrust enforcement by any authority. As stated by the former 
European Commissioner for Competition, Karl van Miert: ‘…owing to the 
progressive disappearance of borders, behaviour of companies which may be 
contrary to the competition rules can affect several countries at the same time; this 
could lead to conflicts between competition authorities on the remedies to be 
adopted…’.13 In the current transnational world of trade, with the increasing 
number of antitrust authorities causing a greater likelihood of conflicting or even 
irreconcilable decisions, unilateral enforcement is flawed in cases with an 
international dimension. 
 
 
3.2 Problematic divergence 
3.2.1 Before progressing to outline and comment upon the tentative moves away from 
unilateralism in antitrust, which inter alia, aim to lessen the risk of conflict 
between antitrust authorities, one further factor must be discussed that heightens 
that risk. There is a varying degree of divergence between many jurisdictions 
regarding the purpose, scope and importance of antitrust law. The divergence can 
sometimes be reflected within terminology, while the thesis adopts ‘antitrust’ as a 
                                                 
13 Competition Policy in the New Trade Order, (European Commission Report, 1995) at p.4. 
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generic term, many jurisdictions will use other terms such as ‘competition law’, 
‘fair trading law’, ‘laws against restrictive practices’, or even ‘laws against unfair 
competition’. The differing terminology may or may not also reflect more 
substantive differences. It is unnecessary to assess the reasons and extent of 
differences between the terms and any related substantive difference between 
jurisdictions. This section will, however, consider the implications of underlying 
divergence between jurisdictions for efforts to minimise the risk of conflict in 
international antitrust. It appears clear that underlying divergence can exist at 
three distinct levels: policy; procedural; and/or substantive.14  
 
3.2.2 Any policy divergence between antitrust regimes can have obvious implications 
for hopes of avoiding conflict within particular cases. Policy objectives are 
relevant factors at the initial legislative design and development stage within 
jurisdictions and they are more subtly relevant at the enforcement stage, the latter 
taking both legislative interpretation and enforcement discretion into 
consideration. At the legislative development stage, essentially when a 
government is considering the structure of the antitrust regime and powers of the 
antitrust authority, there would ordinarily be a clear rationale for the adoption of 
antitrust rules15 and their desired effect would be clear. At the later enforcement 
stage, policies can manifest themselves in decisions taken when implementing 
                                                 
14 Discussion regarding multilateral initiatives in international antitrust in general, and merger control in 
particular infra at chapters 4 and 5 respectively, highlights the extent of current convergence efforts with 
regards to each of these three levels. 
15 As an example of potential policy divergence, the reasons for adopting antitrust rules likely differs 
between developed and developing countries, and different reasons underlie the implementation of antitrust 
rules within the EC and US. Indeed, it may be that each jurisdiction has distinct reasons, perhaps even 
subtle differences, for adopting an antitrust regime.   
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antitrust rules and/or in the interpretation of those rules.16 Policy at this stage can 
affect the importance attached to antitrust within a particular jurisdiction, 
demonstrated by such factors as the resources made available to the antitrust 
authority, and the jurisdictional enforcement activity. Additionally, policy 
objectives undoubtedly impact upon the exercise of discretion17 by antitrust 
authorities. The potential impact of policy objectives upon enforcement strategies 
and decisions in individual cases makes avoiding conflict in international antitrust 
a complex and ongoing issue. Policies and priorities can alter over a relatively 
short period of time, e.g. when a new minister or government takes office,18 and it 
is not always easy to identify or confirm when a policy shift takes place.  
 
Procedural divergence can stem from the structure of the antitrust regime, e.g. 
whether a one or two phase merger review process is adopted, or the procedural 
rules and guidance adopted by the antitrust authority. Procedural divergence 
between antitrust regimes is arguably less likely to lead to direct conflict between 
authorities than policy or substantive differences. Procedural divergence could 
nonetheless result in a greater burden upon the firms that are subject to multi-
                                                 
16 Policy can be a consideration in judicial, as well as administrative, antitrust decisions, as demonstrated in 
the EC by the teleological approach adopted by the Court of Justice. The ECJ has often been said to be 
giving effect to the wider goals of the EU when interpreting the EC competition provisions, e.g. see 
discussion in J. Galloway, ‘The pursuit of national champions: the intersection of competition law and 
industrial policy’ (2007) 28 ECLR 172. 
17 For detailed analysis of the use of discretion in antitrust, see chapter 4 in M.M. Dabbah, The 
Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
18 As an example: a change of leadership within an independent antitrust authority could bring about a 
change of priorities and set a new enforcement strategy, and equally, a change of government can impact 
upon the doctrinal approach and enforcement strategies of an antitrust authority. For a discussion of the 
lessening impact of political change upon US antitrust enforcement by the US DOJ and FTC, see J.B. 
Baker, ‘Competition policy as a political bargain’, (2006) 73 Antitrust L.J. 483, and R. Pitofsky, ‘Past, 
present and future antitrust enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission’ (2005) 72 University of Chicago 
Law Review 209. 
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jurisdictional antitrust enforcement, and also diminish the ability of antitrust 
authorities to engage in effective cooperation. As will be discussed infra at 
chapters 4 and 5, there have been significant multilateral efforts to achieve greater 
procedural convergence in international antitrust. 
 
Any points of divergence existing at the substantive level are perhaps the most 
challenging for a number of reasons. Substantive divergence can be the result of 
differing legislation, binding rules or case-law regarding legal standards, the 
investigatory powers, or the penalties for infringement. Substantive divergence is 
inherently more difficult to remedy as legislative changes would likely be 
required. To achieve greater substantive convergence between antitrust 
jurisdictions, political will is required as well as engagement in lengthy legislative 
processes. The prospect of consultation procedures and inevitable lobbying ensure 
that any substantive divergence existing between jurisdictions is difficult to 
reconcile, particularly if legal traditions are taken into consideration.19 Given that 
divergence can exist at any or all of these levels, at varying degrees, between the 
world’s many antitrust regimes, the likelihood of conflict in international antitrust 
is increased. It is necessary to consider the initiatives that have tried to diminish or 
manage the risk, and this moves the thesis to consider the ‘second face’ of 
international antitrust, bilateralism in the context of cooperation agreements.20 In 
                                                 
19 Legal traditions can have a bearing upon, inter alia, whether decision-making is judicial or 
administrative, whether regulators are independent of government, whether sanctions for breach of antitrust 
rules include those of a penal and criminal nature, and whether there can be individual liability. Such 
factors can lead to divergence and are not easily reconcilable given that legal traditions are often associated 
with the very culture of a state and far more deep-rooted than policy choices. 
20 Note that bilateralism in the context of enforcement cooperation will be considered in relation to merger 
review infra at 5.4. 
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order to appreciate the impact of bilateral agreements upon international antitrust 
as a whole, and not merely the impact on the relationship between the 
jurisdictions involved, it is necessary to undertake a detailed comparative 
assessment of the principal agreements in place. A detailed comparative 
assessment is also necessary to investigate why such agreements tend to take 
place at a bilateral and not multilateral level. 
 
 
3.3 From unilateralism to bilateralism: the advent of antitrust cooperation agreements 
3.3.1 ‘As business concerns have increasingly pursued foreign trade and 
investment opportunities, antitrust compliance issues have arisen which 
transcend national borders and have led antitrust authorities in the affected 
jurisdictions to communicate, cooperate, and coordinate their efforts to 
achieve compatible enforcement results’.21  
 
The rationale for communicating, co-operating and co-ordinating to ensure 
compatible results, is the realisation that in the globalised context of commercial 
activity, reaching incompatible or irreconcilable decisions is an ineffective 
method of antitrust enforcement.22 The widespread recognition of the need for 
cooperation mechanisms between antitrust authorities is normally reflected within 
some form of agreement between either states or the antitrust authorities 
themselves. The historical model for bilateral agreements is peculiarly a 
multilateral instrument. In 1967, two decades after the failure of the Havana 
Charter and the ITO, members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) reached agreement on a ‘Recommendation’ prescribing 
                                                 
21 J.J. Parisi, ‘Enforcement Cooperation Among Antitrust Authorities’ (1999) 20 ECLR 133 at p.133. 
22 See discussion supra in chapter 2, particularly 2.8 
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basic principles of cooperation between member countries on restrictive business 
practices affecting international trade.23 OECD Recommendations adopted by its 
governing Council are effectively non-binding instruments that are subject to 
member countries’ domestic law.24 The principles within the 1967 
Recommendation on antitrust cooperation were expanded in 1973,25 consolidated 
in 1979,26 and further developed in 198627 and 1995.28 Additionally, there is a 
1998 Recommendation dealing exclusively with cartel activity,29 a 2005 
Recommendation concerning merger review,30 and other specialised 
Recommendations.31  
 
3.3.2 The consolidated 1995 Recommendation outlines the features of modern 
cooperation between antitrust authorities and advances many key principles, 
which are also implemented in most bilateral cooperation agreements. The 
fundamental and most basic requirement in the 1995 Recommendation is that 
                                                 
23 OECD: Council Recommendation Concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on Restrictive 
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, 5th October 1967, reprinted in A.V. Lowe, 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction; an annotated collection of legal materials, (Grotius Publications, 1983) at 
p.243. 
24 See OECD competition homepage:  
http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_37463_1_1_1_1_37463,00.html.  
25 OECD: Council Recommendation Concerning Consultation and Conciliation Procedure on Restrictive 
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, 3rd July 1973, reprinted in A.V. Lowe, Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction; an annotated collection of legal materials, (Grotius Publications, 1983) at p.244. 
26 OECD: Council Recommendation Concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on Restrictive 
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, 25th September 1979, C(79)154/Final. 
27 OECD: Council Recommendation Concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on Restrictive 
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, C(86)44/Final. 
28 OECD: Council Recommendation Concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on 
Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, 27th July 1995, C(95)130/Final. 
29 OECD: Council Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 25th March 
1998, C(98)35/Final. 
30 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review, 25 March 2005 – C(2005)34, discussed in 
more detail infra at 5.5. 
31 All current OECD Recommendations are available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,2340,en_2649_37463_4599739_1_1_1_37463,00.html.  
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OECD member countries should notify counterparts when initiating an antitrust 
investigation or proceeding that could affect the ‘important interests’ of other 
member countries, and with such notice to enable the affected country to 
comment on the investigation.32 It is highlighted however, that notification will 
not restrict the freedom of the investigating country to make the final decision in 
the case, i.e. notification does not impact upon the sovereignty of the jurisdictions 
involved. Notification has become a fundamental principle in international 
antitrust, and is designed to avoid much of the hostility to extraterritorial antitrust 
enforcement encountered in the 1950s through to 1980s.33 The assumption 
appears to be that information sharing regarding ongoing proceedings and 
opportunities for affected jurisdictions to comment would make any conflict more 
amicable. Notification can therefore be regarded as an expression of the 
traditional principle of comity.34 Other principles such as coordination of 
enforcement activity and exchange of information are also specified in the 1995 
Recommendation. The former urges coordination when two or more Member 
countries proceed against an anti-competitive practice in international trade, 
insofar as it is appropriate and practicable.35 The latter principle encourages the 
sharing of information relevant to concurrent investigations, subject to the 
significant caveat that legitimate interests must be protected, as well as 
safeguarding confidentiality.36 In practice, domestic legislation and the 
                                                 
32 OECD 1995 Recommendation, op. cit. note 28, at Section A, Article 1. 
33 Discussed supra at 2.4 and 2.7. 
34 See B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 1 at p.54. 
35 OECD 1995 Recommendation, op. cit. note 28, at Section A, Article 2. 
36 OECD 1995 Recommendation, op. cit. note 28, at Section A, Article 3. 
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requirement of consent to disclose commercially sensitive information37 are the 
two main barriers to the exchange of information in relevant situations. There are 
many other situations however, where antitrust authorities can assist counterparts 
by locating and obtaining information from each others’ territory.  
 
The second section within the 1995 Recommendation outlines further principles 
on consultation and conciliation during international antitrust investigations. 
Member countries whose important interests could be affected by the antitrust 
investigation of a counterpart are encouraged to submit their views on the 
situation to the investigating country (the ‘addressed country’) or possibly request 
a consultation to discuss the case. Furthermore, addressed countries are urged to 
give ‘full and sympathetic consideration’ to any views expressed by the 
requesting country. Protection of important interests, outlined in Article 4 of the 
Recommendation, is the first situation that can justify submitting views to or 
requesting consultation with the addressed country. A second situation is outlined 
in Article 5 whereby Member countries can consult in order to remedy anti-
competitive practices by firms situated in other Member countries. Article 5 
recommends that if the addressed country accepts that firms situated in its 
territory are engaged in anti-competitive practices, harmful to the interests of the 
requesting country, then it should attempt to remedy the anti-competitive effect, if 
possible to do so. This recommendation is known as positive comity. 
 
                                                 
37 See discussion infra at 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 regarding confidentiality waivers in multi-jurisdictional merger 
review. 
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The remaining part of the 1995 Recommendation encourages cooperation and 
coordination to reach compatible and mutually acceptable results in particular 
cases,38 and suggests Member countries should use ‘the good offices of the 
Competition Law and policy Committee’ of the OECD to facilitate conciliation if 
they cannot agree a solution.39 If Member countries are able to agree a solution to 
an international antitrust problem, Article 7 urges that the Members involved 
inform the Competition Law and Policy Committee of the OECD of the problem 
and how a solution was found, presumably this is an attempt at a sharing of best 
practices. There is little information to suggest that either of these provisions are 
used in practice. 
 
3.3.3 The OECD Recommendation was not the first initiative aimed at avoiding 
bilateral antitrust disputes. The US and Canada had already committed themselves 
to trying to avoid, or at least minimise, disagreements with the Fulton-Rogers 
understanding of 1959.40 The understanding sought to establish a channel of 
communication for notification and consultation mechanisms, but it cannot be 
accurately described as enabling enforcement cooperation,41 although it clearly 
laid the foundation for the landmark 1967 OECD Recommendation. A bizarre 
characteristic of international antitrust, that will be considered further towards the 
end of the chapter, is the prevalence of bilateral cooperation agreements in spite 
                                                 
38 OECD 1995 Recommendation, op. cit. note 28, at Section B, Article 6. 
39 OECD 1995 Recommendation, op. cit. note 28, at Section B, Article 8. 
40 See B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 1, at p.53, footnote 3. Also see L. Fullerton and C.C. Mazard, ‘International 
Antitrust Cooperation Agreements’ (2001) 24 World Comp. 405 at 415 for further discussion of the 1959 
understanding. 
41 See Remarks by C.S. Stark, former Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, US 
Department of Justice, ‘Improving Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation’, Washington, D.C., 23 June 2000. 
 118
of the existence of the OECD Recommendation. Furthermore, while some OECD 
Member countries have concluded agreements with non-Member countries, which 
is pragmatic given that the 1995 Recommendation would be inapplicable, the vast 
majority of bilateral antitrust agreements are between existing Member countries. 
The US, Canada and increasingly Japan and Australia are OECD countries that 
also actively pursue antitrust cooperation agreements.  
 
 
3.4 Negotiating and implementing bilateral cooperation agreements 
3.4.1 The rationale for negotiating and entering into bilateral cooperation agreements, 
notwithstanding the existence of multilateral agreements like the OECD 
Recommendation, is twofold. Firstly, bilateral agreements merely re-iterating the 
OECD Recommendation have the effect of emphasising the bilateral relationship 
and diminishing the importance of the multilateral Recommendation, which may 
advance policies adopted by a particular government. Indeed, a preference for 
bilateral, as opposed to multilateral relations, may be a strong political view held 
by a government unwilling to cede, or give the impression of ceding any 
sovereign powers to a multilateral body. Secondly, and more importantly, bilateral 
agreements can be tailored to suit the specific bilateral relationship existing 
between the signatory states, and thereby facilitate the optimal level of 
cooperation achievable. Hence, in theory bilateral agreements should offer the 
best chance of avoiding conflict between certain states, as compared with a 
multilateral agreement which entails compromise by pursuing a common accord 
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between all signatory states. It is this rationale that in effect presents a key 
justification for the uptake of bilateral cooperation agreements in antitrust in spite 
of the potential for more advanced multilateral cooperation agreements. This can 
be seen as controversial as multilateral agreements could provide greater legal 
certainty to international firms that are subject to antitrust investigation, and 
reduce the risk of their ‘over-punishment’,42 whilst also combating the risk of 
conflict between antitrust authorities more efficiently. It is the increasing 
prevalence of bilateral cooperation agreements that has effectively relegated the 
status of the OECD Recommendation, from a potential multilateral antitrust 
cooperation agreement, to a model for bilateral agreements between Member 
countries. 
 
3.4.2 Bilateral cooperation agreements are often reached upon conclusion of a lengthy 
negotiation process and it can be argued that they are more formal than the non-
binding OECD Recommendation and that this element ensures greater reliance 
can be placed upon the agreement by the parties. Charles S. Stark provided an 
insight into bilateral agreements when he suggested: 
‘…there is no single template for antitrust cooperation. Each of [the US’] 
bilateral relationships has developed along a unique path, sometimes in 
ways neither party would have predicted. Each jurisdiction has its own 
laws, procedures, priorities, and legal cultures, and these and other factors 
take cooperation in different directions. [The US] objective is always to 
                                                 
42 See C. Canenbley and M. Rosenthal, ‘Cooperation Between Antitrust Authorities In – and Outside the 
EU: What Does It Mean for Multinational Corporations?: Part 2’ (2005) 26 ECLR 178 at p.186: ‘Neither 
the principles of international law, nor the cooperation agreements entered into by sovereign states have 
necessarily improved convergence in the application of competition law by different antitrust authorities’. 
Furthermore at p.183: ‘The risk of over-punishment is omnipresent in an increasingly global business 
environment triggering multiple prosecutions in all those jurisdictions where the allegedly anti-competitive 
behaviour had an effect’. 
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work with our partners as effectively as we can to accomplish our basic 
shared mission – sound and effective antitrust enforcement’.43  
 
Stark’s comments clearly support the view that bilateral agreements are tailor-
made to the specific relationship involved, and the detailed comparison 
undertaken below will test the veracity of his assertion. An initial assessment 
reveals that bilateral agreements tend to be between significant trading partners 
and tend to be limited to a relatively small number of jurisdictions, many of whom 
are OECD Member countries. Not all of the principal jurisdictions, which account 
for most of the agreements, have an agreement with each other, e.g. Australia 
does not have a bilateral cooperation agreement with the EC, but has two 
agreements with the US, and a tripartite arrangement with New Zealand and 
Canada.44 While the absence of such an agreement could be described as an 
anomaly, it could also be symptomatic of the characteristics of bilateral 
agreements as outlined by Stark, namely that they are peculiar to each bilateral 
relationship. Zanettin provides an excellent example of just such a peculiarity by 
citing the cooperation agreement between the EC and Canada, where it apparently 
took 4 years to draft and agree due to ‘linguistic obstacles’.45  
 
3.4.3 The negotiation and adoption of a bilateral agreement can also be influenced by 
the historical relationship between the two contracting states, demonstrated by the 
agreement between the US and Canada. The geographic and economic proximity 
of the US and Canada necessitated the development of what was probably the first 
                                                 
43 Op. cit. note 41. 
44 Discussed further infra. 
45 See B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 1, at p.68 and note 61. 
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bilateral antitrust relationship. Canada was one of the first states to be effected by 
US extraterritoriality, and was the first jurisdiction to enact a blocking statute in 
response.46 The Fulton-Rogers understanding of 1959 is discussed above, yet that 
was merely an initial attempt to defuse the heated antitrust disputes that arose 
between the US and Canada at that time. The Mitchell-Basford understanding of 
1969 followed, although the Canadian adoption of a new Competition Act in 1986 
was a significant development in the bilateral relationship at the time.47 A Mutual 
Legal Assistance Agreement between the two states was adopted in 1990, and a 
comprehensive bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement followed in 1995. In light 
of the development of the US – Canadian antitrust relationship it would be 
difficult to argue that the antitrust agreements are based on anything but the 
specific bilateral relationship involved, historically stemming from a Canadian 
defensive reaction to US extraterritoriality. In contrast, the 1976 bilateral antitrust 
cooperation agreement between the US and Germany did not arise from historical 
conflict, but was possible due to the strong degree of convergence between the 
two antitrust regimes. These agreements are mere examples in illustrating the 
historical ties that can underlie a bilateral antitrust agreement,48 although it is far 
from clear that differing reasons for adopting a bilateral agreement, result in 
different provisions within the principal agreements themselves.  
 
 
                                                 
46 See discussion supra at 2.7.4. 
47 See speech by Charles S. Stark, op. cit. note 41. 
48 Such as the Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Government of the French Republic Concerning Cooperation on Restrictive Practices, 28th May 1984. 
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3.5 The principal agreements49
3.5.1 There are two distinct types of antitrust cooperation that arguably may fall under 
the general category of bilateral antitrust agreement. The first is simply to be 
described as a bilateral antitrust agreement, which is a formal state-to-state 
cooperation agreement negotiated and adopted by governments. The second type 
is known as an agency-to-agency arrangement, which is concluded between 
antitrust authorities. Arguably the latter type should not be included under 
consideration of bilateral antitrust agreements, not only because of the intent to 
distinguish them from the former by using different terminology, but also as it is 
questionable whether they are binding upon the contracting authorities due to their 
more informal nature. Agency-to-agency arrangements may also be regarded as a 
precursor to negotiation of a full state-to-state cooperation agreement as they are 
normally shorter in length and far less detailed. While the current agency-to-
agency arrangements will be briefly discussed in this chapter, the focus will be on 
the principal state-to-state bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements that are 
currently in force. 
 
3.5.2 Perhaps the salient indicator of the apparent peculiarity of bilateral agreements, as 
discussed above, is their sporadic adoption by states. Examining when the states 
most active in this area entered into the agreements demonstrates the point. The 
                                                 
49 Tables of the principle agreements, with hyperlinks, are provided at the end of this chapter. Table 3.1 
provides a note of the state-to-state agreements that have been mentioned, and table 3.2 provides a note of 
the agency-to-agency arrangements that have also been mentioned. Also note that an earlier version of the 
remainder of the chapter (minus the tables) has appeared as a published article in J. Galloway, ‘Moving 
Towards a Template for Bilateral Antitrust Agreements’ (2005) 28 World Comp. 589. 
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US currently has bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements with 8 jurisdictions:50 
a cooperation agreement with Australia in 1982 and an advanced IAEAA 
agreement in 199951 also with Australia, which can also be described as a Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty (‘MLAT’) allowing for, inter alia, obtaining of evidence 
and sharing of information in criminal law enforcement.52 The US also entered 
into a bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement with Germany in 1976 and Canada 
in 1995, a landmark agreement was reached with the European Commission in 
1991 and a more advanced agreement on positive comity adopted in 1998. In a 
relative flurry of activity the US then concluded bilateral antitrust cooperation 
agreements with Brazil, Israel and Japan in 1999 and Mexico in 2000. The 
distinction between state-to-state agreements and agency-to-agency arrangements 
becomes relevant when considering both Australia and Canada. Australia 
currently has state-to-state agreements with the US and with New Zealand.53 
However the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has 
also entered into 6 agency-to-agency arrangements, tripartite arrangements with: 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom (2003);54 New Zealand and Canada 
                                                 
50 All US antitrust cooperation agreements are available at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/int_arrangements.htm.  
51 The US – Australian Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Agreement of 1999. 
52 An IAEAA agreement is facilitated by the US International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 
1994, Public Law 103-438, 108 Stat. 4597, and codified at 15 USC §§6201-6212 (1994). 
53 Cooperation and Coordination Agreement between the Australian Trade Practice Commission and New 
Zealand Commerce Commission regarding competition and consumer laws entered into in July 1994. For a 
fuller discussion of the Australian – New Zealand bilateral commercial relationship see discussion infra at 
5.4.5. 
54 Cooperation Arrangement between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the 
Commerce Commission in New Zealand and Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and 
the Office of Fair Trading in the United Kingdom Regarding the Application of their Competition and 
Consumer Laws. 
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(2000);55 and New Zealand and Taiwan (2002).56 The ACCC also has bilateral 
arrangements with: Fiji (2002);57 Korea (2002);58 and Taiwan (1996);59 and is 
currently in negotiations with the Japanese FTC.60 While the Australian tripartite 
arrangements are de facto not bilateral, they are included due to their shared 
purpose and similar content to bilateral arrangements, additionally the antitrust 
harmonisation achieved between the Australian and New Zealand regimes makes 
the tripartite arrangements unique in nature.61 Canada has the aforementioned 
state-to-state agreement with the US and an agency-to-agency arrangement with 
Australia and New Zealand, but also has state-to-state agreements with the EC 
(1999), Mexico (2001), and Japan (2005). In addition, Canada has agency-to-
agency arrangements with Chile (2001),62 the United Kingdom (2003),63 and 
more recently Korea.64 Japan65 has the aforementioned bilateral agreements with 
                                                 
55 Cooperation Arrangement between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the 
Commerce Commission in New Zealand and the Commissioner of Competition (Canada) Regarding the 
Application of their Competition and Consumer Laws. 
56 Cooperation Arrangement between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the 
Commerce Commission in New Zealand and the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC) Regarding the 
Application of their Competition and Fair Trading Laws. 
57 Cooperation Arrangement between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the 
Commerce Commission of the Fiji Islands Regarding the Application of their Competition and Consumer 
Laws. 
58Cooperation Arrangement between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Korea 
Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) Regarding the Application of their Competition and Consumer Laws.  
59 Cooperation Arrangement between the Australian Commerce and Industry Office and the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Office Regarding the Application of their Competition and Fair Trading Laws. 
60 See the ACCC press release of 14 May 2003, ‘ACCC and Japan Fair Trade Commission commence 
discussions on closer cooperation in competition issues’ (MR 098/03). 
61 See discussion infra at 5.4.5. 
62 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Commissioner of Competition (Canada) and the Fiscal 
Nacional Economico (Chile) Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws. 
63 Cooperation Arrangement Between the Commissioner of Competition (Canada) and Her Majesty’s 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Office of Fair Trading in the United Kingdom Regarding 
the Application of their Competition and Consumer Laws. 
64 Cooperation Arrangement between the Fair Trade Commission of the Government of the Republic of 
Korea and the Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau of the Government of Canada regarding 
the application of their competition and consumer laws. 
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the US and Canada, and is in negotiations with Australia, it also concluded an 
agreement with the EC in 2003 and included a competition chapter in a bilateral 
agreement with Singapore,66 and a competition agreement with Mexico in 2004 
under the auspices of a wider economic agreement.67 The EC has bilateral 
antitrust cooperation agreements with the US, Canada and Japan. France also 
entered into an arrangement with Taiwan in January 2004.68 Given the evidence 
of the sporadic adoption of bilateral antitrust agreements, and the often peculiar 
relationships involved that impact upon the negotiation of the agreements, 
bilateral agreements are prima facie unique to the relationship involved, and 
would not appear able to operate on a multilateral level.69 This impression could, 
however, be misleading.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
65 Note that only the principal antitrust agreements entered into by Japan, or the Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission (JFTC) are mentioned; for a full list of the Japanese antitrust agreements, and access to the 
text, see http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/internationalrelations/index.html.  
66 Chapter 5: Competition (Articles 15-25) of the Implementing Agreement Between the Government of 
Japan and the Government of the Republic of Singapore  Pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement Between 
Japan and the Republic of Singapore for a New-Age Economic Partnership. Note that under Article 22 the 
main provisions of chapter 5, i.e. the bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement, are effectively limited to the 
telecommunication, electricity and gas markets pending future adoption of more extensive antitrust 
legislation. Japan has recently concluded similar agreements with Mexico (2005), Malaysia (2006), the 
Philippines (2006), Thailand (2007), and Chile (2007), although these will not be considered further in this 
thesis given their limited status, these agreements can be accessed at: http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-
page/internationalrelations/index.html.  
67 Implementing agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Mexican 
States pursuant to Article 132 of the agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for the 
strengthening of the economic partnership. 
68 Cooperation Arrangement between the Taiwanese Fair Trade Commission and the French Competition 
Council Regarding the Application of their Competition Rules (‘Arrangement’), signed on 5th January 
2004.  
69 Note that there are several other bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements/arrangements in existence, and 
several pending, such as those entered into by the Korean FTC with the Mexican FCC (2004), and the 
Turkish competition authority (2005). Nonetheless the intent is to focus upon the principal agreements, and 
undertake a sufficiently robust comparison of key agreements to draw conclusions that likely apply to all, 
thus it is unnecessary (and unrealistic) to comment upon all agreements in detail.  
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3.6 Misleading impressions? 
3.6.1 The impression that bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements differ significantly 
from each other, and have minimal similarities with the 1995 OECD 
Recommendation is misleading as it fails to take into account the extensive 
convergence that has been achieved between bilateral agreements in matters of 
policy, procedure and substance. When comparing two of the earlier bilateral 
antitrust cooperation agreements, the US-Germany agreement in 1976 and the 
US-Australia agreement in 1982, there are some clear procedural and substantive 
differences. The US-Germany Agreement, for example, lacks coherence and 
clarity by dealing with issues of confidentiality and primacy of existing laws in 
more than one article. On the contrary, the US-Australia agreement, some 6 years 
later, has clearly identifiable and distinct Articles thereby highlighting objectives 
to be pursued. Even on matters of procedure, both agreements differ as to whether 
there is provision for dealing with the cost of cooperation.70 Similarly the US-
Australia agreement considers private antitrust suits in US Courts in Article 6 (the 
substance of which may be considered a very early form of positive comity), 
which is not dealt with by the US-Germany agreement. While there are clear 
differences, one could argue even at this early stage in the evolution of bilateral 
antitrust agreements that shared principles are apparent from the content of the 
two agreements. Both enshrine the primacy accorded to the signatory states’ 
respective laws, particularly with regard to domestic rules on confidentiality of 
                                                 
70 See Article 7 of the US-Germany agreement, although note that Article XII of the 1999 Australia-US 
Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Agreement lays down similar provisions on costs. 
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information.71 Both also establish a basic principle that one state (the requesting 
state) can submit a request to have its views considered when the other state (the 
requested state) is conducting an antitrust investigation that may affect the 
interests of the requesting state.72 Additionally both agreements require the parties 
to consult upon a specific issue at the request of one state73 and include rather 
vague provisions requiring a state to notify the other when it is conducting an 
antitrust investigation, or is contemplating a policy change that may impact upon 
the ‘important interests’ of the notified state.74 A basic tenet of the agreements is 
the commitment to seek to avoid conflict in their antitrust relations.75 
Notwithstanding the shared principles, the 1976 and 1982 agreements are 
undoubtedly different, perhaps reflecting not only the 6 year gap but also the 
differing bilateral relationships that the US had at that time. These early 
differences are not, however, good indicators of the convergence achieved 
between the more recent bilateral agreements. The 1991 EC-US agreement was 
significant not only as it facilitated cooperation and convergence between two 
very large trading partners, as well as important antitrust enforcement authorities, 
but also as a result of its perceived success in lessening the risk of conflict 
between the two parties.  
 
                                                 
71 1976 agreement: Article 3(1); Article 5 and Article 6(1). 1982 agreement: Article 3. 
72 1976 agreement: Articles 2(3) and (4). 1982 agreement: Article 2. 
73 1976 agreement: Article 2(5). 1982 agreement: Article 2. 
74 1976 agreement: Article 4(2). 1982 agreement: Article 1. 
75 Although the US-Germany agreement approaches this objective in Article 4(1) by pledging so far as is 
possible not to inhibit or interfere with antitrust investigations or procedures conducted by the other state. 
The US-Australia agreement embodies the avoidance of conflict principle in Articles 2(5) and (6). 
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3.6.2 The 1991 bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement between the EC Commission 
and the US contains 11 Articles that essentially clarify and expand upon 
principles contained in the 1976 and 1982 agreements discussed above. The 
agreement signified an advance in bilateral cooperation as it expanded upon 
principles espoused in the 1986 OECD Recommendation, and helped facilitate the 
revised 1995 Recommendation. While pioneering, the agreement was also, 
perhaps resultantly, controversial and required a joint European Council and 
Commission decision in 1995 to confirm its legal applicability.76 Since 1991, 
bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements tend to adopt similar formats, with 
roughly the same length and, as will be demonstrated, are also similar in terms of 
content. The twelve state-to-state bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements 
entered into since 1991 by the EC, the US,77 Canada and Japan have shared 
concepts and principles, each of which will be explored in detail in order to 
ascertain the extent of convergence achieved, and whether the agreements truly 
reflect differing bilateral relations. The Cooperation and Coordination Agreement 
with regard to competition and consumer laws entered into by Australia and New 
Zealand is not included in the following analysis as the attempt to harmonise their 
respective business laws,78 including competition law, has removed the ability to 
draw conclusions relevant to international antitrust from that particular agreement 
                                                 
76 10th April 1995 (95/145/EC, ECSC). (1995) OJ L95 of 27th April 1995. The joint decision was necessary 
following the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-327/91 French Republic v. Commission 
[1994] ECR I-3641, where the Court annulled the act by which the Commission concluded the agreement 
with the US following a challenge by France alleging that the Commission had no legal authority to 
conclude such an agreement. 
77 As the Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Treaty between Australia and the US is a specialist 
agreement enabling the acquisition and exchange of antitrust evidence it is not considered amongst the 
other general bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements. 
78 See Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia and the Government of New 
Zealand on Harmonisation of Business Law, which is discussed in more detail infra at 5.4.5. 
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in this article. The focus is upon core antitrust cooperation agreements, and 
discussion of MLATs is therefore also excluded. The twelve state-to-state 
bilateral antitrust agreements each have between 11 and 13 Articles,79 of which 
the first Article always consists of purpose and definitions provisions and the last 
Article always details the entry into force and termination provisions. 
 
3.7 Key principles 
3.7.1 Notification 
With the exception of the Japan-Singapore agreement, the second Article of each 
agreement outlines the general principle of notification in similar albeit more 
detailed terms to those provisions contained in Article I of the 1982 US-Australia 
bilateral agreement.80 In all but the US-Brazil agreement, Article II:1 provides 
that parties shall notify each other of enforcement activities that may affect the 
other party’s important interests. The second paragraph then lists either five81 or 
six sets of circumstances that would ordinarily constitute an enforcement activity 
triggering notification. The eleven agreements appear to have adopted a common 
format whereby a vague general rule is provided, which is then supplemented by 
specific examples applying that rule.82 The 1999 US-Brazil agreement is not 
significantly different. Article II:2 also lists circumstances in six sub-paragraphs 
                                                 
79 The antitrust cooperation articles within the Japan-Singapore agreement are Articles 15-25, as such the 
antitrust agreement is 11 articles in length. 
80 Note that in the Japan-Singapore bilateral agreement, the provisions concerning notification are 
contained in the third article of Chapter 5: Competition, this is Article 17 of the overall agreement. For 
reasons of efficacy, references to Article II in general terms will unless otherwise stated also be referring to 
Article 17 in the Japan-Singapore agreement. 
81 The 1991 EC-US agreement is the exception within the ten agreements in that Article II, paragraph 2 
only has 5 sub-paragraphs, the sixth paragraph in the nine other agreements are not the same, there are two 
variations discussed in body of text. 
82 In principle, similar to the format within Articles 81(1) and 82 EC Treaty. 
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that would amount to enforcement activities triggering notification, yet there is no 
general provision regarding notification when important interests are affected. 
Given that notification will ordinarily arise out of a situation described within 
Article II:2, this difference is likely to be of minor significance.  
 
There is very little substantive difference between the activities triggering 
notification listed in Article II:2 of the agreements. The following types of 
enforcement activities are included, near verbatim, in all agreements: a) those 
relevant to enforcement activities of the other party; b) involve anti-competitive 
activities, other than mergers and acquisitions, carried out significant part in the 
other party’s territory; c) involve a merger or acquisition which one or more of the 
parties to the transaction, or a company controlling one or more of the parties to 
the transaction, is a company incorporated or organised under the laws of the 
other party or of one of its provinces, states or Member States; d) involve conduct 
believed to have been required, encouraged or approved by the other party; and e) 
involve remedies that would, in significant respect, require or prohibit conduct in 
the other party’s territory.  
 
The five bilateral agreements entered into by Japan, also provide for notification 
when activities ‘are conducted against a national or nationals of the other party, or 
against a company or companies incorporated or organised under the applicable 
laws and regulations within the territory of the other party’.83 Another trigger 
                                                 
83 The Canada – Japan agreement has an abbreviated version of the quote. 
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included in six of the agreements84 arises when one party is seeking information 
located in the territory of the other. 
 
The remaining provisions within Article II essentially outline the practicalities of 
notification, with several of the twelve detailing the exact moment notification is 
required in given circumstances.85 All twelve agreements require notification to 
be given as promptly as possible once triggered, and all but the US-Brazil 
agreement require prompt notification once a competition authority becomes 
aware its activities may affect the important interests of the other party. In 
addition the notification must be sufficiently detailed in order for the notified 
party to conduct an impact assessment of the notifying party’s enforcement 
activities. Five of the agreements also acknowledge that antitrust officials of one 
party may visit the territory of the other in the course of investigations, provided 
advance notice has been given. Given the differing structures and legal powers of 
the antitrust regimes and authorities pertinent to these twelve agreements it is 
unsurprising that different notification triggers are listed,86 yet the principle and 
                                                 
84 Included in the following agreements: Canada-Mexico; EC-Canada; US-Brazil; US-Canada; US-Israel; 
and US-Mexico. 
85 For example in the 1991 EC-US agreement, Article II:3 specifies when notification should be made with 
respect to mergers and acquisitions that are legally required to be submitted. Sub-paragraph (a) lists times 
at which the US antitrust authorities must notify the EC, e.g. when additional information on the proposed 
merger is required pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §18a(e). Similarly sub-paragraph (b) list times at which the 
European Commission must notify US authorities, e.g. when notice of the transaction is published in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities. 
86 Note the US-Japan agreement for example where Article II:6 contains a requirement to notify when one 
party initiates a survey which that party considers may affect the important interests of the other party, 
hence covering the ability of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission to conduct market surveys. Furthermore 
Article II:7 requires notification when the antitrust authority of one party publicly participates in an 
administrative, regulatory or judicial proceeding in its country, albeit not initiated by that authority, if the 
authority considers that the issue may affect the important interests of the other party, this provision would 
cover the ability of the US DOJ to submit amicus curiae brief for consideration to a US Court in an antitrust 
litigation brought by private parties. 
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general format of notification provisions are the same within all of the agreements 
discussed.  
 
3.7.2 Enforcement cooperation and coordination 
Beyond notification, the manner in which further principles contained in many of 
the bilateral agreements does vary, yet there remain strong similarities between all 
of the agreements, and sub-groupings of the agreements appear to exist within 
which there is something approaching procedural and substantive harmonisation. 
Provisions outlining the principle of enforcement cooperation and coordination 
are contained in eleven of the twelve agreements. Chapter 5 of the Japan-
Singapore agreement does not contain any description of the principle, although 
this is due to the early stage of development of Singapore’s antitrust regime.87 The 
Japan-Singapore agreement does, however, provide in Article 23 for adopting 
future provisions furthering cooperation with regard to: a) coordination of 
enforcement activities; b) positive comity; and c) comity. With regard to the 
remaining eleven bilateral agreements, the 1991 EC-US and 1999 EC-Canada 
agreements embody the coordination principle in Article IV, while the Canada-
Japan, Canada-Mexico, EC-Japan, Japan-Mexico, US-Brazil, US-Canada, US-
Israel, US-Japan, and US-Mexico agreements all embody a cooperation principle 
in Article III and a coordination principle in Article IV. Considering the eleven 
bilateral agreements that give effect to enforcement cooperation and coordination 
principles, three distinct modes of implementation are identifiable. 
                                                 
87 Which is reflected in the Article 22 provisions limiting the agreement to the telecommunications, 
electricity and gas markets. 
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 The first and most basic mode is that adopted in the 1991 EC-US and 1999 EC-
Canada agreements whereby Article IV:1 commits each party’s competition 
authority to providing assistance to the other in their enforcement activities, 
subject to compatibility with each party’s laws and important interests. The EC-
US agreement also limits assistance to being within each party’s ‘reasonably 
available resources’. Article IV:2 of the EC-US and EC-Canada agreements 
espouse the principle of coordination of the parties’ enforcement activities when 
cases are related. Both agreements also detail the same factors to be taken into 
account when deciding whether to coordinate enforcement activities. The 
remaining provisions of Article IV in both agreements aim to ensure that 
coordinated enforcement activities will be consistent with the enforcement 
objectives of each party. In addition either party can decide to limit or terminate 
coordinated enforcement activities and pursue the investigation independently. 
The EC-US and EC-Canada agreements complement the Article IV principle of 
ordination with cooperation provisions within separate articles: within Article III 
and Article VII respectively, the content of both articles is very similar and both 
are entitled ‘Exchange of Information’. They both provide that ‘the parties agree 
that it is in their common interest to share information’ which will ‘facilitate the 
effective application of their respective competition laws’ and ‘promote better 
understanding’ of each others enforcement activities in their first paragraph. The 
articles also stipulate that parties will provide each other with information in their 
possession that is relevant to enforcement activities by the other party. The EC-
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Canada agreement also provides in Article VII:3 for one party (upon the request 
of the other) to ascertain whether natural or legal persons involved in the action 
will consent to the sharing of confidential information between authorities in the 
event of concurrent action. 
 
The second mode implementing the enforcement cooperation and coordination 
principles is that adopted by Japan in agreements with the US, Canada, the EC 
and Mexico (the ‘Japan agreements’). The substance of the two articles in all 
agreements approaches verbatim. Article 3:1 endorses the cooperation principle 
also contained in Article IV:1 of both the EC-US and EC-Canada agreements 
outlined above. This provides that ‘the competition authority of each party shall 
render assistance to the competition authority of the other party in its enforcement 
activities to the extent consistent with the laws and regulations’ of the party 
rendering assistance and the ‘important interests’ of that party, and ‘within its 
reasonably available resources’. Article III:2 of the Japan agreements then 
outlines three specific acts of cooperation. The fourth article is also very similar to 
Article IV:2 and 3 of the EC-US and EC-Canada agreements. Article IV:1 
implements the general principle that the parties’ competition authorities will 
consider co-ordinating their enforcement activities when they are related, the 
second paragraph then lists specific factors to be taken into account in deciding 
whether to coordinate, these are very similar as Article IV:2 of the EC-Canada 
agreement. The fourth article of the Japan agreements also states that when the 
parties’ competition authorities are coordinating their activities, each authority 
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will consider the enforcement objectives of the other competition authority. 
Furthermore these paragraphs give effect to the same provision embedded in 
Article VII:3 of the EC-Canada agreement such that one party (upon the request 
of the other) must ascertain whether natural or legal persons involved, will 
consent to the sharing of confidential information between authorities in the event 
of concurrent action. The final element regarding enforcement cooperation and 
coordination within these agreements is contained in Article IV:5, which provides 
for a party to terminate coordinated activities following notification to the other, 
similar to terms in Article IV of the EC-US and EC-Canada agreements. It will be 
interesting to note whether the negotiations entered into by Japan with Australia 
(initiated in 2003) result in the implementation of enforcement cooperation and 
coordination principles in the same manner, and if so whether there is any 
explanation for the prolonged negotiation of the agreement. 
 
The third mode implementing enforcement cooperation and coordination 
principles is that adopted by the US in its bilateral agreements with Canada in 
1995, Brazil and Israel in 1999 and Mexico in 2000. The 2001 Canada-Mexico 
agreement has also adopted this mode. Essentially the third mode adopts a 
cooperation principle in Article III: Enforcement Cooperation, and the 
coordination principle in a further article entitled Coordination with Regard to 
Related Matters, ordinarily in Article IV, with the exception of the US-Brazil 
agreement where it is in Article V. While the US-Brazil bilateral agreement is 
conceptually identical to the other four in this category, it lacks the detail of the 
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others, perhaps as a result of the developing stage of the Brazilian antitrust 
regime. Discussion will therefore focus on the US-Canada, US-Israel, US-Mexico 
and Canada-Mexico agreements. The four agreements all contain four paragraphs 
in Article III and five paragraphs in Article IV,88 the content of which is verbatim 
in both Articles throughout the four agreements. Article III:1 contains two 
elements, firstly that: 
‘the parties acknowledge it is in their common interest to cooperate in the 
detection of anti-competitive activities and the enforcement of their 
competition laws to the extent compatible with their respective laws and 
important interests, and according to their reasonably available 
resources’.89  
 
The second element mirrors provisions in Article III of the 1991 EC-US 
agreement and Article VII of the EC-Canada agreement regarding the sharing of 
information, acknowledging that this would be in the parties’ common interest in 
order to facilitate effective competition law enforcement and promote better 
understanding of each other’s enforcement policies and activities. Article III:2 
allows for further arrangements to be adopted in the future in order to enhance 
cooperation. Article III:3 consists of four specific acts of cooperation, three of 
which are the same as in Article 3:2 of the Japanese bilateral agreements. The four 
agreements have achieved similar convergence with regards to the principle of 
coordination in Article IV. While the US-Brazil agreement again contains a fairly 
limited endorsement of the principle of coordination in Article V, the US-Canada, 
US-Israel, US-Mexico and Canada-Mexico bilateral agreements implement this 
                                                 
88 The US-Brazil agreement contains 2 paragraphs in both Article III: Enforcement Cooperation and Article 
V: Coordination with Regard to Related Matters. 
89 The US-Brazil agreement has contains this first element, but has no further provisions on the sharing of 
information. 
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principle in Article IV in similar terms to Article IV:2 and 3 of the EC-US and 
EC-Canada agreements, and with minor and inconsequential differences to Article 
IV of the Japan-US agreement discussed above. Having considered in some detail 
the various modes adopted in order to implement the principles of cooperation 
and coordination, it is apparent that an overwhelming degree of convergence has 
been achieved between various signatory states of bilateral antitrust agreements 
with regard to these principles. 
 
3.7.3 Positive comity 
The OECD has defined the term positive comity as:  
‘the principle that a country should (1) give full and sympathetic 
consideration to another country’s request that it opens or expands a law 
enforcement proceeding in order to remedy conduct in its territory that is 
substantially and adversely affecting another country’s interests and, (2) 
take whatever remedial action it deems appropriate on a voluntary basis 
and in considering its legitimate interests’.90  
 
Positive comity has evoked a great deal of debate and discussion yet its 
consideration here is strictly confined to the manner of its implementation in the 
twelve bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements highlighted. With the exception 
of the Japan-Singapore agreement where the future adoption of positive comity 
provisions is envisaged by Article 23:2(b), the eleven remaining bilateral antitrust 
cooperation agreements since 1991 all include provisions implementing the 
principle of positive comity. The fifth article in the Japanese agreements, as well 
as the EC-US, EC-Canada, US-Canada, US-Israel, US-Mexico and Canada-
                                                 
90 Report on Positive Comity-Making International Markets More Efficient Through ‘Positive Comity’ in 
Competition Law Enforcement, OECD Competition Law and Policy Committee, May 1999 
(DAFFE/CLP(99)19). Referenced by B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 1, at p.183. 
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Mexico agreements, and Article IV of the US-Brazil agreement all implement the 
principle of positive comity in very similar terms. While the articles within the 
Japanese agreements are untitled,91 Article V of the US-Israel and Canada-Mexico 
agreements are entitled simply ‘Positive comity’, whereas Article V of the EC-
US, EC-Canada, US-Canada and US-Mexico agreements as well as Article IV of 
the US-Brazil agreement are all entitled ‘Cooperation Regarding Anticompetitive 
Practices in the Territory of One Party that may Adversely Affect the Interests of 
the Other Party’. Article V:2 outlines the core provision of positive comity stating 
that if a party’s important interests are being affected by anti-competitive 
activities taking place within the other party’s territory, the affected party can 
notify and request the other party’s antitrust authorities to initiate appropriate 
enforcement activities. The notification must be as detailed as possible with 
regard to both the anti-competitive activity and its alleged effect on the party’s 
important interests. Article V:3 then provides for responses to positive comity 
requests, essentially permitting the notified party to refuse to initiate or expand 
enforcement activities, but it should only do so after considering the request and 
after discussions between the parties. The notified party should advise the other of 
its decision, and if enforcement activities are initiated or expanded it should also 
advise the notifying party of the outcome of the enforcement activities, and of 
significant interim developments. Article V:4 contains the provisos that these 
provisions do not impact upon the parties’ discretion to engage in concurrent 
enforcement activities.  
                                                 
91 With the exception of the Japan-Mexico agreement which is entitled ‘Cooperation regarding 
anticompetitive activities in the territory of the country of one party that adversely affects the interests of 
the other party’. 
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 These provisions are exactly the same as those contained in Article V of the US-
Canada, US-Israel, US-Mexico and Canada-Mexico bilateral antitrust agreements, 
with the exception that the US-Israel agreement has condensed the provisions into 
three paragraphs (from four), and that the reference to discussion between the 
parties in Article V:3 of the EC-US agreement is excluded from these four 
agreements. The EC-Canada agreement is also very similar to these four 
agreements, with two minor amendments in Article V:3 such that the 
notified/requested party ‘shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to the 
request’92 and that the notified party must provide reasons as well as informing 
the other party of its decision. Similarly, Article IV of the US-Brazil agreement is 
substantively very similar to Article V of the US-Canada, US-Israel, US-Mexico 
and Canada-Mexico agreements, although a positive comity request under Article 
IV:2 can only take place ‘after prior consultation with the other party’. The one 
other difference is the inclusion in Article IV:1 of a peculiarly general provision 
that ‘the parties agree that it is in their common interest to secure the efficient 
operation of their markets by enforcing their respective competition laws in order 
to protect their markets from anti-competitive practices’.93 The inclusion of this 
general provision is probably a further indicator of the developing nature of the 
Brazilian antitrust regime. Furthermore the inclusion of this general provision is 
reflective of the second model of positive comity suggested by Zanettin: whereby 
                                                 
92 Substituting a careful consideration of the request. 
93 Article IV of the US-Brazil agreement again reflects the omission in this particular bilateral antitrust 
agreement, discussed earlier, regarding a party’s important interests, Article IV:1 simply discusses the 
affect on the interest of the parties, while the other agreements discuss the affect on the parties’ important 
interests. 
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there is a requirement for a foreign state to increase the enforcement of its 
antitrust law at a general level, described as ‘positive comity between unequal 
partners’.94  
 
Finally the fifth article of the Japanese agreements is very similar to those already 
discussed, with minor differences in terminology and structure that do not alter 
the substantive convergence achieved. The core provision on positive comity is 
included within Article 5:1 of the agreements.95 In nearly all respects the Japan-
EC bilateral agreement is identical to the US-Canada, US-Israel, US-Mexico and 
Canada-Mexico agreements, although Article V of the Japan-US, Japan-Canada, 
and Japan-Mexico agreements does, however, omit provisions ordinarily 
contained in the fourth paragraph. Thus, there are no provisos securing the ability 
of the parties to engage in concurrent enforcement action. Nonetheless it would be 
bizarre and highly contentious to suggest that positive comity requests, once made 
under this agreement affect the parties’ ability to initiate their own investigations, 
therefore this omission is likely to be inconsequential.  
 
In conclusion, bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements that implement the 
principle of positive comity have achieved a very high level of substantive 
convergence, with minor variations for agreements between ‘unequal partners’ 
and some linguistic variations within the Japanese bilateral agreements. Indeed, 
many agreements have achieved fully harmonised positive comity provisions. 
                                                 
94 See B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 1 at pp.191, 196-199. 
95 While it is ordinarily contained within the second paragraph of the positive comity article of the other 
agreements. 
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 3.7.4 Avoidance of conflict 
The principle that states should seek to avoid conflict in international antitrust by 
taking each others’ interests into consideration is perhaps the primary objective of 
concluding bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements, and embodies the concept 
of comity in public international law.96 The only bilateral antitrust agreement 
since 1991 not to include provisions on the avoidance of conflict is the Japan-
Singapore agreement where Article 23:2(c) allows for such provisions to be 
adopted in the future. The eleven other bilateral agreements all embody the 
avoidance of conflict principle within their sixth article. Article VI of the 1991 
EC-US agreement, entitled ‘Avoidance of Conflicts Over Enforcement 
Activities’, contains an unusual preamble outlining the general principle, then 
three sections detailing specific factors, inspired by efforts to avoid conflict, that 
should be taken into consideration. The preamble commits each party to taking 
into account the important interests of the other party at all stages of enforcement 
activity, subject to compatibility with their laws and important interests. When 
considering each others’ important interests, the parties must also take into 
account specified factors outlined in three sections. Firstly, as an aid to defining 
‘important interests’ it is recognised in Article VI:1 that ‘such interests would 
normally be reflected in antecedent laws, decisions or statements of policy by its 
competent authorities’. Secondly, while it is accepted that a party’s important 
interests can be affected at any stage of enforcement activity, in Article VI:2 the 
                                                 
96 Indeed Zanettin regards avoidance of conflict provisions as a product of negative comity, discussed in B. 
Zanettin, op. cit. note 1, at p.75. 
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parties recognise that prohibitive or otherwise negative decisions by one party 
carry greater potential for affecting the other party’s important interests than 
merely investigative actions. Article VI:3 contains a non-exhaustive list of factors 
to be considered when it appears that one party’s enforcement activities may 
adversely affect the other’s important interests in order to achieve a correct 
balance between the competing interests, and to determine what weight to attach 
to comity concerns during enforcement activities.  
 
The Japanese agreements, which are identical in substance and format, have 
perhaps achieved the greatest degree of convergence with the EC-US agreement 
regarding avoidance of conflict, the sixth article of the Japanese agreements also 
contain three sections, and the third is very similar to Article VI:3 of the EC-US 
agreement. The first section commits the parties to giving ‘careful consideration 
to the important interests of the other party throughout all phases of its 
enforcement activities’. The second section provides for each party to ‘endeavour 
to provide timely notice of significant developments of such enforcement 
activities’ when activities are affecting the others’ important interests. This is not 
included in Article VI of the EC-US agreement. One further difference between 
the Japanese and EC-US agreements is the wording and number of factors listed 
in the third section of the sixth article although this is of little significance. 
  
Article VI of the EC-Canada agreement entitled ‘Avoidance of conflict’ contains 
two sections with the second listing factors to be considered when one party’s 
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enforcement activities appear to adversely affect the other party’s important 
interests. The first section is materially identical to the preamble within Article VI 
of the EC-US agreement and Article VI:1 of the Japanese agreements. The EC-
Canada agreement states that the impact of enforcement activities upon 
reasonable expectations should be a factor when considering the weight to attach 
to comity concerns, as in the EC-US agreement. The significance of the anti-
competitive activities upon the parties’ important interests is also noted, as within 
the EC-US and Japanese agreements, although the foreseeability of the effects of 
the anti-competitive activity is also included within the EC-Canada agreement. 
While the Japanese agreements stipulate in Article VI:3 that the extent to which 
anti-competitive activities substantially lessen competition within the respective 
parties territory is a factor, there is no equivalent in the EC-Canada agreement, 
although the latter agreement notes ‘the need to minimise the negative effects on 
the other party’s important interests, in particular when implementing remedies to 
address anti-competitive effects within the party’s territory’. The remainder of the 
ten factors included in Article VI:2 of the EC-Canada agreements are 
substantively identical to those included in the Japanese agreements. The five 
remaining bilateral agreements implement the principle of avoidance of conflict in 
two distinct forms.  
 
The US-Brazil agreement is again distinctive, with a characteristically vague and 
under-developed provision contained in Article VI:1 outlining the general 
principle. The US-Brazil agreement does not contain a list of factors for 
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consideration when one party’s activities affect the other’s important interests. 
The US-Canada, US-Israel, US-Mexico and Canada-Mexico bilateral agreements 
are all identical in implementing the avoidance of conflict principle via the five 
sections of Article VI. The first section contains the general principle, while the 
second section is very similar to the Japanese agreements in that the parties are 
committed to providing timely notice of developments in enforcement activities 
that are of significance to the other’s important interests. Article VI:3 of the four 
agreements is identical to that contained in Article VI:1 of the EC-US agreement, 
thus recognising that a party’s important interests are normally reflected in 
antecedent laws, decisions or statements of policy by its competition authority. 
Article VI:4 bears a strong similarity with provisions contained in Article VI:2 of 
the EC-US agreement by acknowledging that the potential for adversely affecting 
the other party’s important interests is greater at the stage at which conduct is 
prohibited or penalised. Article VI:5 of the four agreements contains the list of 
factors to be considered when determining the weight to attach to the other party’s 
important interests. The list is substantively identical to that within Article VI:2 of 
the EC-Canada bilateral agreement. With the exception of the Japan-Singapore 
and US-Brazil agreements, it is noteworthy that there is a very close degree of 
substantive convergence between the post-1991 bilateral agreements regarding 
avoidance of conflict. 
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 3.7.5 Consultations 
Another basic principle contained within bilateral antitrust cooperation 
agreements is that parties may request consultations in order to address any 
matters relating to the agreement. Ordinarily these consultations will be at the 
diplomatic level according them more symbolic importance than informal 
discussions. The seventh article of the EC-US, Japanese-EC, Japan-Canada, 
Japan-US and US-Israel agreements, as well as Article VIII in the US-Canada, 
US-Mexico and Canada-Mexico agreements, Article VI:2 of the US-Brazil 
agreement, Article III of the EC-Canada agreement, Article 9 of the Japan-Mexico 
agreement and Article 24 in the Japan-Singapore bilateral agreement all 
implement a basic principle of consultation. The detail of the provisions does 
however, vary between the agreements. Article 24 of the Japan-Singapore 
bilateral agreement contains the simplest form providing for the parties to hold 
consultations as necessary on any matter arising in connection with the 
competition chapter of the agreement.  
 
The seventh article of the Japan-US, Japan-Canada and Japan-EC agreements 
contain the same provision regarding consultations through the diplomatic 
channel, but Article VII:2 of the Japan-Canada agreement provides for 
cooperation between the antitrust authorities themselves, and Article VII:3 
requires that consultation requests be made in writing with reasons provided. 
Article 9 of the Japan-Mexico agreement also provides for cooperation between 
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the antitrust authorities after the submission of a written request, but does not 
mention the diplomatic channel. The US-Brazil agreement makes no mention of 
the diplomatic channel, but does build upon the Japan-Singapore agreement by 
stating that the requesting party: 
‘shall indicate the reasons for the request and whether any procedural time 
limits or other constraints require that consultations be expedited. Each 
party shall consult promptly when so requested with a view to reaching a 
conclusion that is consistent with the purpose of the agreement’.97
 
The EC-US and EC-Canada agreements implement the principle of consultation 
in a very similar way. Article VII:1 of the EC-US agreement also states that: 
‘These consultations shall take place at the appropriate level, which may include 
consultations between the heads of the competition authorities concerned’. The 
second sections of these Articles in the EC-US and EC-Canada agreements are 
very similar, but also state that the parties should be prepared to explain the 
impact that the pursuit of the principles contained within the agreement has had 
on the consultations taking place.  
 
Article VIII of the US-Canada, US-Mexico and Canada-Mexico agreements and 
Article VII of the US-Israel agreement all contain identical provisions on 
consultations within three sections. The first section, similar to above, provides 
that either party may request consultations on any matter relating to the 
agreements, also indicating the reasons for the request and whether any factors 
need the consultations expedited. Also included is the requirement that each party 
shall consult promptly upon receiving a request and endeavour to achieve results 
                                                 
97 Article VI:2. 
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in line with the agreements’ principles. The second section mirrors a provision 
contained in Article VII:1 of the EC-US agreement, simply stating ‘Consultations 
under this Article shall take place at the appropriate level as determined by each 
party’. The third section in all requires that each party must provide the other with 
as much information as is possible in order to facilitate the broadest discussion in 
consultations. Similar to Article VII:2 of the EC-US agreement and III:2 of the 
EC-Canada agreement, the third section also provides that each party shall 
carefully consider the representations of the other in light of the principles within 
the agreements and that each party should be prepared to explain the specific 
results of its application of those principles to the matter subject to consultation. 
While there is no significant divergence between the twelve bilateral agreements 
regarding the principle of consultation, the detail varies to such a degree that 
parties requesting consultations under the EC-US, US-Canada, EC-Canada, US-
Mexico, Canada-Mexico and US-Israel agreements are entitled to demand certain 
information, such as the impact of cooperation principles upon the other party’s 
activities, which parties to the US-Brazil and Japanese agreements are not. 
 
3.7.6 Technical assistance 
Five of the twelve bilateral agreements contain an additional provision on 
technical assistance. This principle is arguably one of the most important for the 
future of international antitrust given the vast number of states with developing 
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antitrust regimes and enforcement authorities.98 Provisions implementing this 
principle are designed to enable more developed antitrust authorities to support 
other authorities in their development without imposing standards and 
procedures.99 Article VII of the US-Brazil, US-Mexico, Canada-Mexico and 
Japan-Mexico agreements as well as Article 19 of the Japan-Singapore bilateral 
agreement have been included with the aim of providing assistance to the party 
with a developing antitrust authority: Brazil, Mexico and Singapore in the 
respective agreements. The Japan-Singapore agreement contains the simplest 
form of wording allowing for the parties to render technical assistance to each 
other for ‘the effective management and adoption of laws and regulations 
controlling anti-competitive activities’. Article VII of the US-Brazil, US-Mexico, 
Canada-Mexico and Japan-Mexico agreements are substantively the same, 
initially acknowledging that technical cooperation activities/initiatives is in the 
parties’ common interest, then outlining examples of such activities/initiatives. It 
is explicit within these articles that assistance is subject to the reasonably 
available resources of the competition authorities involved. The four agreements 
list ‘exchanges of competition agency personnel for training purposes’ and 
‘participation of competition agency personnel as lecturers or consultants at 
training courses on competition law and policy organised or supported by each 
other’s competition authority’ as types of assistance. 
                                                 
98 For some discussion on the importance currently attached to technical assistance within bilateral 
agreements see I. Maher, ‘Competition Law in the International Domain: Networks as a New Form of 
Governance’, (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 111. 
99 For a discussion of the needs of authorities in states with developing antitrust regimes, and how far 
developed antitrust authorities are going to meeting such needs see T. Serebrisky, ‘What Do We Know 
about Competition Agencies in Emerging and Transition Countries? Evidence on Workload, Personnel, 
Priority Sectors and Training Needs’ (2004) 27 World Comp. 651. 
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 3.7.7 Periodic meetings 
There is provision for periodic meetings to take place between the parties to the 
agreement within eleven of the twelve bilateral agreements. The Japan-Mexico 
agreement does not contain a specific provision to this effect. The US-Brazil and 
Japan-Singapore bilateral agreements contain simplified forms of the provisions 
contained within the other eight agreements. Article VIII of the US-Brazil 
agreement provides for a periodical meeting of officials of the parties’ 
competition authorities to ‘exchange information on their current enforcement 
efforts and priorities in relation to their competition laws’. Article 23:1 of the 
Japan-Singapore agreement provides for the parties to meet within three years of 
the agreement entering into force to review the extent of cooperation pursuant to 
the agreement. The remaining nine bilateral agreements provide for either 
‘periodical’,100 ‘annual’101 or ‘semi-annual’102 meetings of competition authority 
officials in order to: 
‘(a) exchange information on their current enforcement efforts and 
priorities in relation to the competition laws of each country; 
(b) exchange information on economic sectors of common interest; 
(c) discuss policy changes that they are considering; and 
(d) discuss other matters of mutual interest relating to the application of 
the competition laws of each country’.103  
 
                                                 
100 Article VIII entitled ‘Interagency Meetings’ within the US-Israel agreement and Article IX entitled 
‘Periodic meetings’ within both the US-Mexico and Canada-Mexico agreements. 
101 Article 8:2 within the Japan-EC bilateral agreement and Article VIII:2 within the Japan-US agreement. 
102 Article VIII of the Japan-Canada agreement, Article III:2 within the 1991 EC-US bilateral agreement, as 
well as Article IX of the US-Canada agreement and Article VIII of the EC-Canada agreement. 
103 The wording is the same in all the agreements with the minor exception that deceptive marketing laws 
are also included in (a) and (d) of Article IX of the US-Canada bilateral agreement due to the inclusion of 
cooperation with regard to deceptive marketing laws within that particular bilateral antitrust agreement, 
within Article VII. 
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Article VIII also contains an interesting provision for meetings to ‘discuss 
developments relating to bilateral or multilateral fora involving the parties that 
may be relevant to the cooperative relationship between the competition 
authorities of the parties’. Article VIII:2 of the EC-Canada agreement also 
provides that a report on these semi-annual meetings be made available to the 
Joint Cooperation Committee under the Framework Agreement for Commercial 
and Economic Cooperation between the EC and Canada. This is clearly a 
peculiarity and does not diminish the harmonisation achieved between the nine 
agreements on this matter. 
 
3.7.8 Confidentiality 
One of the principal difficulties in international antitrust cooperation is dealing 
with issues raised by national legislation protecting confidentiality of information. 
Much of the information collected by antitrust authorities can be commercially 
sensitive and so in order to protect the delicate balance between market 
intervention and encouraging competition, the information must remain 
confidential, a tricky exercise when entering into information exchanges in 
international antitrust.104 All of the twelve bilateral agreements discussed enshrine 
the principle of confidentiality of information within a specific article. The 
simplest formulations of this principle are found in the identical provisions of the 
EC-US, US-Brazil and US-Mexico agreements, Article VIII, IX and X 
respectively. These articles contain two sections that are also included, in Article 
                                                 
104 See C. Canenbley and M. Rosenthal, op. cit. note 42, for some discussion of the exchange of 
information amongst antitrust authorities outside the EC. 
 151
IX of the US-Israel agreement and Japan-Canada agreement, and Article X of the 
US-Canada, EC-Canada, Canada-Mexico and Japan-Mexico agreements, the 
latter six agreements also contain a further four sections with greater detail on the 
protection of confidentiality during and after exchanges of information.105  
 
The first section outlines the general principle that ‘neither party is required to 
communicate information to the other party if such communication is prohibited 
by the laws of the party possessing the information or would be incompatible with 
that party’s important interests’. The second section provides that:  
‘Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, each party shall, to the fullest 
extent possible, maintain the confidentiality of any information 
communicated to it in confidence by the other party under this Agreement. 
Each party shall oppose, to the fullest extent possible consistent with that 
party’s laws, any application by a third party for disclosure of such 
confidential information’.  
These provisions implement what has become the core principle of confidentiality 
within the bilateral agreements, while reflecting standards and rules ordinarily 
required by the parties. The third section within both Article X of the US-Canada 
and Canada-Mexico agreements and Article IX of the US-Israel agreement allows 
for assurances to be sought and agreed upon prior to any information exchanges. 
If a party requests assurances on the confidentiality of the information to be 
                                                 
105 The US-Canada agreement contains eight sections within Article X relating to confidentiality of 
information, however Article X:7 and 8 relate to Article VII of the agreement with regard to cooperation on 
enforcement of deceptive marketing practices laws, as such only Article X:1-6 are relevant for antitrust 
purposes. 
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provided or regarding the purpose to which it would be put then the receiving 
party must provide such assurances. The sixth section of Article X of the EC-
Canada agreement contains a similar provision allowing a party to require that 
information provided under the agreement be used subject to conditions. The US-
Canada and Canada-Mexico agreements provide that the ‘notified party may not, 
without the consent of the other party, communicate to its state or provincial 
authorities information received from the other party pursuant to notifications or 
consultations under this Agreement’. This provision is likely to be irrelevant for 
most of the other bilateral agreements.  
 
The US-Canada and US-Israel agreements include another, rather detailed, 
provision under the fourth section allowing the notified/receiving party to contact 
and consult the subject of the enforcement activities, once the notifying party has 
made that person aware he/she is subject to a notification. The exclusion of this 
provision from the Canada-Mexico and other bilateral agreements is likely to be 
explained by the many antitrust regimes whose substantive rules and competence 
do not extend to natural persons, notably unlike the US. As with provisions within 
the fourth section of the US-Canada, US-Israel and Canada-Mexico agreements, 
the EC-Canada agreement also contains provisions outlining confidentiality 
requirements for information exchanges with internal authorities. Article X:3 
expressly permits the European Commission, after notice to the Canadian 
Commissioner of Competition, to inform any Member States’ competition 
authorities that it has received a notification, when the Member States’ important 
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interests are affected. Furthermore specific provision is made for the unique status 
and allocation of competences among competition law authorities within the EC 
by permitting the European Commission to inform Member States’ competition 
authorities of any enforcement cooperation with the Canadian Commissioner of 
Competition. The Commission must first consult with the Commissioner and 
information to the national competition authorities may be limited by the 
Commission’s obligation to respect a request from the Canadian Commissioner 
not to disclose information he has provided, when non-disclosure is necessary to 
ensure confidentiality.  
 
The fifth section of the ‘confidentiality articles’ within the US-Canada, US-Israel 
and Canada-Mexico agreements reiterates the ban on communicating confidential 
information to third parties, unless consent has been given. The ‘confidentiality 
article’ within the EC-Canada agreement also makes reference to third parties but 
within a different context. Article X:4 provides that the parties’ competition 
authorities ‘shall consult one other and give due consideration to their respective 
important interests’ before taking any action which may result in a legal 
obligation to make available to a third party information provided in confidence 
under the agreement.106 The final, sixth section within the ‘confidentiality articles’ 
of the US-Canada,107 US-Israel and Canada-Mexico agreements provides that 
confidential information communicated from one party to the other can only be 
                                                 
106 This is likely to be relevant within the EC given the rights of access to file that subjects of antitrust 
investigations have. 
107 Article X: 7 and 8 relate to confidentiality during enforcement cooperation on deceptive marketing 
practices. 
 154
used for competition law enforcement purposes unless consent has been received 
for another purpose. Article X:5 of the EC-Canada agreement and Article IX:7 of 
the Japan-Canada agreement contain similar provisions.  
 
Article 9:1 of the Japan-EC agreement and Article X:1 of the Japan-Canada 
agreement mirror the first section of the seven agreements already discussed in 
that neither party is required to communicate information if that is prohibited by 
the parties’ laws or contrary to their important interests, Article IX:5 of the Japan-
US agreement, Article 10:6 of the Japan-Mexico agreement and Article 20:4 of 
the Japan-Singapore agreement contain identical provisions. Article 9:2(a) of the 
Japan-EC agreement is similar to the first section of Article IX in the Japan-US 
agreement, both state that confidential information communicated from one party 
to another will only be used for competition law enforcement purposes. Article 
9:2(b) then differs from 1(b) of Article IX in the Japan-US agreement. While the 
latter provision prevents the receiving competition authority from communicating 
confidential information to a third party or other authority without consent, the 
former provision within the Japan-EC agreement makes no direct mention of a 
‘third party’ but states ‘when a party communicates information in confidence 
under this Agreement, the receiving party shall, consistent with the laws and 
regulations, maintain its confidentiality’. Article 20:1 of the Japan-Singapore 
agreement provides a simplified form of Article IX:1 of the Japan-US Agreement. 
Article 9:3 of the Japan-EC agreement contains a clause similar to that within 
Article X of the EC-Canada agreement and other agreements described above, 
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permitting the party providing information to specify terms and conditions for the 
use of the information. Supporting the third section, Article 9:4 then permits 
either party to limit information provided when the receiving party cannot: i) 
guarantee its confidentiality; ii) guarantee that the terms and conditions attached 
would be complied with; or iii) agree to limit the uses to which the information 
would be put. Article IX:4 of the Japan-US agreement and Article 20:3 of the 
Japan-Singapore agreement provide for information exchanges to be limited when 
confidentiality and use restrictions cannot be guaranteed. One other element to the 
confidentiality provisions within the Japan-US, Japan-Canada, Japan-Mexico and 
Japan-EC agreements is that information sharing with relevant enforcement 
authorities for the purpose of competition law enforcement is permitted. Unique 
to several of the Japanese agreements are further provisions regarding the use of 
confidential information, communicated under the agreement, in criminal 
proceedings.108
 
3.7.9 Existing laws 
Ten of the twelve bilateral agreements examined proclaim the primacy of 
domestic legislation over provisions within the agreement within a single article, 
in spite of there being many such provisions throughout other articles as well. The 
Japan-Singapore and Japan-Mexico agreements are the exception, which have no 
specific article but nonetheless incorporate the principal of primacy of national 
law in separate articles. Article IX of the EC-US and US-Canada agreements, 
                                                 
108 Article X of the Japan-US agreement, Article X:7(a) of the Japan-Canada agreement, Article 10:1(d) of 
the Japan-Mexico and Article 21 of the Japan-Singapore agreement. 
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Article X of the US-Brazil and US-Israel agreements, and Article XI of the EC-
Canada, Canada-Mexico and US-Mexico agreements all implement the principle 
of primacy of national law with identical wording, stating that nothing in the 
agreement shall require a party to take any action, or refrain from taking any 
action, that is inconsistent with its existing laws. The remaining Japan-US, Japan-
Canada and Japan-EC agreements implement this principle within Articles XI, 10 
and X respectively in a similar yet more protracted form. All twelve agreements 
clearly stipulate that they cannot operate so as to affect rights or obligations 
arising out of domestic rules or legislation. This is significant in terms of the type 
of convergence that can be achieved through concluding bilateral agreements and 
is discussed further below. 
 
3.7.10 Communications under the agreement 
Each of the twelve bilateral agreements detail how parties should communicate 
with each other under the agreement. Article IX of the EC-Canada and Japan-
Canada agreements, Article X of the EC-US agreement, Article XI of the US-
Israel and US-Brazil agreements, Article 11 of the Japan-EC and Japan-Mexico 
agreements, Article XII of the US-Canada, US-Mexico, Canada-Mexico and 
Japan-US agreements, and Article 25 of the Japan-Singapore agreement all 
provide that communications under the agreements may be carried out directly 
between the parties’ competition authorities. However, one proviso is that 
notifications under the agreements and, where relevant, positive comity and 
consultation requests must be promptly confirmed in writing through the 
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diplomatic channel. On this matter the twelve agreements have achieved a large 
degree of procedural harmonisation 
 
3.7.11 Modern state-to-state bilateral antitrust agreements 
A modern state-to-state bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement can be 
characterised by the inclusion of most, if not all, of the principles considered 
above, but also by its formal status. This status is exhibited by various factors: the 
lengthy negotiation period; governments are the actual signatories to the 
agreement and not the competition authority; the use of the diplomatic channel for 
certain communications; and significantly by the provisions within each 
agreement for termination after written notice by one of the parties. While in force 
these agreements amount to legally binding instruments under international law, 
albeit constrained by agreed parameters, notably to the extent consistent with the 
parties’ domestic laws and regulations. The agreements may also lay the 
foundation for further agreements that facilitate more advanced cooperation in 
specific areas of antitrust. For example, the 1991 EC-US agreement facilitated the 
advanced 1998 agreement between the same parties on positive comity, building 
upon Article V in the original agreement. The 1998 agreement did not however, 
replace the 1991 agreement, it was merely a supplement to aid cooperation in 
particular areas of antitrust enforcement, notably stating in Article II:4(a) that the 
ECMR is excluded from its application. Similarly, merger control provisions 
 158
under US antitrust are also excluded.109 Furthermore, MLATs or US IAEAA 
agreements can complement the basic bilateral cooperation agreement by, inter 
alia, enabling greater sharing of confidential information in relevant situations.110 
While state-to-state bilateral agreements arguably constitute the primary basis for 
international antitrust cooperation, there are also several agency-to-agency 
bilateral agreements in existence.111
 
 
3.8 Agency-to-agency bilateral arrangements 
3.8.1 There are at least eleven antitrust cooperation arrangements currently in force 
between antitrust authorities themselves. These will be referred to as agency-to-
agency arrangements. It is unnecessary to enter into a detailed comparison of each 
arrangement. The sole objective of discussion regarding these arrangements is to 
determine whether their provisions are consistent with the principles implemented 
within the state-to-state bilateral agreements. For reasons discussed above, 
tripartite arrangements are included in this determination. It is instantly notable 
that Australia has a prominent role within this area of international antitrust as its 
antitrust authorities are signatories to six of the eleven antitrust arrangements. The 
                                                 
109 Excluding application of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§12-27) provisions which relate to investigations 
under Title II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §18a, i.e. merger 
investigations. 
110 Note that the Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Treaty between Australia and the US could be 
regarded as a specialist agreement with regard to the acquisition and exchange of antitrust evidence and 
does not contain the basic principles that are contained within the 1982 agreement, discussed above. Note 
that the recent Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) also contains provisions on antitrust notably 
Article 14.2: Competition Law and Anti-competitive Business Conduct and 14.4: State Enterprises and 
Related Matters. 
111 Note that agency-to-agency arrangements are often considered as an antecedent to a more formal state-
to-state agreement. 
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Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has entered into 
arrangements with the New Zealand Commerce Commission (NZCC) and the 
Commissioner of Competition (Canada) in 2000, the Commerce Commission of 
the Fiji Islands, the NZCC and the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC), and 
the Fair Trade Commission of Korea in 2002, and with the NZCC and the 
Secretary of State for the Department of Trade and Industry and the Office of Fair 
Trading (UK) in 2003. Additionally the arrangement between the Australian 
Commerce and Industry Office and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office 
(Taiwan) entered into in 1996 remains in force. Three further arrangements have 
been entered into by the Commissioner of Competition (Canada): with the Fiscal 
Nacional Economico (Chile) in 2001; the Secretary of State for the DTI and the 
OFT (UK) in 2003; and the Korean Fair Trade Commission in 2006. The 
remaining two arrangements are between the French Competition Council and the 
Taiwanese Fair Trade Commission and between the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission and the Mexican Federal Competition Commission, both in 2004. 
 
3.8.2 There are two distinct formats adopted by the eleven arrangements, the format 
adopted by the Australia-NZ-Canada, Canada-Chile, Canada-Korea, Canada-UK, 
Australia-NZ-Taiwan, Australia-NZ-UK, France-Taiwan and Korea-Mexico 
arrangements have similar terms and provisions to the state-to-state bilateral 
agreements. The Australia-Taiwan, Australia-Fiji, and Australia-Korea 
arrangements, however, adopt a rather distinctive format, similar to the 1994 
Australia-New Zealand bilateral agreement. With the exception of the France-
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Taiwan and Korea-Mexico arrangements, the first group of arrangements contain 
provisions on ‘Purpose and Definitions’, ‘Notification’, ‘Enforcement 
Cooperation and Coordination’, and ‘Avoidance of Conflict’ in the first four 
articles. The Australia-NZ-Taiwan and Australia-NZ-UK arrangements also 
include further provisions on ‘Exchange of Information’, and similar provisions 
on periodical meetings, confidentiality of information, primacy of existing laws, 
communications under the arrangement and unilateral termination of the 
arrangement. The France-Taiwan arrangement is very similar to the arrangements 
discussed above and has provisions on ‘Purpose and Definitions’ and 
‘Notification’ in the first two articles, as well as an article on ‘Exchange of 
Information’ similar to the Australia-NZ-Taiwan and Australia-NZ-UK 
arrangements but does not have specific provisions on ‘Enforcement Cooperation 
and Coordination’ and ‘Avoidance of Conflict’ as outlined for the other 
arrangements. Instead there is one article on ‘Consultations’ as well as similar 
provisions on periodical meetings, confidentiality, communications, existing laws 
and termination. The Korea-Mexico arrangement has separate provisions on 
cooperation and coordination, as well as provisions on positive comity and 
technical cooperation in very similar terms to that of the formal agreements. The 
provisions in these eight arrangements are entirely consistent with the concepts 
and principles implemented within the state-to-state bilateral agreements 
discussed above.  
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3.8.3 The second format adopted within the Australia-Taiwan, Australia-Fiji and 
Australia-Korea arrangements all contain provisions on ‘Purpose’, ‘Definitions’, 
‘Scope of Cooperation’, ‘Confidentiality’, ‘Procedure for Assistance’, and 
‘Termination and Review’. The Australia-Taiwan and Australia-Korea 
arrangements contain detailed additional provisions on technical assistance, while 
the Australia-Taiwan and Australia-Fiji arrangements implement the principle of 
avoidance of conflict. It is clear that the principles of notification, enforcement 
cooperation, comity, and primacy of existing domestic law actually underlie many 
of the provisions contained within these three arrangements.  Notwithstanding that 
many of the Australian arrangements and the Australia-New Zealand agreement 
adopt a peculiar format, it would be difficult to substantiate any suggestion that 
this is as result of differing bilateral relationships, and it appears more likely that 
it is simply an Australian peculiarity. It is clear that the substance of the three 
arrangements and solitary agreement is consistent with concepts and principles 
implemented within the ten agreements examined above.112 One very notable and 
distinctive element within two of the three tripartite arrangements, Australia-NZ-
Taiwan and Australia-NZ-UK, however, is that the final provision allows for 
other competition authorities to join the arrangement ‘on terms to be decided 
between it and the Participants to the Arrangement at the time of the application 
to join. The Participants may develop, as they consider appropriate, procedures to 
                                                 
112 It is, however, conceded that certain peculiarities do exist within the Australia-New Zealand bilateral 
agreement, notably the provisions on facilitating joint publications or co-operative ventures in the area of 
education and compliance education within section 9, yet even this peculiarity does not amount to a 
divergence from principles implemented within other bilateral agreements, and in substantive terms the 
1994 agreement is consistent with the standard that appears to have developed amongst other agreements. 
Indeed the only significant difference is the format adopted which may be a result of the endeavour to 
harmonise the business laws of the two states, yet is more likely to be attributable to a peculiar Australian 
approach to formatting its international antitrust cooperation agreements. 
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deal with such new Participants’. This innovation is the sole distinguishing factor 
for these two arrangements from concepts and principles implemented within 
general bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements. Unfortunately, and similar to 
the conciliation provisions under the OECD Recommendation, this innovation 
which could have significance for the development of international antitrust 
cooperation, has remained idle.  
 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
3.9.1 The proliferation of bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements, in whatever form, 
certainly has clear potential to diminish the risk of conflict between the 
enforcement activities of antitrust authorities on the international stage. There are 
many factors in the latter half of the 20th century that heightened the risk of 
conflict, including: the globalisation of trade; the integration of market 
economies; the growth of antitrust across the globe; and the increasing readiness 
to use extraterritoriality as an enforcement tool. The ‘second face’ of international 
antitrust, bilateralism, has an important role in ensuring that international antitrust 
enforcement can be both effective and efficient, and operate to reduce the burden 
of multi-jurisdictional enforcement for the firms involved. Nonetheless, in light of 
the significant degree of convergence between the agreements discussed, it is 
questionable whether bilateral antitrust agreements do actually reflect peculiarities 
in the bilateral relationship of the signatory states. It is certainly arguable that the 
proliferation of bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements has had a detrimental 
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impact upon efforts to establish a multilateral framework for international 
antitrust.113 A lingering question however, is why the success of bilateral 
agreements has been at the expense of a multilateral framework, and/or whether a 
multilateral framework is necessary in international antitrust. While proposals 
such as concluding a WTO agreement on competition policy114 go beyond 
provisions within current bilateral agreements, the main innovations are likely to 
centre around capacity building and sharing of best practices, and not the adoption 
of an international code or creation of an international antitrust authority that 
would represent a stark policy shift from cooperation to harmonisation.115 
Nonetheless it is clear from the movements from unilateralism to bilateralism, that 
there is ambiguity in international antitrust as to what the objective of the 
international antitrust dialogue actually is. The assessment of bilateral agreements, 
and the significance of the convergence achieved can only be judged against a set 
objective, which is currently unclear. This is an issue that will be considered in 
greater depth at the end of chapter 4. 
 
3.9.2 What is clear at this stage is that the twelve principal state-to-state bilateral 
agreements entered into since 1991, as well as the current agency-to-agency 
arrangements, suggest that a remarkable degree of convergence has already been 
achieved between these agreements. Antitrust officials tend to convey the view 
                                                 
113 See similar comments by Eleanor Fox, supra chapter 2 at note 27, arguing that a multilateral antitrust 
agreement would be more likely had it not been for the US effects doctrine. 
114 See J. Drexl, ‘International Competition Policy after Cancun: Placing a Singapore Issue on the WTO 
Development Agenda’, (2004) 27 World Comp. 419. 
115 For an accurate account of proposals regarding a WTO agreement that dispels many of the myths, see F. 
Jenny, ‘Competition Law and Policy: Global Governance Issues’, (2003) 26 World Comp. 609. 
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that bilateral agreements are peculiar to each bilateral relationship,116 a view that 
suggests a comparison of the current agreements would identify significant 
differences. Strikingly, many of the key principles outlined above are 
implemented in very similar terms across a wide spectrum of bilateral agreements, 
including the US and EC agreements, but also exhibited within the Australian 
‘arrangements’ and the Japan-Singapore agreement. Nonetheless it is clear that 
some differences do exist between the principal agreements, as within several of 
the Japanese agreements regarding limiting the use of confidential information in 
criminal investigations, and the provisions within five agreements for technical 
assistance, also the generality of the provisions within the US-Brazil agreement. 
While certain provisions are undoubtedly a consequence of a peculiarity within a 
party’s antitrust regime, any significant differences between the agreements are 
likely to be either of a procedural (i.e. differing procedures within the parties’ 
respective regimes result in differences between the agreements, e.g. notification 
triggers) as opposed to a substantive nature, or as a result of the developing nature 
of one of the parties’ antitrust regimes, and not as a result of any underlying 
divergence. Indeed, it is arguable that differences between agreements are not 
attributable to differing bilateral relationships between the parties, but simply as a 
result of internal peculiarities or the ongoing development of the antitrust regime 
of one of the parties. It is suggested therefore that a template has inadvertently 
come into being for bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements irrespective of the 
peculiarities of any particular bilateral relationship. The bilateral relationship 
existing between states clearly does, however, have a bearing on at least one very 
                                                 
116 See the quote by Charles S. Clark, supra at 3.4.2. 
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important factor: the negotiation and conclusion of the bilateral agreement. Even 
if the actual content of the agreement does not vary according to the relationship, 
the political will to enter into the agreement inevitably does, and this is a factor 
that is further explored at the beginning of chapter 4.  
 
Table 3.1: state-to-state bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements 
Parties Year Electronic access point 
US – Germany 
 
1976 US DOJ website: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/int_arra
ngements.htm  
US – Australia  
 
1982 US DOJ website, as above. 
US – Canada 
(MLAT) 
1990 Electronic access no longer available. 
US – EC  
 
1991 US DOJ website, as above. 
US – Canada  
 
1995 US DOJ website, as above. 
US – EC 
(positive 
comity) 
1998 US DOJ website, as above. 
EC – Canada 
 
1999 EC DG COMP website at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/international/b
ilateral/canada.html  
US – Australia 
(MLAT) 
1999 US DOJ website, as above. 
US – Brazil  
 
1999 US DOJ website, as above. 
US – Israel  
 
1999 US DOJ website, as above. 
US – Japan  
 
1999 US DOJ website, as above. 
US – Mexico  
 
2000 US DOJ website, as above. 
Canada – 
Mexico  
2001 CCB website: 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cf
m?itemID=1594&lg=e  
Japan – 
Singapore  
2002 JFTC website: 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-
page/internationalrelations/index.html  
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EC – Japan  
 
2003 EC DG COMP website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/international/b
ilateral/japan.html
Canada – Japan  
 
2005 CCB website: 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cf
m?itemID=2012&lg=e  
 
 
 
 Table 3.2: agency-to-agency antitrust cooperation arrangements 
Parties 
 
Year Electronic access point 
Australia – 
Taiwan  
1996 ACCC website: 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/5
64911/fromItemId/255435  
Australia – NZ 
– Canada  
2000 CCB website: 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cf
m?itemID=1595&lg=e  
Canada – Chile  
 
2001 CCB website: 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cf
m?itemID=1599&lg=e  
Australia – Fiji 
 
2002 ACCC website, as above. 
Australia – 
Korea  
 
2002 ACCC website, as above. 
Australia – NZ 
– Taiwan  
2002 ACCC website, as above. 
Australia – NZ 
– UK  
2003 ACCC website, as above. 
Canada – UK  
 
2003 CCB website: 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cf
m?itemID=1596&lg=e  
France – 
Taiwan 
2004 Taiwanese FTC website: 
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/EnglishWeb/English.html  
Canada – Korea 
 
2006 CCB website: 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cf
m?itemID=2075&lg=e  
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4 
Completing the landscape of international antitrust: regional agreements and 
multilateral initiatives 
 
 
4.1 The prerequisite of trade? 
4.1.1 In light of the comparative analysis in chapter 3 concerning current bilateral 
cooperation agreements, and the conclusion that an extensive degree of 
convergence has been achieved, the question arises as to why bilateral agreements 
remain the most prevalent form of international antitrust agreement in spite of 
clear potential for some form of multilateral agreement. Given the historical 
relationship between trade and international antitrust,1 it is helpful to briefly 
consider the trading relationship between those states that have entered into the 
principal cooperation agreements to assess whether any linkages exist. While the 
chapter 3 analysis strongly suggests that the particular bilateral relationship 
existing between two states has very little bearing upon the substance of any 
antitrust agreements they enter into, the decision regarding whether to enter into 
such an agreement is ordinarily a political decision2 and as such is likely to be 
determined by the nature of the relationship between the two states. Therefore, the 
strength of a bilateral trading relationship may be an important factor. A 
noteworthy start is to highlight that in 2003, eight of the top ten leading importers 
and exporters in world merchandise trade were active in international antitrust3 
                                                 
1 See discussion supra, as well as generally Y.H. Akbar, Global Antitrust: Trade and Competition 
Linkages, (Hampshire, Ashgate, 2003). 
2 See M.M. Dabbah, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2003) for a good discussion of the interface between antitrust and other disciplines including politics. 
3 Referring to the US, the EC (external trade), Japan, Canada, Mexico, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. 
Sourced from the World Trade Organisation Press Release 373 on 5th April 2004, Appendix Table 2: 
Leading exporters and importers in world merchandise trade (excluding intra-EU trade), 2003. 
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(with China and Hong Kong the two other leading traders,4 although they are 
currently in the process of adopting domestic antitrust laws). Furthermore, the 
three other main states that have entered into bilateral antitrust agreements were 
included in the top 30 leading traders (Brazil, Australia and Israel). 
 
The trading relationship between the US and the seven jurisdictions with which it 
has a bilateral antitrust agreement will now be considered. Arguably its most 
significant agreement, with the EC, is with one of its largest trading partners, as 
trade with the EC accounts for 19.3% of all US imports (with an approximate 
value of $232,142million) and 20.8% of all US exports5. Similarly, underlying the 
US-Canada bilateral agreement is the trading relationship accounting for 17.8% of 
all US imports and 23.2% of all US exports. Furthermore, Mexican imports are 
11.3% and Japanese imports 10.4% of total US imports, and exports to Mexico 
14.1% and exports to Japan 7.4% of total US exports. While Australian, Israeli 
and Brazilian trade is far less significant with the US than those already 
mentioned, the US is the principal trading partner to Israel (accounting for 18.5% 
of all Israeli imports and 40.2% of all Israeli exports), and Brazil (accounting for 
21.9% of all Brazilian imports, and 25.7% of all Brazilian exports), and one of the 
two main trading partners with Australia. While suggesting a link may be 
premature, it is noteworthy that 71.6% of all US exports go to one of the seven 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of the background to antitrust within these jurisdictions see M. Williams, Competition 
Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
5The EC figures include the trading figures between the US and Germany, both of whom negotiated a 
bilateral antitrust agreement many years before the US-EC agreement was entered into. All trade statistics 
used in this section, apart from those detailing the total European Union imports and exports, are sourced 
from the United Nations International Trade Statistics Yearbook 2002, Volume 1. 
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trading partners with whom the US has a bilateral antitrust agreement, 
additionally 60.5% of all US imports are from those same trading partners. 
 
The three bilateral antitrust agreements entered into by the EC exhibit a similar 
trend as the US, Japan and Canada are three of the largest single external trading 
partners with the EC. The US makes up 22.8% of all EC imports and 15.3% of 
exports, while Japan makes up 6.7% of all imports and 8.2% of exports, and 
Canada accounts for 4.8% of all imports into the EC and 5.6% of exports.6
 
Canadian trade figures are the most suggestive of a connection between the 
bilateral trade relationship and antitrust agreements. Canada has entered into 
bilateral antitrust agreements with the US, Mexico and Japan, additionally it has 
an agency-to-agency arrangement with the UK. These are 4 of Canada’s top five 
trading partners (the other being China). Trade with the EC, including the UK, 
accounts for 11.2% of all Canadian imports and 4.4% of exports, second on both 
counts to the US which makes up a huge 62.6% of all Canadian imports and 
87.2% of Canadian exports. These states coupled with Australia, Chile, and Japan 
account for a vast 82.3% of all Canadian imports and 94.7% of total exports. 
Whilst definitive conclusions from these figures alone may not be possible, they 
do highlight the importance of avoiding any disputes detrimental to trade (such as 
an antitrust dispute) with the principal trading partners, and many of the partners 
to bilateral antitrust agreements appear to be principal trading partners. 
                                                 
6Trade figures sourced from the ‘European Union and its Main Trading Partners 2000 Economic and Trade 
Indicators’, available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/data.htm. 
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 Trade figures for Japan provide evidence of a similar trend, albeit on a smaller 
scale, as it has bilateral agreements with two of its top three trading partners: the 
EC and the US (the other being China). The current negotiations between Japan 
and Australia7 only serve to strengthen this trend. The EC, US, Australia and 
Japan amount to 36.8% of all Japanese imports and 47.4% of all Japanese exports. 
 
Mexico also demonstrates the importance of the trading relationships that often 
underlie bilateral antitrust agreements as the two principal agreements are with 
trading partners accounting for 66.1% of all Mexican imports (63.4% from the US 
and 2.7% from Canada), and 90.8% of all Mexican exports (89.1% to the US and 
1.7% go to Canada). Similarly Australia either has or is in negotiations to 
conclude antitrust agreements with its two principal trading partners as the US 
accounts for 18.4% of total Australian imports and 9.7% of total exports, while 
Japan accounts for 12.4% of imports and is the largest Australian exporter with 
18.6% of the total. Including the United Kingdom and Korea, as well as New 
Zealand, with whom Australia has antitrust arrangements, Australia’s antitrust 
partners account for 43% of total imports and 47.9% of total exports. 
 
4.1.2 It is obvious that merely considering the size of the trading relationship between 
states with antitrust agreements is insufficient support to state that a strong trading 
relationship is a prerequisite to a bilateral antitrust agreement, or that a strong 
trading relationship between states with antitrust regimes will thereby lead to an 
                                                 
7 See ACCC Press Release MR 098/03 on 14th May 2003. 
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antitrust cooperation agreement. Nonetheless it is significant that those states with 
bilateral antitrust agreements also have a strong trading relationship.8 Conflict 
between antitrust authorities can clearly have a negative impact upon trade, and 
one of the principles evident in bilateral antitrust agreements is the avoidance of 
conflict. Concluding antitrust cooperation agreements in this context appears 
entirely logical. 
 
The negotiation and conclusion of a bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement 
represents an acknowledgement by the signatory states of the presence of certain 
circumstances, namely that commerce taking place in one state has the potential 
(due to the movement of trade) to impact upon commerce in the other state. 
Furthermore, the agreements implicitly acknowledge that commerce may have 
cross-border anti-competitive effects, and that state authorities are entitled to act 
against such effects.9 Confronted with anti-competitive effects originating from 
foreign conduct, states will generally not however, seek to sever the commercial 
linkages that enabled the foreign conduct to have domestic effects10 because those 
commercial linkages are regarded as beneficial and indeed desirable by states 
                                                 
8 Note that while the size of US trade with Israel and Brazil is not particularly significant, the US is the 
principal trading partner to both nations, it is also possible, and probable, that political and regional motives 
influence the decision to negotiate a bilateral antitrust agreement. 
9 In some respects it can therefore be argued that the conclusion of a bilateral antitrust cooperation 
agreement is an implicit acceptance of the legality of extraterritorial application of antitrust laws, i.e. a 
variation of the US effects doctrine. Equally however, one could argue that bilateral agreements are a 
means for a state, which may in essence oppose extraterritoriality, to minimise the detrimental impact upon 
national interests deriving from foreign extraterritoriality (particularly as certain states will use 
extraterritoriality as an antitrust enforcement tool with or without cooperation). 
10 E.g. assume the hypothetical situation of a Japanese manufacturer cross-subsidising its US subsidiary to 
enable predatory pricing in the US market, to force a US competitor out of that domestic market. US 
antitrust authorities would not ordinarily seek to sever the Japanese firm’s commercial links by requiring 
the disposal of the subsidiary or by prohibiting the sale or purchase of its goods, but would instead take 
remedial action against the Japanese firm, normally in the form of imposing financial and behavioural 
remedies. 
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operating a market economy. The importance attached to maintaining and 
encouraging increased commerce can effectively place external 
limitations/pressures upon extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. Thus, a balance is 
required between providing effective deterrence and remedial action for anti-
competitive conduct, and maintaining the incentives that foster those beneficial 
commercial linkages.11 There may be no need for a bilateral antitrust cooperation 
agreement in the absence of significant commercial linkages, as the foreign 
commerce cannot have a domestic effect. Another rationale for an agreement 
could arise if states were in the process of cultivating commercial links, and did 
not want the anticipated benefits to be nullified by anti-competitive practices or a 
damaging dispute resulting from unilateral antitrust enforcement. Trade issues are 
therefore clearly relevant considerations in international antitrust and important to 
the negotiation and conclusion of bilateral cooperation agreements, it is far from 
certain that antitrust considerations are equally important factors during the 
negotiation of trade agreements, or during the creation and development of 
trading blocs. 
 
 
4.2 The role of antitrust in RTAs 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Assessing the importance of antitrust considerations (if indeed there are any) to 
the negotiation and conclusion of trade agreements and the creation of trading 
blocs will enable a fuller understanding of the extent of the international antitrust 
                                                 
11 This balance is discussed in terms of a paradox for international merger control in chapter 5, infra. 
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dialogue, and indeed the objective that has attached to international antitrust. In 
carrying out such an assessment it is helpful to consider principal trade 
agreements and the legislative instruments of trading blocs, and examine whether 
they contain any antitrust provisions. This assessment will focus upon regional 
trade initiatives. As there have been in excess of 300 Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) notified to the WTO, with at least 180 still in force,12 it is neither possible 
nor productive to consider all current RTAs. The focus will therefore be upon 
those RTAs and trading blocs with a relatively large number of 
signatories/members and those concerning large commercial markets. Agreements 
between the EC and third countries will be considered at infra at 4.3. 
 
The importance attached to antitrust considerations by trade negotiators will 
usually be reflected within the substance of trade agreements or within the stated 
objectives of trade blocs, yet the nature of any antitrust involvement varies widely 
amongst the principal RTAs. Not all RTAs have antitrust provisions and there are 
substantive differences amongst those with antitrust provisions. Substantive 
provisions can range from the setting up of a working group to examine antitrust 
and trade links, to a clear attempt at providing a harmonised set of antitrust rules. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 According to WTO compiled figures, see the table  at  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/eif_e.xls. Note that many of these ‘RTAs’ are actually 
bilateral trading agreements included within the WTO definition of a regional trade agreement. 
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4.2.2 The ANDEAN Community/The ‘CAN’ 
The ANDEAN Community (also known as the CAN) is a sub-regional grouping 
of four South American countries: Bolivia; Colombia; Ecuador; and Peru.13 The 
CAN was created by the signing of the Cartagena Agreement on 26th May 1969, 
and the member countries have been engaged in a process of closer cooperation 
and integration ever since. The ANDEAN Free Trade Area was formed in 
February 199314 and the CAN has been operating as a Customs Union for 
Colombia and Ecuador (and originally Venezuela) since 1995 when they adopted 
a Common External Tariff (CET). Bolivia and Peru did not fully implement the 
CET until 2003. The CAN has been working towards the creation of a Common 
Market, initially with a target of 2005, and the Community has many features of 
such an integrated system, including the existence of inter alia, an ANDEAN 
Court of Justice, Commission, Presidential Council and Foreign Ministers 
Council. It has been suggested that: 
‘A review of the competition rules of the CAN alongside those of the EU 
confirm that the CAN is closest to the EU model in terms of 
supranationality, institutions, and competition rules. Assuming completion 
of the common market, the resemblance may grow’.15  
 
While a substantive comparison of the CAN and EC antitrust provisions could not 
support such a statement, if the suggestion was focusing upon the institutional 
structure and legal status of Community rules within national law, then the 
                                                 
13 Note that Venezuela withdrew from the ANDEAN Community following an announcement on 20 April 
2006, see BBC News report, ‘Venezuela Quits Andean Trade Bloc’, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4925056.stm. 
14 Although note that Bolivia did not join the Free Trade Area until July 1997. 
15 See Paper by C.A. Jones, ‘Leveling the Playing Field in the EU, NAFTA, CAN, Mercosur and Beyond: 
Comparing the Role of Competition Rules in Regional Economic Organizations’ presented to the European 
Union Studies Association Conference, Austin, Texas 31st March – 2nd April 2005. 
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statement is with merit. Currently the directly applicable antitrust rules of the 
CAN are principally found in two decisions adopted on the 21st March 1991: 
Decision 285 Rules and regulations for preventing or correcting distortions in 
competition caused by practices that restrict free competition; and Decision 283 
Rules for preventing or correcting distortions in competition caused by dumping 
or subsidy practices. The CAN antitrust rules do not apply when practices solely 
affect one Member State and also originate from that same Member State, in 
which circumstances it is left to national antitrust rules to investigate.16 When the 
CAN antitrust rules are applicable, the Decisions set out the correct procedure for 
Member States or enterprises with a ‘legitimate interest’ to submit their 
investigation ‘request’ (i.e. complaint) to the Board of the Andean General 
Secretariat. Only the General Secretariat can investigate alleged antitrust 
infringements and issue ‘injunctions’ to require that activities are brought to an 
end, although the onus of enforcing the ‘injunction’ is upon national authorities. 
With regard to the substantive provisions within Decisions 283 and 285, neither 
Decision contains a clear prohibition against certain types of conduct or conduct 
having a certain type of effect. The Decisions confer a discretion upon Member 
States and ‘interested’ enterprises to ‘ask the Board for authorisation or a mandate 
to take measures to prevent or correct…’: i) ‘the threat of injury or injury to 
production or exports, caused by practices that restrict free competition 
originating in the Subregion or involving an enterprise that carries out its 
                                                 
16 Article 2, ANDEAN Community Commission Decision 285 Rules and regulations for preventing or 
correcting distortions in competition caused by practices that restrict free competition. 
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economic activity in a Member Country’;17 or ii) ‘distortions in competition in the 
Subregional market caused by dumping or subsidies’.18 Both Decisions elaborate 
upon the basic provisions with examples of behaviour caught by the provisions, 
and the examples within Decision 285 bear a clear resemblance to anti-
competitive conduct identified by ECJ and CFI jurisprudence. Nonetheless, a 
large proportion of the provisions address procedural issues. It is clear that the 
substantive antitrust provisions of the ANDEAN Community lack depth and often 
clarity. It would be difficult to argue that the provisions alone were capable of 
informing firms of their rights and obligations. It is noteworthy that there are no 
explicit rules providing for merger control within the ANDEAN Community, and 
it is difficult to envisage any developing implicitly from the current provisions. 
Beyond the two principal Decisions providing for regional antitrust rules, there 
are also efforts within the CAN to harmonise and strengthen the domestic antitrust 
rules of its Member States. The EC has been assisting with these efforts through a 
joint ‘Competition Project’ with the aim ‘to improve the region’s legislative, 
administrative and judicial context for competition law, support the Andean 
institutions responsible for the application and control of provisions on the 
subject, and promote a culture of competition’.19 At the launch of the joint project, 
the CAN Director General, Héctor Maldonado, ‘underscored the importance of 
having rules of competition to ensure the free play of market forces and boost 
                                                 
17 Article 2, ANDEAN Community Commission Decision 285 Rules and regulations for preventing or 
correcting distortions in competition caused by practices that restrict free competition. 
18 Article 2, ANDEAN Community Commission Decision 283 Rules for preventing or correcting 
distortions in competition caused by dumping or subsidy practices. 
19 See Andean Community Press Release 3 March 2003, CAN country rules of competition to be 
harmonized with European Union assistance. 
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economic efficiency and, above all, reinforce the economic integration of the 
CAN countries’.20 He also stated ‘we believe that the project will help us to move 
ahead firmly toward our target of establishing the Andean Common Market’.21  
 
4.2.3 APEC 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC) is not a trade bloc as such 
but a diverse inter-governmental forum established in 1989 aimed at ‘facilitating 
economic growth, cooperation, trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region’.22 
The 21 ‘Member Economies’23 are supported by a permanent secretariat and 
operate on the basis of non-binding commitments and open dialogue. APEC’s 
long term objective is for ‘free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific 
by 2010 for industrialised economies and 2020 for developing economies’.24 In 
pursuing this objective, the APEC leaders agreed upon Principles to Enhance 
Competition and Regulatory Reform in September 1999,25 and created a 
Competition Policy and Deregulation Group within the APEC Committee on 
Trade and Investment with the aim of enhancing the region’s ‘competitive 
environment’. The 1999 set of principles is recognition by the Member 
Economies of: 
                                                 
20 Andean Community Press Release 3rd March 2003, CAN country rules of competition to be harmonized 
with European Union assistance. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Further details are provided on the APEC website at: http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec.html.  
23 Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand, USA, and Vietnam.  
24 The so-called ‘Bogor Goals’ agreed at the APEC Leaders 1994 meeting in Bogor, Indonesia. 
25 APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration: APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory 
Reform, 13th September 1999 Auckland, New Zealand, available at: 
http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders__declarations/1999/attachment_-_apec.html.  
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‘the strategic importance of developing competition principles to support 
the strengthening of markets to ensure and sustain growth in the region 
and that these principles provide a framework that links all aspects of 
economic policy that affects the functioning of markets’. 
 
The principles do not, however, provide any guidance as to the structure, content 
or enforcement mechanism of any potential antitrust rules. Indeed the principles 
contain very little detail regarding an antitrust regime, other than endorsing the 
inclusion of the principles of non discrimination, comprehensiveness, 
transparency, accountability and implementation within any such regime. One key 
objective outlined in the principles is to ‘foster confidence and build capacity in 
the application of competition and regulatory policy’. The following specific tasks 
are then established: promote advocacy of competition policy and regulatory 
reform; build expertise in competition and regulatory authorities, the courts and 
the private sector; and adequately resource regulatory institutions, including 
competition institutions. It is clear that the work of the Competition Policy and 
Deregulation Group tends to focus upon these tasks, as well as developing means 
of cooperation between competition authorities,26 and it is this work that forms the 
principal antitrust related activities of APEC. In substantive terms the CPD Group 
runs the APEC Training Programme on Competition Policy, which is strongly 
supported by the OECD. This programme operates a seminar series promoting 
discussion on themed topics between experts from member economies as well as 
international organisations.27 Another key antitrust related activity has been the 
                                                 
26 Which is another goal outlined in the 1999 set of principles. 
27 See Report on APEC Training Programme on Competition Policy presented to the CPD Group Annual 
Meeting 24th may 2005 at Jeju, Korea, available at: 
http://www.apec.org/content/apec/documents_reports/competition_policy_deregulation_group/2005.html.  
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creation of the APEC Competition Policy and Law Database,28 which Taiwan 
took full operational and financial responsibility for setting up, although each 
member economy is responsible for updating its own data. The CPL Database is 
publicly accessible and given the lack of substantive convergence efforts under 
the auspices of APEC at this stage, the database is an important step in order to 
build mutual understanding and confidence amongst member economies with 
regard to their respective antitrust laws and policies. It also clearly increases the 
transparency of the operation of antitrust laws in several jurisdictions which can 
only be of benefit to the business community. The aim of the database is set out in 
its introduction:  
‘Competition policy is complex and varies greatly from member to 
member. Some APEC member economies have laws dating back more 
than a century, some have relatively recent laws, and others still have no 
laws at all. Recognizing this disparity of conditions among member 
economies, gathering and collating information and the establishment of a 
regional database is one essential step towards narrowing the competition 
gap among member economies’.29  
 
The database contains information on the antitrust laws and policies of all 21 
member economies split into one of 14 distinct categories including inter alia: 
policy statements; competition laws and policies; organisational structure; 
administrative procedures; decision guidelines; administrative decisions; and 
judicial decisions. Given the diversity of the 21 member economies it is difficult 
to envisage anything other than information sharing and capacity-building being 
                                                 
28 Available at: http://www.apeccp.org.tw/.    
29 Ibid.  
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achieved in the area of antitrust under the auspices of APEC.30 Nonetheless the 
APEC activities can be beneficial, particularly for members which are developing 
countries. A criticism of international antitrust initiatives has often been that there 
is too much emphasis on achieving convergence among developed countries, at 
the expense of adapting provisions to address the interests of developing 
countries, and APEC’s activities may partially answer that criticism.31  
 
4.2.4 ASEAN 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in 1967 with 
the signing of the Bangkok Declaration by the 5 founding states. ASEAN now 
comprises 10 Member Countries from South East Asia,32 the majority of which 
are also APEC member economies. One of ASEAN’s primary goals is to 
accelerate economic growth in the region. There is no need to discuss ASEAN in 
particular depth given the lack of substantive antitrust activities within the 
organisation, and no mention of antitrust in the Bangkok Declaration or the 1976 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia (TAC) or subsequent 
agreements. Nonetheless there is a stated desire from the ASEAN Secretariat for 
                                                 
30 For a detailed examination of the domestic antitrust laws of APEC members, and the prospects for a 
regional antitrust agreement, see M. Taylor, International Competition Law: A New Dimension for the 
WTO?, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), particularly at chapter 4. 
31 Note that this has been a criticism often levied against the OECD, see A. Piilola, ‘Assessing Theories of 
Global Governance: A Case Study International Antitrust Regulation’ (2003) 39 Stanford Journal of 
International Law 207 at p.237. In the OECD’s defence however, it’s Global Forum on Competition does 
engage with non-member countries and it has been suggested that this forum offers greater opportunity for 
wider discussion than within the International Competition Network where the initial intent was to create a 
forum for discussion amongst antitrust authorities, the implication being that a state would need to have 
established an antitrust authority in order to participate in the ICN, see paper by Frederic Jenny, ‘The 
OECD Global Forum, The ICN, the WTO, UNCTAD: who is doing what in the area of international 
competition and why?’ presented at the 2002 Antitrust Conference. New York, 7 – 8 March 2002. 
32 Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao, 
Myanmar/Burma, and Cambodia. 
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this to change in the future.33 Future antitrust activities are likely initially to 
include technical assistance, expert training and capacity-building,34 although 
there have already been ASEAN conferences on fair competition law and policy. 
Additionally, antitrust is likely to gradually come within the ASEAN remit in 
light of the EC-ASEAN cooperative partnership which notes antitrust as an 
identified issue,35 as well as due to the projected creation of an ASEAN 
Economic, Security and Socio-Cultural Community.36 Note that there have also 
been persuasive arguments advanced in favour of substantive regional antitrust 
rules for the ASEAN.37
 
4.2.5 CARICOM 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a common market with substantive 
antitrust rules leading the way towards harmonised rules and centralised 
enforcement among its fifteen Member States38 through The Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community, including the CARICOM 
                                                 
33 See speech by T.D. Minh, Deputy Secretary General of the ASEAN Secretariat, ‘Regional Approach to 
Competition law and Policy’. Hong Kong on 16 -18 April 2002, note that any antitrust principles or rules 
developed under the auspices of ASEAN would likely include merger control as the Deputy Secretary 
General stated: ‘Some countries take the view that competition law should control behaviour, not market 
structures, and thus have not enacted merger control. Experience suggests this is likely to be an error’. 
34 Ibid. 
35 See Report by the European Commission, A New Partnership with South East Asia COM (2003) 399/4 at 
p.34. 
36 ASEAN leaders pledged to create such a Community by 2010 at the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, 7-8th 
October 2003. 
37 See e.g. L. Thanadsillapakul, ‘The Harmonisation of ASEAN Competition Laws and Policy from an 
Economic Integration Perspective’ (2004) Issue 2 (Spring) Online Thailand Law Journal, available at: 
http://www.thailawforum.com/articles/theharmonisation.html.  
38 In a manner not too dissimilar to that adopted within the Treaty of Rome establishing the EC. The 
Member States of CARICOM are Antiqua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. While Anquilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, the 
Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands are Associate Members. 
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Single Market and Economy.39 The Revised Treaty has not yet entered into force 
in all Member States, and very few have given full effect to the provisions such as 
establishing national antitrust authorities,40 and many have not adopted national 
antitrust rules, although the CARICOM Legal Affairs Committee (LAC) has 
approved a draft model law.41 The existence and regional harmonisation of 
national antitrust regimes is required by Article 74(2)(f) of the Revised Treaty, 
and while this has not fully taken place, the Member States are working towards 
this requirement.  The perceived importance of antitrust to the CARICOM 
common market is clear from the preamble to the Revised Treaty where it states: 
‘Mindful further that the benefits from the establishment of the CSME 
[CARICOM Single Market and Economy] are not frustrated by anti-
competitive business conduct whose object or effect is to prevent, restrict 
or distort competition; Convinced further that the application and 
convergence of national competition policies and the cooperation of 
competition authorities in the Community will promote the objectives of 
the CSME’.  
 
The substantive antitrust provisions are included in chapter 8 of the Revised 
Treaty including a general provision on the objective of Community Competition 
Policy within Article 169(1): ‘The goal of the Community Competition Policy 
shall be to ensure that the benefits expected from the establishment of the CSME 
are not frustrated by anti-competitive business conduct’, although consumer 
welfare and protection of consumer interests is noted as a secondary objective in 
Article 169(2)(c). Article 171 establishes the Competition Commission of the 
                                                 
39 Available at: http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/publications/revisedtreaty.pdf.  
40 As required by Article 170(2) of the Revised Treaty. Only Barbados and Jamaica have established 
antitrust authorities thus far, although St Vincent and the Grenadines have passed relevant legislation and 
Trinidad and Tobago have a draft bill. 
41 Ibid. Note that Jamaica, Barbados, and St Vincent and the Grenadines already have national antitrust 
rules. 
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CARICOM charged with the task of promoting Community antitrust policy and 
applying the antitrust rules laid out in the Revised Treaty in circumstances of 
‘anti-competitive cross-border business conduct’.42 The antitrust rules regarding 
anti-competitive agreements and monopolistic behaviour are framed in very 
similar terms to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. Article 177(1)(a) prohibits 
‘agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and 
concerted practices by enterprises which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Community’. Article 
177(1)(b) prohibits ‘actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position 
within the Community’ and while examples of such prohibited behaviour is then 
also provided in Article 177 and 179, there is also additional guidance on 
determining a dominant position,43 on exemptions,44 and additionally on the 
application of a de minimis rule.45 While there are no distinct rules providing for 
merger control within CARICOM, it does appear that the third and general 
antitrust prohibition against ‘any other like conduct by enterprises whose object or 
effect is to frustrate the benefits expected from the establishment of the CSME’46 
could provide a wide discretion to review M&A activity. Indeed there also 
appears to be some scope for considering mergers under the prohibition against 
abuse of a dominant position, as one of the listed factors when considering 
whether conduct is abusive is ‘the concentration level before and after the relevant 
                                                 
42 The functions of the Competition Commission are provided for in Article 173. 
43 Article 178. 
44 Article 177(4), Article 179(3) and Article 183. 
45 Article 181. 
46 Article 177(1)(c). 
 184
activity of the enterprise measured in terms of annual sales volume, the value of 
assets and the value of the transaction’.47  
 
The CARICOM antitrust regime is still in its infancy, and will not enter into force 
until ratified by all Member States, yet the antitrust provisions and infrastructure 
are amongst the most advanced and detailed within a RTA or trading bloc. The 
antitrust regime is clearly modelled on the EC, to the extent that the CARICOM 
Competition Commission is the initial adjudicator and has ex proprio motu 
investigative jurisdiction.48 A key factor must also be The Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas, which establishes a Common Market akin to the EC, notably unlike 
many of the other RTAs that are still in the Free Trade Area or Customs Union 
stages of economic integration. 
 
4.2.6 COMESA 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)49 was 
established in December 1994 with a key aim being to form a large economic and 
trading bloc and work towards a Free Trade Area, which was achieved between 9 
Member States on 31st October 2000. The Free Trade Area now consists of 11 of 
the 20 COMESA Member States.50 COMESA is now working towards a Customs 
                                                 
47 Article 179(2)(b). 
48 See Article 176, and contrast with the CDC within MERCOSUR, infra at 4.2.8. 
49 The COMESA website is available at: http://www.comesa.int/about/.   
50 Angola, Burundi*, Comoros, D.R. Congo, Djibouti*, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya*, Libya, 
Madagascar*, Malawi*, Mauritius*, Rwanda*, Seychelles, Sudan*, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia*, and 
Zimbabwe*. *= Members of the Free Trade Area. 
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Union for 2008, and a Common Market for 2014.51 The regional organisation is 
based upon the COMESA Treaty52 which includes basic antitrust rules and 
provides for the future adoption of more detailed rules within the COMESA 
framework. Article 55 of the COMESA Treaty provides that:  
‘The Member States agree that any practice which negates the objective of 
free and liberalised trade shall be prohibited. To this end, the Member 
States agree to prohibit any agreement between undertakings or concerted 
practice which has as its objective or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the Common Market’.  
 
Article 55 also allows for the COMESA Council to declare exceptions to the 
general prohibition when the conduct in question ‘improves production or 
distribution of goods or promotes technical or economic progress and has the 
effect of enabling customers a fair share of the benefits’53 provided that it is 
consistent with the objectives of the COMESA Treaty54 and does not eliminate 
competition. A particularly important section of Article 55 allows for the 
COMESA Council to make regulations providing for further regional antitrust 
rules,55 which facilitated the draft COMESA Competition Regulations in February 
200356 and the draft COMESA Competition Rules.57 These antitrust provisions 
                                                 
51 See Paper by B. Ali El Dean, ‘Regional Integration Agreements Related to Competition Law and Policy: 
The Experience of the Common Market of East and Southern Africa COMESA’ presented to the 
Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy. Geneva, 8-10 November 2004. Also 
presented by COMESA to the UNCTAD. 
52 Available at: http://www.comesa.int/comesa%20treaty/comesa%20treaty/view. 
53 Article 55(2) of the COMESA Treaty. 
54 It could be argued that this provision bears some resemblance to the teleological approach of the 
European Court of Justice when interpreting the Treaty of Rome, thereby ensuring that interpretation of 
specific Treaty provisions do not operate to circumvent the wider objectives of the Common Market, see 
discussion surrounding Case 26/63 van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] 
ECR 1. 
55 Article 55(3) COMESA Treaty. 
56 Available at: http://www.comesa.int/trade/issues/policy/. Note that Member States are required by Article 
5(2)(b) of the COMESA Treaty to ensure COMESA Council Regulations have the force of law within 
national legal systems.   
 186
are the result of a lengthy consultation period involving the COMESA Member 
States and the international consultancy team it commissioned.58 One of the 
notable features of the development of the COMESA antitrust regime is that 
regional rules are being established while only 5 of the 21 Member States have 
national antitrust rules, and do not necessarily have an effective enforcement 
mechanism. A member of the COMESA consultancy team justifies this apparent 
discrepancy by stating, inter alia: 
‘there are anti-competitive practices taking place on the regional level and 
leaving them unsanctioned would simply mean that benefits of integration 
shall not materialize. It is only a regional law that can protect such 
regional economic interests. Absent a regional competition law the 
negative effects of global and regional mergers shall not be dealt with’.59  
 
The draft COMESA antitrust rules are comprehensive and often bear significant 
similarity to the infrastructure and rules of the EC antitrust regime. The COMESA 
rules provide for the creation of a COMESA Competition Commission (CCC)60 
with significant powers and the ability to issue decisions that are legally binding 
in all Member States.61 The Board of the CCC can impose fines of up to 10% of 
an ‘undertaking’s’ annual turnover for infringing Article 16(1) (prohibition of 
anti-competition agreements) or Article 18 (prohibition of abuse of a dominant 
position) of the draft COMESA Competition Regulations.62 Part 4 of the 
Regulations also provides for an ex ante merger control regime within the 
                                                                                                                                                 
57 By virtue of Article 39 of the COMESA Competition Regulations, these are available at: 
http://www.comesa.int/trade/issues/policy/. 
58 Consisting of six consultants, one from each of the US, Australia, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Egypt. 
See Paper by B. Ali El Dean, op. cit. note 51. 
59 Paper by B. Ali El Dean, op. cit. note 51. 
60 Article 6 of the draft COMESA Competition Regulations. 
61 Ibid, as well as Article 8 of the draft COMESA Competition Regulations 
62 Rule 45(2) of the draft COMESA Competition Rules. 
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COMESA antitrust framework, whereby undertakings to a proposed merger or 
acquisition that has a ‘regional dimension’63 must notify the CCC. The CCC has 
wide ranging powers within Article 26(7) of the Regulations to approve, vary or 
declare unlawful any proposed merger or acquisition. A decision must be based 
upon an initial finding that the proposed merger would ‘substantially prevent or 
lessen competition’ under Article 26(1), and secondly that it cannot be justified on 
specified efficiency or substantial public interest grounds. The proposed 
COMESA regional antitrust regime is remarkable in terms of its advanced stage 
of preparation and considerable detail, all the more so given the dearth of national 
antitrust rules amongst the Member States. The development of the regional 
system has been strongly motivated by a perceived threat to trade liberalisation, 
which is a central objective of COMESA. It remains to be seen how quickly each 
Member State will ratify the Competition Regulations and Rules, and whether an 
effective enforcement regime and antitrust culture can be cultivated within the 
COMESA.  
 
4.2.7 FTAA 
The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was launched at the first summit of 
the Americas in December 1994 and had been set a ten year negotiation period. 
The original proposal intended for an agreement to be reached by 1st January 2005 
to enter into effect in December 2005. Notwithstanding the monumental task of 
negotiating a common antitrust framework for the Americas, encompassing such 
diverse nations as the US and Venezuela, and coupling the current trade blocs of 
                                                 
63 See Article 23(2) of the draft COMESA Competition Regulations. 
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NAFTA, MERCOSUR and the ANDEAN Community, a draft set of antitrust 
provisions was included within chapter XIX of the Third Draft FTAA, dated 21st 
November 2003.64 The objective of chapter XIX has been stated as being ‘to 
guarantee that the benefits of the FTAA liberalization process not be undermined 
by anti-competitive business practices’,65 and to ‘guarantee the enforcement of 
regulations on free competition among and within countries of the Hemisphere’.66 
The draft provisions appear to reflect a compromise between the antitrust 
provisions within NAFTA and MERCOSUR, with additional features more 
regularly found in bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements. There are general 
provisions recognising the importance of antitrust provisions to securing the 
benefits of the FTAA,67 as well as ensuring confidentiality and the precedence of 
national rules regarding disclosure of confidential information.68 There are also 
principles regarding cooperation and coordination of antitrust enforcement 
activities,69 and consultation procedures.70  
 
There are provisions requiring the adoption and enforcement of national or sub-
regional (i.e. at the level of MERCOSUR or the CAN) provisions to ‘proscribe 
anti-competitive business conduct so as to promote economic efficiency and 
consumer welfare’.71 The draft does permit the creation of monopolies72 and state 
                                                 
64 Available at: http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index_e.asp.  
65 Issued by the Negotiating Group on Competition Policy, FTAA Fourth Meeting of Ministers of Trade, 
Ministerial Declaration, Annex II. 19 March 1998, San Jose, Costa Rica. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Chapter XIX: Article 1 of the third draft FTAA. 
68 Chapter XIX: Article 4 of the third draft FTAA. 
69 Chapter XIX: Article 8 of the third draft FTAA. 
70 Chapter XIX: Article 14 of the third draft FTAA. 
71 Chapter XIX: Article 6.1 of the third draft FTAA. 
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enterprises, but requires both to comply with the principle of non-discrimination, 
thereby reflecting certain provisions within chapter 15 of the NAFTA. Reflecting 
the nature of some provisions to be found within the MERCOSUR framework, the 
draft FTAA envisages the creation of a Committee on competition,73 consisting of 
representatives from each signatory (national and sub-regional entities) in order to 
assist with, inter alia, monitoring of implementation of antitrust provisions, 
promoting cooperation among parties, and assisting in coordination of technical 
assistance. The draft also provides vague guidance on the type of conduct antitrust 
provisions should address.74 A successful negotiation of the FTAA negotiations, 
with the current chapter XIX included, would represent a remarkable achievement 
for many reasons. An agreement would be a success for the antitrust advocacy of 
developed antitrust authorities, and it would also represent a significant change of 
direction for the US, to refocus its international antitrust cooperation efforts from 
bilateral cooperation to regional cooperation. Notwithstanding the extensive 
antitrust dialogue that has taken place within the FTAA framework, it is uncertain 
as to whether the Agreement will ever come into being.75
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
72 Chapter XIX: Article 9 of the third draft FTAA. 
73 Chapter XIX: Article 12 of the third draft FTAA. 
74 Chapter XIX: Article 6.2 of the third draft FTAA. 
75 For a media assessment of the prospects of the FTAA see analysis on BBC News website ‘Little hope for 
Americas free trade plan’, available at:  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4399354.stm.  
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4.2.8 MERCOSUR 
The Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), consisting of 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela,76 does not include any 
substantive antitrust provisions within the founding Treaty of Asunción in 1991.77 
The 1996 Protocol for the Defence of Competition78 however, sought to establish 
guiding principles for domestic antitrust enforcement, as well as drafting regional 
provisions and creating the Committee for the Defence of Competition (CDC), as 
a central MERCOSUR antitrust investigative authority. The protocol primarily 
seeks to establish prohibitions against: 
‘individual or concerted acts, of whatever kind, the purpose or final effect 
of which is to restrict, limit, falsify or distort competition or access to the 
market or which constitute an abuse of a dominant position in the relevant 
goods or services market in the framework of the MERCOSUR, and 
which affect trade between the states parties’.79  
 
To avoid any doubt as to whether merger control is a feature of the MERCOSUR 
framework, Article 7 requires Member States to adopt common rules: 
‘for the control of acts and contracts of any kind, which may limit or in 
any way cause prejudice to free trade, or result in the domination of the 
relevant regional market of goods and services, including which result in 
economic concentration, with a view to preventing their possible anti-
competitive effects in the framework of the MERCOSUR’.  
 
                                                 
76 As well as Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru (4 ANDEAN Community Member States), Chile, and 
Mexico holding associate membership status. 
77 Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of 
Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, (MERCOSUR), 26th March 1991, 
30 ILM 1041. 
78 MERCOSUR Protocol of the Defense of Competition, Decision 18/96, of 17th December 1996, as 
amended. English translation included within the Inventory of the competition policy agreements, treaties 
and other arrangements existing in the Western hemisphere available from the Organisation for American 
States’ (OAS) Trade Unit’s Foreign Trade Information System, see: 
http://www.alca-ftaa.org/ngroups/NGCP/Publications/treaty_e.asp.  
79 Article 4 MERCOSUR of the Defense of Competition, Decision 18/96, of 17th December 1996, as 
amended. Note that 17 examples of behaviour targeted by the prohibition are included within Article 6. 
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MERCOSUR’s current status is more akin to a customs union working towards its 
overriding objective of becoming a common market.80 The five Member States 
view antitrust rules (particularly those capable of functioning at a regional level) 
as essential to the eventual achievement and continuation of this goal as they have 
stated that ‘the free movement of goods and services between the states parties 
renders essential that adequate conditions of competition be assured in order to 
contribute to the strengthening of the custom union’.81 MERCOSUR’s goal of 
creating ‘a competitive environment in the integrated framework of the 
MERCOSUR’82 is furthered by the creation of the CDC. The CDC however, can 
only act on references from domestic authorities where there is a MERCOSUR 
dimension, and must recommend appropriate sanctions to the MECOSUR Trade 
Commission.83 The CDC’s ability to act is clearly hampered by the developing 
nature of the domestic antitrust regimes, particularly with regard to Paraguay and 
Uruguay, as well as the continuing generality of many key provisions and the 
potential for inconsistency and divergence among the Member States.  
 
The movement towards an effective antitrust regime for the MERCOSUR has 
been bolstered by the signing of an enabling agreement in 2002,84 which set in 
                                                 
80 See Paper by C.A. Jones, op. cit. note 15. 
81 Preamble to the MERCOSUR Protocol of the Defense of Competition, Decision 18/96, of 17th December 
1996, as amended. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Only the MERCOSUR Trade Commission can adopt legally enforceable decisions to penalise entities for 
engaging in anti-competitive activities, although the CDC can negotiate and agree undertakings to remedy 
the detrimental effects.  For a discussion of the antitrust rules and procedures established by the 1996 
Protocol, as well as interesting views on antitrust enforcement see: J.T. de Araujo Jr & L. Tineo, ‘The 
Harmonization of Competition Policies Among Mercosur Countries’ (1998) 24 Brook J. Int’l L 441. 
84 Agreement on the Regulation of the Protocol of Defense of the Competition of the MERCOSUR, signed 
in Brasilia on 5th December 2002. 
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place rules regarding the CDC’s composition, procedure and powers.85 The 1996 
Protocol has still to be ratified by all Member States however, and will not enter 
into force until that point. Additionally, the ongoing negotiations between the EC 
and MERCOSUR for the creation of a ‘bi-regional or inter-regional Association 
Agreement’ strongly encourages the continued development of an effective 
antitrust regime for MERCOSUR and its Member States. The agreement states 
that ‘Ensuring adequate and effective competition policies and a mechanism for 
cooperation in the field of competition’ is one of the ten primary objectives to be 
pursued by entering into a inter-regional free trade agreement.86 Note that ‘the EU 
is the 1st trading partner of MERCOSUR, representing 23% of total MERCOSUR 
trade, and its first source of inward investment. MERCOSUR ranks 9th among EU 
trading partners, accounting for 2.3% of total EU trade’.87 Member States of the 
CAN are additionally either Members or Associate Members of MERCOSUR, 
and vice versa, and both regional blocs are moving towards gradual integration 
within the South American Community of Nations (SACN)88. SACN should 
theoretically lead to a near-continental convergence and harmonisation 
programme. 
                                                 
85 Note, however, that the CDC’s powers are severely constrained by not being able to initiate 
investigations ex proprio motu, and by not having any adjudicative function. For further discussion of these 
issues and a comparison between the EC’s antitrust regime and that developing under the MERCOSUR, see 
J.T. de Araujo Jr, ‘Competition Policy and the EU-Mercosur Trade Negotiations’, prepared for the Working 
Group on EU-Mercosur Trade Negoitations. Paris, 12-13 May 2000. 
86 See the following web pages of the European Commission for an overview of EU-MERCOSUR relations 
as well as an update on the negotiations towards an Association Agreement to create a free trade area: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mercosur/intro/#1, as well as: 
 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/mercosur/index_en.htm.  
87 Information available from the European Commission Bilateral Trade Relations website, ibid. 
88 Created on 8th December 2004 by the Cusco Declaration on the South American Community of Nations. 
For discussion see speech by A. Wagner, Andean Community Secretary General, ‘The South American 
Community of Nations: A great decentralized development program’ Lima December 2004, available at: 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/press/articles/Allanwagner8-2-04.htm.  
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 4.2.9 NAFTA 
The antitrust provisions within the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) have been both productive and disappointing at the same time. The US, 
Canada and Mexico entered into the NAFTA on 1st January 2004, thereby giving 
effect to the five antitrust Articles within chapter 15 with a key objective being to 
‘reduce trade distortions’.89 While there are no substantive antitrust provisions, 
Article 1501 requires each signatory to ‘adopt or maintain measures to proscribe 
anti-competitive business conduct and take appropriate action with respect 
thereto, recognizing that such measures will enhance the fulfilment of the 
objectives of this Agreement’. This provision did not effect the US or Canada as 
they have long-established antitrust regimes, yet the signing of the Agreement in 
December 1992 did prompt Mexico to pass a more rigorous antitrust law in mid-
1993.90 Articles 1502 and 1503 impose limited restrictions by permitting 
signatories to create monopolies and state enterprises but nonetheless committing 
them to the obligations within the NAFTA, and the principle of non-
discrimination. Article 1504 established a Working Group on Trade and 
Competition, which does not appear to have had an active role in the operation of 
the Agreement or in the function of the NAFTA Secretariat since 1998.91 The 
closer cooperation encouraged by Article 1501 has led to the conclusion of 
                                                 
89 See Preamble to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 17th December 1992, 32 ILM 289 (1993). 
90 See J. Wilson, Globalization and the Limits of National Merger Control Laws, (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2003) at p.217. 
91 See A.D. Melamed, ‘International Cooperation in Competition Law and Policy: What can be achieved at 
the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels’ (1999) JIEL 423 at p.429. For a fuller discussion of the 
promise of the inclusion of antitrust within the NAFTA framework see P. Glossop, ‘Editorial: NAFTA and 
Competition Policy’ (1994) 15 ECLR 191. 
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bilateral antitrust agreements between the three signatories,92 all but one of which 
refer to chapter 15 of the NAFTA. Nonetheless, it is disappointing to observe the 
preference for a network of bilateral agreements, in spite of the potential for a 
trilateral cooperation agreement between the parties, within the framework of this 
regional agreement. 
 
4.2.10 WAEMU/UEMOA 
 The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)93 was created in 
1994 with seven Member States,94 which increased to eight in 1997.95 The 
WAEMU has supranational institutions such as the Court of Justice, and the 
Commission. The WAEMU has been a customs union since January 2000, and its 
Member States have the CFA franc as their single currency. The former Director 
of Trade and Competition of the WAEMU Commission, Jean-Luc Senou, has said 
that the Union’s wider aim is ‘to strengthen competitiveness in economic and 
financial activities in the Member States, in the framework of an open, 
competitive market and a rationalised and harmonised legal environment’.96 The 
1994 WAEMU Treaty contains several antitrust provisions which entered into 
                                                 
92 See the 1995 Agreement between The Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of Canada Regarding the Application of their Competition Deceptive Marketing Practice Laws, now 
supplemented by the Agreement on the Application of Positive Comity Principles to the Enforcement of 
their Competition Laws (5th October 2004), as well as the Agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States Regarding the Application of 
their Competition Laws (11th July 2000), and the 2001 Agreement between the Government of Canada and 
the Government of the United Mexican States on the Application of their Competition Laws, see chapter 2 
for further discussion of these agreements. 
93 Which is more commonly known under its French title of Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest 
Africaine (UEMOA). 
94 Bénin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire/Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Sénégal and Togo. 
95 Guinea-Bissau joined in May 1997. 
96 J.L. Senou, ‘Development of Community Competition Law within WAEMU: The Role of Technical 
Assistance’, in a contribution by WAEMU/UEMOA to the OECD Global Forum on Competition, 13 
February 2002 (CCNM/GF/WD(2002)30). 
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force in 2003, including Article 76 which provides for the antitrust rules to apply 
to public and private enterprises, as well as state aids,97 and more substantive rules 
within Articles 88-90. The antitrust provisions are closely modelled upon EC 
provisions and indeed at a general level, the WAEMU has been described as 
having enacted the ‘substantial constitutional law of the European Community’.98 
Articles 88 and 89 are modelled upon Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty, and Article 
90 provides for rules on state aid. The WAEMU appears to have a highly 
centralised antitrust regime under the direction of the Commission, which also has 
exclusive competence to deal with commercial activities that may breach the 
antitrust provisions.99 There is also strong evidence to suggest that many Member 
States have reformed, or are in the process of reforming their antitrust laws in 
light of the WAEMU provisions.100 The decision to base WAEMU antitrust 
provisions on the EC antitrust regime has caused problems however, and it has 
been accepted that a weakness of the technical assistance facilitated by the EC: 
‘concerns the choice of the European competition regulation model, 
without properly evaluating the resources required to implement it. It 
should be noted that this weakness is also found in some [WAEMU] 
Member States which enjoyed considerable technical support from 
UNCTAD or French cooperation in formulating their laws, but which ran 
into difficulties due to the mismatch between the volume of rules adopted 
and the domestic capacity to enforce them’.101
 
                                                 
97 The text of the WAEMU Treaty can be accessed at: 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/waemufta.pdf (in French). 
98 M. Bakhoum, ‘Delimitation and Exercise of Competence between the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) and its Member States in Competition Policy’ (2006) 29 World Comp. 653, at 
655 and note 17. 
99 See discussion in M. Bakhoum, ibid. 
100 See paragraph 34 of the UNCTAD Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition 
Law and Policy, 19 September 2003 (TD/B/COM.2/CLP/39). Available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clpd39_en.pdf.  
101 Op. cit. note 96. 
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This is undoubtedly an issue that is relevant to many of the RTAs discussed, 
particularly those adopting models based upon the EC regime. While the issue of 
how best to implement antitrust rules within developing countries is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, the desire to follow the EC model perhaps illustrates that 
regional blocs accept the need for a parallel approach to economic integration, 
encompassing both free trade and antitrust. 
 
4.2.11 Conclusion 
A common perception may be that antitrust is the exclusive purview of developed 
countries, yet the preceding assessment of RTAs provides evidence that many 
developing countries are engaged in regional antitrust initiatives. The 
infrastructure and enforcement mechanisms within such countries and trading 
blocs may be questionable and certainly in their infancy, yet the willingness of 
developing countries to commit to introducing antitrust regimes in parallel to their 
trade liberalisation efforts, is of some significance in itself. It is apparent that the 
nature of antitrust provisions within RTAs does vary, yet it is equally clear that 
this reflects the varying nature of the RTAs in existence. It may even be possible 
to discern a greater emphasis being placed upon antitrust provisions within RTAs 
that are moving towards a Common Market or Customs Union, than compared 
with those where the objective is a Free Trade Area such as NAFTA. The above 
assessment has enabled a fuller understanding of the extent of the international 
antitrust dialogue and its linkages with international trade. Consideration of the 
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role of antitrust in the EU’s external affairs as well as multilateral antitrust 
initiatives will further strengthen this understanding. 
 
  
4.3 Exporting antitrust  
4.3.1 Introduction 
It can be seen from the foregoing analysis of antitrust within regional trade 
agreements and trading blocs that there are often strong similarities between the 
RTAs and the EC, in terms of the wording and interpretation of antitrust 
provisions as well as enforcement structure. The principal EC antitrust provisions 
have been considered supra at 2.6, and in order to further understand the scope of 
the international antitrust dialogue, and its relationship with trade, the antitrust 
provisions within association, cooperation and partnership agreements between 
the EC and third countries must be considered. Perhaps the most legally 
significant of these EC agreements is the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Agreement’) and will be considered first. 
 
4.3.2 The EEA 
The European Economic Area (EEA) creates a common market with common 
rules protecting the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons 
between the EU Member States and three of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) countries.102 The Agreement entered into force on 1st January 1994103 and 
                                                 
102 Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Note that the fourth EFTA country, Switzerland, decided against 
joining the EEA following a referendum. 
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extended much of the EC acquis communautaire to the contracting EFTA 
countries. The EEA is far less politically significant than it once was. Several 
current EU Member States were members of the EEA prior to their accession to 
the EU, hence the EEA has lost importance as the EU has widened. The principal 
difference between EEA membership and EU membership is the lack of political 
objectives present in the former that exist in the latter, additionally EU 
membership entails the harmonisation of national laws across a wider range of 
areas than experienced by EEA membership alone.104 Prima facie, it may be 
unclear why the three EFTA countries would wish to participate in the EEA, 
which effectively adopts and adheres to the internal market rules of the EC 
(including competition law), given that the three EFTA countries have no decision 
making or significant policy making role in relation to these rules. In spite of the 
apparent loss of sovereignty, it is apparent that the benefits of participation within 
the EEA outweigh the cost for these countries.  
 
The aim of the Agreement is ‘to promote a continuous and balanced strengthening 
of trade and economic relations between the contracting parties with equal 
conditions of competition, and the respect of the same rules, with a view to 
creating a homogeneous European Economic Area’.105 It appears that the benefits 
stemming from a strong trading relationship with the EU offers sufficient 
                                                                                                                                                 
103 Albeit with different contracting states reflecting the changing membership of both the EU and EFTA. 
104 In order to gain further insight into the function and legal effect of the EEA see M. Johansson & L. 
Sevon, ‘The protection of the rights of individuals under the EEA Agreement’ (1999) 24 EL Rev 373. There 
is also some useful discussion in M.M. Dabbah, op. cit. note 2, at pp.116 – 120, additionally the websites of 
both the EFTA Secretariat (http://secretariat.efta.int) and the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
(http://www.eftasurv.int) are helpful sources of information. 
105 Article 1(1) European Economic Area Agreement. 
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incentives to adhere to EC laws. In order to achieve the objective of creating a 
European Economic Area with ‘equal conditions of competition’ the antitrust 
provisions within the Agreement are often substantively identical to those in the 
Treaty of Rome and subsequent Community Regulations. Articles 53 and 54 EEA 
Agreement mirror Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome. Article 57 provides 
for the control of concentrations within the EEA and is applied in accordance with 
the terms of Protocols 21 and 24, as well as Annex XIV to the Agreement, which 
have been amended106 to give effect to the revised ECMR107 within the EEA. The 
EEA antitrust provisions apply to activities that may have an effect on trade 
between contracting parties and are enforced by the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
(ESA), established under Article 108 of the Agreement, as well as the European 
Commission.108  
 
There are clearly defined rules contained in Articles 56 and 57 of the Agreement 
for the attribution of competence to investigate cases between the ESA and the 
European Commission, which seek to avoid duplication of effort. The European 
Commission’s status amongst EU Member State antitrust authorities as primus 
inter pares is replicated within the EEA, as the Commission retains sole 
jurisdiction when trade between EU Member States is affected by anti-
competitive activities, while the ESA will exercise jurisdiction only when there is 
                                                 
106 See EEA Joint Committee Decisions No.78/2004 and No.79/2004. Note also the updates on the 
European Commission website regarding application of the merger control rules to the EEA: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/eea.htm.  
107 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) which replaced Regulation 4064/89 from 1st May 2004.  
108 Note that Protocol 4 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement provides the ESA with comparative 
investigative and adjudicative powers to that of the European Commission in the field of antitrust. 
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an effect on trade between contracting EFTA countries. In circumstances where 
trade between the EC and one or more EFTA countries is affected, the 
Commission retains jurisdictional competence should it wish to investigate 
alleged anti-competitive practices, although the ESA will normally deal with the 
case if internal EC trade is not appreciably restricted and the Commission decides 
against investigating the matter.109 In the field of merger control the European 
Commission operates the ‘one-stop-shop’ principle across the whole of the EEA 
with the result that where concentrations have a ‘Community Dimension’ within 
the meaning of Regulation 139/2004,110 the Commission shall have ‘sole 
competence to take decisions on these cases’.111 When the concentration fails to 
satisfy the requirements of having a ‘Community Dimension’, thereby removing 
the jurisdiction of the European Commission to scrutinise the merger, it may 
nonetheless be subjected to analysis by the ESA if it has an ‘EFTA Dimension’.112 
In order to ensure that the most appropriate antitrust authority deals with the 
concentration, there are provisions enabling the transfer of notified concentrations 
from one authority within the EEA to another,113 which are utilised when 
appropriate.114  
                                                 
109 See the EFTA Surveillance Authority website for further discussion of the division of competence: 
http://www.eftasurv.int/fieldsofwork/fieldcompetition/compregrole/dbaFile547.html. 
110 Article 1(2) of the ECMR, op. cit. note 107. 
111 Article 57(2)(i) EEA Agreement. 
112 A concentration will have an ‘EFTA Dimension’ if it satisfies the turnover thresholds laid out in EC 
Regulation 139/2004 when read in conjunction with Annex XIV of the EEA Agreement. 
113 Article 10 of Protocol 24 to the EEA Agreement on cooperation in the field of control of concentrations. 
Note that Broberg has considered the issue of jurisdictional competence with regard to merger control in 
some depth, see M.O. Broberg, ‘The delimitation of jurisdiction with regard to concentration control under 
the EEA Agreement’ (1995) 16 ECLR 30, note that while the substantive tests have developed in light of 
the ECMR, the discussion regarding jurisdictional competence nonetheless remains valid. 
114 See for example the proposed acquisition of Kvaerner by Aker Maritime where the European 
Commission referred the case to the Konkurransetilsynet (Norwegian Antitrust Authority), see Commission 
 201
 There is some potential for parallel investigations by the ESA and EC national 
competition authorities (NCAs) when there is a lack of a Community dimension, 
or between EFTA antitrust authorities and EC NCAs when there is a lack of an 
EFTA or Community Dimension. In order to address the potential overlap the 
European Commission, EC NCAs, the ESA, and antitrust authorities of the 
contracting EFTA countries participate in the EFTA Network of Competition 
Authorities.115 To enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the attribution of 
competence rules there are also extensive cooperation provisions within the 
principal EEA Agreement as well as the Surveillance and Court Agreement.116 It 
should be noted that in order to further enhance the harmonious application of 
common rules across the EEA, Article 6 of the Agreement provides for the 
recognition of ECJ and CFI rulings, relating to provisions of EC law that are 
replicated within the EEA Agreement. Articles 105 and 106 of the Agreement 
also provide a mechanism for monitoring EC case law and amending the 
Agreement if necessary ‘in order to ensure as uniform an interpretation as 
possible of [the] Agreement’.117 As a result of a parallel application of the 
European Commission’s modernisation package amending both EC and EEA 
                                                                                                                                                 
Press Release IP/02/123 and Unattributed, ‘Commission Decision: Commission Refers Aspects of Aker 
Maritime/Kvaerner Deal to Norway’ (2002) 94 EU Focus 7. 
115 This entity closely resembles the European Competition Network established following modernisation 
of EC competition law brought about by Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1, 
to provide guidance on cooperation the ESA has issued the Notice on cooperation within the EFTA 
Network of Competition Authorities (Adopted by College on 15 July 2005 by College Decision 
175/05/COL). 
116 See Articles 58 and 109(2) EEA Agreement for general cooperation obligations between the ESA and 
European Commission, there are also further provisions within Article 56 EEA Agreement and Protocols 
23 and 24 to the Agreement, as well as several ESA Notices of relevance; see  
http://www.eftasurv.int/fieldsofwork/fieldcompetition/otherpublications/.   
117 Article 106 European Economic Area Agreement. 
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antitrust provisions, the antitrust authorities of contracting EFTA countries now 
have powers and obligations to enforce Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA 
Agreement.118 This is comparable to those of EC NCAs with regard to Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty of Rome. It is also noteworthy that the antitrust laws of 
Norway119 and Iceland120 closely resemble the key EC antitrust provisions. 
 
4.3.3 EU accession 
The prospect of greater access to the vast EC internal market of 485 million 
citizens is of interest to many states aside from Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein 
discussed above, yet the form of agreement enabling states to benefit from 
stronger trading ties with the EC varies considerably. For many European 
countries membership of the EU may have a wider appeal than trade-related 
benefits alone. States may apply to join in order to obtain benefits such as 
increased political stability, increased security, as well as strengthening of the rule 
of law. It appears clear however that the principal motivation for EU accession is 
often related to the economic benefits that stem from participation within the 
common market.121 The process of EU accession is far from guaranteed or 
straightforward however due to the EU’s policy of conditionality.122 
Conditionality requires prospective candidate states to satisfy the basic 
                                                 
118 See EEA Joint Committee Decisions No. 130/2004 and No. 178/2004. 
119 For discussion of Norway’s antitrust provisions see E. Vesterkjaer, ‘Norway: Legislation – New 
Competition Law’ (2004) 25 ECLR N144. 
120 Law No. 9/1993 of 25th February 1993 (as amended), in particular see Articles 10 and 11, available in 
English at:  http://www.samkeppni.is/. 
121  See discussion on the enlargement section of the European Union’s website available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/enlarg/overview_en.htm.  
122 For an in depth assessment of the policy of conditionality see J. Hughes, G. Sasse & C. Gordon, 
‘Conditionality and Compliance in the EU’s Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of 
Sub-national Government’ (2004) 42 JCMS 523. 
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‘Copenhagen criteria’123 before their membership application is accepted, after 
which the individual state embarks upon a lengthy process of implementing the 
acquis communautaire into their domestic legal system. Only after completing 
this process and receiving the unanimous approval of the European Council, and 
the approval of the European Parliament can the state join the Union.124  
 
The relevance of the EU accession mechanism to the present discussion is to 
highlight that candidate or prospective candidate states (i.e. those wishing to join 
the EU but have either not yet submitted a formal application, or the formal 
application has not yet been approved) enter into a process of implementing EC 
law into domestic legal systems, including EC antitrust law. The legal basis for 
the implementation is grounded in the European Association Agreement between 
the EC, the Member States and the candidate country. Notably a state’s progress 
towards implementation is closely scrutinised by the European Commission and 
neither formal negotiations nor final accession can take place until the state’s 
progress is satisfactory. The burden upon candidate states with regard to 
implementing EC antitrust law is increasingly onerous in light of the 
modernisation progamme and Regulation 1/2003.125 Candidate countries will be 
expected to, inter alia, establish a national competition authority and empower it 
                                                 
123  All prospective candidate states must: be a stable democracy, with respect for human rights, the rule of 
law, and the protection of minorities; have a functioning market economy; and adopt the common rules, 
standards and policies that make up the body of EC law. This is known as the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ 
following the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Summit in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993, 
see section 7A(iii). 
124 Article 49 TEU. 
125 Op. cit. note 115. 
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to enforce EC antitrust law.126 The result of the conditionality policy towards 
accession can be seen in the context of antitrust by noting that the ten Member 
States127 that acceded to the EU on 1st May 2004 had implemented EC antitrust 
law into their domestic legal system by December 2002,128 thereby ‘closing’ 
negotiations on the then chapter 6 of the acquis communautaire. Additionally the 
two Member States that joined on 1st January 2007, Bulgaria and Romania, 
‘closed’ Chapter ‘6’ negotiations in June 2004 and December 2004 
respectively.129  
 
Regarding the current candidate states, EU accession negotiations were opened on 
3rd October 2005 with Croatia and Turkey130 and the European Commission has 
began assessing the preparedness of both candidates to implement the acquis 
communautaire into their domestic legal system. The Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM) is perhaps the least advanced candidate state having only 
submitted an official application for EU membership on 22nd March 2004. 
Official candidate status was conferred in December 2005, following a 
                                                 
126 See for example Article 5 Regulation No 1/2003, op. cit. note 115. 
127 For a detailed account of the antitrust provisions within the pre-accession Association Agreements of 
Eastern European states see A.M. Van den Bossche, ‘The International Dimension of EC Competition Law: 
The Case of the Europe Agreement’ (1997) 18 ECLR 24. 
128 Although note that many of the 10 Member States that joined in 2004 secured transitional time periods 
for the entry into force of state aid rules, for discussion see J. Rapp, ‘State aid in the accession countries – 
sorting through the confusion’ (2005) 26 ECLR 410.
129 See the European Commission’s 2004 Annual Report on Competition Policy at p.185. Also, for a 
detailed account of the progress towards implementation of EC antitrust law by the 12 most recent Member 
States pre-accession see J. Lorentzen & P. Mollgaard, ‘Competition compliance: limits to competition policy 
harmonisation in EU enlargement’ (2003) 24 ECLR 280, as well as T. Tóth, ‘Competition Law in Hungary: 
Harmonisation Towards E.U. Membership’ (1998) 19 ECLR 358.
130 Note that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has also been accepted as a candidate 
country although formal negotiations have yet to begin. For an insightful socio-legal discussion of the 
problems facing the proposed Turkish accession to the EU see I. Ward, ‘The Culture of Enlargement’ 
(Winter 2005/2006) 12 The Columbia Journal of European law 199. 
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recommendation by the European Commission. In spite of the lengthy negotiation 
process ahead, the impact of EC law upon both Croatian and Turkish antitrust law 
is already evident. Articles 9 and 16 of the Croatian Competition Act131 closely 
resemble Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome while Article 18 of the Act 
prohibits concentrations in certain circumstances. The Croatian Competition 
Authority has also implemented secondary legislation to ensure that Croatian 
antitrust law was ‘brought into compliance with the relevant EC regulations 
covering the respective areas’132 and has stated ‘the harmonization process of the 
secondary legislation with the EC acquis in the area concerned is considered to be 
completed’.133 In Turkey:  
‘[The] Protection of Competition No. 4054 was put into force on 
December 13, 1994, and the Competition Authority provided for in the 
Act was set up and commenced operation in 1997…The Competition 
Authority which commenced its operation in 1997 rapidly adapted the EU 
legislation which is the source of the Act, through the Communiqués 
issued by it, and ensured a considerable alignment with the EU in terms of 
competition policies, by means of closely following the EU practices’.134  
 
Articles 4 and 6 of the Turkish Act on the Protection of Competition closely 
resemble Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome, whilst Article 7 of the Act 
seeks to establish a system for merger control based on the ECMR.  The accession 
process leading to full EU membership necessarily involves candidate states 
implementing EC antitrust laws into their own legal system and can be seen as a 
                                                 
131 Official Gazette, No 122/2003. 
132 See Croatian Competition Authority webpage at: http://www.aztn.hr/e_index.asp.  
133 Ibid. 
134 Statement on the website of the Turkish Competition Authority, see:  
http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/ebaskanmesaj.html.  
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very advanced form of international antitrust cooperation in the run-up to 
membership.135  
 
This heightened period of cooperation prior to accession is further enhanced by 
the activities of the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) 
programme. TAIEX is operated by the European Commission and provides inter 
alia: advice to beneficiary states on implementing the acquis communautaire into 
national law; as well as organising study visits; expert exchanges; and training 
seminars and workshops.136 The 2004 and 2007 accession states137 as well as 
current EU candidate states, and Western Balkan states have all benefited from 
the TAIEX programme, which deals with many topic areas including EC antitrust 
law.138 Many states that are not formal EU applicants have also entered into other 
forms of agreement that include an obligation to approximate their antitrust laws 
with those of the EC in order to further strengthen ties, these countries are 
discussed further below. 
 
 
                                                 
135 Note that the 2005 progress assessment by the European Commission on the preparedness of Turkey 
was generally favourable: ‘Harmonisation with the anti-trust acquis appears well advanced. The level of 
enforcement of anti-trust rules and merger control by the Competition Authority has continued to be 
satisfactory, although serious delays in the handling of appeal cases have occurred in the judiciary’, SEC 
(2005) 1426 at p.70. Croatia’s report was not as positive: ‘Croatia has continued to make some progress, 
both as regards anti-trust and state aid, but needs to intensify its efforts. There is a need for important 
further legislative alignment, strengthening of administrative capacity and more effective enforcement.’, 
SEC (2005) 1424 at p.60. 
136 See TAIEX website at: http://taiex.ec.europa.eu.  
137 For a discussion of the development of antitrust law and policy under the EU accession framework see J. 
Hölscher & J. Stephan, ‘Competition Policy in Central Eastern Europe in the Light of EU Accession’ 
(2004) 42 JCMS 321. 
138 See e.g. discussion of training seminars organised by the European Commission’s Competition DG and 
TAIEX office within the 2004 Annual Report on Competition Policy at p.185. 
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4.3.4 Other external agreements 
There is a wide array of agreements entered into by the EC (as the legal 
personality of the EU139) and its Member States with third countries,140 which 
encompass a mixture of political and economic objectives, and which include 
some form of antitrust provision designed to foster antitrust dialogue and in 
certain instances work towards substantive convergence. These agreements will 
be considered below to assess their significance to the international antitrust 
dialogue, and the identification of the key objective in international antitrust. 
Many of these agreements are negotiated in furtherance of the EU neighbourhood 
policy, but they are best categorised according to the nature of the agreement. The 
categories are: i) agreements entered into under the stabilisation and association 
process; ii) partnership and cooperation agreements; iii) the so-called Med-
agreements; iv) state specific association agreements; and v) the Contonou 
Agreement entered into between the EC and the 71 signatories from African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 
 
4.3.5 Stabilisation and association process 
The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) defines the relationship between 
the EC and the Western Balkan states, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia and Montenegro. The SAP previously included FYROM before it was 
accepted as a formal candidate state at the Brussels European Council Meeting on 
                                                 
139 The agreements are entered into by the ‘European Community’ due to the distinct legal personality of 
the EC, which the European Union, as a wider political entity, currently lacks. 
140 For a wider and more conceptual discussion of agreements entered into by the EC and its Member States 
with third counties see R. Leal-Arcas, ‘The European Community and Mixed Agreements’ (2001) 6 
European Foreign Affairs Review 483. 
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15th and 16th December 2005.141 Croatia also started the path to EU membership 
within the SAP, before being formally recognised as a candidate. The EU has 
consistently stated that the SAP is a means of encouraging long-term commitment 
to stability and democracy by Western Balkan states, as well as helping to move 
them towards fully functioning market economies. The medium to long-term 
benefit to these countries for engaging with the EU is the prospect of EU 
membership, whilst in the short-term the EU supports reform in these states with 
training assistance and financial support through the Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabilization (CARDS) scheme. Following 
the EU Council Summit in Thessaloniki on 21st June 2003, the EU and Balkan 
states’ heads of government signed a declaration stating: ‘The future of the 
Balkans is within the European Union…Preparation for integration into European 
structures and ultimate membership into the European Union, through adoption of 
European standards, is now the big challenge ahead’.142  
 
In light of the ongoing movement towards functioning market economies of the 
SAP states, and indeed taking into account the differing stages of development of 
the states concerned, it is difficult to make an assessment on the significance of 
the SAP to the international antitrust dialogue. Nonetheless it is clear that to the 
extent that the SAP moves the concerned states toward EU accession the EC will 
play an important role in the development of antitrust regimes in these states, and 
                                                 
141 Paras 23-25 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 15/16 December 2005, 
15914/1/05 Rev 1. See also the Communication from the Commission: Commission opinion on the 
application of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for membership of the European Union COM 
(2005) 562. 
142 EU – Western Balkans Summit Declaration, Thessaloniki 21st June 2003, 10229/03 (163) Press Release. 
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that this will likely result in national antitrust laws modelled upon EC provisions. 
This process of ‘exporting’ the EC antitrust framework and provisions, already 
discussed in many examples above, is also evident in the SAP with the example of 
Albania. In assessing Albania’s recent ‘EC compliant’ antitrust reforms, Dajkovic 
commented: 
‘Given that foreign investors are mainly attracted by an open market, 
competition reform, in any country, must include not only the adoption of 
competition legislation, but also the elaboration of a well defined 
competition policy, the creation and maintenance of a competitive 
environment and, in parallel with such reform, the establishment of a 
modern legal and institutional framework capable of supporting these 
developments’.143  
 
The comment highlights the motivation for reforms modelled on EC law in spite 
of antitrust harmonisation not being requirements of the SAP, although the 
European Commission does consider antitrust when assessing SAP states 
conformity with European standards.144
 
 
                                                 
143 I. Dajkovic, ‘Competing to reform: an analysis of the new competition law in Albania’ (2004) 25 ECLR 
734. 
144 European Commission 2005 Progress Report on Albania SEC (2005) 1421 Final at p.43 ‘Albania has 
taken important legislative and administrative steps in establishing structures to regulate competition and 
state aid. However, in a country where competition culture is still in its infancy, much more needs to be 
done to increase the overall understanding of the principles of competition, as a tool to protect the market 
and consumers’ interests. The Competition Authority is substantially understaffed and has an insufficient 
budget. Despite progress in adopting a legislative framework, legislation in this area needs to be further 
improved to make competition control effective’. Note also Commission’s 2005 Progress Report on Serbia 
and Montenegro SEC (2005) 1428 at p.41: ‘Serbia and Montenegro have taken the first preparatory steps 
towards setting up republican regimes for anti-trust and state aid control, but efforts should be intensified in 
order to make these regimes operational.’; Commission’s 2005 Progress Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
SEC (2005) 1422 at p.47 ‘the establishment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Competition Council and the 
adoption of a new Competition Law in July 2005 have been important developments and confirm ongoing 
anti-trust efforts. However, the capacity of the Competition Council should be enhanced if it is to fully 
implement its tasks. Efforts aimed at further aligning legislation with the acquis need to continue.’; note 
that the Commission has stated with reference to FYROM that ‘the country might not be able to comply 
with the requirements of the acquis in the medium term’ with regard to antitrust law (see Communication 
from the Commission: Commission opinion on the application of the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia for membership of the European Union COM (2005) 562). 
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4.3.6 Partnership and cooperation agreements 
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) entered into by the EC and 
its Member States with third counties are primarily designed to foster closer 
economic and political relations with former Soviet Republics. The respective 
agreements between the EC and Armenia,145 Azerbaijan,146 Georgia,147 
Kazakhstan,148 Kyrgyzstan,149 Moldova,150 Russia,151 Ukraine152 and 
Uzbekistan153 are not identical, but they share common objectives and are for the 
most part substantively very similar. The principal difference is that the 
agreements between the EC and Russia, Moldova and Ukraine contain an 
additional and more onerous provision with regard to antitrust than the six other 
PCAs discussed. The reasons for the underlying similarity are twofold. Firstly 
bilateral relations with each of these states are essentially replacing the pre-1989 
                                                 
145 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part, [1999] O.J. L239/3. 
146 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part, [1999] O.J. L246/3. 
147 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of Georgia, of the other part, [1999] O.J. L205/3. 
148 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the other part, [1999] O.J. 196/3. 
149 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, of the other part, [1999] O.J. 196/48. 
150 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, [1998] O.J. 181/3. 
151 Agreement on partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European 
Communities and their Member States,  of the one part, and the Russian Federation,  of  the other part, 
[1997] O.J. L327/3. Note that the Agreement between the EC, its Member States and Russia is very similar 
to one concluded between the EC, its Member States and Belarus, although the latter agreement has as yet 
to be ratified following difficult relations between the EU and the Belarusian Government.  
152 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, [1998] O.J. L49/3. 
153 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, of the other part, [1999] O.J. L229/3. 
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relationship established between the then EEC and Euratom, and the USSR154 and 
subsequent relations have developed in a similar way with each of these states.155 
Secondly, due to a lack of European aspirations, their geographic location and/or 
the economic status of the state concerned, these states do not/cannot have EU 
membership as a short-to-medium term objective. All these states are therefore in 
the same category of relationship with the EU: EU membership is not a 
foreseeable prospect, although both the states concerned and the EU would 
benefit from closer relations and incremental steps towards a free trade area. In 
spite of the inherently limited relationship between the EU and these former 
Soviet Republics, the overarching objective of creating a free trade area increases 
the importance to the EU that these states develop antitrust laws in conformity 
with EC law.  
 
There are broad obligations within the partnership and cooperation agreements on 
legislative cooperation that extend to antitrust. The obligation involves an 
acknowledgement that: 
‘an important condition for strengthening the economic links between [the 
state concerned] and the Community is the approximation of legislation. 
[The state concerned] shall endeavour to ensure that its legislation will be 
gradually made compatible with that of the Community’.156
 
                                                 
154 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on trade and commercial and economic cooperation, signed on 
18 December 1989 and approved by Council Decision 90/116/EEC [1990] O.J. L68/1. 
155 The term ‘subsequent relations’ refers to the period following the collapse of the USSR up until the 
negotiation and conclusion of the PCAs discussed, it is acknowledged that recent political changes and 
market-economy orientated reforms in both Georgia and Ukraine may clearly distinguish their future 
relations with the EU, from those of the other former Soviet Republics discussed in this section. 
156 Article 55(1) Russia-EC PCA; Article 50(1) Moldova-EC PCA; Article 51(1) Ukraine-EC PCA; Article 
43(1) of the Georgia-EC PCA, the Armenia-EC PCA, Azerbaijan-EC PCA, and Kazakhstan-EC PCA, 
Article 44(1) Kyrgyzstan-EC PCA, and Article 42(1) Uzbekistan-EC PCA. 
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Further provisions then specify which areas of legislation are subject to this 
approximation obligation, which includes antitrust.157 The agreements also 
provide for the EC to provide technical assistance to the other signatories 
including the exchange of experts, organising seminars and training activities. The 
Russian, Moldovan and Ukrainian PCAs impose additional requirements upon the 
former Soviet republics by creating a positive obligation upon the signatories to 
introduce and enforce domestic antitrust law to remedy ‘restrictions on 
competition by enterprises or caused by state intervention in so far as they may 
affect trade between the Community’ and the signatory state.158 It will be 
interesting to observe the growing relationships between the EC and these former 
Soviet states and determine whether the creation of a free trade area is an 
achievable goal.159 Particularly interesting will be the relations with Georgia and 
Ukraine both of which have experienced a radical realignment of foreign policy 
orientated towards the EU.160
 
4.3.7 Med-Agreements 
The so-called ‘Med-Agreements’ refer to the series of Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreements creating associations between the EC and its Member States on the 
one part, and each of eight territories in the Mediterranean region on the other 
                                                 
157 Article 55(2) Russia-EC PCA; Article 50(2) Moldova-EC PCA; Article 51(2) Ukraine-EC PCA; Article 
43(2) of the Georgia-EC PCA, the Armenia-EC PCA, Azerbaijan-EC PCA, and Kazakhstan-EC PCA, 
Article 44(2) Kyrgyzstan-EC PCA, and Article 42(2) Uzbekistan-EC PCA 
158 Article 53 of the Russia-EC PCA, Article 48 of the Moldova-EC PCA and Article 49 of the Ukraine-EC 
PCA. 
159 For a more in depth and focused discussion of the Russia-EC PCA see M.M. Dabbah, op. cit. note 2, at 
p.122. 
160 For a discussion of the impact of EU policies and the PCA upon Ukrainian law see R. Petrov, ‘Recent 
Developments in the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law’ (2003) 8 European Foreign Affairs 
Review 125. 
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part. These agreements have been concluded as part of the Barcelona Process that 
began in November 1995 involving a ‘wide framework of political, economic and 
social relations between the Member States of the European Union and Partners 
of the Southern Mediterranean’.161 This process aims to foster peace and stability 
in the region and work towards the creation of a free-trade area. The current 
agreements are with Algeria,162 Egypt,163 Israel,164 Jordan,165 Lebanon,166 
Morocco,167 the Palestinian Authority,168 and Tunisia.169 These eight agreements 
contain limited provisions on antitrust often intended to assist the establishment 
and development of an antitrust regime within the partner territory. The antitrust 
provisions are very similar, although a couple contain elements of key principles 
ordinarily found in bilateral cooperation agreements.170  
 
All med-agreements contain the core provision declaring anti-competitive 
agreements and concerted practices that affect trade between the EC and the 
                                                 
161 See details at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/index.htm.  
162 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its 
Member States, of the one part, and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part. 
163 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part and Egypt, of the other part. 
164 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the state of Israel, of the other part, [2000] O.J. L147/3. 
165 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, [2002] O.J. 
L129/3. 
166 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part, (COM(2002)170 27 March 
2002). 
167 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, [2000] O.J. L70/2. 
168 Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European 
Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization for the benefit of the Palestinian 
Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, [1997] O.J. L187/3. 
169 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part, [1998] O.J. L97/2. 
170 Discussed supra at chapter 3. 
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partner territory incompatible with the agreement.171 There is a similar provision 
with regard to the abuse of market power within the territory of the EC or the 
partner territories or a substantial part of either. The EC-Jordan, EC–Morocco, 
EC-Palestinian Authority and EC-Tunisia agreements contain the additional 
provision that practices contrary to the two core prohibitions shall be assessed on 
the basis of the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome, 
signifying a strong acceptance of EC antitrust law to assess conduct affecting 
trade between the parties.172 The EC-Algeria agreement requires the parties to 
‘ensure administrative cooperation in the implementation of their respective 
competition legislations and exchange information taking into account the 
limitations imposed by the requirements of professional and business secrecy’ 
within Article 41(2). Article 41(3) facilitates consultations when an anti-
competitive practice taking place in one party’s territory seriously prejudices the 
interests of the other party. Both provisions are very similar to the principles 
within many bilateral antitrust agreements. These provisions are substantively 
identical to those within Article 35(2) and (3) of the EC-Lebanon agreement. 
Similar consultation provisions also exist within Article 35(5) of the EC-Egypt 
agreement, Article 36(5) of the EC-Israel agreement, Article 53(6) of the EC-
Jordan agreement, Article 36(6) of the EC-Morocco and EC-Tunisia agreements, 
and Article 30(7) of the EC-Palestinian Authority agreement.  
                                                 
171 Article 41 of the EC-Algeria agreement, Article 35 of the EC-Egypt, EC-Israel and EC-Lebanon 
agreements, Article 53 of the EC-Jordan agreement, Article 36 of the EC-Morocco and EC-Tunisia 
agreements, and Article 30 of the EC-PA agreement. 
172 Negotiations have also been concluded on a Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the EC, its 
Member States and Syria. Although the final text has yet to be made available, the antitrust content is likely 
to closely resemble that discussed above. See the EU Commission’s External Relations website for further 
information: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/med_ass_agreemnts.htm.  
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 The antitrust provisions within these agreements are clearly limited, although they 
are of significance in light of the wider framework within which they operate. 
Assisting partner territories to develop antitrust authorities is seen as essential 
within the Barcelona Process given the eventual objective of a free trade area. It is 
certainly beneficial to the EU that many of these agreements also stipulate that 
any assessment of anti-competitive activities affecting their trading relations be 
based upon the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty. In many respects this 
provision can be seen as securing the supremacy of EC antitrust law over the 
domestic law of the partner territories in assessing anti-competitive activities. It 
may even be regarded as akin to the approximation requirement seen in many of 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, discussed supra at 4.3.6. 
 
4.3.8 State-specific association agreements 
Discussion of state specific association agreements is a reference to the three  
rather distinctive agreements that the EC and its Member States have entered into 
with third countries. The agreements are: a Trade, Development and Cooperation 
Agreement with South Africa;173 an Economic Partnership, Political Coordination 
and Cooperation Agreement with Mexico;174 and an Association Agreement with 
                                                 
173 Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation establishing an association between the European 
Community  and  its Member States,  of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part, 
[1999] O.J. L311/3. 
174 Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part, [2000] 
O.J. L276/45.
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Chile.175 These agreements have both political and economic objectives, yet 
antitrust provisions are included with the aim of protecting benefits gained from a 
strengthened bilateral trading relationship. The EC-Chile mixed agreement 
exemplifies this underlying aim by stating ‘The parties undertake to apply their 
respective competition laws in a manner consistent with this…Agreement so as to 
avoid the benefits of the liberalisation process in goods and services being 
diminished or cancelled out by anti-competitive business conduct’.176  
 
Notwithstanding the wider and distinct framework within which the respective 
antitrust provisions operate, the provisions in all three agreements replicate 
principles of antitrust authority cooperation that are ever-present within the 
bilateral cooperation agreements considered in chapter 3. The provisions within 
the EC-South Africa agreement also closely resemble many of the provisions 
within the Med Agreements discussed above. Prima facie the provisions within 
the EC-Chile agreement (Articles 172-180) most closely resemble the principles 
of cooperation ordinarily seen in bilateral cooperation agreements, while the EC-
South Africa agreement contains only a limited endorsement of these principles 
(Articles 35-40), and the EC-Mexico agreement delegates the responsibility for 
giving effect to the principles and creating mechanisms for cooperation to the EC-
Mexico Joint Council (which is created by the agreement). In furtherance of 
Article 11 of the EC-Mexico agreement, Annex XV to Decision No 2/2000 of the 
                                                 
175 Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, [2002] O.J. L352/3. 
176 Article 172(1). 
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EC-Mexico Joint Council contains 10 Articles effectively creating a bilateral 
antitrust cooperation agreement between the EC and Mexico.177  
 
Article 174 of the EC-Chile agreement, as well as Article 3 of the EC-Mexico 
Joint Council Decision, clearly give effect to the principle of notification. Article 
38 of the EC-South Africa agreement also gives some effect to the principle of 
notification, under the heading of ‘Comity’ and permits the respective antitrust 
authorities to request each other to take remedial action against anti-competitive 
activities to address an adverse impact on their ‘important interests’. This 
provision is clearly a limited endorsement of the principle of positive comity 
present in many of the bilateral cooperation agreements, yet it is perhaps 
surprising that the EC-South Africa antitrust provisions do not also require 
notification from one authority to the other in circumstances where one’s 
enforcement activities affect the other’s important interests. Article 177 of the 
EC-Chile agreement and Article 4 of the EC-Mexico Decision address the 
complex and controversial topic of exchange of information, and establish a basic 
principle that the respective antitrust authorities should exchange information on 
their respective laws and enforcement activities in order to facilitate ‘the effective 
application of their respective competition laws’. Article 177 safeguards the rights 
of confidentiality within the domestic legal systems of both parties by stipulating 
that the principle of exchange of information is subject to the ‘standards of 
confidentiality applicable in each party’, and furthermore ‘confidential 
                                                 
177 Annex XV is given effect by Article 39 of Decision No 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 
March 2000(1) (2000/415/EC), [2000] O.J. L157/10. 
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information…shall not be provided without the express consent of the source of 
the information’. Whilst Article 4 of the EC-Mexico Decision does not contain 
similar safeguards, a comparable result is ensured by the operation of Article 8 of 
the Decision dealing with the issue of confidentiality of information. Article 40 of 
the EC-South Africa agreement provides a relatively vague endorsement of these 
same principles by stating ‘The parties shall exchange information taking into 
account the limitations imposed by the requirements of professional and business 
secrecy’.  
 
Article 175 of the EC-Chile agreement and Article 5 of the EC-Mexico Joint 
Council Decision provide for the coordination of enforcement activities between 
the respective antitrust authorities, although both provisions include the caveat 
that coordination ‘shall not prevent the parties from taking autonomous 
decisions’. The EC-South Africa agreement does not contain any provisions 
relating to enforcement coordination. Article 176 of the EC-Chile agreement and 
Article 6 of the EC-Mexico Decision entitle the parties’ respective antitrust 
authorities to request consultations when enforcement activities of the other may 
affect its important interests. Upon receipt of a consultation request, the antitrust 
authority ‘should give full and sympathetic consideration to the views expressed’. 
Article 38(4) of the EC-South Africa agreement contains a weaker form of 
consultation provisions. All three agreements contain provisions facilitating 
technical cooperation/assistance between the respective antitrust authorities. 
Article 178 of the EC-Chile agreement simply endorses the potential for parties’ 
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antitrust authorities to receive technical assistance, while Article 39 of the EC-
South Africa agreement provides some examples of the assistance that may be 
offered, and Article 9 of the EC-Mexico Decision provides for the parties to 
conduct joint studies of antitrust law and policy, as well as engage in antitrust 
advocacy. Article 35 of the EC-South Africa agreement contains provisions that 
are beyond the ambit of most bilateral cooperation agreements, and outlines 
substantive antitrust rules. Article 35 declares certain anti-competitive agreements 
and concerted practices that affect trade between the EC and South Africa 
incompatible with the agreement unless the firms concerned can prove the ‘pro-
competitive effects’ outweigh the ‘anti-competitive’ ones. There is a similar 
provision with regard to the abuse of market power within the territory of the EC 
or South Africa or a substantial part of either. 
 
4.3.9 Contonou agreement 
The Contonou agreement was entered into between the EC and 71 African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries on 23rd June 2000, and came into force on 1st 
April 2003. The agreement only merits brief consideration here. Article 45 of the 
agreement relates to antitrust, and is not designed to create supranational or 
regional antitrust provisions. The objective of Article 45 is to commit each 
signatory to implementing national or regional antitrust laws, designed to prohibit 
anti-competitive agreements and abuses of a dominant position within the EC or 
in the territory of the ACP countries. The article also commits the parties to 
cooperation in the field of antitrust, as well as stipulating that cooperation shall 
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include technical assistance aimed at drafting an appropriate legal framework for 
each ACP country. 
 
 
4.4 Multilateral antitrust initiatives 
4.4.1 Introduction 
There has been intense academic debate as to how best to facilitate enforcement in 
international antitrust cases for many years. Debate has included criticism of the 
ongoing practice of extraterritoriality, comment on the increasing adoption of 
bilateral cooperation agreements and proposals as radical as adopting a binding 
international antitrust code. In light of the ongoing debate and lack of agreement 
on some of the more persistent recommendations, some may conclude that there 
has been no progress in adapting national antitrust law and policy to deal with 
international commercial behaviour that could have anti-competitive effects. That 
conclusion would be an erroneous one. The preceding discussion within this 
chapter has demonstrated an irrefutable link between the movement towards trade 
liberalisation and antitrust cooperation. The antitrust provisions within regional 
trade agreements and trading blocs, as well as the extensive antitrust dialogue 
fostered by the EU through its enlargement and neighbourhood policies, 
demonstrate the increasing recognition of antitrust as an important consideration 
in the pursuit of trade liberalisation. There have also been developments aimed at 
increasing the profile of antitrust advocacy as well as procedural convergence to 
assist cooperation in international investigations. The remaining part of this 
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chapter will focus upon multilateral antitrust initiatives, mainly identifying the 
current extent of antitrust dialogue within multilateral fora.  
 
4.4.2 ICN 
The International Competition Network (ICN) came into being on 25th October 
2001178 following widespread recognition that the existing multilateral efforts to 
deal with anti-competitive activities were insufficient. The stimulus underlying 
the creation of the ICN was the Final Report of the US-based International 
Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) in 2000.179 ICPAC was 
established in 1997 by the US Department of Justice with the mandate of 
investigating ‘What new tools, tasks and concepts will be needed to address the 
competition issues that are emerging on the horizon of the global economy’. In 
particular, the investigation focused upon: ‘multijurisdictional merger review; the 
interface of trade and competition issues; and future directions in enforcement 
cooperation between US antitrust authorities and their counterparts around the 
world’.180 After submitting its final report in February 2000, ICPAC was officially 
disbanded in June 2000, although its recommendations were decisive in Assistant 
Attorney General Klein’s call for an inclusive Global Competition Initiative 
(GCI) in September 2000. The ICPAC Final Report proposed a ‘“Global 
Competition Initiative” which is designed to address differences in national 
approaches to competition that have international consequences’.181 In essence the 
                                                 
178 At the Fordham Corporate Law Institute’s annual international antitrust conference. 
179 ICPAC Final Report (2000) available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/icpac.htm.  
180 Ibid. at p.1.  
181 Ibid. at p.28. 
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GCI was envisaged as being complementary to pre-existing international fora 
involved in antitrust, although the GCI would have a transient form and operate as 
a type of inter-governmental conference solely for antitrust matters. It is probably 
the case that the GCI was seen by many in the US as an alternative to the 
European calls for a WTO agreement on competition issues,182 yet surprisingly 
seen by many Europeans as complementary to the vision of a WTO antitrust 
agreement.  
 
The proposal for a GCI was further boosted when former EC Competition 
Commissioner Monti endorsed it in October 2000,183 subsequently becoming one 
of the strongest and most consistent supporters of a GCI. Substantive progress 
was made at a ‘brain storming session’184 held at Ditchley Park, UK from 2nd to 
4th February 2001, when representatives and experts from 23 countries decided to 
make the GCI a reality. On 25th October 2001 at the Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute’s 28th Annual Antitrust Conference in New York, a GCI was launched 
under the title of the International Competition Network (ICN). It was famously 
billed as a forum that would be ‘all antitrust all the time’.185 Since its creation, the 
ICN has focused upon three distinct areas of international antitrust: promoting 
                                                 
182 See the Communication submitted by Sir Leon Brittan and Karel Van Miert Towards an international 
framework of competition rules Communication to the Council, COM (96) 284, following a report 
submitted to the European Commission entitled ‘Report by the group of experts on competition policy in 
the new trade order’. 
183 Endorsed in a speech in Fiesole, see Commission Press Release EU Competition Commissioner Outlines 
Ideas for an International Forum to Discuss Competition Policy Issues, IP/00/1230. 
184 As per Commissioner von Finckenstein at the ICN’s inaugural conference in Naples, 28th September 
2002 . 
185 The well known quote by C.A James, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of 
Justice, in ‘International Antitrust in the Bush Administration’, Annual Canadian Bar Association Fall 
Conference on Competition Law. Ottawa, Canada, 21 September 2001. 
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best practice in the field of merger review;186 trying to address the challenges of 
anti-cartel enforcement;187 and seeking to assist developing antitrust authorities 
with engaging in antitrust advocacy and capacity-building.188  
 
The ICN does not have a permanent secretariat and the administrative capability 
is provided by the chair of the 15 member steering group,189 which leads the 
organisation. The membership of the ICN is composed of national and regional 
antitrust authorities, and the chair position is held by a member and rotates every 
two years. Whilst not members, non-Governmental advisers such as antitrust 
academics and practitioners, and other international bodies involved in antitrust 
(i.e. the other fora discussed in this section), are closely involved in the work of 
the ICN. The organisation is clear in that it is not working towards a binding 
international antitrust code, but instead adopts a ‘soft convergence’ approach by 
favouring the conclusion of best practice recommendations, the enforcement of 
which is entirely voluntary. The transient modus operandi recommended by the 
ICPAC Final Report has also been adopted by the ICN, as seen from its own 
description: ‘The initiative is project-oriented, flexibly organized around working 
groups, the members of which work together largely by Internet, telephone, fax 
                                                 
186 See the ICN Mergers Working Group home page: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/working-groups/mergers.  
187 See the ICN Cartels Working Group home page:  
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/working-groups/cartels.   
188 See the ICN Competition Policy Implementation (CPI) home page: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/working-groups/competition-policy-
implementation. 
189 As required by the ICN Operational Framework (June 25, 2003). For details on the composition of the 
ICN steering group, see http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/about-icn/steering-
group.  
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machine and videoconference’.190 A key objective of the ICN is to foster an 
environment where antitrust enforcers and other experts could meet, share 
experiences and work towards convergence. This objective is certainly possible in 
light of the large ICN membership, currently in excess of 90 members 
representing over 70 jurisdictions. The membership alone is a significant success 
for an organisation that is a relatively recent addition to the international antitrust 
dialogue.  
 
Some commentators may be ready to point out however, that the size of the ICN’s 
membership, coupled with the mixing of antitrust authorities from developed and 
developing nations, may frustrate the organisation’s efforts at convergence and 
consensus. The diverse membership and modest objectives, as compared with 
proposals for a binding multilateral antitrust code, led to some early criticism 
from Zanettin, who believed that the ICN was ‘unlikely to significantly improve 
the present situation’,191 referring to problems encountered due to a lack of 
multilateral antitrust initiatives. Other commentators however, were willing to 
applaud the creation of the ICN, albeit viewing the initiative as little more than an 
exercise in soft convergence, facilitating exchange of ideas at a policy level and 
the building of trust between antitrust authorities.192 More recent and reflective 
commentary appears to view the ICN positively whilst acknowledging its 
limitations. Williams appears to have a generally favourable view of the ICN, 
                                                 
190 See ICN homepage at: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.  
191 B. Zanettin, Cooperation Between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, (Oxford and Portland, 
Hart Publishing, 2002) at p.239. 
192 See G. Murphy, ‘Two powerful resources for competition law compliance now in place’ (2002) 23 
ECLR 479. 
 225
noting that it ‘has none of the disadvantages of offending political sensibilities on 
sovereignty issues that would inevitably arise in the more formal setting of the 
WTO’ and suggests it may be a more effective environment for ensuring 
compliance with core principles than the WTO.193 Williams does however, 
highlight that the ICN does not have a clear role to play in influencing the very 
early stages of development of antitrust regimes, as those states without an 
existing antitrust framework cannot satisfy the criteria for ICN membership.194 
This is not to suggest that Williams was advocating that the ICN should take on 
such a role. Indeed, it would surely be counterproductive in the pursuit of 
convergence and consensus in an ‘all antitrust all the time’ forum to accommodate 
the views of those jurisdictions that have as yet to establish a basic antitrust 
framework. In Dabbah’s view, the capability of the ICN to ‘build a strong 
network between antitrust authorities from developed and developing countries’ is 
sufficient to recognise that the ICN is fulfilling an important role in the 
international antitrust arena. Dabbah also suggests that the work undertaken by 
the ICN in its first couple of years is ‘very promising’.195  
 
One of the most thorough analyses of the ICN conducted thus far is that 
undertaken by Budzinski, where he argues that ‘a reduction of jurisdictional 
conflicts and an enhancement of efficiency can be expected’ as a result of the 
                                                 
193 M. Williams, op. cit. note 4, at p.92. 
194 Ibid., this is of particular relevance to Williams’ text of course as he is engaging in a comparative study 
of antitrust in China and Hong Kong (where there are currently no comprehensive antitrust laws in place) 
as well as Taiwan. 
195 M.M. Dabbah, op. cit. note 2, at p.256-257 and 291. 
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ICN’s work.196 Budzinski does highlight the organisation’s limitations however, 
and suggests that its long term future is far from clear, and inherently carries the 
risk of becoming an ineffective and impotent entity should peer pressure and 
transparency fail to secure compliance with best practice principles and 
recommendations. Amongst its limitations, Budzinski discusses the weakness of 
the ICN to work to avoid conflict when serious disputes arise. These cases are 
likely to involve non-competition interests, such as industrial or employment 
policy considerations, although history suggests that they will be small in 
number.197 While much of the academic commentary, discussed above, assesses 
the ICN on the basis of its modus operandi, its mission statements and the work of 
its working groups, there is data beginning to emerge regarding the impact of ICN 
best practice recommendations upon legislative and procedural changes within 
national antitrust regimes.198 This type of data is vital in order to measure the 
success of the non-binding, soft convergence approach adopted. The ICN’s 
reliance upon transparency and peer pressure among antitrust authorities, as a 
means of securing compliance with voluntary best practice recommendations, can 
be judged on the basis of data on implementation of those recommendations. 
Indeed the ICN’s future as a meaningful forum dealing with international antitrust 
is likely to depend upon its ability to demonstrate high levels of best practice 
                                                 
196 O. Budzinski, ‘The international competition network: prospects and limits on the road towards 
international competition governance’ (2004) 8 Competition & Change 223. 
197 Ibid, p.13-14. See also M. Bode & O. Budzinski, ‘Competing Ways Towards International Antitrust: the 
WTO versus the ICN’ in F. Columbus (ed.), New Developments in Antitrust, (New York, Nova, 2005). 
198 Also note the discussion of the ICN in the context of multi-jurisdictional merger review infra at chapter 
5, particularly 5.5.4. 
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implementation in the medium term.199 The initial indicators in this regard are 
encouraging, particularly regarding procedural changes concerning merger review 
to achieve compliance with ICN recommendations.200 Australia201 and the EC202 
are two prominent examples of antitrust regimes that have implemented many of 
the ICN recommendations whilst undergoing an internal reform programme. The 
ICN guiding principles and recommended practices for merger notification and 
review procedures will be considered in greater depth in chapter 5. 
 
4.4.3 OECD 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was 
created in 1961 as a forum for industrialised countries to discuss how to combat 
common problems stemming from globalisation effectively. The membership has 
                                                 
199 As Ezrachi notes: this is ‘the beginning of a process. The substance of the [ICN and OECD] 
recommendations adopted, the number of states endorsing them, and the real level of compliance will 
determine the future impact of these voluntary initiatives.’ in ‘Merger Control and Cross Border 
Transactions – A Pragmatic View on Cooperation, Convergence and What’s in Between’, University of 
Oxford Centre of Competition Law and Policy Working Paper (L) 11/05. 
200 The mergers notification and procedures subgroup is one of the two groupings within the ICN mergers 
working group. The recommendations referred to are provided within two documents; the guiding 
principles for merger notification and review procedures (available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_1st_naples_2002/icnnpworking
groupguiding.pdf) and the recommended practices for merger notification and review procedures (available 
at: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mnprecpractices.pdf).  
201 See R. Lewis & A. George-Deacons, ‘Australia: Mergers – Procedure’ (2005) 26 ECLR N67.  
202 See the ICN report: Implementation of the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and 
Review Procedures (April 2005) at p.10-11 where it states that the ICN Recommended Practice on Timing 
of Notification was ‘a source of inspiration for the changes’ to the ECMR. Presented to the Fourth Annual 
ICN Conference, Bonn, Germany, 5-8 June 2005. Available from 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org. Also see a speech by M. Monti, ‘International antitrust – 
a personal perspective’, Fordham Corporate Law Institute. New York, 11 October 2004 (SPEECH/01/449), 
where he states ‘With regard to procedures and jurisdictional issues [in the field of merger control], the ICN 
has already achieved a lot. It is now time for each of our competition authorities and legislators to move 
decisively forward with the implementation of the agreed ICN standards. After the Merger Review, the EU 
already substantially conforms to the recommendations. If the same standards of compliance would be 
achieved by all the ICN members who have subscribed to the recommendations, I believe companies would 
find compliance with multi-jurisdictional merger review much less burdensome’ [emphasis added]. 
Furthermore, speech by J.W. Rowley, ‘The internationalisation of merger review: global solutions require 
both words and actions’ to the 2003 Antitrust Conference: Antitrust issues in today’s economy. New York, 
18 – 19 March 2003. 
 228
grown from 20 to 30 in the intervening years,203 although it has nonetheless 
remained something of a cliquish organisation where there is a large degree of 
convergence and mutual interdependence between the economies of the respective 
members.204 The organisation does, however, endeavour to establish working 
relationships with non-member countries and various international organisations. 
This is coordinated through its Centre for Cooperation with Non-Members, which 
tends to focus upon engaging in dialogue with and assistance that can be provided 
to developing countries.205 In general terms, the work of the OECD seeks to 
identify best practice within its 31 Committees (i.e. designated topic areas), and 
often ‘produces internationally agreed instruments, decisions and 
recommendations  to promote rules of the game in areas where multilateral 
agreement is necessary for individual countries to make progress in a globalised 
economy’.206 In contrast to the ICN, the OECD has an established secretariat 
based in Paris with around 2000 members of staff that support the various 
committees.  
 
                                                 
203 A modest increase by comparison with the rapid membership growth of the ICN, discussed supra at 
4.4.2. 
204 See M.M. Dabbah, op. cit. note 2, at p.253 where he states ‘Moreover, many non-member countries 
regard the organisation as one for more developed countries’, and the ICPAC Final Report (2000) at p.258. 
Note also that while the OECD has indicated its desire to enlarge its membership in order to maintain its 
current international role and influence, the 2004 OECD Report entitled ‘A STRATEGY FOR 
ENLARGEMENT AND OUTREACH’ stated ‘Members agreed on the usefulness of “like-mindedness” and 
“significant players” as criteria evaluating candidate countries’, thereby highlighting the inherently limited 
potential for enlargement (p.38,  available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/15/37434513.pdf).  
205 See discussion in M. Williams, op. cit. note 4, at p.81, as well as the centre’s homepage: 
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_33709_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
206 OECD home page: http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
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The OECD issues non-binding best practice recommendations in all areas of its 
activity including antitrust207 to try to encourage consensus and promote 
convergence. Similarly to the ICN, compliance with these instruments relies upon 
peer pressure, although the OECD has a reputation for instigating a vigorous 
policy of peer review.208 Interestingly the OECD competition committee, as well 
as the OECD global forum on competition, and OECD Latin American 
competition forum, have encouraged both members and non-members to 
voluntarily submit their antitrust legislation and institutions for peer review since 
1998. Several antitrust jurisdictions have undergone an OECD peer review 
including the EC in 2005,209 and several non-member antitrust jurisdictions such 
as South Africa, Russia, Peru and Brazil.210 The importance of this mechanism to 
the OECD modus operandi is clear from the foreword to the 2005 Brazilian peer 
review report:  
‘“Peer review” has always been a core element of OECD cooperation. The 
mechanisms of peer review vary, but OECD cooperation has always been 
founded upon the willingness of all OECD countries to submit their laws 
and policies to substantive questioning by other members. This process not 
only promotes transparency and mutual understanding for the benefit of 
all, it also provides the peer reviewed country with valuable insights about 
possible improvements… [recent reviews] confirm that the peer review 
process is an extremely useful means of promoting cooperation and 
voluntary convergence among OECD and non-OECD economies, 
                                                 
207 Competition Law and Policy is a designated OECD topic area, see: 
http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_37463_1_1_1_1_37463,00.html.  
208 Indeed the OECD views the peer review mechanism as essential in order to ensure effective compliance 
with its soft law approach, see discussion on OECD website as well as the Foreword by Donald J. Johnston, 
OECD Secretary General to the 2004 OECD Report, op. cit. note 204. 
209 Competition Law and Policy in the European Union: A Peer Review, 2005 OECD Report, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/41/35908641.pdf. 
210 All OECD peer reviews of antitrust regimes are available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/43/0,2340,en_2649_33759_2489707_1_1_1_1,00.html. See also the 
discussion in M. Williams, op. cit. note 4, at p.83. 
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providing both transparency and a candid discussion of what constitutes 
“best practice” in different situations’.211
 
The OECD peer review mechanism has a good reputation for providing thorough 
yet objective recommendations for future reform of specific antitrust regimes, and 
also facilitating increasing transparency and mutual understanding amongst 
antitrust authorities. Nonetheless, the OECD’s antitrust activities extend beyond 
that of peer review. The competition committee has a sizeable capacity-building 
programme that was initiated in 1990, and is supported by expertise and financial 
assistance from member countries. The programme provides a wide range of 
technical assistance to countries in the process of implementing an antitrust 
regime, as well as those with a developing antitrust authority. Capacity-building 
activities include ‘case studies seminars, courses in merger analysis, help in 
legislative drafting, studies in sector specific regulation and high-level policy 
briefings’,212 as well as training programmes for national judges. The capacity-
building programme has been further enhanced by the opening of regional centres 
in 2004 and 2005 in Seoul213 and Budapest214 respectively, designed to act as 
regional hubs for antitrust exchanges and activities. 
 
In addition to facilitating peer reviews and the development of antitrust regimes, 
the most prominent feature of the OECD activities in international antitrust is 
likely to be the various guidelines and best practice recommendations that have 
                                                 
211 Competition Law and Policy in Brazil: A Peer Review, 2005 OECD Report, at p.3. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/45/35445196.pdf.   
212 See: http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_34535_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
213 See: http://www.oecd.org/document/43/0,2340,en_2649_34535_35118955_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
214 See: http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,2340,en_2649_34535_35118981_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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been adopted since 1967. The Recommendations and guidelines have addressed 
many diverse antitrust issues. A key OECD instrument is the set of 
Recommendations concerning antitrust cooperation between member counties, 
the latest set of which was produced in 1995,215 and which was discussed in detail 
supra at 3.3. The other principal instruments are Recommendations concerning 
effective action against hard core cartels,216 structural separation in regulated 
industries,217 merger review,218 and for the formal exchange of information 
between antitrust authorities in hard core cartel investigations.219  
 
Two preliminary observations can be made at this stage regarding the OECD’s 
role in international antitrust. Firstly, the organisation’s activities over many years 
have been fairly successful and continue to be important. Secondly, there is clear 
potential for overlap and duplication of effort between the OECD and the ICN.220 
Most commentators would agree that the OECD’s activities in the field of 
antitrust have been important in acknowledging the inherent limitations of 
unilateral enforcement in international antitrust, and seeking to avoid conflict 
through stimulating consensus and convergence. Damro cites convincing 
empirical evidence demonstrating the success of the OECD Recommendations in 
                                                 
215 OECD Council Recommendation Concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on 
Anticompetitive Practices affecting International Trade, 27 July 1995, C(95) 130/Final. 
216 OECD Council Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 25 March 
1998 - C(98)35/FINAL, available at: http://webdomino1.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/C(98)35.  
217 OECD Recommendation of the Council on the Structural Separation in Regulated Industries, 26 April 
2001 - C(2001)78, available at: http://webdomino1.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/C(2001)78.  
218 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review, 23 March 2005 - C(2005)34, available at: 
http://webdomino1.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/c(2005)34. Discussed further infra at 5.5. 
219 OECD Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of Information between Competition Authorities in Hard 
Core Cartel Investigations (October 2005), available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/33/35590548.pdf.  
220 This is an issue that is also considered infra at 5.5.2 
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increasing international antitrust authority cooperation, particularly evident during 
the 1980s.221 Judge Wood shares this view and states that ‘it would be hard to 
overestimate the contribution [that OECD Recommendations] have made over 
time to the development of consistent and harmonious competition rules that have 
influence at a global level’.222 Wilson also clearly views the OECD antitrust 
activities as a success and believes that the competition committee ‘has made 
substantial contributions in harmonizing competition laws within its member 
states’.223 Wilson’s view may be exaggerating the true impact of the OECD, 
however, given that it seems clear in this context that harmonisation and 
convergence are two distinct concepts. While the organisation has undoubtedly 
achieved some success in the latter (through best practice recommendations, peer 
reviews and facilitating capacity-building), its ability to effectively pursue the 
former has been questioned by Dabbah and Akbar amongst others.224 Indeed 
Piilola has suggested that the impression of the OECD is ‘as more of a forum for 
discussion than for decision making…’ and that ‘[t]his view has given the 
organization a second-class status in the international arena’.225 Tarullo has also 
highlighted the ‘organizational shortcomings’ of the organisation.226 Nonetheless 
the OECD has now accumulated valuable experience within international antitrust 
                                                 
221 C. Damro, ‘Multilateral Competition Policy and Transatlantic Compromise’ (2004) 9 European Foreign 
Affairs Review 269 at p.272. 
222 D.P. Wood, ‘Soft harmonization among competition laws: track record and prospects’ (2003) Summer 
The Antitrust Bulletin 305 at p.312. 
223 J. Wilson, op. cit. note 90, at p.215. 
224 See M.M. Dabbah, op. cit. note 2, at p.253 and Y.H. Akbar, op. cit. note 1, at p.143 and p.162. Both 
authors use the failure of the OECD to agree upon the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), due to 
its implications upon national sovereignty, to suggest that the organisation would be unable to foster any 
further movements towards a set of binding rules for international antitrust. Also see the ICPAC Final 
Report (2000) at p.258. 
225 A. Piilola, op. cit. note 31, at p.237. 
226 D.K. Tarullo, ‘Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy’ (2000) 94 American Journal of 
International Law 478 at p.503. 
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and has certainly played a key role in assisting many countries, including non-
members, with capacity-building programmes. It has also increased mutual 
awareness and trust amongst antitrust authorities and in many ways prompted the 
proliferation of bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements,227 which has been a 
welcome move away from unilateralism in international antitrust.  
 
In spite of the previous success of the OECD in this field, it is necessary to ponder 
whether the organisation can continue to maintain that position in light of the 
changing ‘landscape’ of international antitrust. In particular, the ICN may be 
accused of encroaching upon the ‘territory’ of the OECD by also working towards 
best practice recommendations and providing technical assistance to developing 
antitrust regimes. A report presented to the Fourth Annual ICN Conference on 
implementation of best practice recommendations draws attention to the potential 
for duplication of effort with regard to merger review best practices by making the 
following statement: 
‘The OECD Competition Committee, particularly its working party on 
enforcement cooperation, has devoted substantial efforts to studying the 
merger review process and its work helped inform the development of the 
ICN Recommended Practices. Following the ICN’s adoption of 
Recommended Practices, the OECD Council adopted a Recommendation 
Concerning Merger Review that closely follows the Recommended 
Practices and further supports the ICN’s work’.228
 
It may be that the OECD and the ICN have distinct strengths and weaknesses and 
that their roles in international antitrust are complementary, yet that is far from 
                                                 
227 See discussion in B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 191, at p.57. 
228 Implementation of the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures 
(April 2005) at pp.5-6, presented to the Fourth Annual ICN Conference, Bonn, Germany, 5-8 June 2005. 
Available at: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.  
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certain. Perhaps the expertise of the OECD in conducting peer reviews and 
providing certain types of technical support and training through its regional 
centres suggests a distinct strength over the ICN. Equally the ICN’s wider reach 
by appealing to all antitrust jurisdictions irrespective of economic status, thereby 
being seen as more of an ‘honest broker’ may enable it to achieve greater success 
in antitrust advocacy, and more likely to achieve global convergence than the 
OECD. If each forum indeed has distinct strengths and limited activities to the 
pursuit of those, then they are arguably complementary whilst also ensuring for 
the efficient allocation of resources in international antitrust. Yet, as the above 
statement demonstrates, the activities of these fora are not mutually exclusive. It 
is clear that these fora engage in similar activities with no clear delineation of 
competences, and this prima facie suggests duplication of effort and hence 
inefficient allocation of resources.229 The ICN’s view is that its work and that of 
the OECD ‘have been mutually reinforcing in establishing benchmarks for multi-
jurisdictional merger review’,230 and it is arguable that some overlap is 
unavoidable amongst international organisations that all deal with a particular 
subject area, albeit from different perspectives. It may be that the most realistic 
solution (in contrast to a clear delineation of competences) is to ensure 
coordination of activities (which the OECD and the ICN certainly do) to avoid 
conflicting advice and recommendations. Furthermore, some may argue that any 
overlapping competence should be viewed positively as it increases the likelihood 
                                                 
229 The same conclusion is drawn infra with regard to activities concerning multi-jurisdictional merger 
control, see 5.5.2. 
230 Op. cit. note 228 at p.6.  
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of convergence through greater peer pressure.231 Notwithstanding these possible 
justifications for refusing to combat overlapping competences, the concern that 
this muddled situation may hinder rather than support efforts at convergence and 
undoubtedly create some inefficiency in the process is inescapable,232 and 
damages the pursuit of clarity and transparency in international antitrust. These 
concerns will be revisited, focusing upon the role of international fora with regard 
to merger control, in chapter 5. 
 
4.4.4 UNCTAD 
The United Nations has been the longest serving forum engaged in international 
antitrust following its efforts in negotiating the doomed Havana Charter in 1948 
for the creation of the International Trade Organisation (ITO). The ITO 
incorporated antitrust provisions that were not included in the next multilateral 
trade agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).233 
Following the failure to introduce a set of multilateral antitrust provisions through 
either the ITO or within the GATT, it was a considerable period of time before the 
UN would again be at the forefront of debate within international antitrust. In 
1978 when the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
                                                 
231 For example; by agreeing common best practice recommendations within both the ICN and OECD it 
may increase the likelihood of compliance by antitrust regimes, by subjecting jurisdictions to peer pressure 
within both organisations. 
232 A concern that has been alluded to by, inter alia, B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 191, at p.239. Note that 
Budzinski also raises important questions in this regard ‘Does a competition of ways represent an efficient 
regime in regard to balancing the prospects and limits of harmonisation versus policy coordination? Or 
does it disperse forces instead of unifying them to overcome the dissatisfactory regime of effects-doctrine 
based national competition policy?’. O. Budzinski, op. cit. note 196, at p.21. 
233 See discussion in chapter 2, as well as M. Williams, op. cit. note 4, at p.78, and generally in A.O. 
Krueger (Ed.), The WTO as an International Organization (Chicago and London, University of Chicago 
Press, 1998) at pp.1-4. 
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(UNCTAD) convened a Conference on Restrictive Trade Practices to discuss how 
to deal with such activities impacting upon international trade,234 the landscape of 
international antitrust had considerably changed due increased unilateralism,235 
and the negotiation of a bilateral cooperation agreement.236 The OECD 
Competition Law and Policy Committee, whose membership was already a far 
more homogenous grouping than that within the United Nations, had made 
substantive efforts at achieving convergence in international antitrust a decade 
earlier.237  
 
Notwithstanding the multi-track approach already in existence, the UN 
Conference on Restrictive Trade Practices worked through 1979 and produced the 
Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices (hereinafter referred to as ‘the UN Set’) in 1980, 
which was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly on 5 December 
1980.238 The UN Set has been reviewed several times since its adoption, most 
                                                 
234 Note, however, that discussions on international antitrust within the UNCTAD were underway before 
the Conference on Restrictive Trade Practices was set up, see M.M. Dabbah, op. cit. note 2, at p.254. 
235 Following the espousal of the effects doctrine in the US, see discussion in chapter 2. 
236 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 23 June 
1976, available from http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/0353.htm. See discussion in 
chapter 3.  
237 See supra at 4.4.3. 
238 35th Session of the UN General Assembly, Resolution 35/63 of 5th December 1980. Available from: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf10r2.en.pdf. The UN Set is now formally referred to as the UN Set 
of Principles and Rues on Competition since the UNCTAD Fourth Review Conference on the Set in 2000 
(TD/RBP/CONF.5/15 of 4 October 2000). See D.L. Miller & J. Davidow, ‘Antitrust at the United Nations: 
A Tale of Two Codes’ (1982) 18 Stanford Journal of International Law 347, for detailed examination of 
the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the UN Set in 1980. Also see discussion in P. Brusick, 
‘UNCTAD’s role in promoting Multilateral Co-operation on Competition Law and Policy’ (2001) 24 
World Comp. 23. 
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recently in 2005.239 One of the key objectives of the UN Set is to ‘ensure that 
restrictive business practices do not impede or negate the realization of benefits 
that should arise from the liberalization of tariff and non-tariff barriers affecting 
world trade’.240 It is clear however, that the UN Set is not designed to provide a 
multilateral antitrust code as a stated objective is ‘to facilitate the adoption and 
strengthening of laws and policies in this area at the national and regional 
levels’.241 Furthermore, the UN Set is not designed to be binding and enforceable, 
and is merely a recommendation that states should adopt antitrust rules addressing 
the matters discussed. In light of the nature of UNCTAD’s other antitrust 
activities, it is perhaps too strong to describe the UN Set as a best practice 
recommendation, since there is little attempt to monitor or enforce compliance. 
The true nature of this instrument is best reflected by considering it as an 
educational tool to assist those states (or indeed RTAs) that are either 
contemplating or in the process of adopting antitrust rules. In stark contrast to 
recommendations advanced from other fora in this field, the UN Set advanced by 
UNCTAD appears to be devoid of any peer pressure, and this is intentionally so. 
In addition to the UN Set, UNCTAD produces a ‘Model Law on Competition’,242 
which its Inter-governmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy 
keeps under review. The model law has been described as ‘a non-prescriptive’ 
                                                 
239 Fifth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable 
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, 14-18 November 2005, Antalya 
(Turkey). 
240 UN Set at p.9, Article A(1). 
241 UN Set at p.9, Article A(5). 
242 TD/RBP/CONF.5/7/Rev.3, available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf5d7rev3_en.pdf.  
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instrument,243 and is intended to be of use to developing states as a flexible and 
educational tool whilst adopting their own antitrust laws.244  
 
In spite of the ambitious beginning for antitrust at the UN, with efforts to include 
antitrust rules in the new international trade order following World War II, as well 
as the agreement upon the UN Set and the ongoing value of the model law, 
UNCTAD can no longer be said to play a leading role in international antitrust. 
Nonetheless UNCTAD appears to have cultivated a specialist role and recognised 
expertise. The organisation’s activities in this field are predominantly focused 
upon antitrust within developing countries, both at a national and regional level. 
In contrast, to the other fora involved in international antitrust, UNCTAD’s 
activities are not geared towards achieving convergence or harmonisation in 
international antitrust. Instead, the focus of UNCTAD is upon increasing the 
awareness and transparency of the antitrust rules adopted by developing countries, 
as well as providing technical assistance to those states that need it. Technical 
assistance includes educational programmes designed to provide guidance and 
information to those jurisdictions considering introducing antitrust rules. The UN 
Set outlines the particular responsibility of UNCTAD with regard to developing 
countries in Article F(6) and F(7).245 Its role is to provide resources and finance 
along with other international organisations for the facilitation of technical 
assistance, advisory and training programmes in antitrust to developing countries 
including, inter alia, exchange of experts, provision of seminars and training of 
                                                 
243 M. Williams, op. cit. note 4, at p.78. 
244 See also comment by J. Wilson, op. cit. note 90, at pp.213-214. 
245 UN Set at p.18. 
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officials. Notably the organisation is not actively involved in antitrust advocacy 
(beyond recommending the UN Set) and does not advise developing countries to 
support moves towards a binding multilateral agreement for antitrust,246 preferring 
to remain neutral and offer assistance and information only if requested to do so. 
In comparison to the activities of the ICN and OECD in international antitrust, it 
is clear that the UNCTAD approaches this area from a particular perspective – the 
protection of developing countries. Whilst at a general level the UNCTAD 
believes it is in the interests of developing as well as developed countries to adopt 
antitrust rules,247 it is equally of the view that developing countries should adopt 
antitrust rules in a way and at a time that best meets their own needs and does not 
jeopardise their economy and other interests. Due to the particular focus of 
UNCTAD’s antitrust activities, as well as their limited objective (provide 
information and assistance), it is likely that UNCTAD has secured a distinct 
territory for itself in the landscape of international antitrust. Whilst the ICN, 
OECD and UNCTAD all engage in some form of technical assistance/capacity-
building in international antitrust, UNCTAD appears to enable a pooling of 
resources to offer the assistance necessary to developing countries and does not 
appear to cause any significant overlap or duplication of effort with the activities 
of ether the ICN or OECD. 
 
 
 
                                                 
246 See discussion in M. Williams, op. cit. note 4, at p.79. 
247 As clearly seen by the UN Set and model law. 
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4.4.5 WTO 
When the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was established on 1 January 1995 
as a result of the GATT Uruguay Round, it increased the scope of the 
international trading system from providing legally binding rules for the 
international trade in goods, to additionally encompassing international trade in 
services, and trade involving intellectual property rights. The Uruguay Round did 
not however, provide for exlicit antitrust rules to be included within the WTO 
framework. In spite of widespread awareness of the linkages between trade and 
antitrust, as has been discussed in this and previous chapters, the failure of the 
ITO has effectively excluded antitrust from the binding rules that establish an 
international trading system, i.e. the GATT, GATS and TRIPS under the auspices 
of the WTO. In light of the persistent proposals for including antitrust rules within 
the WTO framework, the WTO agreed to establish a working group on the 
interaction between trade and competition policy at the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference in December 1996,248 a proposal that was strongly supported by the 
EC. Discussion at this point will outline the pertinent organisational features of 
the WTO and examine the current question mark over the role for the body in 
international antitrust. Proposals arguing for greater WTO involvement in this 
field will be considered where relevant in chapter 5 and the thesis conclusion, and 
will not be dealt with in detail here.  
  
                                                 
248 See the Singapore Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN(96)/DEC 18 December 1996 at paragraph 20, 
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/wtodec.htm. The working group held its first 
meeting in July 1997, its publications are available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/comp_e.htm#top. 
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 The WTO has unique experience and expertise, which would undoubtedly 
complement the current international antitrust fora. Principally, the binding nature 
of the Agreements under the auspices of the WTO, accompanied by its reputation 
for successfully operating a dispute settlement mechanism, offers the potential to 
introduce binding international antitrust rules with a proven ability to enforce the 
rules against signatory states. The large and diverse membership249 could 
potentially boost convergence and harmonisation efforts to a near-global level. 
Several commentators are concerned however, that introducing antitrust rules into 
the WTO framework would incur a ‘race to the bottom’ as only a weak set of 
rules are likely to attract approval from the diverse WTO membership, many of 
which still have no functioning antitrust regime.250 Another particular concern is 
held by developing states, many of which fear for the strength of their domestic 
enterprises to cope with the rigours of international competition after a quick 
transitional period. There are also general concerns about the adaptability of the 
WTO mechanisms to cope with the differences between antitrust disputes and 
trade disputes. Notwithstanding these not insignificant concerns, there was 
agreement in 2001 to undertake preparatory research towards a WTO antitrust 
agreement. 
  
                                                 
249 The WTO has 150 members from both developed and developing economies. 
250 See e.g. C.D. Ehlermann & L. Ehring, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: views from the 
perspective of the appellate body’s experience’ (2002/03) 26 Fordham International Law Journal 1505. 
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 The Fourth Ministerial Conference at Doha in 2001251 was ground-breaking due 
to an agreement that formal negotiations on a multilateral framework on trade and 
competition policy should begin after the Fifth Ministerial Conference. At this 
time the working group on the interaction between trade and competition policy 
was directed to ‘focus on the clarification of: core principles, including 
transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on 
hardcore cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive 
reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries through 
capacity-building’ in the build up to the Fifth Ministerial Conference.252 Many 
commentators regarded this agreement to open negotiations on a multilateral 
antitrust agreement as leading the way towards an inevitable realisation of 
antitrust rules within the WTO framework. Zanettin commented that ‘…the 
remaining question [in international antitrust] is whether this multilateral structure 
will be completed by a WTO competition agreement. After the Doha Ministerial 
Conference in November 2001, this solution seems possible, even likely, but not 
certain’.253 Dabbah shared a similar view for the WTO’s prospects: ‘Beyond that, 
the [4th Ministerial WTO] Conference has provided a great deal of optimism that 
soon formal negotiation of the envisaged agreement at the WTO will begin’.254 In 
spite of such optimism however, the widely publicised failure of the WTO’s Fifth 
                                                 
251 Apparently a key factor that facilitated the agreement at the 4th Ministerial Conference was the differing 
policies of the incoming Republican Bush administration in the US, see speech by A. Schaub, former 
Director-General, European Commission DG Competition, ‘Co-operation in Competition Policy 
Enforcement between the EU and the US and New Concepts Evolving at the World Trade Organisation and 
the International Competition Network’, Mentor Group. Brussels, 4 April 2002. 
252 Doha Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 20 November 2001, at paragraphs 23-25, available 
at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.  
253 B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 191, at p.280. 
254 M.M. Dabbah, op. cit. note 2, at p.246. 
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Ministerial Conference in Cancún in September 2003 to reach agreement upon 
how to conduct negotiations upon the so-called Singapore issues255 – of which 
antitrust is one – left efforts aimed at the inclusion of antitrust rules within the 
WTO in disarray. The likelihood of progress in this area has been considerably 
weakened by the EC’s change of negotiating position. The EC will now consider 
entering into agreement upon one or more of the Singapore issues without 
necessarily reaching agreement upon all four, which was the EC position in 
Cancún. The natural implication is that agreement may well be reached with 
regard to investment protection, transparency in government procurement or trade 
facilitation but not necessarily antitrust.256 The future for antitrust within the 
WTO framework is far from certain. 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The landscape of international antitrust has grown incrementally and has become 
a very crowded scene. Extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust law 
provides the sole enforcement capability for antitrust on the international stage, 
but creates obvious and unavoidable jurisdictional tensions, which have been 
alleviated by the steadily rising number of bilateral cooperation agreements. 
These activities have been explored in depth in the second and third chapters, yet 
do not present a complete view of international antitrust activities. Regional 
                                                 
255 i.e. the working groups established by the Singapore Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN(96)/DEC 18 
December 1996. 
256 See EU Release: Singapore Issues: Clarification of the EU position, European Commission, 31 March 
2004. Also see comment in M. Williams, op. cit. note 4, at p.88, and A. Burnside & H. Crossley, 
‘Cooperation in Competition: A New Era’ (2005) 30 EL Rev 234 at pp.257-258. 
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bodies and multilateral fora are also important participants in the international 
antitrust dialogue, but have become involved in this field at varying times and 
represent diverse interests, which raises the question of whether the numerous 
instruments and bodies are pursuing common or differing objectives through their 
antitrust dialogue.  
 
This chapter has sought to consider the motivations and wider circumstances that 
have resulted in the crowded landscape, and whether there is a common objective 
of the current international antitrust dialogue. The chapter has considered the 
motivation for the adoption of bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements, and why 
entities such as CARICOM, COMESA, the OECD, and the WTO are active in 
this field. Antitrust provisions within diverse international agreements such the 
NAFTA, and those negotiated under the auspices EU’s neighbourhood policy 
have also been considered. As a result of this comprehensive analysis it is clear 
that international antitrust activities are, and always have been, intertwined with 
bilateral and regional trading relations, and with global trading policy. 
 
Notwithstanding a clear lack of consensus as to appropriate goals and objectives 
for an antitrust regime, demonstrated by the failure of the WTO to begin 
negotiations on the Singapore issues at the 5th Ministerial Conference, there has 
been considerable support for some form of international antitrust activity for over 
half a century. Indeed, there have been many cooperation and coordination 
successes in this field simply by linking international antitrust with trade 
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liberalisation policies, an area where there is a very large consensus in principle. 
The result is that existing instruments and entities in international antitrust are 
neither designed nor directed to pursue objectives that go further than preventing 
anti-competitive activities from diminishing or negating the beneficial effects of 
trade liberalisation policies. Anu Piilola convincingly argues: ‘one of the most 
compelling reasons for internationalization of antitrust law and policy has been 
the need to complement the trade liberalization process’.257 International antitrust 
is a very different proposition from being domestic antitrust on the international 
stage as it is clear that the objective is not to pursue domestic antitrust objectives 
(albeit some may wish this was the case), but is in fact to support and supplement 
trade liberalisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
257 A. Piilola, op. cit. note 31, at p.225. Anu Piilola also states at p.246 (note 213) that ‘The essential task of 
the international [antitrust] network is to define the differences that have the potential to hinder the efficient 
functioning of global markets and international trade’. 
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5 
Merger control and trade liberalisation 
 
 
5.1 Focusing on mergers and acquisitions 
5.1.1 Up to this point, this thesis has discussed the development of international 
antitrust and assessed whether there is a common objective for the various strands 
of activity in this field. Having already concluded that the international antitrust 
dialogue seeks to support and supplement trade liberalisation (the ‘primary 
objective’), this chapter will discuss the difficulties of facilitating such an 
objective in the specific context of merger control. The key elements of this 
discussion will be a consideration of the significance of mergers and acquisitions 
to the pursuit of trade liberalisation, followed by an analysis of the current 
international merger control framework, and an assessment of its compatibility 
with the primary objective. Taking into account the extent to which there is 
current cooperation and convergence in this area, the latter part of this chapter 
will briefly consider the capability of proposals for reform in this field to better 
achieve the primary objective. 
 
5.1.2 To initiate the wider discussion concerning how and to what extent the 
international merger control framework facilitates the primary objective, it is 
important to justify why the research has focused upon this area to the exclusion 
of other types of activity subject to antitrust scrutiny, such as cartels. At a basic 
level, mergers and acquisitions are particularly difficult for antitrust authorities to 
scrutinise because they are not per se illegal, and indeed are often strongly 
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encouraged because of the many positive effects that can stem from a successful 
merger, such as creation of economies of scale and synergies that can be passed 
on to the consumer. On the other hand however, as horizontal mergers invariably 
increase the market power of the firms involved, and vertical mergers can lead to 
market foreclosure,1 they can lead to anti-competitive effects and irreparably 
damage market structures. Thus merger control exemplifies something of an 
international antitrust paradox, comparable to that described by Bork,2 since the 
default position is surely to permit the operation of the free market, yet the threat 
presented by anti-competitive mergers to the fulfilment of antitrust objectives 
necessitates some form of scrutiny and intervention capability. The paradox lies in 
the realisation that by establishing a mechanism to scrutinise mergers and identify 
problematic transactions then such intervention (i.e. the suspension of the merger 
or at least the legal uncertainty until the antitrust authorities’ analysis of the 
market effects has been completed) of itself acts as a hindrance upon the free 
movement of trade and jeopardises the realisation of the benefits that should flow 
from trade liberalisation. As Lipsky queries while discussing merger control: 
‘How can antitrust law fulfil its role as a protector of free markets without 
chocking off the avenues of international commerce it was originally intended to 
                                                 
1 Horizontal mergers undoubtedly present the greatest cause for concern amongst antitrust authorities, 
although vertical mergers can lead to market foreclosure, and the theory of ‘portfolio effects’ suggests that 
even ‘pure’ conglomerate mergers may result in enhanced market power. For discussion see T. Kaseberg, 
‘Are Merger Control and Article 82 EC in the Same Market? The Assessment of Mergers Which Facilitate 
Exclusionary Conduct Under EC Merger Control’ (2006) 27 ECLR 409. Also see discussion in E. Navarro, 
A. Font, J. Folguera, and J. Briones, (Navarro et al.), Merger Control in the EU (2nd Ed, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006) at 6.77-6.86 and chapter 9, M. Furse, The law of merger control in the EC and UK, 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) at pp.39-42, as well as the 2001 Commission Decision in GE/Honeywell, 
Case No COMP/M.2220 [2004] O.J. L48/1, and the Court of First Instance rulings on 14 December 2005 in 
T-209/01 Honeywell v. Commission [2005] ECR II-5527 and T-210/01 General Electric v. Commission 
[2005] ECR II-5575. 
2 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself (New York, Free Press, 1993). 
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protect?’.3 Hence the research has focused upon mergers at this stage because they 
highlight the difficult balance that merger control regimes must achieve: M&As 
contribute to the benefits that should flow from trade liberalisation, yet undue 
interference (resulting in time delays and legal uncertainty) may negate some of 
these benefits.  
 
The key initial challenge for merger control is therefore to establish a mechanism 
that identifies problematic transactions (i.e. those mergers that may fail the 
substantive merger test adopted by a particular jurisdiction) and the ability to 
determine whether either a form of remedy or a prohibition decision are 
necessary, whilst not creating undue delays or costs for the pro-competitive or 
competitively neutral mergers. This issue may also be described as trying to 
ensure that there is some balance between managing the risk of causing a Type I 
(i.e. a false negative: blocking a transaction that should have been cleared) and a 
Type II (i.e. a false positive: clearing a transaction that should have been blocked) 
error. Most merger control systems have developed an ex ante review mechanism 
(also known as ‘pre-closing reporting regimes’)4 rather than an ex post review 
                                                 
3 A.B. Lipsky, ‘The Global Antitrust Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Commerce or Runaway 
Regulation?’, (2002) 26-Summer/Fall Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 59 at 60. 
4 See discussion in W.P.J. Wils, ‘Notification, Clearance and Exemption in EC Competition Law: An 
Economic Analysis’ (1999) 24(2) EL Rev. 139 at 151 where he states ‘It appears to be generally accepted 
that ex ante enforcement through pre-screening is indeed appropriate for merger control’. Also see 
discussion of the problem posed by ‘the proliferation of pre-closing reporting regimes’ in a report by J.W. 
Rowley, O.K Wakil and A.N. Campbell, ‘Streamlining International Merger Control’, presented to the EC 
Merger Control 10th Anniversary Conference. Brussels, 14 September 2000. Report available at: 
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/n_america/canada/Streamlining%20International%20Merg
er%20Control_Sept%202000.pdf.  
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system.5 The rationale being that the latter would likely lead to greater legal and 
market uncertainty, as well as increasing the cost of transactions that fail to 
receive clearance, i.e. anti-competitive mergers would have to de-merge in an ex 
post system rather than simply aborting the proposed merger.6 One further reason 
suggested by Wils is ‘the unavailability of sufficiently high sanctions to deter the 
excessive risk bearing under ex post enforcement’ thus driving firms to carry the 
risk and complete anti-competitive mergers in such systems.7 A significant 
consequence of the widespread use of an ex ante review mechanism is the burden 
placed upon merging firms to assess whether their transaction satisfies 
notification thresholds in particular jurisdictions (to which the transaction may 
have no readily identifiable nexus) and then compile and submit often lengthy 
analysis to the relevant authority as part of the notification. Large international 
M&As must expend greater resources on these requirements as multiple filings 
are often required given the lack of international coherence to the current system 
of merger control.8 This chapter will investigate the benefits that stem from 
M&As, as well as outlining the way in which antitrust authorities balance the 
advantages and disadvantages of intervention, and explore the complexity and 
                                                 
5 Although the United Kingdom is a notable exception as there is a voluntary notification regime of 
proposed mergers to the Office of Fair Trading. The OFT nonetheless has a statutory obligation to refer 
completed and anticipated mergers to the Competition Commission when a ‘relevant merger situation has 
been created’ and has resulted or may be expected to result in a substantial lessening of competition, by 
virtue of s.22 and s.33 of the Enterprise Act 2002. 
6 Although note that even in an ex ante system of merger control, there is potential for merged firms being 
forced to de-merge, e.g. if a clearance decision is later overturned. Such a scenario is apparent from the 
decision of the European Court of First Instance in Case T-464/04 Independent Music Publishers and 
Labels Association (IMPALA) v. Commission, [2006] ECR II-2289.  
7 For a detailed comparative analysis of ex ante and ex post enforcement systems see W.P.J. Wils, 
‘Notification, Clearance and Exemption in EC Competition Law: An Economic Analysis’ (1999) 24 EL 
Rev. 139, particularly at 152. Also see discussion infra. at 5.5.3 and 5.6. 
8 These issues will be considered in further depth infra. at 5.5 and 5.6. 
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significance of these issues in the context of merger control in the international 
arena where multi-jurisdictional filings and investigations are commonplace. 
 
 
5.2 International M&As and their contribution to trade liberalisation 
5.2.1 In order to substantiate the suggestion of a paradox within the international 
merger control framework there must be a clear objective, and likelihood that 
enforcement activity may hinder the achievement of that objective in practice. In 
light of the chapter 4 conclusion that the objective for the international antitrust 
dialogue is to support and supplement trade liberalisation, the suggestion of a 
paradox is reinforced if merger control in the international arena hampers trade 
liberalisation policies. This suggestion may be seen to be accurate by assuming 
that pro-competitive and competitively neutral international mergers are part of 
the trade liberalisation process and help create the ensuing benefits, while anti-
competitive international mergers jeopardise the ultimate benefits that should flow 
from trade liberalisation. Furthermore, the paradox presents itself if the current 
international merger control framework unduly hinders the former category (pro-
competitive and competitively neutral mergers), whilst trying to identify and 
intervene in the latter (anti-competitive mergers). Thus the international merger 
control framework may be unduly hindering trade liberalisation instead of 
supporting it. It is unnecessary to prove that the current framework is actually 
inhibiting trade liberalisation, but sufficient to demonstrate that it could operate 
more effectively and efficiently to the benefit to all bar the anti-competitive 
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mergers. In order to investigate the first of these assumptions, the research must 
consider whether international M&As make a positive contribution to trade 
liberalisation policies.  
 
5.2.2 Political decisions and state action that pursue trade liberalisation policies are 
insufficient to achieve the anticipated economic benefits that should flow from 
such policies. Indeed the main role for the state is to gradually remove the barriers 
to trade, but it is then market forces that must take over in order to realise the 
benefits of trade liberalisation and for them to flow down to the consumer. The 
importance of the market in this regard is summed up by Eleanor Fox, stating: 
‘markets have overtaken the strong and insular economic authority of the nation 
state’.9 The benefits of trade liberalisation are primarily achieved by the 
globalisation of markets: firms face increased competition within domestic 
markets from foreign firms entering the market through inter alia foreign direct 
investment. Mergers and acquisitions have an increasingly important role to play 
in such investment and hence in reaping benefits stemming from liberalisation 
also. As the OECD has stated in its 2001 report New Patterns of Industrial 
Globalisation: ‘An overwhelming share of foreign direct investment (FDI), the 
prime vehicle for seriously engaging in business across international borders, now 
goes for M&As rather than Greenfield investment’.10 Furthermore: ‘Cross-border 
M&As can lead to economy-wide efficiency gains through economies of scale 
                                                 
9 E.M. Fox, ‘Competition in World Markets: A Global Problem in Need of Global Solutions’ Global 
Competition Review (April/May 2000) at 17. 
10 New Patterns of Industrial Globalisation: Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and Strategic 
Alliances (OECD, 2001) at p.13. 
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and scope and synergy effects in research and development (R&D), production 
and marketing’.11 To be more specific regarding the wider benefits that should 
flow from mergers, the report also comments:  
‘the globalisation of industry through cross-border M&As and strategic 
alliances has static resource reallocation benefits and thus positive impacts 
on efficiency. Greater mobility of resources and the resulting increase in 
competition free up unproductive resources for more effective use 
elsewhere. There is also a longer-term dynamic benefit: cross-border 
M&As and strategic alliances drive growth and generate jobs by 
integrating firms into global value-added chains and knowledge networks 
and by accelerating industrial restructuring. They can help revitalise ailing 
firms and local economies and create jobs through technology exchange, 
economies of scale and related productivity growth’.12  
 
There are two points that should be made at this juncture: firstly it is obvious that 
not all mergers will result in the benefits outlined above, yet the benefits 
discussed are illustrative of those which may flow from such transactions. Thus 
there is a sound argument as to why the presumption should be in favour of 
encouraging mergers, as a supplement to trade liberalisation. Analysis suggesting 
that a merger would be anti-competitive can obviously rebut such a 
presumption.13 Secondly, it is not merely cross-border mergers that are of interest 
since mergers between domestic firms, such as that between US based firms 
Exxon and Mobil,14 may involve international subsidiaries and operations and be 
                                                 
11 Ibid. at p.110. 
12 Ibid. at p.111. 
13 Note it is arguable that anti-competitive mergers are far less likely to create the efficiency savings and 
beneficial effects that are discussed above than pro-competitive and competitively neutral mergers in any 
case. Hence anti-competitive mergers would tend to hinder the realisation of benefits that should flow from 
trade liberalisation. The distinction (if there is any) between ‘anti-competitive’ mergers and those that 
hinder the objective of supporting and supplementing trade liberalisation would depend upon the goals and 
objectives of the particular merger control regime, which may or may not focus upon efficiency 
considerations. 
14 See European Commission Decision, Exxon/Mobil, Case No.IV/M.1383 of 29 September 1999, [2004] 
O.J. L103/1. Budzinski states: ‘recent mergers of enterprises with the same jurisdiction of origin, like 
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sufficiently large in scale to have an effect in other national markets, and therefore 
be of interest to ‘foreign’ as well as ‘domestic’ merger control authorities. Many 
large ‘domestic’ mergers are in reality of an international character, and equally 
capable of producing wider economic benefits. Given the discussion in this 
section of how mergers can contribute to economic prosperity, it is timely to 
consider the scale of international M&As and thereby assess their importance vis-
à-vis the objective of the international antitrust dialogue to support and 
supplement trade liberalisation. 
 
5.2.3 Black notes that: ‘[m]ergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity seems to come in 
waves’.15 The global economy is currently experiencing an upsurge in merger 
activity in the aftermath of what has been termed as both the ‘first truly 
international takeover wave’,16 and ‘the fifth big merger wave in market 
economy’s history’17 (the latter is in reference to the first four merger waves in 
US history).18 The latest merger wave, which began around 1992,19 was by far the 
largest with 37,671 transactions worldwide being announced in 1999 with an 
                                                                                                                                                 
Exxon/Mobil (USA), Hoechst/Rhone-Poulenc (EU), or Chevron/Texaco (USA), also must be termed 
international since they affect markets all over the world, often are inspired by the globalization of markets, 
and usually are motivated by the will to perform successfully as global players’ in O. Budzinski, ‘Toward 
an international governance of transborder mergers? Competition networks and institutions between 
centralism and decentralism’, (2003) 36 International Law and Politics 1at 2-3. 
15 B.S. Black, ‘The First International Merger Wave (and the Fifth and Last US Wave)’ (1999-2000) 54 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 799 at 799. 
16 Ibid. 
17 O. Budzinski, op. cit. note 14. 
18 Roughly noted to take place between 1895-1903, 1920-1929, 1960-1973, and 1978-1989, for discussion 
of these merger waves see P.A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions & Corporate Restructurings (3rd Ed, John 
Wiley & Sons, 2002), chapter 2. 
19 P.A. Gaughan, ibid. at p.51, although note that Budzinski merely states that the latest merger wave began 
in ‘the mid 1990s’ (op. cit. at note 14), and Van Marrewijk suggests in began in 1995, see C. Van 
Marrewijk, ‘An Overview of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions for Five Countries’ Working Paper. 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, October 2005, at p.1. 
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aggregate value of $4.4 trillion,20 although other sources suggest that the figures 
for completed mergers and acquisitions were significantly lower at $2.25 trillion 
for 24,113 transactions.21 Van Marrewijk notes that the latest wave ended in 2000: 
‘with the collapse of the “New Economy”’.22 Other factors such as the events of 
September 11 2001 and corporate scandals such as Enron and the resulting 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 200223 contributed to low levels of M&A activity for 2002 
and 2003. M&A activity is experiencing something of a recovery however, with 
global completed M&As valued at $2.16 trillion in 2005, accounting for 22,503 
deals.24 2006 appeared to continue the upward trend with 11,008 completed M&A 
in the first half of the year amounting to $1.22 trillion.25 There are many features 
of the last merger wave and recent M&A activity that indicate their ability to 
further the primary objective of international antitrust, these: ‘include the 
international and transcontinental character of the mergers (in terms of both their 
origins and their effects), the phenomenon of equal mergers and the increasing 
size of the average merger’.26 In addition to highlighting the significance of 
M&A, these figures also indicate the strain upon the resources of antitrust 
                                                 
20 B.S. Black, ‘The First International Merger Wave (and the Fifth and Last US Wave)’ (1999-2000) 54 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 799 at 814-815. 
21 New Patterns of Industrial Globalisation: Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and Strategic 
Alliances (OECD, 2001) at p.20. 
22 C. Van Marrewijk, op. cit. note 19. 
23 See commentary in Moneysoft publication: ‘M&A Outlook 2005: “Steady as you go…”’ available at 
http://www.mergerdigest.com/articles/merger_outlook_2005_p.html.   
24 Data sourced from Thomson Financial ‘Global M&A Financial Review: 4Q 2005’, available from 
http://www.thomson.com/pr/pressreleases. Note that slightly differing figures are presented by MergerStat, 
although figures account for announced transactions and are in any case not as comprehensive as those 
presented by Thomson Financial. See ‘FactSet Mergerstat Release: Global M&A Wrap Up for 2005’, 
available at www.mergerstat.com/new/press/release31.htm. 
25 Figures sourced from Thomson Financial ‘Global M&A Financial Advisory Review: 2Q 2006’ available 
from http://www.thomson.com/pr/pressreleases.  
26 O. Budzinski, op. cit. note 14. at p.2. 
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authorities in order to conduct ex ante reviews of proposed M&As,27 although 
clearly not all transactions are notified, depending upon whether there is a system 
of mandatory or voluntary notification, and also the particular jurisdictional 
triggers. 
 
 
5.3 The international merger control framework 1: introduction  
5.3.1 In light of the economic benefits that can flow from international M&As and the 
contribution they can make to furthering trade liberalisation, the current system of 
international merger control (or lack thereof) is potentially working against the 
primary objective if it unduly inhibits or burdens M&As, i.e. could operate more 
effectively and efficiently, particularly with regard to all but anti-competitive 
mergers. In order to determine the impact of the current system, an evaluation of 
the extent of cooperation and convergence in the current merger control 
framework will be undertaken, with a consideration of the costs and requirements 
imposed upon merging parties. There are at least 80 jurisdictions with some form 
of merger control laws,28 and 73 of those jurisdictions have ex ante notification 
                                                 
27 This is true for a number of reasons, including the large volume of proposed mergers and acquisitions 
(that is on an upwards trend year on year), and the large value and complexity of those involved suggesting 
a complicated merger review analysis and the availability of financial resources for the merging firms to 
contest any adverse decision.  
28 R. Whish, Competition Law, (5th Ed, London, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) at p.782. Other sources 
have comparable figures; the ICN suggested there were 75 merger control regimes in 2004, ‘Report on the 
Costs and Burdens of Multijurisdictional Merger Review’ prepared by the ICN Mergers Working Group, 
Notification and Procedures Subgroup, November 2004 at p.4. Available from 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org. The number of regimes has increased considerably from 
the 61 noted in the 2000 ICPAC Final Report, at Annex 2-C, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/2c.htm.  
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requirements.29 The growth of merger control regimes can be regarded as a 
positive development for a number of reasons.30 For the most part it is evidence of 
widespread recognition by countries of the merits of having merger control laws, 
such as the ability to control ‘the concentration of capital and/or economic 
power’, and to ‘protect and promote social welfare in general and, in particular, 
the interests of consumers’.31  Although clearly the nature and extent of the 
benefits deriving from merger control laws will vary depending upon the 
objectives of the particular regime, as well as its effectiveness. The UN Model 
Law on Competition adds that:  
‘It should also be noted that prohibiting a cartel, while being unable to act 
against the cartel members if they merge, is unwarranted. Moreover, by 
not having a merger control system, a host country deprives itself of the 
powers to challenge foreign mergers and acquisitions which might have 
adverse effects on the national territory’.32  
 
In spite of the benefits however, the increasing number of reviewing jurisdictions 
also increases the difficulty for firms wanting to merge, as Langenfeld 
highlighted: ‘obviously the more agencies that look at a merger in a world without 
                                                 
29 Figure sourced from Merger Notification Filing Fees: A Report of the International Competition Network 
(April 2005) at p.2, available from http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.  
30 William Kolasky has been more specific in this regard by commenting upon the beneficial effects of the 
growth of merger notification; ‘The spread of merger notification is, of course, a positive development as a 
general matter. Merger regimes with notification requirements give antitrust authorities the ability to 
identify and potentially remedy problematic transactions before they close, to the benefit of consumers and 
competition in their markets’, in W. Kolasky, DOJ DAAG, ‘Can the Internationational Competition 
Network Help Tame the Growing Multinational Merger Thicket?’, 2002 ABA Annual Meeting. 
Washington DC, 12 August 2002. Available from: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/speeches.htm.  
31 See discussion of the objectives and benefits of antitrust law in the United Nations Set of Multilaterally 
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (the ‘UN Set’) at 
p.8 in particular, available at http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/index.htm. Ariel Ezrachi comments 
simply that ‘the proliferation of merger regimes worldwide is a welcome product of states’ understanding 
the significance of monitoring transactions’ in ‘Merger Control and Cross Border Transactions – A 
Pragmatic View on Cooperation, Convergence and What’s in Between’ University of Oxford Centre for 
Competition Law and Policy Working Paper (L) 11/05, available from http://www.competition-
law.ox.ac.uk/competition/portal.php.  
32 UNCTAD Model Law on Competition (2007) at p.51, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf5d7rev3_en.pdf.  
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true harmonization, the more time and the more cost’.33 The increased monetary 
cost incurred by firms having to complete multi-jurisdictional merger filings is 
perhaps a secondary concern in light of the uncertainty that is created by trying to 
satisfy multiple jurisdictions, which may be investigating different markets, and 
applying different economic models and legal tests. Indeed the problem that 
Ezrachi describes as ‘system friction’, i.e. the risk of ‘conflicting decisions and 
remedies’ in the context of ‘simultaneous application of numerous domestic 
merger regimes to a single transaction’,34 creates a nightmare scenario for firms 
wanting to merge. Whilst irreconcilable decisions are rare occurrences, the 
increasing number of merger control regimes and growing confidence of 
developing antitrust authorities, as well as the increasing size of international 
mergers (making them more likely to multi-jurisdictional review) increases this 
risk yet further.35 Another important and fairly obvious factor is that in practice it 
only takes one jurisdiction to block a merger or require overly onerous remedies 
that scupper the deal, irrespective of how many jurisdictions have approved it. 
Lipsky colourfully notes that: ‘in international antitrust, the slowest boat sets the 
speed of the convoy…the most restrictive standard, wherever applied in the 
world, [will] automatically become the world standard’.36 Eleanor Fox sums up 
                                                 
33 James Langenfeld, former Director for Antitrust at the FTC Bureau of Economics, in testimony to the 
now disbanded ICPAC on 3 November 1998. Available from: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/transcripts.htm.  
34 A. Ezrachi, op. cit. note 31.  
35 There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that firms attempt to address the risk of irreconcilable 
decisions, as well as spiralling costs when dealing with multi-jurisdictional filings and investigations, by 
conducting a risk-assessment to determine which jurisdictions to notify and when, see further discussion 
infra. at 5.6. 
36 A.B. Lipsky, ‘The Global Antitrust Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Commerce or Runaway 
Regulation?’ (2002) 26-Summer/Fall Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 59 at 62. 
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the situation in international antitrust in a way that is equally applicable to merger 
control by commenting: 
‘Our markets are global but we have only national law. This means that, in 
the absence of law that is as broad as the affected market, we must stretch 
our minds to mimic a law that would span the whole market’.37  
 
Thus far however, with the notable exception of the EC merger Regulation,38 
international merger control essentially remains a plethora of national merger 
control regimes, whose substantive legal tests tend to assert jurisdiction on the 
basis of some formulation of the effects doctrine.39 There have been various 
bilateral and multilateral efforts specific to merger control that are deserving of 
comment in addition to the discussion of bilateralism and multilateralism in 
antitrust in earlier parts of the thesis.  
 
 
5.4 The international merger control framework 2: bilateral cooperation 
5.4.1 Bilateral activities in international antitrust primarily consist of cooperation 
agreements and less formal agency-to-agency arrangements. The focus of these 
agreements is undoubtedly upon the desire to implement effective action against 
hardcore cartels, although the key principles of notification, consultation as well 
as enforcement cooperation and coordination in the basic agreements have 
                                                 
37 Eleanor Fox in testimony before the Antitrust Modernization Committee, 15 February 2006. Available 
from www.amc.gov.  
38 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] O.J. L24/1. 
39 See discussion in chapter 2, as well as J. Wilson, Globalization and the Limits of National Merger 
Control Laws (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003) at p.49, and A.B. Lipsky, ‘The Global 
Antitrust Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Commerce or Runaway Regulation?’ (2002) 26-Summer/Fall 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 59. 
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practical significance for international merger control.40 Indeed the majority of 
notifications under the 1991 EC-US agreement (as an example) concern merger 
cases.41 In the Halliburton/Dresser42 merger, for example, there was close 
cooperation between the European Commission and the US Department of Justice 
(DOJ) investigations, and it became clear that the divestiture of shares in M-I 
Drilling would satisfy the antitrust concerns of both authorities. In light of the 
common remedy, ‘the European Commission, invoking the 1991 US-EC bilateral 
cooperation agreement, requested that the DOJ take appropriate enforcement 
action to ensure that the divestiture was implemented’.43 In practice, bilateral 
cooperation in merger investigations can involve a range of activities, such as 
notification to an antitrust authority that merging parties based in its jurisdiction 
are subject to merger review by another jurisdiction,44 or more substantive 
cooperation in the form of meetings between authorities reviewing the same 
proposed merger. Cooperation in merger review can result in agreements between 
authorities to coordinate the timetable for a particular review, as well as policy 
discussions to ensure the authorities understand each others’ approach and factors 
                                                 
40 See discussion in chapter 2, as well as J. Galloway, ‘Moving Towards a Template for Bilateral Antitrust 
Agreements’ (2005) 28 World Comp. 589, and O. Budzinski, op. cit. note 14. 
41 See the respective Commission reports to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of 
the agreements between the European Communities and the USA and Canada regarding the application of 
their competition laws for the year 2000 (COM(2002)45 final), 2001 (COM(2002)505 final), and 2002 
(COM(2003)500 final). 
42 Commission Decision Halliburton/Dresser Case No IV/M.1140, [1998] O.J. C239/16. 
43 See case discussion in the US submission to the OECD Working Party No.3 on Co-operation and 
Enforcement, entitled ‘Roundtable discussion on cross-border remedies in merger review’, 9 February 2005 
(DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2005)7), available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/compcomm/2005--Roundtable%20Discussion%20on%20Cross-
Border.pdf.  
44 See comments by S. Scott, Canadian Commissioner of Competition, ‘Canadian Perspectives on the Role 
of Comity in Competition Law Enforcement in a Globalized World 
To Defer or Not To Defer? Is that the question?’, ABA Antitrust Law Section 2006 Spring Meeting. 
Washington D.C., 29 March 2006. Speech available at: 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cfm?itemID=2049&lg=e. 
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involved in decision-making. If merging parties grant confidentiality waivers45 
then reviewing authorities may also be able to enter into advanced consultations 
regarding the proposed transaction, thereby sharing materials and analyses 
submitted by the parties, and seeking to agree upon market definitions and reach 
either common or compatible remedies if necessary. The formal bilateral antitrust 
agreements contain very little detail on the types of cooperation that are possible 
between authorities in the context of merger control. Notwithstanding the 
limitation of the formal agreements, the European Commission, US DOJ and 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have propelled the EC-US bilateral relationship 
to the forefront of international merger cooperation, by establishing a joint merger 
working group. Following the ‘near-miss’ in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas 
merger where the EC and US antitrust authorities narrowly avoided conflicting 
decisions,46 and the damaging clash in the GE/Honeywell merger,47 the joint 
                                                 
45 As an example see the Model Waiver Letter drafted by the US Department of Justice. A signed waiver 
letter would enable the relevant antitrust authority to share confidential information submitted by the parties 
with counterparts reviewing the same transaction. Available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/206543.htm.  
46 Commission Decision, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, Case No IV/M.877, [1997] O.J. L336/16, and FTC 
Press Release of 1 July 1997, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/07/boeingclose.htm.  See discussion 
in W.E. Kovacic, ‘Transatlantic Turbulance: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and International 
Competition Policy’ [2001] 68 Antitrust Law Journal 805; B. Zanettin, Cooperation Between Antitrust 
Agencies at the International Level (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002) at pp.93-98; and the case 
study T.L. Boeder ‘The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger’ in SJ Evenett, A Lehmann and B Steil (Eds), 
Antitrust Goes Global: What Future for Transatlantic Cooperation? (Washington D.C., Brookings 
Institution, 2000) at 139. 
47 See Commission Decision in General Electric/Honeywell, Case No COMP/M.2220 [2004] O.J. L48/1. 
Discussion in E.M. Fox, ‘Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and the Future of Merger Control’ 
(2002) 23 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 457; A. Burnside, ‘GE, Honey, I Sunk The Merger’ 
(2002) 23 ECLR 107. See also discussion in speech by M. Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
DOJ, ‘Facing The Challenge of Globalization: Coordination and Cooperation Between Antitrust 
Enforcement Agencies of The US and EU’, ABA Fall Meeting. Washington D.C., 22 October 2004. Note 
that the Commission Decision in GE/Honeywell has recently been upheld (although subject to some severe 
criticism) by the Court of First Instance rulings on 14 December 2005 in T-209/01 Honeywell v. 
Commission [2005] ECR II-5527 and T-210/01 General Electric v. Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, see 
commentary in D. Howarth, ‘The Court of First Instance in GE/Honeywell’ (2006) 27 ECLR 485. 
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working group developed a set of best practices for cooperation and coordination 
in merger investigations in October 2002.48  
 
5.4.2 The best practices provide for very close enforcement cooperation and 
coordination between the European Commission and the relevant US authority – 
either the FTC or the DOJ49 – when concurrent merger reviews of the same 
transaction are underway. The best practices note that, inter alia, the objectives 
are: ‘to facilitate coherence and compatibility in remedies, to enhance the 
efficiency of their respective investigations, to reduce burdens on merging parties, 
and to increase the overall transparency of the merger review processes’.50 The 
best practices also specify many practical steps that should be taken to facilitate 
enhanced cooperation, such as making efforts to synchronise investigation 
timetables and offer to hold joint meetings between EC and US officials and the 
merging parties. Yet the potential benefits to be realised from enhanced 
cooperation and coordination depends upon the willingness of the merging parties 
to facilitate such joint activities. As the best practices note states: 
‘cooperation is more complete and effective when the merging parties 
allow the agencies to share information the disclosure of which is subject 
to confidentiality restrictions…at the same time, the EU and US agencies 
                                                 
48 Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/200405.htm. See discussion of the circumstances 
surrounding the development of the best practices in a speech by W. Kolasky, op. cit. note 30.  
49 The US DOJ and FTC both have statutory powers for conducting merger investigations, which can lead 
to disputes regarding which authority investigates a particular merger. The standard practice is that neither 
authority will open a merger investigation until cleared to do so by the other, so as to avoid duplication of 
effort. The allocation of a merger for review under federal antitrust law will normally depend upon the 
industry concerned, and the authority with the most experience in that industry will ordinarily assume 
responsibility for the investigation. For further information and a list of the allocation of industries, see the 
2002 ‘Memorandum of Agreement between the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ Concerning 
Clearance Procedures for Investigations’, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/clearance/ftcdojagree.pdf.  
50 Paragraph 2 of the Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations, op. cit. note 48.  
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recognize that many considerations go into confidentiality waiver and 
transaction timing and/or notification decisions and that these decisions 
are within the discretion of the merging parties’.51  
 
In spite of the latter statement, paragraph 7 of the best practices recommends that 
once a transaction has been announced that requires scrutiny by EC and US 
antitrust authorities: ‘the staffs of the reviewing agencies should, in appropriate 
cases, enter into discussion with the parties with a view to requesting the possible 
execution by the merging parties of confidentiality waivers’. There are similar 
provisions with regard to third parties with an interest in the transaction. Merging 
parties are also advised to: ‘consider coordinating the timing and substance of 
remedy proposals being made to the EC and US agencies, so as to minimize the 
risk of inconsistent results or subsequent difficulties in implementation’.52  
 
Regarding the ‘collection and evaluation of evidence’, the best practices 
encourage the reviewing authorities to:  
‘share publicly available information and … [discuss] their respective 
analyses at various stages of an investigation, including tentative market 
definitions, assessment of competitive effects, efficiencies, theories of 
competitive harm, economic theories, and the empirical evidence needed 
to test these theories’.53  
 
Exchanging draft questionnaires where legally permissible is another practical 
suggestion. A separate section of the document deals with ‘communication 
between the reviewing agencies’ and recommends first contact be made between 
reviewing authorities when it becomes clear that a transaction will be scrutinised 
by both EC and US authorities. Furthermore, the authorities should designate an 
                                                 
51 Ibid. at paragraph 3. 
52 Ibid. at paragraph 14. 
53 Ibid. at paragraph 6. 
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official as a contact person for cooperation concerning that case, with 
responsibilities including: ‘setting up a schedule for conferences between the 
relevant investigative staffs of each agency; discussing with the merging parties 
the possibility of coordinating investigation timetables; and…seeking waivers 
from the merging parties and from third-parties’.54  
 
The reviewing authorities are also invited to attend ‘certain key events’ in each 
others’ review procedure such as the EC’s Oral Hearing and the merging parties’ 
presentation to the DOJ/FTC prior to the final decision being taken on 
enforcement action.55 The best practices also envisage cases where it may be 
appropriate to have consultations between senior officials of the reviewing 
authorities, and specify four separate points in time during the review procedure 
for such consultations. The four points that indicate crucial moments in the review 
process are: 
‘(a) shortly before or after the US issues a second request and the EU 
initiates a Phase II investigation; (b) approximately one week before the 
EU anticipates issuing its Statement of Objections; (c) approximately one 
week after the relevant DOJ/FTC section/division investigating the merger 
makes its case recommendation to the relevant DOJ DAAG [Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General] or FTC Bureau Director; and (d) prior to a 
decision by the Antitrust Division of FTC to challenge a merger or by the 
Competition Commissioner to recommend that the European Commission 
prohibit a merger’.56  
 
Hence upon identification of a transaction that will be or has been notified to 
authorities in both jurisdictions, the best practices provide detailed guidelines of 
                                                 
54 Ibid. at paragraph 10. 
55 Ibid. at paragraph 13. 
56 Ibid. at paragraph 12. 
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how and when officials from EC and US authorities should meet to cooperate and 
coordinate activities in reviewing the case.  
 
5.4.3 With regards to the practical application of the best practice guidelines by the EC 
and US authorities, several points can be noted from anecdotal evidence gathered 
from independent research,57 concerning the issue of confidentiality waivers. 
Firstly, the degree and exact nature of cooperation between authorities in specific 
cases is not particularly transparent; often the parties involved are unclear as to 
the extent and depth of cooperation. The merging parties would likely be aware of 
the fact of ongoing cooperation, and could assume detailed cooperation following 
the signing of a confidentiality waiver, but they are not normally kept informed of 
the detail of cooperation between the authorities. Such cooperation means that 
parties must assume and anticipate full document exchange, and ensure consistent 
arguments are presented to both authorities when seeking merger clearance.  The 
independent research revealed occasions where firms had hampered their hopes 
for merger clearance, because they did not anticipate the exchange of certain 
documents between EC and US authorities, in spite of signing a waiver. The 
Solvay/Ausimont case58 provides such an example. The merging firms had argued 
that they were not competitors in a particular market (the non-coatings PDVF 
market) to the European Commission. Subsequently, the Commission received 
                                                 
57 The author engaged in a series of interviews with leading antitrust practitioners and officials while on a 
research trip to Brussels during the summer of 2006. Interviews were of an informal nature, albeit loosely 
following the terms of a questionnaire provided to interviewees in advance. Copies of the questionnaires 
used are provided at Appendix I and II. The rationale for this very small-scale empirical project was simply 
to develop a better understanding of the operation of case cooperation in multi-jurisdictional merger 
review, by entering into discussions with experienced practitioners and officials. The methodology for this 
research has been provided in chapter 1. 
58 Commission Decision Solvay/Montedison-Ausimont Case No COMP/M.2690 [2002] O.J. C153/11. 
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internal company documents from the FTC, facilitated by the waiver, which 
directly contradicted the parties’ original argument. The documents were 
submitted to the FTC following a ‘second request’.59 The inconsistency was not 
necessarily a conscious strategic decision, as Freshfields have noted: 
‘parties and their advisers cannot afford to treat each jurisdiction discretely 
and must co-ordinate their US and EU strategies on a continuous basis. 
For example, it is an obvious point that the advisers on both sides of the 
Atlantic should liaise with each other before and after every significant 
meeting with their respective agencies…In truth, co-ordination amongst 
advisers needs to catch up with co-ordination amongst the regulators’.60  
 
If nothing else, the Solvay/Ausimont case demonstrates the ignorance of merging 
firms to the detail of cooperation undertaken by EC and US antitrust authorities 
once a waiver is signed, at which moment the firms must accept a certain loss of 
control over the use of the information provided.   
 
Clearly, detailed cooperation can and must be assumed from joint meetings taking 
place between the firms and EC and US antitrust authorities, and may also be 
apparent from the coordinated timing of respective investigations. Yet public 
awareness of cooperation in merger review often stems from short comments 
made in press releases,61 or following anecdotes from antitrust authority officials 
                                                 
59 See discussion in paragraphs 41 and 42 of the Commission decision, ibid. Also see discussion of the US 
‘second request’ infra at 5.5.4 and 5.6. 
60 Transatlantic merger control: The same destination but by different routes, (Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, July 2006) at p.5. 
61 As an example see European Commission Press Release: ‘Commission clears Oracle’s takeover bid for 
PeopleSoft’ (IP/04/1312), which states ‘The Commission conducted its investigation in close cooperation 
with the antitrust division of the US Department of Justice. It also took into account evidence that became 
available during the US trial in the US District Court of Northern California’. Additionally, Press Release 
‘Mergers: Commission opens in-depth investigation into Johnson & Johnson’s takeover of Guidant 
Corporation’ (IP/05/471), which states ‘The Commission is actively co-operating with the US Federal 
Trade Commission, which is also investigating the merger.’ 
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or the parties’ respective counsel after the investigation.62 Additionally, extensive 
cooperation can sometimes be seen from the similarity of remedies required by 
different authorities, and possibly the appointment of a joint trustee to overview 
compliance post-merger with conditions of clearance.63 Interestingly, there is no 
provision within the best practices for the appointment of a joint trustee, yet the 
EC and US antitrust authorities clearly have the flexibility to engage in further 
practical steps of cooperation when appropriate in a particular case, note that such 
flexibility can be contrasted with cooperation with many other antitrust 
authorities, discussed infra.   
 
Thus, agreeing to a confidentiality waiver has significant implications for both the 
merging firms and potentially for the authorities involved, yet it would be naïve to 
assume that firms therefore face a difficult assessment before agreeing to a waiver 
(in spite of the unpredictable implications). DG Competition officials have said 
that they are unaware of any instance when a Commission request for parties to 
sign a waiver has been refused,64 and this has been corroborated by practitioners65 
                                                 
62 As an example, see the discussion of cooperation in the GE-Instrumentarium case in a speech by M. 
Delrahim, op. cit. note 47. 
63 The GE-Instrumentarium case is again an example as the European Commission and Department of 
Justice agreed that the jointly required divestiture of Spacelabs by Instrumentarium would be overseen by a 
joint trustee, if one was needed. See Commission Decision GE/Instrumentarium Case No COMP/M.3083, 
[2004] O.J. L109/1, Section D (paragraph 16) of Annex 1 ‘Commitments to the European Commission’, 
and the US Department of Justice’s ‘Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, United 
States v. General Electric Company & Instrumentarium’ at V.A, which states: ‘ If defendants have not 
divested Spacelabs within the time period specified in Section IV.A., defendants shall notify the United 
States of that fact in writing. Upon application of the United States, the Court shall appoint a trustee 
selected by the United States in good- faith consultation with the European Commission to ensure selection 
of a trustee acceptable to both the United States and the European Commission and approved by the Court 
to effect the divestiture of Spacelabs.’ (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f202400/202436d.htm). 
The Solvay/Ausimont case, op. cit. note 53, is another example whereby the EC and FTC appointed a joint 
trustee. 
64 Information gained from independent empirical-based research, op. cit. note 57. 
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who emphasise that merging parties’ top priority is receiving clearance as quickly 
as possible because time delays (particularly those caused by a decision to open a 
Phase II investigation or issue a ‘second request’ in the US) impose significant 
costs, and can even threaten the merger of themselves.66 Practitioners and merging 
parties appear to view confidentiality waivers as facilitating quicker, more 
efficient investigations and also decreasing the risk of conflicting antitrust 
decisions from different jurisdictions. Refusing a request would also jeopardise 
the good relationship that parties try to build with their case handlers. In short, 
refusing a waiver request from EC and US authorities would, on balance, likely 
cause greater harm to prospects of a speedy merger clearance than unforeseen 
consequences of granting one. Notwithstanding the granting of a waiver, 
independent empirical research suggests that firms try to impose conditions upon 
the use of the information, although this does not restrict cooperation between EC 
and US antitrust authorities and it is unclear how successful firms are in this 
endeavour.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
65 Transatlantic merger control: The same destination but by different routes, (Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, July 2006) p.5 which states, as an example of EC and US cooperation: ‘asking merging parties 
for a waiver to allow the agencies to exchange confidential information (which parties now routinely 
grant)’. 
66 It is widely recognised that ‘during the time that transactions are delayed, the parties may lose savings, 
synergies, and efficiencies that motivated the transaction’ (ICN Report on the costs and burdens of 
multijurisdictional merger review, November 2004), and it is not uncommon for proposed transactions to 
collapse if the merger is subjected to a second phase review. See discussion by P. Willis & G. Young citing 
some examples in the context of UK antitrust law: ‘Proposed merger transactions that are made conditional 
on clearance from the OFT may lapse following a reference to the [Competition Commission] (where the 
purchase agreement is conditional on the OFT not deciding to refer the transaction to the CC). Even where 
there the transaction is not conditional on clearance, the parties may agree to back out of it when faced with 
the prospect of a lengthy and expensive inquiry by the CC. For example, between April 2005 and March 
2006, six CC merger inquiries were cancelled, because the parties abandoned the transactions shortly after 
referral. All six were proposed rather than completed transactions’ in ‘UK Merger Law’, chapter 55 of 
Global Competition Review Special Report: The European Antitrust Review 2007. 
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Shortly after becoming aware of concurrent EC-US merger investigations, and 
normally following initial discussions and the granting of a confidentiality waiver 
if requested, officials will share preliminary market definitions. The market 
definitions relevant to the respective investigations are crucial and may be 
determinative of the extent of cooperation possible between EC and US 
authorities. It may also be the case that cooperation between the authorities will 
assist them in confidently identifying the relevant markets involved.67 
Independent research has suggested that it is neither effective nor efficient for 
authorities to cooperate closely and coordinate investigations unless they are 
investigating the same market(s). Nonetheless, it is clear that the focus of 
respective investigations can differ, whilst still allowing for enhanced 
cooperation. A US account of the GE/Instrumentarium merger68 highlights the 
willingness of the EC and US authorities to cooperate, in spite of a differing 
focus, which may ultimately benefit the merging firms by avoiding conflicting 
remedies:  
‘The markets of concern to the DOJ and EC are different…These 
differences were based on different market conditions in Europe and the 
US…DOJ staff communicated and cooperated extensively with their EC 
colleagues during the course of the investigations and in reaching our 
respective settlements. The agencies kept each other apprised of the status 
and timetables of their respective investigations, including when decisions 
would be reached …[the DOJ] discussed the coordination of the relief 
sought with the EC …[and] worked together to harmonize  terms in DOJ’s 
proposed consent decree with the EC’s undertakings…DOJ also consulted 
with the EC in assessing the proposed purchaser of [the required 
divestiture]’.69
                                                 
67 On this point see discussion in B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 46 at p.86, particularly regarding the Kimberly-
Clark/Scott case. 
68 Op. cit. note 63. 
69 US submission to the OECD Working Party No.3, op. cit. note 43. See discussion of 
GE/Instrumentarium, as an exemplar of bilateral cooperation in a speech by M. Delrahim, op. cit. note 47. 
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 Whilst the focus of the European Commission investigation was upon the patient 
monitoring market, the DOJ appeared far more concerned about competition in 
the mobile C-arm market, concerning fluoroscopic x-ray machines.70 
Furthermore, the Commission conducted a thorough investigation of the X-ray 
machine market involving C-arms, and determined that it ‘did not reveal any 
serious competition concerns’ in that market.71 Thus, in spite of a different focus, 
the Commission and DOJ were able to cooperate effectively throughout their 
investigations and ultimately ensured compatible remedies were imposed upon the 
merging firms. The case exemplified that if there are concurrent investigations 
into the same or related markets (even with differing emphases), and enhanced 
cooperation would be ‘mutually beneficial’,72 then EC and US authorities tend to 
engage in detailed and fairly informal cooperation, often on a daily basis. A 
greater understanding of the extent of cooperation possible between EC and US 
authorities (due to the bilateral agreements and best practices) will be possible by 
considering further case examples. 
 
                                                 
70 DOJ Antitrust Division Press Release ‘Justice Department requires divestitures in General Electric’s 
acquisition of Instrumentarium’, 16 September 2003. Available from 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2003/index03.htm.  
71 Commission Press Release ‘Commission clears acquisition of Instrumentarium by General Electric 
subject to conditions’, 2 September 2003, (IP/03/1193). 
72 Given the resources needed for enhanced cooperation, authorities are highly unlikely to do so unless it 
would, on balance, be beneficial for their ongoing investigation. This ‘mutually beneficial’ test is a key 
factor that must be considered in assessing the likelihood/effectiveness of multi-jurisdictional merger 
investigation cooperation, the point was forcefully made in the course of independent empirical research 
that engaging in merger cooperation with more than one antitrust authority (not including European 
Commission intra-EEA cooperation) would reap ‘diminishing returns’. Note that Sheridan Scott, Canadian 
Commissioner of Competition has supported this view by stating: ‘We speak informally with our foreign 
counterparts on matters of mutual interest, be they at the head of agency or working level’ in a speech, op. 
cit. note 44. 
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5.4.4 There are several noteworthy cases that demonstrate the extent of cooperation that 
takes place between the European Commission and the DOJ/FTC on a regular 
basis. Perhaps one of the most cited examples of bilateral cooperation in merger 
review, which probably led the way for the set of best practices, is the 
WorldCom/MCI case.73 The proposed merger between the two 
telecommunications companies raised antitrust concerns in complex new 
technology markets, where both companies were Internet Service Providers.74 
Cooperation between the European Commission and DOJ ranged from 
discussions and ultimate agreement on the relevant product market and the firms’ 
market strength,75 to ‘co-ordination of information gathering and joint meetings 
and negotiations with the parties’.76 A Commission official worked within the 
DOJ for part of the investigation, and one experienced practitioner has stated that 
‘the DOJ and the Commission worked hand-in-hand throughout the procedure and 
worked in effect as a single agency’77 during the case.78 The scale of the $37 
billion merger was probably one of the key motivations behind the extensive and 
groundbreaking cooperation between the two antitrust authorities. Following 
WorldCom/MCI, cooperation between the EC and US authorities in merger 
review has become more commonplace, although the degree of cooperation 
depends upon the facts of each case. The annual reports from the European 
                                                 
73 Commission Decision WorldCom/MCI Case No IV/ M.1069, [1999] O.J. L116/1. 
74 For a concise discussion of the case see A. Nourry ‘Case Study: The WorldCom – MCI Case’ in S.J. 
Evenett, A. Lehmann and B. Steil (Eds), op. cit. note 46. 
75 B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 46 at p.87. 
76 European Commission Press Release ‘Commission clears WorldCom and MCI subject to conditions’ 
(IP/98/639). 
77 Clive Stanbrook QC, in an oral statement to the ICPAC Hearings, Washington DC, 3 November 1998. 
Transcripts of Committee Hearings are available from http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/transcripts.htm.  
78 Also see paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Commission Decision, op. cit. note 73. 
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Commission to the Council and European Parliament between 2000 and 2002 
provide examples of case cooperation and also list the number of formal 
notifications between antitrust authorities concerning merger investigations.79 The 
vaunted cooperation in WorldCom/MCI was in stark contrast to the 
disillusionment felt by DOJ officials in the aftermath of the GE/Honeywell case,80 
where in spite of extensive cooperation and parallel investigations essentially 
dealing with the same markets, the Commission and DOJ reached conflicting 
conclusions.81 Far from permanently damaging relations between US and EC 
authorities however, the case appears to have reinvigorated efforts to forge greater 
policy, procedural and substantive convergence, and to ensure close cooperation 
and mutual trust and understanding in future merger investigations.82 The joint 
merger working group and set of best practices aim to diminish the risk of similar 
conflict again, and given that extensive cooperation is now commonplace and 
high-profile conflict is rare, they appear to have achieved a degree of success.  
 
                                                 
79 See the respective Commission reports to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of 
the agreements between the European Communities and the USA and Canada, regarding the application of 
their competition laws for the year 2000 (COM(2002)45 final), 2001 (COM(2002)505 final), and 2002 
(COM(2003)500 final). 
80 Commission Decision General Electric/Honeywell Case No. COMP/M.2220 [2004] O.J. L48/1. 
81 See discussion of the close cooperation in ‘Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the application of the agreements between the European Communities and the Government 
of the USA and the Government of Canada regarding the application of their competition laws: 1 January 
2001 to 31 December 2001’, COM(2002)505 final at pp.3-4. For an insightful discussion of the case see B. 
Zanettin, op. cit. note 46, particularly at pp.98-102. Also see A. Burnside ‘GE, Honey, I Sunk the Merger’ 
(2002) 23 ECLR 107. 
82 See the speech by W. Blumenthal, General Counsel FTC, ‘The Status of Convergence on Transatlantic 
Merger Policy’, 2005 Fall Meeting of the ABA Section of International Law. Brussels, 27 October 2005. 
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A more recent example of cooperation between the FTC and the European 
Commission was Boston Scientific’s acquisition of Guidant,83 involving 
cardiovascular medical products. The case was briefly cited by practitioners 
during the course of empirical research, and has been referenced by the FTC as an 
example of cooperation,84 although there are few specific details on what 
measures that cooperation entailed. More tangible results of EC-US antitrust 
cooperation can be seen from the Bayer/Aventis CropScience case85 where the 
European Commission and FTC had to closely cooperate on the remedies required 
to satisfy antitrust concerns, so as to avoid conflicting obligations being imposed 
upon the merging firms.86 Practitioners also suspected that European Commission 
requests for further information in the case were coordinated with information 
sought by the FTC by means of a second request.87
 
The Sanofi-Synthélabo/Aventis case88 involved multiple pharmaceutical markets 
with regional variations, ongoing clinical trials, complex intellectual property 
                                                 
83 See Commission Press Release IP/06/491 of 11 April 2006 ‘Mergers: Commission clears, subject to 
conditions, takeovers of Guidant by Boston Scientific and of Guidant’s vascular businesses by Abbott 
Laboratories’. Commission Decision Boston Scientific/Guidant Case No. COMP/M.4076 of 11 April 2006. 
Boston Scientific/Guidant, FTC Consent Order, Docket no. C-4164, 21 July 2006. 
84 R. Tritell and E. Kraus, “The Federal Trade Commission’s International Antitrust Program” at p.4. FTC 
paper to the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting. Washington D.C., 18 April 2007. Available 
from: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/ftcintantiprogram0407.pdf.  
85 See European Commission Press Release IP/02/570 ‘Commission clears Bayer’s acquisition of Aventis 
Crop Science, subject to substantial divestitures’, 17 April 2003. Commission Decision Bayer/Aventis Crop 
Science Case No.COMP/M.2547, [2004] O.J. L107/1. 
86 See discussion in US submission to the OECD Working Party No.3, op. cit. note 43. 
87 Comment made during independent empirical-based research, op. cit. note 57. 
88 European Commission Decision Sanofi-Synthélabo/Aventis, Case No.COMP/M.3354 (decision is in 
French). Commission Press Release ‘Commission approves planned acquisition of Aventis by Sanofi-
Synthélabo subject to conditions’ (IP/04/545). Sanofi-Synthélabo/Aventis, FTC Press Release ‘Resolving 
Anticompetitive Concerns, FTC Clears Sanofi-Synthélabo’s Acquisition of Aventis’, 28 July 2004, 
available at  http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0410031/0410031.htm. FTC Consent Order, Docket 
No.0410031, July 2004. 
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rights, and third party interests in the US, and is a further example of very close 
cooperation between the European Commission and FTC. The merger was cleared 
by both authorities, but only after extensive investigations and cooperation on 
market definition and coordinated remedies. Both authorities had particular 
concerns regarding medicines used in the treatment of colorectal cancer and 
insomnia, although the investigations highlighted significant differences in the 
market for these medicines between the EC and US. In order to address antitrust 
concerns, Sanofi agreed to a number of divestitures to competitors, but the 
Commission and FTC had to work closely to ensure that the timing and substance 
of the divestitures were compatible.89 Several other case examples of merger 
investigation cooperation between EC and US authorities have been discussed in 
depth by fellow researchers in this field.90
 
5.4.5 The cooperation that regularly takes place between EC and US antitrust 
authorities sets a model for bilateral cooperation in international merger control 
that has few comparators.91 There are provisions for close cooperation and 
coordination between the Australian and New Zealand antitrust authorities, 
although that must be considered in light of the political objective of harmonising 
                                                 
89 See discussion in US submission to the OECD Working Party No.3, op. cit. note 43. Also see 
commentary in the FTC paper by R. Tritell and E. Kraus, op. cit. note 84. 
90 See discussion of several cases in a paper by J.J. Parisi ‘Developments in EU competition law & policy – 
2003: mergers & international aspects’, ABA Seminar. Washington D.C. 4 March 2004. Particularly at 
Section V. Parisi paper available at: 
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business_regulation/antitrust/eucompetitionparisi.pdf. Also see 
B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 46 particularly at pp.85-102. Also see M.M. Dabbah, The Internationalisation of 
Antitrust Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) at pp.113-114. 
91 The special relationship between the European Commission and the antitrust authorities of the EC, EEA, 
Swiss and EU accession countries is noted, but considered to be beyond the scope of the current discussion, 
given their peculiar status due to the wider legal and political context of relations with the EU. 
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Australian and New Zealand business laws.92 In spite of the close relationship 
between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and 
New Zealand Commerce Commission (NZCC), and the overriding political 
objectives, it is notable that there is no suggestion of either authority ceding its 
ability to reach an independent decision following parallel merger 
investigations.93 Furthermore, substantive cooperation will only be undertaken 
when ‘it appears that a review by one or both agencies is likely and that 
cooperation between the agencies may be beneficial’.94 Notably, it appears that 
the cooperation must be of benefit to the ACCC and NZCC investigations, and 
there is little to suggest that such cooperation will be undertaken purely on the 
basis of it being of benefit to the merging parties (e.g. by coordinating review 
timetables).95 Thus it appears that the cooperation and coordination principles 
adopted by the EC and US authorities, when conducting parallel merger 
investigations, are comparable to those adopted by the ACCC and NZCC. 
Nonetheless, convergence and closer ties are undoubtedly further facilitated in the 
ACCC/NZCC relationship given the need for consistency ‘with the Australian and 
New Zealand governments’ shared objective of streamlining the trans-Tasman 
business environment’.96  
                                                 
92 Noted at 3.6.2 supra. 
93 See the ACCC and NZCC Cooperation Protocol for Merger Review, August 2006, available from 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/757826/fromItemId/774553. The absence of 
presumptive deferrals from the ACCC/NZCC accord, in spite of an overriding political objective for 
harmonisation, is perhaps telling of the potential for presumptive deferrals in international merger 
cooperation more generally, and is an issue that will be discussed further infra. 
94 Ibid. at paragraph 10. 
95 Ibid. at paragraph 11, where an indicative list of factors in determining whether cooperation will be 
‘beneficial’ is provided. 
96 Preamble to the ACCC and NZCC Cooperation Protocol, ibid. Also see discussion in Freehills 
Competition Law Update, 11 September 2006, available at: 
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 Lesser degrees of cooperation have taken place between EC/US authorities and 
their Canadian counterparts, and there have also been occasional references to 
cooperation with Japanese, Australian and Mexican antitrust authorities.97 
Mergers that prompt multi-jurisdictional merger review, resulting in concurrent 
investigations concerning the same or related markets do not automatically result 
in cooperation between antitrust authorities, neither does the existence of a state-
to-state or agency-to-agency antitrust cooperation agreement guarantee 
substantive cooperation will take place. In order for substantive cooperation and 
coordination between investigating authorities, it appears necessary for the 
authorities to have confidence in each others’ practices, to have built up a strong 
working relationship, and for cooperation in a particular case to be ‘mutually 
beneficial’. Assuming these elements are in place, bilateral cooperation is then 
possible. Prima facie, multilateral cooperation in merger investigations is also 
possible (with the greatest likelihood being trilateral cooperation between the 
European Commission, US and Canadian antitrust authorities), and there are 
supporting statements, particularly from the FTC,98 indicating cooperation with 
multiple international counterparts in particular cases. Nonetheless, there is a 
difference between multiple examples of bilateral cooperation in a particular case, 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.freehills.com.au/publications/publications_6138.asp. See also speech by P. Rebstock, Chair of 
the NZCC, ‘The Trans-Tasman economic relationship from a regulator’s perspective’, Trans-Tasman 
Business Circle, 4 September 2006, available at: 
http://www.transtasmanbusiness.com.au/paula%20rebstock%20speech%20040906.pdf.  
97 See discussion infra. There are also case examples of cooperation involving national competition 
authorities within the EC, and US authorities, as well as occasional cooperation with Switzerland, although 
intra-EEA and EEA-Switzerland cooperation will not be discussed in detail within the thesis. 
98 See FTC press releases e.g. 20 April 2006 Press Release: ‘FTC Requires Asset Divestitures Before 
Allowing Boston Scientific’s $27 Billion Acquisition of Guidant Corporation’. Boston Scientific/Guidant, 
FTC Consent Order, Docket no. C-4164, 21 July 2006. 
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and what could accurately be described as multilateral cooperation. It will be 
suggested below that substantive cooperation in merger investigations has thus far 
remained on a bilateral basis, with occasional trilateral meetings. Furthermore, 
there are doubts as to whether multilateral cooperation is possible or even 
worthwhile, in light of the ‘diminishing returns’ reaped from multilateral 
cooperation.  
  
The Alcan/Pechiney II99 case was highlighted during independent research as well 
as being cited during DOJ speeches as a more recent model for international 
cooperation in merger investigations.100 In a press release the DOJ stated: ‘The 
Department cooperated closely with the European Commission and the Canadian 
Competition Bureau (CCB) in its review of this transaction’,101 a view echoed by 
the CCB,102 yet unusually the European Commission case documents do not 
mention cooperation with international counterparts.103 Nonetheless, practitioners 
have suggested that the case was far from an exemplar for international 
cooperation, and this view would seem logical in light of the facts and the relevant 
markets. It is likely that the reviewing antitrust authorities would coordinate on 
the timing of review if possible and engage in preliminary discussions, but there is 
                                                 
99 Commission Decision Alcan/Pechiney (II) Case No.COMP/M.3225 of 29 September 2003. 
100 US submission to the OECD Working Party No.3, op. cit. note 43. Also see reference in a speech by J.B. 
McDonald, DAAG, ‘Antitrust update: Trinko and Microsoft’ to the Houston Bar Association. 8 April 2004. 
101 DOJ Press Release ‘Department of Justice will require a divestiture of Alcan Inc. to complete its 
pending tender offer for Pechiney SA’, 29 September 2003. Available at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2003/201302.htm.  
102 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Competition for the year ending 31 March 2004 – Reviewing 
Mergers, available at: http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cfm?itemID=1345&lg=e. 
Canadian Competition Bureau Press Release: ‘Alcan's Offer for Pechiney Cleared by the Competition 
Bureau’, 14 October 2003. 
103 European Commission Press Release ‘Commission clears Alcan takeover bid for Pechiney, subject to 
conditions’ (IP/03/1309), Commission Decision op. cit. note 99. 
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little evidence to suggest more extensive cooperation took place in this particular 
case. Alcan and Pechiney are aluminium producers, with products spanning a very 
wide range of markets. The European Commission and DOJ investigations 
identified distinct geographic markets of concern that also concerned different 
product markets. The focus of the EC investigation was threefold: firstly the 
worldwide market involving alumina refining technology and the IP rights of the 
respective parties in this market; secondly the flat rolled aluminium product 
market, particularly the sub-market for ‘aluminium can end/tab stock’; and the 
related third market of particular concern was the sub-market for beverage and 
food can sheet.104 The second and third markets were limited to the EEA and 
Switzerland.105 The DOJ, however, was particularly concerned with brazing sheet, 
an aluminium alloy used in manufacturing radiators and parts of vehicle engines. 
The relevant geographic market in the US investigation was the North American 
market.106 In order to resolve the antitrust concerns, different and unrelated 
remedies were also required by the EC and US. Clearly there was little need for 
close cooperation and coordination in Alcan/Pechiney II in light of the unrelated 
relevant markets. With regard to the merger investigation by the Canadian 
Competition Bureau, it is unclear whether the CCB had any significant concerns 
regarding the merger, and indeed acknowledged that there was no actual overlap 
between Pechiney and Alcan assets in Canada.107 The primary focus of the CCB 
                                                 
104 Op. cit. note 99. 
105 Op. cit. note 99, at paras 66-68. 
106 See United States v. Alcan & Pechiney, complaint before the Washington D.C. District Court, Case No. 
1:03CV02012   29 September 2003. Available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201300/201303.htm.  
107 Canadian Competition Bureau Press Release: ‘Alcan's Offer for Pechiney Cleared by the Competition 
Bureau’, 14 October 2003. 
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investigation would appear to be the North American brazing sheet market, as 
with the DOJ investigation. In closing its investigation, the CCB adopted a 
rationale it often cites in decisions involving multi-jurisdictional merger review. It 
believed that the enforcement activities of the DOJ and European Commission 
resolved Canadian antitrust concerns in the case and thus determined that there 
was no need to take further action. The CCB essentially deferred to the 
enforcement activity of its international counterparts. Hence, in spite of prima 
facie evidence of close cooperation between the European Commission, DOJ and 
CCB in Alcan/Pechiney II, it appears highly unlikely in light of the facts that 
substantive cooperation would be productive, and thus probably did not proceed 
beyond initial case discussions. For these reasons, there is doubt as to whether this 
case could be accurately described as an example of trilateral cooperation given 
the differing markets being investigated. Furthermore, the action of the CCB in 
the case is perhaps best described as a deferential approach to international 
cooperation in merger review, and not an example of extensive cooperation. The 
timing issue is also important in assessing the extent of cooperation undertaken, 
and the decision of the CCB two weeks after the EC and DOJ press releases 
support the view that a deferential approach was adopted. There is no evidence of 
the CCB engaging in detailed cooperation/coordination with either the DOJ or 
European Commission, and certainly no evidence of the EC or US authorities 
proactively trying to take account of CCB concerns when devising their own 
remedies.  
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There are several other cases where the CCB has adopted the same deferential 
approach. The CCB refrained from taking enforcement action in Boston 
Scientific/Guidant108 because it believed that the FTC and EC remedies dealt with 
Canadian antitrust concerns. Interestingly, the FTC has suggested that cooperation 
took place with the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) in this case, in 
addition to cooperation with the European Commission and CCB.109 Practitioners 
familiar with the case note that the European Commission discussed a variety of 
issues with the FTC, including the impact of intellectual property rights on market 
entry in the case.110 There is however, no suggestion in the EC documents of 
cooperation with either the CCB or JFTC. Similarly the CCB press release does 
not refer to the JFTC, although it does suggest some cooperation with the 
European Commission as well as the FTC. The true extent of cooperation in 
Boston Scientific/Guidant, is however unclear, although it is unlikely that there 
was extensive trilateral cooperation taking place, and even less likely that the FTC 
engaged in detailed cooperation with the JFTC.111 It is also noteworthy that there 
is no mention of cooperation with international counterparts in the JFTC press 
release concerning the case.112 In the course of research, practitioners and antitrust 
officials have remarked that cooperation with the JFTC in general, is unlikely to 
                                                 
108 CCB Press Release: ‘International Remedies Resolve Canadian Issues in Boston Scientific, Guidant 
Merger’, 11 May 2006. Also see European Commission Press Release of 11 April 2006 ‘Mergers: 
Commission clears, subject to conditions, takeovers of Guidant by Boston Scientific and of Guidant’s 
vascular businesses by Abbott Laboratories’ (IP/06/491). Commission Decision Boston Scientific/Guidant 
Case No. COMP/M.4076 of 11 April 2006. 
109 FTC Press Release, 20 April 2006: ‘FTC Requires Asset Divestitures Before Allowing Boston 
Scientific’s $27 Billion Acquisition of Guidant Corporation’. 
110 See discussion in R. Brandenburger & M. O'Regan, ‘EU Merger Control - Developments in 2005’ 
(2006) Issue 2 Antitrust Report 46-137. 
111 For further discussion of the likelihood of trilateral or multilateral cooperation in multi-jurisdiction 
merger investigations, see infra at 5.5. 
112 JFTC Press Release ‘The proposed acquisition of the stock of Guidant Corporation by Boston Scientific 
Corporation’, 1 May 2006, available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/pressreleases/2006/may/060501.pdf.  
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have significant benefits for the merging parties, and the extent of cooperation is 
likely to be very basic. Indeed only very rarely will cooperation take place with 
the JFTC regarding concurrent merger reviews. The difficulty of cooperation with 
the JFTC appears to stem from structural and cultural differences that inhibit 
informal cooperation between case handlers. In the course of empirical research, a 
DG Comp official indicated that JFTC officials are willing to cooperate in 
principle but that case handlers have little autonomy to engage in cooperation 
with counterparts, and each element of cooperation must be approved by senior 
JFTC staff before any cooperation can take place. The hierarchical structure 
effectively diminishes the benefits that could be gained from cooperation, and 
inhibits efforts at cooperation in all but the most rare of cases. 
 
The Proctor and Gamble/Gillette merger113 is a further example of the CCB 
deferential approach, as its antitrust concerns relating to the merger were 
addressed by the remedies imposed by the European Commission and FTC.114 
The European Commission and FTC closely coordinated their respective 
investigations, and shared concerns regarding the market strength of the merged 
firm in the battery-powered toothbrush market, which ultimately resulted in a 
coordinated remedy.115 In this particular case the FTC press release mentions 
cooperation with the Mexican Federal Competition Commission (MFCC), in 
                                                 
113 European Commission Decision Proctor & Gamble/Gillette Case No.COMP/M.3732, 15 July 2005. See 
also Press Release ‘Mergers: Commission approves acquisition of Gillette by Procter & Gamble subject to 
conditions’ (IP/05/955). 
114 CCB Press Release ‘Competition Bureau’s Concerns Resolved in Procter & Gamble’s Acquisition of 
Gillette’ 30 September 2005.  
115 See speech by W. Blumenthal, op. cit. note 82. 
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addition to cooperation with the European Commission and CCB.116 Nonetheless 
there are no details on what the cooperation actually involved, and FTC speeches 
that comment on the case do not make any reference to the MFCC.117 It is likely 
therefore, that the cooperation was at a very basic level. 
 
The deferential approach of the CCB in appropriate circumstances is now well 
known and FTC officials have noted that ‘Canada has been explicit about 
abstaining from bringing its own case when it has concluded that its interests were 
protected by another jurisdiction’s actions’.118 Nonetheless the CCB deferential 
approach does have limits and the Bayer/Aventis CropScience case119 highlights 
that the CCB will continue to impose separate remedies if it does not believe 
those imposed by the European Commission and relevant US authority satisfies 
all of its antitrust concerns relating to the Canadian market. 
 
In addition to the cases above, there are also examples of bilateral cooperation 
between the European Commission and CCB following the conclusion of the 
state-to-state antitrust cooperation agreement in 1999. CCB staff attended 
European Commission hearings relating to the Dow Chemical/Union Carbide120 
                                                 
116 FTC Press Release, 30 September 2005, ‘FTC Consent Order Remedies Likely Anticompetitive Effects 
of Procter & Gamble’s Acquisition of Gillette’. 
117 Speech by W. Blumenthal, op. cit. note 82. 
118 Statement of R.W. Tritell, Assistant Director for International Antitrust, FTC, to the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission (AMC). Hearing on International Antitrust Issues, 15 February 2006, available 
from http://www.amc.gov. 
119 CCB Press Release: ‘Competition Tribunal Orders Canadian Divestitures in Bayer's Acquisition of 
Aventis CropScience’, 19 July 2002.  
120 Commission Decision Dow Chemical/Union Carbide Case No.COMP/M.1671, [2001] O.J. L245/1.
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and Alcoa/Reynolds mergers.121 These cases are also clear examples of basic 
levels of trilateral cooperation as three-way teleconferences and meetings took 
place between the European Commission, CCB and FTC/DOJ respectively.122 
The CCB again deferred to the enforcement activity of the FTC in Dow 
Chemical/Union Carbide, as it believed the US consent decree dealt with its 
antitrust concerns.123 The European Commission press release concerning 
Alcoa/Reynolds also notes some cooperation with the ACCC, and the ACCC press 
release comments that: 
‘In considering the proposed merger the ACCC liaised with European and 
American authorities in trying to reach an effective outcome. Alcoa has 
offered undertakings to the American and European authorities to divest 
itself of the interest in the Worsley alumina refinery and these 
undertakings are sufficient to allay the concerns of the ACCC. In reaching 
its decision the ACCC took into account the obligation for Alcoa to divest 
its interest in the Worsley refinery’.124
 
The Alcoa/Reynolds case therefore highlights that the ACCC is willing to adopt 
the deferential approach commonly seen in CCB decisions in multi-jurisdictional 
merger reviews, when enforcement action of international counterparts adequately 
deal with its own antitrust concerns. The case also highlights that in spite of the 
existence of basic levels of trilateral cooperation, there are inherent limits to the 
extent of multilateral cooperation in any particular case, even where relatively 
developed antitrust regimes are involved. Notably, the DOJ press release only 
                                                 
121 European Commission Press Release ‘Commission clears merger between Alcoa and Reynolds Metals, 
under conditions’ (IP/00/424). European Commission Decision Alcoa/Reynolds, Case No.COMP/M.1693. 
See discussion in speech by D. Burlone, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, CCB, ‘Canada and the 
internationalization of competition policy’, to the Canadian Bar Association. 21 September 2000. 
122 Commission report to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of the agreements 
between the European Communities and the USA and Canada regarding the application of their 
competition laws for the year 2000 (COM(2002)45 final) at p.11. 
123 Speech by S. Scott, op. cit. note 44. 
124 ACCC Press Release ‘ACCC not to intervene in ALCOA/Reynolds Metals merger’, 4 May 2000, 
available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/323061.  
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refers to cooperation with the EC, whereas the CCB press release refers to 
cooperation with the EC and DOJ, and the ACCC press release clearly refers to 
cooperation with the DOJ and EC. The lack of clarity and inconsistency is 
obvious and probably highlights varying degrees of cooperation, with the EC/US 
cooperation being the most detailed. Clearly in a case of this nature, with antitrust 
concerns worldwide, close cooperation is more likely to take place on a bilateral 
basis between several authorities running concurrent investigations than on a 
multilateral basis. 
 
In light of the foregoing discussion of practical cooperation in previous multi-
jurisdictional merger investigations, close cooperation and coordination in 
concurrent merger review is possible and regularly takes place. The relationship 
between EC and US antitrust authorities clearly facilitates the closest degree of 
cooperation (perhaps also motivated by the heightened risk of conflict between 
these jurisdictions), yet it has also been shown that the existence of bilateral 
cooperation agreements (and the OECD Recommendation) facilitates cooperation 
with other antitrust authorities. However, there are clear limitations as there are 
relatively few antitrust authorities active in merger review cooperation, when 
compared with the growing number of merger control regimes (even if limited to 
those with ex ante notification requirements). Furthermore, cases involving 
concurrent review by more than two antitrust authorities do not necessarily result 
in trilateral or multilateral cooperation, and are more likely to result in multiple 
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instances of bilateral cooperation. Extensive cooperation and coordination is, for 
the moment at least, likely to remain predominantly on a bilateral basis.  
 
The numerous examples of cooperation, sometimes including coordinated 
remedies and deferential approaches, fail to illustrate a significant point relevant 
to this discussion. In spite of close cooperation in many cases, particularly 
between EC and US authorities, each antitrust authority ultimately retains 
independent decision-making authority and must work within differing legislative 
parameters, and may also pursue differing objectives and have underlying 
conceptual differences. In short, sometimes close cooperation is insufficient to 
avoid conflicting outcomes, as seen in the GE/Honeywell case.125 Cooperative 
relationships and the ability to coordinate timing and remedies etc. is an 
incomplete solution to the risks of conflicting decisions, and must be 
complemented by broader, longer-term approaches aimed at achieving 
convergence in multi-jurisdictional merger review.  
 
 
5.5 The international merger control framework 3: multilateral cooperation & 
convergence 
 
5.5.1 In the first part of the thesis, the limitations of extraterritoriality and bilateral 
cooperation agreements were readily apparent and thus formed the rationale for 
                                                 
125 Op. cit. note 47. 
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developing multilateral antitrust initiatives.126 Bilateral cooperation in specific 
cases, and joint working groups striving towards greater understanding and 
convergence, is equally limited in international merger control. In light of the 
increasing number of merger control regimes,127 and increasing number of large, 
international M&A, the number of multi-jurisdictional merger reviews are likely 
to increase. Furthermore, given the importance of avoiding conflicting decisions 
contrary to the primary objective,128 there is a need for multilateral efforts to 
minimise the risk of conflicting decisions through greater international 
convergence, and also decrease the overall burden upon business created by 
multi-jurisdictional merger control. Bilateral and occasional trilateral cooperation 
and coordination of concurrent merger investigations is inherently limited given 
the small number and commonality of cooperating authorities. Furthermore, while 
there appear to be benefits stemming from the EC-US joint mergers working 
group, this will do little to achieve convergence with developing merger control 
regimes and particularly those jurisdictions, such as China and India, with whom 
antitrust cooperation may become crucial in the future, in light of increasing trade 
relations. Multi-jurisdictional merger reviews are likely to continue to increase in 
scale,129 and bilateral or trilateral cooperation is unable to effectively or efficiently 
                                                 
126 One of the most detailed and convincing arguments advocating the need for multilateral initiatives in 
international antitrust can be found within the ICPAC Final Report (2000), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/icpac.htm, which ultimately led to the creation of the International 
Competition Network (ICN). 
127 See discussion supra at 5.3.1. 
128 See discussion supra at 5.1 and 5.2. 
129 It must be noted that an increase in the number of merger control regimes will not necessarily result in a 
greater number of multi-jurisdictional merger reviews, even if the developing regimes have low notification 
thresholds and claim jurisdiction over international M&A. Anecdotal evidence suggests that merging 
parties likely undertake some form of risk assessment when determining whether to submit notifications 
pre-closing to developing antitrust authorities. See discussion infra at 5.6. Nonetheless, even if a form of 
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minimise the risk of conflict. The various multilateral fora and initiatives involved 
in international antitrust were outlined in chapter 4. The thesis will now re-
examine these initiatives, focusing upon their contribution in the specific context 
of international merger control.  
 
Multilateral antitrust activities concerning merger review normally have one of 
two objectives: i) achieving or facilitating greater convergence; or ii) making 
proposals for the future development of international merger control. The 
emphasis here will be on the former type of activities, while there will be some 
consideration of relevant examples of the latter in the next section and in the 
thesis conclusion. Activities aimed at convergence will tend to organise research 
and recommendations by reference to certain key stages/issues in merger control. 
Discussion here will be split into four sections, that concerning: a) key principles 
adopted during the merger review process; b) notification by the merging parties 
to the authorities (which will form a significant part of the discussion as it has 
formed a significant part of the work of multilateral fora in this area); c) merger 
investigation and analysis; and d) merger remedies.  
 
5.5.2 Given the large and increasing number of merger control regimes in existence, it 
is hardly surprising that there is no universally accepted objective or set of 
objectives for such laws. Nonetheless, there are multilateral efforts to develop an 
                                                                                                                                                 
risk assessment reduces the number of multi-jurisdictional merger reviews, this should not diminish the 
importance of working towards convergence amongst the rising number of merger control regimes. In fact 
it may heighten the desire to achieve convergence, so as to reduce the perceived need to conduct a risk 
assessment. 
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agreed set of principles to which merger control should adhere, with some degree 
of success. The ICN mergers working group has produced a set of eight ‘guiding 
principles for merger notification and review’.130 The work of the ICN in this area 
has been aided by preparatory work undertaken by non-governmental 
organisations, leading practitioners and the OECD.131 The so-called ‘Merger 
Streamlining Group’, funded by leading international companies and consisting of 
leading antitrust practitioners, produced a set of best practices for the review of 
international mergers in October 2001 (herein referred to as the MSG best 
practices).132 The set of best practices included fundamental principles that should 
guide the design and operation of merger control regimes, and are reflected within 
the ICN principles. The MSG best practices were supplemented almost 
immediately by substantively similar recommendations produced jointly by the 
business and industry advisory committee to the OECD (BIAC) and the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).133 The BIAC/ICC best practices also 
highlighted many of the key principles that have been further developed by the 
ICN.134 The ICN principles are: sovereignty; transparency; non-discrimination on 
the basis of nationality; procedural fairness; efficient, timely and effective review; 
coordination; convergence; and protection of confidential information.  
 
                                                 
130 Available at: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.  
131 See discussion in the paper by J.W. Rowley, ‘The internationalisation of merger review: towards global 
solutions (perspectives of a non-governmental advisor)’, first ICN annual conference. Castel Dell’Ovo, 
Naples, 28-29 September 2002. 
132 J.L. McDavid, P.A. Proger, M.J. Reynolds, J.W. Rowley & A.N. Campbell, ‘Best practices for the 
review of international mergers’, October 2001, available at 
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/n_america/canada/MergerSep21.pdf?id=323.  
133 J.W Rowley paper, op. cit. note 131. 
134 BIAC/ICC Recommended Framework for Best Practices in International Merger Control Procedures, 4 
October 2001, available at http://www.biac.org/statements/comp/BIAC-ICCMergerPaper.pdf.  
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The inclusion of the principle of sovereignty is significant as it limits the work of 
the ICN in this area to promoting convergence, and does not support some of the 
more radical proposals for reform that have been suggested.135 The key principles 
of transparency, and non-discrimination (between domestic and foreign 
companies) within merger analysis have been gaining widespread recognition, 
and are reflected in the work undertaken by other bodies at the international level, 
including the WTO.136 The principle of transparency should apply generally with 
regard to the policies, practices and procedures within each jurisdiction, but also 
at a case-by-case level with regard to the antitrust assessment undertaken and to 
ensure that the bases for any adverse decision are clear and understood.137 The 
principles of procedural fairness and efficient, timely and effective review are 
with regard to the investigative and determinative stages of a merger review. The 
principles seek to ensure that merging firms are provided with an opportunity to 
respond to adverse findings before a final decision is taken, and also provide that 
the timetable for merger review should be ‘reasonable and determinable’. The 
latter principle notably provides that the merger review process: ‘should not 
impose unnecessary costs on transactions’.138 The principles of coordination and 
convergence reflect the international context within which national merger control 
regimes must operate. The principle of coordination encourages jurisdictions to 
coordinate respective investigations when dealing with a multi-jurisdictional 
                                                 
135 See J. Wilson, op. cit. note 39 at chapters 7 and 8, for a thorough discussion of the leading proposals for 
an international merger control regime, ranging from work sharing and lead jurisdiction models (e.g. part of 
the ICPAC proposals) to the creation of a supranational institution (e.g. The Munich Group of antitrust 
scholars, and Campbell and Trebilcock proposals). 
136 See discussion supra at 4.4.5, and infra. 
137 The importance of the principle of transparency was highlighted J.W. Rowley, op. cit. note 131. 
138 ICN Guiding Principles, op. cit. note 130. 
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merger that is subject to concurrent review. Although this is encouraged only to 
the extent that coordination would: ‘enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the review process and reduce transaction costs’,139 and is presumably consistent 
with the general approach of antitrust authorities to engage in coordination only 
when it is ‘mutually beneficial’, discussed supra at 5.4.3 and 5.4.5. The principle 
also recognises the requirement to work within the framework of domestic laws. 
The principle of convergence highlights the importance of agreed best practice 
recommendations in achieving convergence. The eighth principle within the ICN 
document recognises the need to protect confidentiality at all stages of the merger 
review process. Protecting confidential information is crucial to every merger 
control regime in order to gain the trust of merging firms, which are required to 
notify and provide sensitive commercial information.140  
 
Whereas the ICN has compiled a document with eight concise ‘guiding 
principles’ for merger control regimes, and a supplementary and detailed set of 
‘recommended practices for merger notification procedures’,141 the OECD has 
combined principles and best practice within a relatively short OECD 
recommendation on merger review.142 The work of the ICN and the sovereignty 
of OECD Member countries are recognised within the preamble to the OECD 
recommendation, and the other seven ICN principles are included within the 
                                                 
139 Ibid. 
140 See further discussion infra at 5.5.3. 
141 Document available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org. See discussion infra at 5.5.3.  
142 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review, 25 March 2005 – C(2005)34 at I.A1.2.2 and 
A2 respectively. Available from: 
http://webdomino1.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/c(2005)34.  
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substantive recommendations, albeit with varying degrees of emphasis. The 
OECD recommendation also ‘invites non-member economies to associate 
themselves with [the] Recommendation and to implement it’.143 ‘Non-member 
economies’ will only be in a position to implement the recommendation if they 
have a merger control regime. Furthermore, as the ICN now has a membership 
from 80 different jurisdictions, it is perhaps likely that those states able to 
implement the OECD recommendation (as well as the 30 Member countries of the 
OECD) will have some form of ICN membership, and thus be aware of the ICN 
guiding principles and recommended practices. Hence, as discussed supra at 
4.4.3, there is clear duplication of effort and resources occurring with regard to 
key merger review principles in the work of the ICN and OECD. It could be 
argued that the nature of membership and legal status of 
recommendations/guidelines differs between the OECD and ICN, as the OECD 
has state-level membership, whilst ICN membership consists of antitrust 
authorities. Assuming that antitrust authorities hold ICN membership with 
government support, this distinction appears trivial and does not present a strong 
justification for producing twin sets of principles and best practice 
recommendations that tend to use very similar language.  
 
UNCTAD and the WTO working group on the interaction between trade and 
competition policy both engage in general antitrust activity. Whilst the activities 
can be relevant for merger control, they are not focused upon addressing the 
peculiar problems and issues relevant to multi-jurisdictional merger review. 
                                                 
143 Ibid. at III. 
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Nonetheless the UN Set144 reflects many of the core principles already discussed 
such as non-discrimination,145 transparency,146 confidentiality,147 and effective 
review,148 as does the UN Model Law, to a more limited extent.149 WTO activity 
in this area has stagnated since the failure of the 2003 Fifth Ministerial 
Conference in Cancún to agree on the Singapore issues, which included 
antitrust.150 WTO activity has always focused on the key principles of non-
discrimination, transparency and procedural fairness however, and would be 
unlikely to conflict with the work undertaken as part of other multilateral 
initiatives such as the ICN and OECD.151
 
There are indicators suggesting that providing for independent antitrust analysis in 
merger control (i.e. free from government intervention in all but exceptional 
cases) is gaining recognition as an important means of implementing many of the 
key principles outlined above.152 Indeed the ICN has said that ‘competition 
                                                 
144 See discussion in supra at 4.4.4. The United Nations Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles 
and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices is available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf10r2.en.pdf.  
145 UN Set at E3. Although note that the UN Set also recommends flexibility to enable preferential or 
differential treatment when dealing with developing countries. In particular it states at C7 that in order to 
ensure the equitable application of the UN Set, competition rules in developing countries may reflect the 
need to promote ‘the establishment or development of domestic industries and the economic development 
of other sectors of the economy’. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. at E5. 
148 Ibid. at E6. 
149 For example, see the chapter X.II provisions on confidentiality, UNCTAD Model Law on Competition, 
op. cit. note 32.  
150 See discussion supra at 4.4.5. 
151 Also see discussion in the WTO Secretariat background note on The Fundamental Principles of 
Competition Policy, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 
WT/WGTCP/W/127 7 June 1999 (99-2281), available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/wgtcp_docs_e.htm.  
152 See ‘Aspects of Independence of Regulatory Agencies and Competition Advocacy – a Getúlo Vargas 
Foundation (NGA) Contribution’, submitted to the ICN competition policy implementation working group; 
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agencies should have sufficient independence to ensure the objective application 
and enforcement of merger control laws’.153 Independent antitrust analysis (or 
‘depoliticised’ antitrust analysis) is not explicitly recognised as a key principle 
within international merger control currently, but is perhaps destined to become 
more important in future. Implementation of such a principle would likely require 
legislative changes in many antitrust jurisdictions, and given the developing 
nature of many antitrust authorities with ICN membership, this is unlikely to be 
an immediate priority,154 unless pursued by the OECD, given that its membership 
is a fairly homogenous group of developed economies.  
 
5.5.3 The overwhelming degree of consensus achieved with regard to key principles 
applicable to multi-jurisdictional merger review contrasts with the divergent 
national procedures and rules that determine the timing and form of merger 
notification, as well as the substantive merger analysis and case determination. In 
recognition of the growing number of merger control regimes, and the prevalence 
of ex ante systems of mandatory notification,155 many commentators and non-
governmental organisations have identified notification thresholds as a key issue, 
including Hawk, who commented:  
                                                                                                                                                 
subgroup 3: competition advocacy in regulated sectors, 6. Available from: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.  
153 The ICN recommended practices for merger notification procedures, op. cit. at note 141, at XII.C. 
154 For further discussion of the trend towards recognising the importance of independent antitrust analysis 
see J. Galloway, ‘The pursuit of national champions: the intersection of competition law and industrial 
policy’ (2007) 28 ECLR 172. Also see a speech by R. Hewitt Pate, whilst Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust at the DOJ, ‘Competition and Politics’, delivered to the 12th International Conference on 
Competition. Bonn, Germany, 6 June 2005. 
155 See discussion supra at 4.1.2 and also the Global Competition Review Publication, ‘Getting the Deal 
Through: Merger Control 2006’, which provides a detailed review of merger control regimes in 54 
jurisdictions worldwide; one of the points of reference is whether notification is mandatory or voluntary. 
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‘there is a proliferation of merger controls throughout the world. What is 
the problem? The problem is volume… The solution is volume 
control…the trick is minimizing all this volume of merger control and all 
these costs or somehow try to reduce the volume so that transactions that 
have little or no antitrust importance are screened out’.156
  
Merger notification thresholds are a fundamental consideration in the assessment 
of the current international merger control framework. The large number of 
merger control regimes becomes particularly problematic if jurisdiction is readily 
asserted over international M&A,157 resulting in multi-jurisdictional merger 
reviews. Merger notification thresholds essentially act as a procedural means of 
asserting jurisdiction, particularly in regimes with ex ante mandatory 
notification.158 Thus generally low thresholds, or those which assert jurisdiction 
(i.e. require notification) in spite of the merger having insubstantial or superficial 
links with the reviewing regime, tend to increase the burden upon merging firms 
and raise the potential for conflicting decisions. Notification thresholds can 
therefore affect the ability of international merger control to conform to the 
primary objective of the international antitrust dialogue. Non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), the OECD and the ICN have all been active in this area to 
help identify the specific issues involved, and work towards best practice 
recommendations so as to facilitate convergence. The key issues regarding 
notification concern: a) the proximity of the nexus between the merging firms and 
                                                 
156 Barry E. Hawk, in an oral statement to the ICPAC Hearings, Washington DC, 3 November 1998. 
Transcripts of Committee Hearings are available from http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/transcripts.htm. 
157 Other problems can of course arise, notably when it is difficult to determine whether notification is 
actually required (perhaps due to a lack of publicly available information, vague thresholds or those which 
are subject to local, subjective assessments). The ICN guiding principles and recommended practices 
attempt to address these issues. 
158 Although note that even if notification thresholds are not met, many jurisdictions may nonetheless 
enable/oblige antitrust authorities to challenge proposed mergers ex proprio motu when applying the 
substantive legal tests within the merger control regime. 
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the reviewing jurisdiction (jurisdictional nexus);159 b) the clarity and transparency 
of the notification thresholds;160 c) the timing requirements for notification;161 d) 
the amount of information required in a notification;162 and to a limited extent e) 
the issue of filing fees.163 The ICN appears to have undertaken the most recent 
and certainly the most in-depth work regarding these key issues. Achieving 
convergence through notification best practices could reduce the number of 
jurisdictions that review particular mergers, and is likely to be far more productive 
in the short-term than efforts towards substantive convergence. For these reasons, 
it is necessary to conduct a detailed analysis of the attempts to achieve 
convergence on the key issues regarding notification. 
 
a) Broad consensus on the issue of jurisdictional nexus appears to have been 
achieved through the various NGO, OECD and ICN best practice 
recommendations. Although, as with most ‘soft law’ tools for convergence, the 
significance of the consensus can only be determined by monitoring 
implementation. While there has been no attempt to provide a precise template for 
determining when a merger has a sufficiently proximate or ‘material’ nexus to the 
reviewing jurisdiction, the NGO, OECD and particularly ICN work suggests that 
                                                 
159 See the ICN recommended practices for merger notification procedures, op. cit. at note 141, at I; the 
OECD merger recommendation, op. cit. at note 142, at I.A.1.2(1); as well as Part I(1) of the MSG best 
practices, op.cit. note 132; and the BIAC/ICC best practices, op. cit. at note 134, at 2.1.2. Also see speech 
by W. Kolasky, op. cit. note 30. 
160 See the ICN recommended practices at II, the OECD merger recommendation at I.A.1.2(2), and the 
BIAC/ICC best practices at 2.1.2. 
161 See the ICN recommended practices at III, the OECD merger recommendation at I.A.1.2(5), and the 
BIAC/ICC best practices at 2.1.3. 
162 See the ICN recommended practices at V, the OECD merger recommendation at I.A.1.2(3), and the 
BIAC/ICC best practices at 2.1.4. 
163 See the ICN Merger notification filing fees report, April 2005, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org. Also see the MSG best practices, op.cit. note 132, at Part 
I(8), and the BIAS/ICC best practices at 2.1.5.6 
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notification thresholds should require that mergers have a minimum ‘local nexus’ 
to the reviewing jurisdiction.164 In implementing such a recommendation, a 
minimum level of sales or asset levels within the jurisdiction could establish a 
minimum ‘local nexus’, and the ICN recommendation suggests that the test 
should ensure that at least two of the entities involved have a ‘local nexus’, so as 
to avoid the possibility of a combined ‘local nexus’ test being satisfied by one of 
the entities alone.165 The MSG best practices are likely to be slightly more 
controversial by stating that ‘transactions should not be pre-notifiable unless at 
least two parties have some local presence in the jurisdiction. Substantive 
competition concerns are substantially less likely in a jurisdiction where only one 
or neither of the parties to a merger has local operations’.166 Regarding 
implementation, it is noteworthy that in a survey of 53 ICN member jurisdictions 
only 35 had a ‘local nexus’ requirement within their notification thresholds.167
 
b) The jurisdictional nexus, as part of the notification threshold, is entwined with 
the issue of clarity and transparency of notification thresholds. There is a clear 
effort, as demonstrated by the best practices in this area,168 to avoid opaque and 
subjective merger notification thresholds. The MSG best practices state that in the 
interests of certainty ‘market share (or other judgement-based) tests should not be 
used as the basis for pre-merger notification thresholds because they require up-
                                                 
164 Op. cit. at note 159. 
165 The ICN recommended practices for merger notification procedures, op. cit. at note 141, at I.C, 
particularly Comments 2 and 3.  
166 Part I(2) of the MSG best practices, op.cit. note 132. 
167 ICN Report, ‘Implementation of the ICN recommended practices for merger notification and review 
procedures’, April 2005, at Annex B: Compliance with recommended practices, RP I: Nexus. Report 
available at: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.  
168 Op. cit. note 160. 
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front analyses of product and geographic markets which are time-consuming and 
uncertain’.169 The recommendation to move away from market share thresholds 
towards objective thresholds (such as those based on local assets and/or sales) is 
mirrored within the BIAC/ICC best practices,170 the ICN recommendation and 
briefly within the OECD merger recommendation.171 The ICN recommendation 
notes that ‘notification thresholds should be based on information that is readily 
accessible to the merging parties’.172 Whilst the point links into discussion infra at 
5.6 regarding the burden upon merging parties, it also has the consequence that 
objective thresholds, such as local assets and/or sales, should be expressed in 
currency values and not other economic measures such as wage multiples.173 The 
majority of those ICN members surveyed by the ICN implementation project 
group in 2005, responded that their merger notification thresholds used subjective 
criteria contrary to the ICN recommended practices, with 18 jurisdictions 
adopting a variant of a market share test.174 The argument in favour of certain 
subjective tests such as one based on market share, is of course that they are much 
more likely to identify (and thus pull within a state’s jurisdiction) mergers that 
may cause antitrust concerns. Note that the best practices do not recommend 
against the use of market share or other subjective tests throughout the merger 
                                                 
169 Part I(4) of the MSG best practices, op.cit. note 132. 
170 The BIAC/ICC best practices, op. cit. at note 134, at 2.1.2.3. 
171 Op. cit. at note 160. 
172 The ICN recommended practices for merger notification procedures, op. cit. at note 141, at II.C. 
173 The oft-cited example of a jurisdiction with merger notification thresholds that are partially expressed in 
terms of monthly wage multiples is Russia. Pre-merger notification is currently required to the Russian 
Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS), when, inter alia, the total amount of assets involved in the merger 
exceeds 30 million times the Russian Federal monthly minimum wage (currently Rb100). For further 
information see the Global Competition Review Publication, ‘Getting the Deal Through: Merger Control 
2006’ at chapter 39: Russia, as well as the ICN Russian merger notification and procedures template (July 
2006), available at: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.  
174 Op. cit. at note 167, at RP II: Notification thresholds/pre-notification guidance. 
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control process,175 but merely suggest it is an inappropriate model for merging 
parties to be able to determine whether notification is required or not.176 The best 
practices suggest that where subjective notification thresholds are nonetheless 
adopted, the antitrust authority should provide guidance on interpretation for the 
merging parties or allow pre-notification contact.177 Independent research tends to 
suggest a mixed reaction to subjective pre-merger notification thresholds on the 
part of leading practitioners.178 While many recommend and favour the adoption 
of objective thresholds, there is a real debate concerning how much of a burden 
subjective thresholds actually cause for merging firms. Several practitioners 
suggested that law firms with expertise of dealing with antitrust authorities in key 
jurisdictions, as well as links with local practitioners dramatically minimises the 
apparent difficulty for clients in determining when notification is required under 
subjective thresholds.179 Nonetheless it is clear that if the convergence of pre-
merger notification procedures and practices are to be of benefit to merging 
parties, then jurisdictions should work towards adopting clear and objective 
notification thresholds, as opposed to market share thresholds which could still 
vary significantly in interpretation. 
                                                 
175 Hence the share-of-supply test employed by UK merger control under s.23 Enterprise Act 2002 would 
be unlikely to conflict with these best practices in a strict sense, as the test is not utilised as part of a 
mandatory pre-merger notification regime. Nonetheless, merging firms may wish to consider this issue 
when deciding whether it is in their interests to notify the OFT pre-merger. For a discussion of the UK 
share-of-supply test under s.23 and the UK voluntary notification procedure see M Furse, op. cit. note 1 at 
pp.210-212 and pp.236-240 respectively. 
176 See the ICN recommended practices, op. cit. at note 141, at II.B, particularly Comment 1. 
177 See the ICN recommended practices, op. cit. at note 141, at V.C, and the MSG best practices, op.cit. 
note 132, at Part II(2). Also note that only 2 jurisdictions out of the 53 taking part in the ICN survey, op. 
cit. note 167 at RP II, stated that they do not provide formal or informal pre-notification guidance. 
178 Research noted supra at 4.4.3 and note 57. 
179 Returning to the Russian example of a threshold partially based upon a multiple of the federal minimum 
wage, one leading practitioner stated that international law firms would very easily use a formula to 
determine whether notification was required, and that any legal changes would be monitored so as to adjust 
their practice.  
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 c) The issue of timing is crucial throughout the whole merger review process, 
particularly for the merging parties themselves, and this is not any different at the 
pre-merger notification stage. Notifications tend to require the coordination of 
legal and commercial strategies designed to ‘get the deal through’. Hence for 
merging firms and their counsel, the issue of notification timing, including 
notification triggers and any associated deadlines, is crucial and easily 
complicated by the burden of multiple notifications. The notification triggers are 
the points in the merger/acquisition process at which the merging parties 
should/can notify relevant antitrust authorities for merger clearance. There is a 
tension regarding notification triggers for while they ostensibly establish a point 
in the commercial M&A process from which merging firms must notify within a 
set time period, the triggers often act to prevent premature notifications. In 
essence, notification triggers balance the interests of legal certainty (which is 
furthered by early notification) with the need to ensure efficient and effective use 
of resources (flexible triggers may encourage notifications regarding M&As that 
are at very early stages of the commercial negotiation stage, with the obvious risk 
that an antitrust investigation is undertaken while the deal collapses for 
commercial reasons).180 The ICN recommended practices suggest that parties 
‘should be permitted to notify proposed mergers upon certification of a good faith 
intent to consummate the proposed transaction’.181 Thus the best practices 
envisage allowing the merging parties flexibility in deciding when to notify, 
                                                 
180 This tension is apparent from the wording of the best practice recommendations regarding timing and 
filing deadlines, in particular see the BIAC/ICC best practices, op. cit. at note 134, at 2.1.3.1 – 2.1.3.4. 
181 ICN recommended practices, op. cit. note 141, at III.A. 
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whilst also aiming to prevent notifications with regard to ‘speculative’ mergers.182 
The ICN best practices implicitly favour allowing notification filing on the basis 
of a signed letter of intent, which would allow notification before the proposed 
merger had become public. The BIAC/ICC and MSG best practices share this 
view, whereas the OECD merger recommendation is too vague on this point to 
offer guidance.183 Nonetheless, where jurisdictions continue to require a definitive 
merger agreement, the ICN best practices recommend that parties should be 
allowed to enter into pre-notification consultations with the antitrust authority.184 
A secondary issue regarding notification timing, is whether jurisdictions should 
impose deadlines for notification after the trigger point has occurred. Whilst there 
is the general and obvious point that deadlines should allow merging parties a 
‘reasonable time’ for compiling the relevant information and submitting the 
notification,185 there is a consensus against the imposition of notification 
deadlines in jurisdictions that suspend the merger transaction pending merger 
review.186 The clear rationale is that there is sufficient impetus for merging parties 
to notify as quickly as possible when jurisdictions prohibit the conclusion of the 
merger pending review, without the need to impose notification deadlines. The 
ICN implementation survey highlights a wide divergence between the 53 
respondents with regard to triggering events, with 10 jurisdictions requiring the 
parties to conclude a definitive agreement pre-notification. 12 jurisdictions allow 
                                                 
182 Ibid. at III.A: Comment 1. 
183 The BIAC/ICC best practices, op. cit. note 134, at 2.1.3.1 – 2.1.3.4, the MSG best practices, op.cit. note 
132, at Part I(6), and the OECD merger recommendation, op. cit. note 142, at I.A.1.2(5). 
184 ICN recommended practices, op. cit. note 141, at III.A: Comment 4. 
185 Ibid. at III.C. 
186 Ibid. at III.B. Also see the MSG best practices, op.cit. note 132, at I(7). 
 300
notification upon evidence of a good faith intent to consummate the merger, and 
13 jurisdictions have very flexible notification triggers.187 This likely highlights 
the continuing need for further convergence efforts in this area. 
 
d) The information requirements, or so-called ‘form filing requirements’, in a 
notification have been the subject of harmonisation efforts for many years, with 
attempts having been made to achieve consensus upon the type and amount of 
information required by jurisdictions. There have been ambitious attempts to 
produce a common filing form, spurred on by recommendations in the influential 
OECD Whish/Wood Report in 1994.188 Whilst recommending the creation of ‘one 
or two model filing forms, which request common information in a single format, 
and which use different country annexes as appropriate’,189 the Whish/Wood 
Report highlighted some of the difficulties of such an undertaking by stating ‘the 
notification form and the timetable in themselves are a reflection of the 
substantive criteria by reference to which mergers are judged’.190 Hence the 
implication is that harmonising procedural requirements, such as the information 
required in pre-merger notification, is often very difficult without accompanying 
harmonisation, or at least convergence of the substantive legal tests involved. The 
United Kingdom, France and Germany produced a voluntary common filing form 
in September 1997, to be used when a merger would be subject to review in two 
                                                 
187 Op. cit. at note 167, at RP III: Timing of Notification. 
188 R. Whish & D. Wood, Merger cases in the real world – a study of merger control procedures, (Paris, 
OECD, 1994). 
189 Ibid. at p.108. 
190 Ibid. at p.109. 
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or more of the jurisdictions.191 The OECD also produced a somewhat vague 
template notification form in February 1999,192 although it failed to be 
implemented by its relatively homogenous membership. In spite of these apparent 
developments, common notification forms appear destined to failure unless they 
are built upon substantive convergence, and also receive the support of merging 
firms and their legal counsel, in the form of common usage. In the absence of 
substantive convergence, common filing forms are likely to require a level of 
information so as to satisfy the most onerous jurisdiction amongst the signatories. 
Furthermore, a common form may simply necessitate supplemental information to 
be provided at the notification stage to particular jurisdictions, following the 
submission of the common form (as the UK, French and German common form 
allows for). Hence, in the absence of substantive convergence, a common filing 
form simply masks over diverging legal tests and requirements, and the incentive 
remains for merging parties to notify jurisdictions individually where less 
information may be required, and direct contact is more efficient.193
 
In light of the difficulty of agreeing upon an effective common filing form for 
pre-merger notification, it becomes more important to work towards convergence 
                                                 
191 See discussion in J.W. Rowley & A.N. Campbell ‘Multi-jurisdictional merger review – is it time for a 
common form filing treaty?’ at VI, in Policy Directions for Global Merger Review, a Special Report by the 
Global Forum for Competition and Trade Policy, published by the Global Competition Review, 1999. Also 
see the UK Office of Fair Trading guidance document, Mergers: Procedural Guidance (OFT 526), at 
paragraphs 3.26 and 4.30. 
192 OECD Report on notification of transnational mergers (DAFFE/CLP(99)2/FINAL), 24 February 1999, 
specifically the appendix which provides a ‘framework for a notification and report form for 
concentrations’. 
193 In spite of apparent support amongst many practitioners for a common notification filing form, many 
have expressed strong concern for such a form in the absence of substantive convergence. See J.W. Rowley 
& A.N. Campbell, op. cit. note 191, this stance was also representative of the views of practitioners 
interviewed in the course of independent research, see supra at note 57. Also see J. Wilson, op. cit. note 39 
at p.296. 
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as to the type and detail of information that jurisdictions actually need from 
merging firms at the notification stage. After reviewing the notification 
requirements of many jurisdictions, the ICPAC final report observed that: 
‘many of the forms used in various jurisdictions require the submission of 
extensive information about markets, competitors, customers and 
suppliers, and entry conditions in each of the markets in which the 
merging parties operates. This information is required even for 
transactions that pose few or no competition issues’.194  
 
A key objective of the best practices in this area is to minimise the notification 
burden for merging firms; jurisdictions should only require information in a 
notification that is necessary to determine whether the proposed merger would 
pose serious antitrust concerns meriting a more detailed review. If the information 
in the initial notification suggested to the reviewing authority that a more detailed 
review was merited, then obviously a more onerous level of information would 
subsequently be required from the parties.195 The ICN recommended practices 
also suggest alternative notification formats, depending upon whether the merger 
transaction appears to represent ‘material competition concerns’,196 this appears to 
suggest a possible way of significantly minimising the notification burden (and 
antitrust authority resources) for mergers that are clearly pro-competitive or 
competitively-neutral. Indeed the Form CO and Short Form used by DG Comp at 
the European Commission197 exemplifies such an approach, although at least 17 
ICN jurisdictions do not provide for such flexibility in notifications depending 
                                                 
194 Chapter 3 of the ICPAC Final Report (February 2000). 
195 ICN recommended practices, op. cit. note 141, at V: Requirements for initial notification. Also see the 
MSG best practices, op.cit. note 132, at I(9) and (10). 
196 Ibid. at V.B: Comment 2. 
197 See Annex I and II of Commission Regulation (EC) No.802/2004 implementing Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 139/2004, [2004] O.J. L133/1. 
 303
upon the anticipated level of antitrust concern.198 The ICPAC final report and 
multilateral best practice recommendations concerning ‘form-filing requirements’ 
are closely tied to recommendations regarding the merger review process in 
general, e.g. the recommended level of information at the notification stage is 
premised upon jurisdictions having a two-phase approach to merger review. 
Further multilateral recommendations concerning the merger investigation and 
analysis stage will be considered at 5.5.4 below. 
 
e) Many jurisdictions require merging firms to pay filing fees upon the 
submission of a pre-merger notification. Jurisdictions vary widely regarding filing 
fees, with many having no such requirement,199 but it is common practice among 
those imposing fees to adopt a progressive system whereby the fee depends upon 
the size of the merger.200 While filing fees tend to impose a small cost to the 
merging parties relative to the overall scale of the merger and the costs incurred 
through time delays resulting from multi-jurisdictional merger review,201 it is 
                                                 
198 ICN Implementation Report, op. cit. note 167, at RP V: Requirements for Initial Notification. 
199 As an example, the European Commission does not charge filing fees for merger notifications under 
Article 4 of the ECMR (Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] O.J. L24/1), also see Commission Regulation (EC) 
No.802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004, [2004] O.J. L133/1. 
200 The UK and US are leading examples. Pre-merger notifications in the UK under the Enterprise Act 
2002, and in the US in accordance with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (§7A of 
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C 18a) both have a progressive system of fees. In the UK, there are three levels of 
filing fees depending upon the turnover of the acquired undertaking (see OFT Notice, Merger fee 
information, February 2006). There are also three levels of fees in the US, yet the categories are linked to 
the aggregate value of assets that would be held by the merged entity (see the instructions to the Antitrust 
Improvements Act Notification and Report Form for Certain Mergers and Acquisitions, available on the 
FTC website at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsr.htm). 
201 It has been suggested that notification filing fees on average account for 19% of the total external costs 
encountered by merging firms during multi-jurisdictional merger review, ICN Report on the costs and 
burdens of multijurisdctional merger review, November 2004, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/costburd.pdf. Also see the suggestion 
that, on average, external costs amount to 0.11% of the overall transaction value, Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
survey (commissioned by the International and American Bar Associations), A tax on mergers? Surveying 
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nonetheless a facet of pre-merger notification that has been considered by 
multilateral fora. The MSG best practices are unique in arguing against filing fees, 
suggesting that as merger review should ultimately benefit consumers, review 
costs are more appropriately ‘borne by the public treasury’.202 As the merger 
streamlining group was funded by leading international companies, this is not a 
surprising view. The ICN produced a report on merger notification filing fees in 
2005203 and it is notable for its lack of recommended practices. The report is 
essentially a restatement of the diverging practices of ICN members in this area. 
Nonetheless, there is implicit recognition of the rationale for requiring filing fees 
in order to recoup part of the cost of undertaking a merger review, albeit in 2005 
the majority of ICN members with a notification system did not charge a fee 
(although many were considering introducing one).204 The BIAC/ICC best 
practices likely provide the most accurate guide as to current international 
consensus regarding appropriate pre-merger notification merger filing fees. The 
best practices accept the legitimacy of filing fees, but detail a variety of 
safeguards to ensure that the fee only covers the cost of the merger review and is 
not an arbitrary means of levying charges upon large companies.205 These best 
practices also indicate that whilst fees can vary depending upon the size of the 
merger (presumably to reflect the complexity and cost of conducting a merger 
review), antitrust authorities’ budgets and funding should not be directly linked to 
                                                                                                                                                 
the time and costs to business of multi-jurisdictional merger reviews, June 2003. PWC survey available at: 
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/gcfpaper.htm.  
202 MSG best practices, op.cit. note 132, at I(8). 
203 Merger Notification Filing Fees: A report of the International Competition Network, April 2005. 
Available at: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/filing_fees_rpt.pdf.  
204 42 of 73 jurisdictions did not charge a filing fee in 2005 according to the ICN filing fees report, ibid. at 
p.2. 
205 BIAC/ICC best practices, op. cit. note 134, at 2.1.5.6. 
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the sum received through pre-merger notifications.206 Given that the revenue from 
filing fees in 2003 was in excess of $110 million in the US alone,207 there is 
potential to manipulate such a system to the detriment of the merging firms. There 
clearly exists a large divergence in international merger control as to whether 
jurisdictions impose filing fees, and if so, there are many different methods used 
to determine the amount due. Yet it is equally clear that the business community 
considers such fees to be ‘part of doing business’, and provided the fees are 
reasonable and antitrust authorities do not have a financial incentive to receive 
more notifications, it is arguable that there is no pressing need for extensive 
convergence or harmonisation in this area. 
 
5.5.4 Multilateral efforts aimed at achieving convergence regarding merger 
investigation and analysis address both procedural and substantive issues. 
Recommendations seeking to bring about convergence regarding investigation 
and review seek to adhere to the principles discussed at 5.5.2, whilst also building 
upon best practices regarding notification discussed at 5.5.3, and further laying 
the foundation for recommendations regarding coordinated remedies, discussed at 
5.5.5 below. Overlap between these different stages/issues is inevitable given the 
international convergence towards a coherent set of principles and practices for 
merger review. Additionally, many of the initiatives aimed at achieving 
substantive convergence are supported by antitrust advocacy and capacity 
                                                 
206 Ibid. 
207 ICN filing fees report, op. cit. note 203, at Appendix D. 
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building programmes as well as general roundtable discussions run by the OECD, 
ICN and other multilateral fora, some of which were discussed supra at 4.4.  
 
The procedural aspects of merger investigations and analyses primarily concern 
the length of merger review periods and whether there are strict deadlines, 
although a key distinction between merger control regimes, relevant to this 
discussion, is whether a one or two phase review process is adopted. The 
implementation of several of the guiding principles, namely procedural fairness, 
transparency and efficient, timely and effective review, are also relevant 
considerations. The best practices generally recommend that merger control 
regimes adopt a two-phase merger review process, with reviews entering the 
second phase if there are antitrust concerns regarding the merger at the end of an 
initial investigative stage.208 The adoption of a two-phase process has many 
benefits, particularly for the merging parties, as the ‘form-filing requirements’ at 
the notification stage can be less burdensome because further information can be 
sought at the beginning of the second phase if necessary.209 Indeed it appears that 
on average only 10% of notified mergers tend to progress to a second phase 
review, although the percentage is 4% in the US.210 The end of the first phase also 
                                                 
208 See the BIAC/ICC best practices, op. cit. note 134, at 2.1.5.1, the MSG best practices, op.cit. note 132, 
at I(7), and the ICN recommended practices, op. cit. note 141, at IV: B. 
209 The US second request has an international reputation for being extraordinarily burdensome, see 
comments by W.J. Baer before the US Antitrust Modernization Commission on 17 November 2005 
(http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings/merger_enforcement.htm). Although note that the FTC and 
DOJ have implemented reforms to reduce the burden of second requests, see the FTC document, Reforms 
to the merger review process, announced on 16 February 2006 by D.P. Majoras, Chairman of the FTC, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/02/mergerreviewprocess.pdf. Also see N.R. Koberstein and J.J. 
Hegarty, ‘US Antitrust Law: Enforcement of Laws Governing Mergers and Acquisitions’ [2003] 2 Comp 
Law J 361, where they state that second requests are ‘extraordinarily burdensome’, at 366. 
210 See the ICN filing fees report, op. cit. note 203, at Appendix D. 
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presents an opportunity to ensure that there is adequate procedural fairness by 
affording the merging parties the right to be heard. Perhaps the most advantageous 
aspect of a two phase review process is that many pro-competitive and 
competitively-neutral mergers should be cleared at the end of phase one, without 
being subjected to the significant burden of a full merger review, hence this would 
appear to be 90% of notified transactions, on average. In spite of the convergence 
upon a two phase process for merger review, the ICN implementation survey 
identified 13 jurisdictions that currently adopt a one phase merger review 
process.211 The divergence has obvious implications for the ability of antitrust 
authorities to cooperate and coordinate investigations in multi-jurisdictional 
reviews. The ICN best practices do not state what the length of merger reviews 
should be, but recommend that those jurisdictions adopting a two-stage review 
process should complete the first phase review after a specified and transparent 
period, and the second phase should be completed in a ‘determinable time 
frame’.212 The BIAC/ICC best practices are more explicit and recommend that the 
first phase of merger review should ‘conclude within 30 days of the initial 
filing’,213 and there should be a ‘maximum phase II review period of 4 months’.214 
The MSG best practices mirror these recommendations and also suggest allowing 
parties to ‘stop the clock’ in merger review.215 In spite of the apparent general 
consensus, the ICN implementation survey identified five jurisdictions whereby 
the initial phase of merger review lasted for longer than six weeks (which is 
                                                 
211 ICN Implementation Report, op. cit. note 167, at RP IV: Review Periods. 
212 ICN recommended practices, op. cit. note 141, at IV: C and D, and VI: D. 
213 BIAC/ICC best practices, op. cit. note 134, at 2.1.5.2(2). 
214 Ibid. at 2.1.5.2(3). 
215 MSG best practices, op.cit. note 132, at I(13)-(16). 
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comparable to the 30 day recommendation, assuming the ‘days’ are ‘working 
days’ as is normally the case), and identified at least three jurisdictions where it 
was not possible to complete a merger review, involving a second phase, within 6 
months from the date of notification.216 These best practices highlight that there is 
a growing international convergence upon reasonable time frames for the first and 
second phases of merger review, but a lot of divergence nonetheless exists.  
 
The substantive aspects of merger investigations and analyses are unlikely to 
affect the ability of antitrust authorities to engage in basic cooperation and 
coordination in multi-jurisdictional merger review, yet extensive cooperation 
regarding assessment of relevant markets and competitive harm and will not be 
possible without substantive convergence being achieved on these issues. 
Substantive convergence is crucial to diminish the risk of conflict in international 
merger control, and the primary objective of the international antitrust dialogue is 
in jeopardy unless there is progress towards substantive convergence. The 
multilateral efforts at convergence in this area have mainly focused upon opening 
up a multilateral dialogue on substantive issues affecting the investigation and 
analysis stage of merger review, hence promoting convergence through discussion 
and antitrust advocacy, rather than prescribed sets of best practices. The ICN 
merger working group217 and OECD roundtable discussions218 have focused on 
                                                 
216 Ibid. note 211. 
217 See the ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook, April 2006, available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_5th_capetown_2006/ICNMerge
rGuidelinesWorkbook.pdf.  
218 See the OECD Roundtable on Competition Policy, Substantive Criteria Used for the Assessment of 
Mergers, 11 February 2003 (DAFFE/COMP(2003)5). Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/3/2500227.pdf.  
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issues such as investigative techniques (role of the counterfactual, and measures 
of concentration in the market), conceptual thinking (including role of efficiencies 
and theories of competitive harm), and assessment of respective merits of the 
differing legal tests for merger review (i.e. the dominance test, significant 
impediment to effective competition test, the substantial lessening of competition 
test, and variations thereof, possibly including a public interest test). While the 
multilateral activities in this area appear somewhat limited, convergence on the 
substantive issues is undoubtedly occurring at an international level, as evinced by 
the discussion of the EC – US bilateral relationship supra at 5.4. Furthermore, 
antitrust advocacy is assisting in ensuring that developing antitrust authorities are 
making use of the examples provided by the mature authorities, taking the 
experience and expertise of the latter into account when drafting and applying 
their own embryonic regimes.219 In any case, it is highly unlikely that 
convergence of substantive issues, to the point of harmonisation, is necessary in 
order to ensure that international merger control conforms with the primary 
objective. To recommend significant international convergence in all facets of 
merger control would surely move beyond the identified objective of supporting 
and supplementing trade liberalisation, and drift towards the more audacious 
objective of an international merger control regime, which several commentators 
support.220
 
                                                 
219 See discussion supra at 4.3, 4.4.3, and 4.4.4. 
220 See discussion in, inter alia, J. Wilson, op. cit. note 39. 
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In light of remaining divergence between jurisdictions regarding procedural 
matters in merger review (apparent from the foregoing discussion and 5.5.3), it is 
perhaps clear as to why cooperation and coordination of concurrent merger 
reviews is only likely to proceed on a bilateral basis between comparable 
authorities. Detailed coordination and cooperation in merger review is far more 
difficult to undertake at a multilateral than bilateral level. Significantly, there are 
also likely to be ‘diminishing returns’ for antitrust authorities engaging in 
multilateral cooperation regarding concurrent merger reviews.221 Cooperation at a 
bilateral level between comparable antitrust authorities, conducting concurrent 
reviews of the same transaction, could produce many direct benefits for the 
reviewing authorities, such as: improving information gathering; developing a 
better understanding of the transaction and its effects upon the market (as well as 
developing a better understanding of a counterpart’s view of substantive issues); 
and identifying suitable remedies. Nonetheless, there are unlikely to be additional 
benefits reaped with each additional authority engaging in the cooperation and 
coordination, and as multilateral cooperation would be more resource intensive, 
the rationale for such idealist levels of cooperation, from an antitrust authority’s 
perspective at least, soon disappears. Cases ostensibly involving cooperation 
between three and four different antitrust authorities were discussed supra at 5.4, 
yet the discussion highlighted that extensive cooperation and coordination is only 
likely to take place at a bilateral level. Trilateral and multilateral cooperation was 
either at a very basic level (e.g. early notification of the merger investigation from 
                                                 
221 See discussion above at 5.4.5, the term ‘diminishing returns’ was used in this context by an antitrust 
official during an interview as part of independent research, see note 57. 
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one authority to the other and some three-way conference calls) or was extensive 
bilateral cooperation, supplemented by further jurisdictions adopting a deferential 
approach to multi-jurisdictional merger review. 
 
It is perhaps noteworthy at this stage that there is no detailed guidance or best 
practice recommendations dealing with the circumstances of when a reviewing 
authority should enter into extensive cooperation/coordination with counterparts 
conducting a concurrent merger review. There are general principles outlined in 
multilateral best practices as to considerations during cooperation and 
coordination,222 and there are certain specified cooperation triggers, and types of 
cooperation and coordination outlined in many bilateral antitrust cooperation 
agreements.223 However, there are no detailed guidelines specifying when 
antitrust authorities should engage in bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation/coordination in respect of a multi-jurisdiction merger review, and 
what factors should be taken into account when reaching such a decision. 
 
5.5.5 The multilateral efforts aimed at achieving convergence with regard to merger 
remedies take a similar form to efforts regarding merger investigation and 
analysis in that the issue of merger remedies has also been the subject of OECD 
roundtable discussions.224 There appears to be an international consensus on 
certain key principles regarding the proper role of remedies in merger control, 
                                                 
222 As an example see the ICN recommended practices, op. cit. note 141, at X: Interagency Coordination. 
223 See discussion supra in chapter 3. 
224 See the OECD Roundtable on Competition Policy, Merger Remedies, 23 December 2004 
(DAF/COMP(2004)21). Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/34305995.pdf.  
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these key principles have been identified by the OECD roundtable discussions as 
well as multilateral best practices. The OECD and ICN key principles225 regarding 
merger remedies are consistent, albeit the OECD principles are espoused with 
greater clarity and detail than the ICN principles, perhaps surprising given the 
ICN’s more detailed work in other areas of merger control. Although it should be 
remembered that the OECD membership has greater commonality, and thus it 
may be more able to reach a consensus on certain issues than the ICN. The OECD 
principles initially consider the proper role of remedies, and state that they should 
only be considered by the reviewing authority once a ‘threat to competition has 
been identified’.226 Furthermore, the roundtable discussion suggested that the 
principle of proportionality should be applied, such that remedies should be the 
‘least restrictive means to effectively eliminate’ the identified antitrust 
concerns.227 Additionally, remedies should not be used to advance non-antitrust 
concerns, such as furthering industrial policy considerations, and antitrust 
authorities must have a flexible and creative approach in ‘devising’ remedies.228 
The consensus within the OECD regarding the unsuitability of using remedies to 
further non-antitrust policies is significant as divergence on this point would make 
cooperation between reviewing authorities very difficult. However, it would likely 
be of greater significance to have such a principle endorsed via the ICN, where 
there is a far more diverse membership. The OECD roundtable also acknowledges 
that antitrust authorities generally prefer imposing structural, rather than 
                                                 
225 ICN recommended practices, op. cit. note 141, at XI: Remedies. 
226 OECD Roundtable on Merger Remedies, op. cit. note 224, at the Executive Summary at (1)(i). 
227 Ibid. at (1)(ii). 
228 Ibid. at (1)(iii) and (iv). 
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behavioural remedies, but recommends that the latter type should nonetheless be 
considered, albeit regularly reviewed, if appropriate.229 Finally the roundtable 
emphasises the importance of antitrust authorities coordinating remedies in multi-
jurisdictional merger review, even in spite of any procedural and/or substantive 
differences, so to avoid inconsistencies and possible conflict.230  
 
The principles regarding merger remedies within the ICN recommended practices 
complement the OECD principles, and appear more concerned with the process of 
identifying and implementing suitable remedies. Initially the principles highlight 
the need to ensure the causal connection between the identified antitrust concern 
and the remedy that is being proposed by the antitrust authority, but then address 
the issue of transparency and procedural fairness, so as to facilitate discussion 
with the merging parties when devising suitable remedies.231 Regarding 
implementation of remedies, the ICN principles suggest that remedies should not 
require ‘significant administrative intervention’ post-merger,232 which would 
suggest a favouring of structural remedies as acknowledged within the OECD 
principles. The ICN principles also highlight the need for an effective monitoring 
mechanism of compliance post-merger, and suggest that antitrust authorities 
should have appropriate resources and powers for the monitoring and possible 
alteration of remedies, as well as the capability to enforce the remedies through 
                                                 
229 Ibid. at (2) – (5). 
230 Ibid. at (6). 
231 ICN recommended practices, op. cit. note 141, at XI.A and B. 
232 Ibid. at XI.C: Comment 1. 
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the judicial process.233 As with the OECD principles, the ICN principles 
recommend cooperation regarding remedies between authorities conducting 
concurrent reviews of the same transaction, so as to avoid inconsistent results. 
Furthermore, the ICN principles propose that reviewing authorities coordinate 
post-merger compliance with measures such as common trustees and harmonised 
reporting requirements – which would be in the interests of effective and efficient 
enforcement as well as being in the parties’ best interests.234
 
 
5.6 Assessing the international merger control framework against the primary 
objective 
 
5.6.1 In assessing whether the current merger control framework unduly hinders the 
pursuit of the primary objective, i.e. to support and supplement trade 
liberalisation, (and thereby creates something of a paradox for international 
merger control) it is beneficial, and indeed crucial, to consider the impact of the 
current framework upon merging parties. As discussed at 5.2.1, it is unnecessary 
to demonstrate that the current framework is actually inhibiting M&A, but 
sufficient that international merger control could operate more effectively and 
efficiently for the benefit of merging parties. The key concern must be that 
international merger control is currently imposing unduly burdensome 
requirements upon pro-competitive and competitively-neutral M&As, perhaps by 
stifling or delaying such mergers, thereby hindering the pursuit of the primary 
                                                 
233 Ibid. at XI.D. 
234 Ibid. at X.E. 
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objective. Thus, if the international merger control framework could be 
streamlined to be more effective and efficient, for the benefit of all but anti-
competitive mergers, then it would better facilitate the primary objective. Kolasky 
has commented that: 
‘As cross-border trade and investment grows, and as more and more 
jurisdictions enact antitrust laws, it becomes all the more critical that 
antitrust agencies impose no unnecessary bureaucratic roadblocks on the 
merger process and that antitrust authorities worldwide continue to 
achieve greater convergence’.235
 
The elements of multi-jurisdictional merger review, in the current framework, that 
impose a particular burden upon the merging parties are likely implicit from the 
discussion supra at 5.5. Nonetheless it is helpful to elucidate upon some of the 
key issues at this point. 
 
5.6.2 The burden imposed upon merging parties as a result of multi-jurisdictional 
merger review results in additional ‘costs’ being borne by the parties in terms of: 
working time devoted to gaining antitrust approval; direct pecuniary costs 
incurred; and crucially the implications of the delay and legal uncertainty arising 
from the review process (i.e. costs resulting from lost merger synergies arising as 
a result of the delay, particularly relevant when jurisdictions prohibit ‘closing’ 
pending a completed merger review).236 Costs associated with each of these 
categories will vary depending upon the stage of the merger review process. Costs 
tend to heighten at particular points in the process, such as at the actual point of 
                                                 
235 Speech by W. Kolasky, op. cit. note 30. 
236 See the Pricewaterhouse Coopers survey and ICN report on the costs and burdens of multi-jurisdictional 
merger review, op. cit. note 201. 
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submitting pre-merger notification, and if a second phase merger investigation is 
initiated, requiring further information and market analysis from the parties by the 
antitrust authorities. The seminal Pricewaterhouse Coopers survey on the costs 
involved in multi-jurisdictional merger review (‘the PWC survey’), suggested that 
the burden imposed upon firms represents ‘a relatively small, [0.11%] regressive 
tax on mergers’, and noted that ‘while merger review costs do represent a 
substantial proportion of the overall costs of a merger, they do not amount to a 
significant tax on the overall value of deals.’237 Nonetheless, as Rowley and 
Campbell have argued: 
‘Some officials and [practitioners] have focused on survey responses 
which indicated that merger review costs were a small fraction of deal 
value and that they have not deterred subsequent transactions. This misses 
the point: unnecessary inefficiency is a serious policy concern precisely 
because the costs are borne by businesses that have no alternative to avoid 
such regulatory processes’.238
 
‘Unnecessary inefficiency’ suggests the existence of an unduly burdensome 
international merger control framework that would likely hinder those 
transactions capable of achieving the benefits sought by the primary objective.  
 
In its November 2004 report, the ICN sought to build upon the PWC survey by 
identifying four categories of ‘unnecessary costs’ that merging firms encounter in 
multi-jurisdictional merger review.239 The four categories are:  
‘i) ascertaining notification and filing requirements;  
                                                 
237 Op. cit. note 201, at p.42. 
238 J.W. Rowley and A.N. Campbell, ‘A Comment on the Estimated Costs of Multi-Jurisdictional Merger 
Reviews’ September 2003 The Antitrust Source at p.3. 
239 ICN report on the costs and burdens of multi-jurisdictional merger review, op. cit. note 201, at pp.2, 9 – 
18. 
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ii) complying with notification requirements for transactions lacking an 
appreciable nexus to the notified jurisdiction;  
iii) complying with unduly burdensome filing requirements; and  
iv) unnecessary delays in the merger filing and review process.’ 
  
As is clear from discussion supra at 5.5, multilateral initiatives are attempting to 
address each of these issues (and other costs not stated). In order to counter the 
issues at i), the ICN has inter alia, encouraged the implementation of: the 
principle of transparency; the use of objective pre-merger notification thresholds; 
and pre-notification contact between the merging parties and reviewing authorities 
on an informal basis. In response to ii), there are ongoing efforts aimed at 
achieving convergence on notification thresholds, including ensuring that mergers 
have a sufficiently proximate nexus to the reviewing jurisdiction. The growing 
consensus upon a two-phase merger review process should reduce the information 
required at the pre-merger notification stage, which alongside convergence on the 
type of information required at the form filing stage should reduce the 
‘unnecessary costs’ of ii) and iii). The ICN has also encouraged flexibility with 
regards to the ‘form-filing’ requirements of pre-merger notification, and this 
should also address the concerns regarding burdensome filing requirements. 
Convergence regarding procedural time limits, and extensive cooperation, 
including information-sharing between antitrust authorities, should alleviate the 
implications of unnecessary delays in the review process.  
 
In addition to the efforts briefly discussed above, it must be considered whether i) 
and ii) really are significant ‘unnecessary costs’ for merging parties. Many 
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practitioners suggest that the costs incurred while determining the jurisdictions 
where notification is required, should not be exaggerated and is manageable by 
most experienced law firms.240 Law firms must establish and maintain 
international links with antitrust authorities and ‘local’ counsel in order to offer 
antitrust expertise to clients, and would generally keep track of notification filing 
requirements as part of this process/service. Notification requirements and 
thresholds are widely known and discussed openly in practitioner-orientated 
publications, irrespective of whether a jurisdiction adopts objective or subjective 
thresholds.241 Many firms maintain a database with up-to-date notes on merger 
control regimes worldwide. Obviously the cost of maintaining such a networking 
‘service’, will directly or indirectly be passed onto clients, i.e. the merging firms, 
yet such links are unlikely to become redundant even if there were harmonised 
notification thresholds. Legal counsel consider it important to build a rapport with 
antitrust officials, and maintaining links with local counsel can be important to 
help address translation requirements and for other practical reasons. In short, the 
cost of ‘ascertaining notification and filing requirements’ in multi-jurisdictional 
merger review is clearly an ‘unnecessary cost’. Nonetheless, the actual costs 
incurred may not be as significant as first thought, in light of the proactive 
response of law firms in addressing this issue in the course of maintaining 
relationships and links with many antitrust authorities and local counsel. 
Regarding the issue of ‘complying with notification requirements for transactions 
lacking an appreciable nexus to the notified jurisdiction’ at ii) above, there are 
                                                 
240 This was a commonly held view and expressed to the author in the course of interviews during 
independent empirical-based research, see note 57 supra. But see, e.g., comments made by Baer (infra). 
241 Ibid. and see e.g. the Global Competition Review, Antitrust Source and in-house law firm publications. 
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also clear signs that most experienced law firms ‘manage’ this issue. There is 
strong anecdotal evidence to suggest some form of risk assessment takes place in 
determining where pre-merger notifications are submitted,242 this could clearly 
result in not notifying jurisdictions unless parties have ‘assets on the ground’, 
irrespective of whether notification is legally required. There are many 
commercial considerations involved in determining where to submit pre-merger 
notifications, it is not limited to being a legal assessment.243 In short, jurisdictions 
with notification requirements for mergers which lack a proximate nexus clearly 
impose an unnecessary cost upon merging parties, but it cannot be assumed that 
all M&A notify every jurisdiction where filing is required. Achieving 
convergence on this issue however, to the point where filing could only be 
required if a sufficiently proximate nexus existed, would remove a great deal of 
the risk in such a ‘risk assessment’. 
 
In addition to the ‘unnecessary costs’ identified by the ICN, which focus upon 
pre-merger notification, many other features of the current international merger 
control framework impose a significant burden upon the merging parties. Costs 
incurred as a result of substantive divergence are considered to be particularly 
burdensome, thus requiring different analyses to be undertaken on the part of the 
merging parties, and increasing the likelihood of divergent (and possibly 
                                                 
242 Ibid. and also note that in spite of their being c.73 jurisdictions with ex ante pre-merger notification 
systems (see supra at 5.3.1) and many with low notification thresholds, large multinational M&As only 
submit eight pre-merger filings, on average (see the PWC survey, op. cit. note 201). 
243 Note that there can also be strategic reasons for the timing and location of pre-merger filings. Such a 
strategy, which determines the timing and order of multi-jurisdictional pre-merger notifications according 
to the perceived best interests , although such a strategy has its pitfalls, and is commonly advised against, 
see discussion supra at 5.4.3 regarding the Solvay/Ausimont case. 
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conflicting) outcomes by reviewing authorities.244 A leading antitrust practitioner, 
William Baer, has commented: 
‘It is tough enough today determining where, when and how a transaction 
must be notified in the roughly sixty nations with some notice 
requirement. But it is much worse to have fundamental differences in the 
analytics and the outcome. That uncertainty potentially discourages 
otherwise pro-competitive and efficiency enhancing M&A activity’.245
 
In addition to the particular features of multi-jurisdictional merger review 
highlighted above, and in light of the discussion throughout this chapter, it is 
apparent that many facets of the current international merger control framework 
operate with ‘unnecessary inefficiency’,246 and therefore impose unnecessary or 
unduly burdensome requirements upon merging parties. Thus international merger 
control is in a paradoxical position, it aims to support and supplement trade 
liberalisation, yet it inhibits that objective by imposing unduly burdensome 
requirements upon international M&As. 
 
5.6.3 The most obvious and often recommended solution to the deficiencies of the 
current international merger control framework, is to create an international 
merger control regime (IMCR) of a supranational nature, which would 
complement the current framework. The exact form of the IMCR varies among its 
proponents, but there are generally three modes into which most proposals would 
fit. The first mode focuses upon pre-merger notification and would harmonise 
                                                 
244 These costs were not identified by the ICN in the list provided at 5.6.2, as they are not considered to be 
‘unnecessary costs’. 
245 Testimony of W.J. Baer before the US Antitrust Modernization Commission, 17 November 2005, 
available at http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings/merger_enforcement.htm. 
246 Op. cit. note 238. 
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procedural rules at the notification stage of merger review, and place some of the 
operational responsibilities under an international body. This mode is often 
thought of as a common pre-merger notification ‘clearing house’,247 and national 
authorities would retain investigative and substantive merger review 
responsibilities. The second mode for an IMCR involves a harmonised set of 
substantive antitrust principles to which national antitrust regimes must adhere or 
converge towards. The second mode also generally, but not universally, involves 
the proposal to have a dispute settlement mechanism to deal with jurisdictional 
conflict. Most advocates of the second mode tend to suggest the WTO as the most 
appropriate forum given its experience and recognition as an impartial dispute 
settlement body.248 The third mode is the most unlikely to come into being, and is 
essentially a combination of the first and second modes, combining the 
substantive harmonisation of key principles, with a common pre-merger 
                                                 
247 Eleanor Fox has consistently advocated in favour of harmonisation at the pre-merger notification stage, 
in the form of a ‘disinterested common clearinghouse’, although it would perhaps be wrong to describe the 
proposed international body as a supranational entity. See the testimony of E.M. Fox before the US 
Antitrust Modernization Commission on 15 February 2006, available at: 
http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings/international_antitrust.htm. Also see Annex 1-A of the ICPAC 
Final Report (2000): Separate Statement of Advisory Committee Member Eleanor M. Fox, as well as 
footnote 24 of chapter 3, available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/icpac.htm. Additionally, Andre 
Fiebig’s proposals essentially fall into the first mode, by suggesting a ‘Premerger Office’ be created and 
operate under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation. Fiebig proposes that the WTO Premerger 
Office would act as a filter to avoid antitrust authorities seizing jurisdiction without a sufficiently proximate 
nexus to the merger. It would operate on the basis of voluntary notifications by merging parties, which 
would identify the jurisdictions requiring notification, after which the Premerger Office would remove the 
notification requirement for jurisdictions without a proximate nexus.  See A. Fiebig, ‘A Role for the WTO 
in International Merger Control’ (2000) 20 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 234. 
248 See e.g. B. Zanettin, op. cit. note 46, and M.M. Dabbah, op. cit. note 90. In chapter 10, Dabbah argues in 
favour of a Global Antitrust Framework (GAF) that would eventually include a dispute settlement 
mechanism, although significantly this would review differences between signatories in general terms, but 
not engage in case-by-case disputes. Also see the proposals by Martyn Taylor for the conclusion of a 
plurilateral antitrust agreement under the auspices of the WTO, which would initially be of a soft law 
nature and encourage convergence  in key areas (as opposed to complete harmonisation),  in M. Taylor, 
International Competition Law: A New Dimension for the WTO?, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
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notification system, both under the auspices of a supranational institutional 
framework.249  
 It is unnecessary to engage in a detailed critique of the various IMCR proposals as 
the arguments are longstanding and have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere.250 
It is sufficient to consider whether an IMCR would reform international merger 
control so as to further advance the primary objective. Proponents of an IMCR 
present convincing arguments as to why global consumer welfare would be 
advanced with the implementation of such harmonisation. Nonetheless it is far 
from certain that an IMCR, particularly the third mode, would reduce the burden 
of multi-jurisdictional merger review for merging parties. It is equally uncertain 
therefore, and perhaps doubtful, whether an IMCR would move international 
merger control any closer to conforming to the primary objective. Widely 
diverging political views on the acceptable aims and objectives for antitrust 
regimes have, when combined with other factors, derailed all previous attempts to 
agree upon a multilateral antitrust agreement. It is difficult to envisage the 
political willingness that would be necessary to bring about some of the more 
ambitious IMCR proposals at any point in the short or medium-term future, 
particularly as some proposals involve a clear transfer of sovereignty. The third 
mode would involve the largest transfer of competence from individual states to 
the IMCR, due to the creation of a supranational antitrust body.  
                                                 
249 For example, see the proposals of the ‘Munich Group’ for the creation of an International Antitrust 
Authority alongside an International Antitrust Code, ‘A Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-
MTO Plurilateral Trade Agreement’, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.1628 (Special Supp. 19 
August 1993), and commentary within J. Wilson, op. cit. note 39, at pp.253-258. Also see the proposals by 
J. Wilson, at chapter 8, for a ‘WTO Competition Office’ that would run parallel to the current international 
merger control framework; receiving pre-merger notifications and assist in the identification of a ‘lead 
authority’ and settle disputes. 
250 See e.g. J. Wilson, op. cit. note 39. 
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 There are many difficulties encountered by IMCR proposals in addition to the 
lack of political support. Crucially an IMCR would need to secure the confidence 
of national/regional antitrust authorities, in addition to the confidence of merging 
parties themselves. Confidence would stem from: the IMCR having sufficient 
expertise; staff with adequate experience; and there would have to be a 
transparent, predictable and efficient division of competence identifying when 
national/regional merger control regimes would operate independently, and when 
the IMCR would operate. These considerations are relevant to all three modes 
identified, although they become more pressing as the role of the IMCR becomes 
more substantive. A particular difficulty that the second and third modes would 
likely encounter, is the need to ensure confidentiality of commercial information 
following a pre-merger notification by merging parties. Independent research 
highlighted that a key concern on the part of merging parties would be that an 
IMCR in the form of (or including) a common notification system would likely 
require a large amount of information at the pre-notification stage, in order to 
satisfy the notification requirements of multiple jurisdictions.251 Furthermore, the 
merging parties would likely have less control over that information than under 
the current decentralised framework, where parties retain the ability to decide 
where to notify, and whether the information can be shared with other 
jurisdictions (i.e. the confidentiality waiver).  
 
                                                 
251 Op. cit note 57. 
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The multilateral fora involved in international merger control (i.e. the ICN and 
OECD) appear to have achieved a degree of convergence upon key principles for 
merger control as advocated by the second form of IMCR. Nonetheless these 
principles are not legally binding upon jurisdictions and are not subject to a 
dispute settlement mechanism in the event of conflict. The stalled efforts at 
negotiating a basic WTO agreement on competition law would present the most 
likely route for furthering proposals in the form of the second mode of IMCR. It is 
equally likely however, that the substantive principles applicable to merger 
control will remain on a ‘soft law’ basis for the foreseeable future – advanced 
through the OECD and ICN. Advocates in favour of the first mode of a possible 
IMCR, notably Eleanor Fox, received a recent boost when the US Antitrust 
Modernization Commission endorsed a ‘common premerger notification system 
across countries that would reduce the burden associated with multiple filings’ 
within its final recommendations to the US Congress.252 The AMC suggested 
there should be ‘an opportunity for companies to provide a single, simple initial 
submission for use by all jurisdictions’ and stated that ‘further steps toward a 
common system would be valuable and should be feasible’. It suggested that the 
FTC and DOJ should evaluate the potential for such a system and report promptly 
to the US congress.253 In order to have a common pre-notification system, there 
must be extensive convergence between jurisdictions on underlying procedural 
and substantive issues, so that the information supplied in the common 
notification is sufficient for each jurisdiction to carry out a preliminary 
                                                 
252 Antitrust Modernization Commission Final Report (April 2007) at p.217, available at: www.amc.gov.  
253 Ibid. 
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investigation.254 Paradoxically, radical proposals for a common pre-merger 
notification ‘clearinghouse’, which assumes the notification responsibilities of 
national merger control regime, is politically infeasible, and yet it is likely that 
only a radical proposal would actually produce benefits for the merging parties, 
and advance the primary objective. A common clearinghouse is more likely to be 
politically acceptable if it provides for voluntary notification, allows national 
antitrust authorities to seek further information if necessary, and enables 
jurisdictions to conduct merger reviews when important ‘national interests’ are 
affected. There is a clear danger that a weakened form of the common 
clearinghouse would act as a further layer of bureaucracy for merging parties and 
may have the same fate as that of the common British, French and German filing 
form.255 Hence, while this form of IMCR appears to offer efficiencies for the 
merging parties and reviewing jurisdictions, if a weak form were to be 
implemented it could actually offer merging parties an inefficient and ineffective 
means of achieving merger clearance within the respective jurisdictions. 
 
There is the additional question of whether a dispute settlement mechanism, in the 
form of that often suggested in the second mode of IMCR, is necessary in order to 
ensure international merger control operates to advance the primary objective. It 
is axiomatic that a conflict between jurisdictions where a particular merger is 
cleared by at least one and prohibited by another, as in the GE/Honeywell case,256 
represents the most severe form of system friction and inhibits M&A. The desire 
                                                 
254 See discussion supra at 5.5.3 and 5.5.4. 
255 Supra at 5.5.3 (d). 
256 Op. cit. note 1. 
 326
to minimise the risk of conflicting decisions underlines much of the bilateral and 
multilateral convergence efforts in this area. Nonetheless, it must be considered 
whether eliminating the risk of conflicting decisions, or merely minimising that 
risk is necessary in order to conform with the primary objective. Certainly, from 
the merging parties’ perspective, a dispute settlement mechanism is unlikely to 
offer a practical means of overturning a prohibition decision and consummating 
the merger. Time delays in reaching the dispute settlement body (e.g. consider the 
lengthy appellate procedure from European Commission decisions) would likely 
lead to the abandonment of the transaction in any case, and the legal uncertainty 
that would stem from an additional appellate route could actually be detrimental 
to both merging and third parties. Hence, the value of decisions on specific cases 
would likely be limited to encouraging antitrust authorities to avoid conflicting 
decisions in the future. Arguably, this outcome is already being achieved by 
means of multilateral convergence efforts and peer review systems. If a dispute 
settlement mechanism were to become politically viable, it would likely be most 
effective in the form suggested by Taylor,257 whereby points of divergence are 
resolved by reference to international standards, but case-by-case reviews are not 
possible. Regarding conflicting decisions, unless a global standard is adopted for 
merger review, it is logical and legitimate for antitrust authorities to review 
mergers in accordance with the domestic legal standard, and on the basis of 
predicted effects (in an ex ante regime) within the particular jurisdiction. It is also 
imminently logical that different assessments, conducted by different bodies, on 
the basis of effects in different markets, may produce different results. Indeed the 
                                                 
257 Op. cit. note 248. 
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example of the FTC commissioners highlights that reasonable people can 
reasonably disagree when dealing with same facts, same laws and same market 
definitions.258 As long as merger reviews and any conflicting decisions are 
transparent and every effort had been made to avoid conflict, including flexibility 
when considering possible remedies, then the international merger control 
framework should be able to support and supplement trade liberalisation without 
the presence of a dispute settlement mechanism.  
 
The various proposals for an IMCR are clearly not devoid of merit and offer 
possible solutions to the inefficiencies, risks, and burdens that are an inherent part 
of the current international merger control framework. Indeed, the former 
President of the German Bundeskartellamt, Dieter Wolf, stated that ‘I do not 
consider that the current co-existence of national merger control systems and 
bilateral agreements will in the long run be sufficient to adequately control the 
wave of transnational mega-mergers’.259 Hence, some form of an IMCR may offer 
a complementary dimension to the current framework. Yet it is clear that an 
IMCR is not the panacea that many commentators suggest, and proponents would 
have to overcome many political, legal and practical obstacles before an IMCR is 
feasible in any form. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that the operation of such 
a regime would reduce the burden for merging firms, and advance the primary 
objective. Indeed many proposals would operate to further increase the legal 
                                                 
258 A point that has also been made in a speech by S. Scott, op. cit. note 44. 
259 D. Wolf, ‘International Mergers’, in R. Zach (ed), Towards WTO Competition Rules: Key Issues and 
Comments on the WTO Report (1998) on Trade and Competition, (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
1999). 
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uncertainty and overall burden for merging firms, particularly at the pre-merger 
notification stage.260 In the absence of an established common political objective 
necessitating an international merger control regime, it would be unjustified to 
bring about harmonisation by creating a supranational IMCR, particularly in the 
model of the third mode, when less radical and controversial multilateral 
proposals would offer a viable solution to the problems of the current framework. 
 
5.6.4 There are compelling proposals of a different nature that seek to build upon the 
current level of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, which stops short of 
creating an IMCR. These proposals primarily seek to extend the concept of 
comity, discussed in chapter 2, to include work sharing models and deferential 
approaches to multi-jurisdictional merger review. Eleanor Fox has commented 
that:  
‘Comity is a concept of reciprocal deference. It holds that one nation 
should defer to the law and rules (or dispute resolution) of another 
because, and where, the other has a greater interest; a greater claim of 
right…It is irrelevant that the outcome may not be the preferred one of the 
deferring country. Indeed, that is the point’.261
 
 Work sharing models would not necessarily fully adhere to the reciprocal 
deference approach outlined by Eleanor Fox, indeed there are many variants such 
as the deferential approach often adopted by the Canadian Competition Bureau, 
discussed supra at 5.4. Work sharing, which formed part of the recommendations 
within the ICPAC Final Report, would involve the identification of a ‘lead 
authority’ in each case involving multi-jurisdictional merger review. The proposal 
                                                 
260 See e.g. the Fiebig proposal, op. cit. note 247. 
261 E.M. Fox in testimony before the Antitrust Modernization Committee, 15 February 2006. Available at: 
www.amc.gov. 
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could be limited to providing a single point of contact for merging parties during 
the pre-merger notification stage, but would likely include the lead authority 
taking overall responsibility for conducting the substantive review of the proposed 
merger, while taking account of the interests of counterpart jurisdictions. A 
particular difficulty of such a system would be how to identify the lead authority, 
and while suggestions of deference to the ‘best-placed’ jurisdiction or the 
authority with the most substantial nexus to the transaction are indicative, it would 
be a very difficult determination in practice. There is also legitimate concern that 
smaller jurisdictions would tend to have a lesser connection to multinational 
mergers, and thus always be required to defer to larger antitrust jurisdictions such 
as the EC and US.262  
 
Perhaps the most complex aspect of the work sharing model is whether it should 
include a commitment on the part of antitrust authorities to presumptive deferrals 
to the lead authority, which could bind authorities to follow the assessment and 
finding of the lead authority. The AMC suggests that ‘other compelling reasons’, 
presumably important national interests, could enable independent merger review 
and an opt-out from work-sharing, even under a principle of presumptive 
deferral.263 Nonetheless, there are obstacles to implementing an apparently modest 
proposal of work-sharing. Legislative changes to domestic merger control laws 
may be required to facilitate the principle of presumptive deferrals, given that 
                                                 
262 See statement of R.W. Tritell, Assistant Director for International Antitrust, FTC, to the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission (AMC). Hearing on International Antitrust Issues, 15 February 2006. The 
concern was also reflected within the AMC Final Report at p.224. Available at: www.amc.gov. 
263 Op. cit. note 252 at p.224. 
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antitrust officials have highlighted264 there is a legal obligation upon authorities to 
review the impact of M&A within their jurisdiction, and to take action to prevent 
and/or resolve any anti-competitive effects. It may be difficult to reconcile the 
two.265 Variations of the principle of presumptive deferral or enhanced comity 
would operate to further decrease, if not remove, the risk of conflicting decisions 
and hence further advance the primary objective. Yet there are significant 
obstacles to its implementation at both bilateral and multilateral levels, which are 
easily underestimated. 
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to focus upon the means of reviewing mergers and 
acquisitions in the international antitrust framework, and to evaluate the means of 
review against the primary objective of the international antitrust dialogue, as 
determined at the end of chapter 4. Initially, the beneficial effects stemming from 
M&A activity were highlighted, alongside the paradoxical position of 
international merger control if it were found to unduly inhibit all but the anti-
competitive transactions. It was this potential paradox, and need for further 
research, which justified the decision to focus upon M&A at the exclusion of 
other types of commercial activity subject to antitrust scrutiny and intervention. In 
                                                 
264 See speeches by S. Scott, op. cit. note 44, and R.W. Tritell, op. cit. note 262. 
265 The need for antitrust authorities to engage in an independent merger analysis that satisfies their legal 
obligations is perhaps highlighted by the Impala case (Case T-464/04 Independent Music Publishers and 
Labels Association v. Commission [2006] ECR II-2289), where a third party successfully appealed the 
European Commission’s clearance of the Sony/BMG merger to the CFI, on the basis of an inadequate 
market analysis. 
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simplistic terms, with international M&A increasing in scale, and the number of 
merger control regimes increasing coupled with the predominant use of ex ante 
mandatory review mechanisms, there is a clear danger that the international 
merger control framework (in its decentralised form) imposes significant burdens 
upon merging parties.  
 
A large part of the chapter engaged in a review of the current international merger 
control framework, analysing both its bilateral and multilateral dimensions. As 
with other parts of the thesis, research did not deal with intra-EC cooperation and 
convergence. The research identified very strong cooperative relationships 
between the EC and US antitrust authorities in particular, with good relations 
extending to the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand authorities also. Bilateral 
co-operation, and very limited examples of trilateral co-operation was also found 
to exist in particular cases between strong trading partners such as the US and 
Mexico.266 In general terms however, in spite of there being in excess of 80 
merger control regimes, there is clearly a small clique of antitrust authorities 
between whom substantive case cooperation and co-ordination is possible. Even 
within this clique, substantive cooperation is unlikely to meaningfully extend 
beyond bilateral cooperation due to the diminishing returns for the antitrust 
authorities involved. Hence in transactions subject to multi-jurisdictional merger 
                                                 
266 In the course of independent research, op. cit. note 57, it is noteworthy that experienced practitioners 
including Professor Hawk suggested that close co-operation between antitrust authorities was possible in 
large part due to the personal relationships and trust that has established between authorities, and not 
necessarily linked to the mature or developing status of the authority involved. The ability to establish 
informal connections appears to mark out the relationship between the European Commission and US 
authorities in particular, and this is one area where the regular ICN meetings could informally engender 
more co-operation between a larger group of authorities in the future. 
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review, the merging parties may benefit (in terms of greater efficiency stemming 
from information exchanges and coordination of timing, as well as a diminishing 
risk of conflict) from the close cooperation between leading antitrust authorities, 
but this is unlikely to take place at a multilateral level and thus has inherent 
limitations when average multinational M&A file in eight jurisdictions.267  
 
Discussion shifted focus away from case-by-case cooperation to assess the means 
by which multilateral cooperation and convergence efforts seek to minimise the 
impact of the decentralised system of merger control upon merging parties. 
Research focused upon the means by which antitrust authorities assert initial 
jurisdiction in merger review, i.e. notification thresholds, in light of compelling 
arguments that the key problem for merging parties, and hence the likely key 
inhibitor to merger control advancing the primary objective, is actually the 
number of authorities reviewing a particular transaction, and not the differences 
between reviewing regimes. Discussion identified key principles and best 
practices that have been developed by multilateral fora and NGOs with regard to 
all stages of merger control, although considered pre-merger notification in most 
depth. At each stage of this discussion, evidence pertinent to the implementation 
and thus effectiveness of the best practices was considered, and the burden upon 
merging parties at each stage of the review process was also highlighted. In the 
latter stages of the chapter, the overall burden, including ‘unnecessary costs’, 
upon merging parties was considered and linked into preliminary conclusions as 
to whether the current international merger control framework does in fact unduly 
                                                 
267 PWC Survey, op. cit. note 201. 
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inhibit M&A activity and thereby frustrate the primary objective. It is argued that 
the current framework occupies a paradoxical position by not operating as 
efficiently and effectively as possible, exemplified by the limitations upon 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Nonetheless, the research does not suggest 
that a supranational international merger control regime is an appropriate, viable 
or likely solution to the deficiencies of the current framework, in contrast to the 
work of many fellow researchers. The most ambitious form of IMCR neither 
looks politically feasible or indeed a solution to the unduly burdensome nature of 
the current framework, it is arguable that an IMCR would only serve to further 
frustrate the primary objective. The chapter finally considered alternative, and 
more modest international merger control proposals that have been advanced 
elsewhere, the thesis conclusion and recommendations will touch on some of 
these issues further. 
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6 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
 
6.1 The three faces of international antitrust 
6.1.1 The three faces of the international antitrust dialogue have developed 
incrementally at different points in time, yet all three approaches attempt to 
address a fundamental problem: antitrust laws remain on a national or regional 
basis in spite of the increasingly borderless nature of commercial activity and 
markets. The Havana Charter for the International Trade Organisation recognised 
that anti-competitive commercial behaviour could undermine the benefits that 
should flow from trade liberalisation. Nonetheless, the failure to ratify the ITO, 
and the subsequent omission of antitrust rules from the global trading system, 
resulted in a lack of international antitrust rules, which several states, international 
fora, NGOs, practitioners and others have attempted to remedy with unilateral 
enforcement, bilateral engagement and multilateral initiatives. The lack of 
international antitrust rules has prevented the emergence of a parallel approach to 
trade liberalisation, which is arguably necessary to protect the benefits that should 
flow from free trade. The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee 
(ICPAC) implicitly recognised the desire for a parallel approach to trade 
liberalisation, by stating that it had tried to identify antitrust initiatives ‘that would 
contribute to achieving the integration of markets’1 throughout its two year 
existence.  
 
                                                 
1 ICPAC Final Report (February 2000) at p.2, available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/icpac.htm. 
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Unilateral enforcement of domestic antitrust law was developed in the US in the 
1940s, in the form of extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction over foreign firms, 
on the basis of effects within US markets. While extraterritoriality can be seen as 
a means of protecting domestic markets from anti-competitive behaviour, it also 
prevents firms from exploiting the globalisation of trade to escape antitrust 
scrutiny. In spite of the hostile reaction of many states to US extraterritoriality in 
the mid-20th century,2 variants of the US effects doctrine have gained greater 
recognition as more jurisdictions have adopted some form of antitrust law. In the 
context of increasing volumes of cross-border trade and the increasing number of 
antitrust regimes, the unilateral approach to international antitrust was destined to 
result in conflict between antitrust jurisdictions and ongoing ‘regulatory overlap’ 
and ‘system friction’.3 The unilateral approach to international antitrust is clearly 
flawed,4 and offers an incomplete solution to the difficulties created by a lack of 
international antitrust rules. Indeed the ICPAC final report pondered, somewhat 
rhetorically, ‘is it possible to rely upon national law, yet at the same time work 
towards the development of a more seamless international system that facilitates 
the workings of global markets?’.5 Bilateral engagement between antitrust 
jurisdictions was seen as an obvious means of trying to remedy the failings of the 
unilateral approach. 
 
                                                 
2 See discussion supra at 2.7. 
3 See a discussion of system friction in the context of merger control in A. Ezrachi, ‘Merger Control and 
Cross Border Transactions – A Pragmatic View on Cooperation, Convergence and What’s in Between’ 
University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy Working Paper (L) 11/05. Available from 
http://www.competition-law.ox.ac.uk/competition/portal.php. Also see discussion supra at 5.3. 
4 See discussion supra at 2.8 and 3.1.3. 
5 Op. cit. note 1, at p.2. 
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6.1.2 Bilateral engagement has primarily taken the form of bilateral antitrust 
cooperation agreements, although it can also include the formation of joint 
working groups,6 both of which should lead to greater convergence and some 
form of enforcement cooperation in specific cases. The number of formal state-to-
state bilateral cooperation agreements and informal agency-to-agency bilateral 
cooperation arrangements is increasing every year, although the agreements tend 
to be limited to a core group of antitrust jurisdictions. The US, the EC, Canada, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and to a lesser extent South Korea and Mexico, 
are responsible for the vast majority of bilateral cooperation agreements. The core 
group of signatories indicates that a large number of antitrust jurisdictions do not 
actively engage on a bilateral basis, given that there are in excess of 100 antitrust 
regimes worldwide.7 Bilateral agreements are often said and thought to be unique 
to the bilateral relationship between the signatories,8 which would limit their 
general significance to international antitrust, and indicate that differing 
objectives exist within the international antitrust dialogue. On the contrary, the 
comparative analysis of the principal bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements in 
chapter 3, suggests that these agreements are actually very similar in terms of 
format and substance, and share common objectives. Indeed, the analysis revealed 
that the only significant variable factors regarding bilateral agreements are which 
jurisdictions will enter into an agreement, and when. Further investigation and 
discussion, at 4.1 supra, suggests that a strong bilateral trading relationship may 
                                                 
6 See e.g. the joint EC-US mergers working group, discussed supra at 5.4.1-5.4.3. 
7 See discussion supra at 3.1.3. 
8 See e.g. speech by C.S. Stark, former Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, US 
Department of Justice, ‘Improving Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation’, Washington, D.C., 23 June 2000. 
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be regarded as a key prerequisite to antitrust jurisdictions entering into a 
cooperation agreement, although there are clearly other relevant factors.9  
 
The comparative analysis in chapter 3 and discussion at the beginning of chapter 4 
also established that the principal bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements are 
sufficiently homogeneous to query why jurisdictions primarily rely upon bilateral 
and not multilateral cooperation agreements. While the basic 1995 OECD 
Recommendation can be regarded as a multilateral instrument, albeit a limited one 
in light of the limited and cliquish OECD membership,10 it is very much regarded 
as a default agreement in the absence of a bilateral agreement. Nonetheless, the 
limitations of the OECD do not explain why OECD member countries have 
entered into supplementary bilateral agreements with each other, and do not 
explain why a multilateral cooperation agreement or template is not pursued 
through a more inclusive international fora, such as the ICN. Clearly, the 
relationship between international trade and antitrust is very strong in the context 
of bilateral antitrust engagement. The principle of avoidance of conflict, stated as 
a key objective in the bilateral agreements, carries greater significance when one 
considers that a strong bilateral trading relationship underpins most, if not all of 
the bilateral cooperation agreements. It is obvious that antitrust disputes between 
jurisdictions are capable of hindering trade, and it is clear in light of the foregoing 
discussion, that this is a key motivating factor in the decision to enter into a 
bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement with key trading partners. In spite of the 
                                                 
9 Such as mutual trust and confidence between the antitrust jurisdictions and authorities – something that is 
undoubtedly enhanced through engagement and discussion in multilateral fora, such as the ICN. 
10 See discussion at 4.4.3 supra. 
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pre-existing circumstances and apparent objectives of bilateral cooperation 
agreements, they have been proven to be a limited form of engagement in the 
international antitrust dialogue. Bilateralism cannot provide a feasible means of 
securing cooperation and avoiding conflict between antitrust authorities in a 
globalised market, when over 100 antitrust regimes exist, particularly as the 
number of formal bilateral agreements are limited, and primarily involve the 
‘mature’ antitrust authorities. Before discussing the third and final face of 
international antitrust, it is useful to identify conclusions at this stage: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations regarding bilateral engagement:  
• Greater recognition and transparency is required within the 
international antitrust dialogue regarding the relevant factors antitrust 
jurisdictions should consider when deciding whether to enter into a 
bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement.  
• Most antitrust jurisdictions have chosen to give greater prominence to 
bilateral, rather than multilateral cooperation agreements, without 
sufficient explanation.  
• The current bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements have largely 
achieved substantive harmonisation, and created a common template 
for bilateral cooperation. This template should be recognised at a 
multilateral level, to establish common principles and procedures for all 
bilateral cooperation in international antitrust. Ideally, the template for 
cooperation would be endorsed by the ICN, as it is the most inclusive 
international antitrust fora.  
• More jurisdictions should be actively involved in the web of antitrust 
cooperation agreements, particularly those states with fast growing 
economies and those that are in the process of adopting antitrust laws, 
such as India and China. The onus should be upon the developed 
antitrust jurisdictions to encourage others to participate. 
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 6.1.3 The third face of international antitrust, multilateralism, has been shown to 
include a wide array of international agreements, fora, and initiatives, involving 
both developed and developing countries. Many regional trade agreements and 
trade blocs (RTAs), such as the ANDEAN Community, CARICOM and 
WAEMU/UEMOA, have strong prima facie similarities to the EC, in terms of 
comparable linkages between antitrust and trade. Indeed the RTAs highlight that 
the linkages between antitrust and trade are strengthened as the level of economic 
integration is deepened. Most of the RTAs adopt a parallel approach to trade 
liberalisation, which attaches importance to antitrust rules in order to support free 
trade policies. A deeper understanding of the relationship between international 
trade and antitrust has been made possible by also considering the external 
relations of the European Union, focusing upon the trade agreements entered into 
by the EC, its Member States, and third countries. The discussion at 4.3 supra, 
highlights the importance of a parallel approach to trade liberalisation from the 
European perspective. Antitrust is firmly rooted as an essential element in the 
trade relations of the EC, irrespective of the nature of the trade relationship or the 
status of the third country. 
 
 The final multilateral element of the international antitrust dialogue consists of 
multilateral antitrust initiatives and fora. Discussion at 4.4 supra, considered the 
key international bodies active in international antitrust, namely the ICN, OECD, 
UNCTAD and the WTO, and their respective roles and responsibilities. The 
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discussion identified a clear niche in the international antitrust dialogue for the 
UNCTAD in working in the interests of, and supporting the needs of, developing 
countries in introducing antitrust rules. It is also evident that antitrust dialogue 
under the auspices of the WTO has the capability to provide for greater 
convergence in international antitrust, given its large and diverse membership. 
Furthermore, the potential for a binding set of key principles, with an experienced 
and respected dispute settlement mechanism, are unique characteristics of the 
WTO within the international antitrust dialogue. The distinctive roles of 
respective international antitrust fora become blurred however, when considering 
the two most active bodies.  
 
The OECD and ICN undoubtedly have particular strengths and weaknesses. The 
OECD has an active and respected peer observation programme, and engages in 
capacity building activities supported by its own secretariat. The OECD also has a 
long standing involvement in international antitrust, and has produced several 
notable best practice recommendations. Nonetheless, the OECD’s limited and 
selective membership is widely regarded as a weakness in trying to achieve 
convergence in international antitrust (in spite of many activities involving non-
member countries). The role of the OECD in international antitrust has also been 
seen as a diminishing one in recent years.11 Conversely, the ICN’s primary 
strengths rest upon its large and diverse membership, its transient and flexible 
                                                 
11 See comments by A. Piilola, ‘Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study International 
Antitrust Regulation’ (2003) 39 Stanford Journal of International Law 207 at p.237. 
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modus operandi, as well as its ‘all antitrust all the time’12 mission. While the ICN 
was established as recently as 2001, the organisation has worked to achieve 
convergence in several areas of antitrust by establishing working groups, 
involving NGOs and renowned experts, and producing several best practice 
recommendations. The weakness of the ICN is however recognised as being the 
voluntary nature of the best practices, and the possible difficulty of achieving 
consensus in such a diverse organisation. Hence, in spite of the differing 
structures and membership of the OECD Competition Committee and the ICN, 
there is a clear overlap of competences and duplication of effort and resources 
between these organisations, particularly with regard to the formulation of best 
practice recommendations.13 The two organisations could ensure a more effective 
and coherent multilateral framework for international antitrust by focusing upon 
their own strengths and coordinating their activities so as to avoid duplication of 
scarce resources. While the OECD should continue to focus upon peer 
observation and capacity building activities, it should work to directly support the 
ICN best practice recommendations (by using the ICN best practices when 
conducting peer reviews) and avoid unnecessary duplication. The ICN could also 
coordinate capacity building activities with the OECD, and should strengthen its 
best practice recommendations by regularly reflecting upon its soft law approach 
and reviewing implementation in coordination with the OECD. In order to 
reinforce attempts to achieve greater convergence among antitrust regimes, the 
                                                 
12 The well known quote by C.A James, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of 
Justice, ‘International Antitrust in the Bush Administration’, Annual Canadian Bar Association Fall 
Conference on Competition Law. Ottawa, Canada, 21 September 2001. 
13 See discussion at 4.4.3 at 5.5.2 supra for specific examples of the overlap between the antitrust activities 
of the OECD Competition Committee and the ICN. 
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ICN should also consider whether a more robust means of encouraging 
implementation of best practice recommendations is possible. One option may be 
to consider introducing a ‘comply or explain’ principle14 whereby members would 
regularly self-assess their antitrust laws and practices against the ICN 
recommendations, and explain any inconsistencies.  
 
6.1.4 The lack of a coherent and structured multilateral approach within the 
international dialogue is a direct result of the decentralised and fragmented nature 
of international antitrust. Nonetheless, it remains clear that trade relations and 
considerations underpin all of the multilateral antitrust initiatives in some form or 
another. Indeed, the discussion at 4.5 supra, argued that trade considerations 
underpin all international antitrust activities, and identified the primary objective 
of the international antitrust dialogue as being to support and supplement trade 
liberalisation. In light of this conclusion at the end of chapter 4, the thesis was 
able to focus upon a particular area of antitrust concern, mergers and acquisitions, 
in chapter 5, and assess the operation of multi-jurisdictional merger review 
against the primary objective. Before discussing the international merger control 
framework, several conclusions can be identified: 
  
 
                                                 
14 The principle of ‘comply or explain’ is a recognised element of principles based regulation, and is 
adopted within the EC and UK corporate governance regulatory framework. For some general discussion 
see the European Commission Press Release: ‘Corporate governance: European Forum clarifies 'comply or 
explain' principle and issues annual report’ (IP/06/269) 6th March 2006. The ‘comply or explain’ approach 
underpins the UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance (July 2003), available at: 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf.  
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 Conclusions and recommendations regarding multilateralism and the objective 
of the international antitrust dialogue: 
• The primary objective of the international antitrust dialogue is to 
support and supplement trade liberalisation, and thus is not necessarily 
to achieve harmonisation of national antitrust rules. 
• There is a lack of coordination of antitrust activities between 
international fora, evinced by a large degree of overlap between the 
OECD and ICN. 
• The OECD and ICN should enter into a memorandum of 
understanding, setting out respective roles and responsibilities, and 
avoiding duplication of effort and resources. Each body should focus 
upon its core strength, and coordinate activities with the other. 
• The ICN should regularly consider the suitability and viability of 
shifting towards a more robust soft law approach to encourage 
implementation of best practices, perhaps by imposing a ‘comply or 
explain’ regulatory model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 The international merger control framework 
6.2.1 The thesis is akin to a story of two parts. The first part is a critical review of the 
development of international antitrust, and identifies the primary objective of the 
international antitrust dialogue after reviewing unilateral, bilateral and multilateral 
activities. The second part focuses upon mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and 
analyses the operation of multi-jurisdictional merger review, and its consistency 
with the primary objective. M&A are important means of foreign direct 
investment and can create cross-border synergies, which should help realise the 
benefits to be reaped from trade liberalisation. While anti-competitive M&A 
jeopardise those benefits, and are correctly scrutinised (and occasionally blocked), 
the operation of merger control at an international level must balance the need to 
intervene in anti-competitive M&A, with the need to facilitate all other M&A, 
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which  should be encouraged. Furthermore, a paradoxical position arises if multi-
jurisdictional merger review unduly hinders those M&A which would further the 
cause of trade liberalisation, whilst attempting to control the anti-competitive 
mergers. Chapter 5 assessed the current international merger control framework 
(i.e. the operation of multiple merger control regimes, which often results in 
multi-jurisdictional merger review, as well as the other international activities 
regarding merger control) against the primary objective. The assessment explored 
the extent of policy, procedural and substantive convergence efforts at bilateral 
and multilateral levels, as well as the extent of cooperation between antitrust 
authorities in merger investigations.  
  
 In light of the preponderance of ex ante notification systems within merger 
control regimes,15 it is obvious that multi-jurisdictional merger review imposes a 
significant burden upon merging firms. Furthermore, it is arguable that the burden 
will increase given the rising number of merger control regimes, and the growth 
of international M&A. Greater market liberalisation in Europe and parts of Asia, 
greater market access and perhaps also progress in the WTO Doha trade round 
will likely further encourage cross-border trade and international M&A. Growing 
market integration and economic inter-dependency suggests that international 
M&A will continue to have effects across a wider geographic area, and will lead 
to a heightened risk of jurisdictional conflict, or ‘system friction’. It is within this 
context that the international merger control framework must operate as 
                                                 
15 See discussion at 5.3.1 supra, which highlights the adoption of ex ante notification requirements within 
73 antitrust jurisdictions. 
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seamlessly as possible to avoid imposing unnecessary burdens upon merging 
parties, which could hinder the consummation of the merger and negate the 
economic benefits that should follow from the transaction. Research suggests that 
time delays and legal uncertainty as a result of multi-jurisdictional merger review, 
are the most significant ‘costs’ to merging parties, and are of greater concern than 
the direct pecuniary costs incurred.16 Importantly, it is also arguable that 
coordination and cooperation within the current international merger control 
framework could alleviate the burden upon merging firms without the need for 
international harmonisation of merger control regimes, which could actually and 
ironically result in a greater burden upon merging firms in the short to medium 
term.17
 
6.2.2 In order to gain a firm understanding of the operation of the current international 
merger control framework, it was necessary to investigate the extent of 
cooperation undertaken between antitrust authorities conducting concurrent 
merger investigations. The procedural and substantive merger control rules, which 
apply to multi-jurisdictional merger review, remain on a national (or regional) 
basis, hence cooperation and coordination is required between antitrust authorities 
in order to minimise the risk of conflicting decisions and the burden upon merging 
firms, thereby furthering the primary objective. The relationship between the 
European Commission and US antitrust authorities is clearly the closest and most 
informal example of bilateral cooperation in multi-jurisdictional merger review, 
                                                 
16 See discussion at 5.6.2 supra. 
17 See discussion at 5.6.3 supra, and infra. 
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likely spurred on by previous high-profile conflicts and the importance of their 
trading relationship.18 It is also clear however, that underlying similarities and 
convergence at the policy, procedural and substantive levels, have facilitated the 
development of a good bilateral working relationship, and created the potential for 
close cooperation and coordination during concurrent merger investigations. The 
extent of cooperation and coordination possible in multi-jurisdictional merger 
review will naturally vary from case to case, depending upon many factors 
including the relevant market definition,19 yet it is evident that widely varying 
levels of cooperation are possible, depending upon the jurisdictions involved. It is 
also clear that case cooperation and coordination in merger review only rarely 
occurs on a multilateral basis, probably due to practical difficulties in achieving 
multilateral cooperation and coordination, but also due to the ‘diminishing 
returns’ of such practices from the antitrust authorities’ perspective.20 Short case 
studies in chapter 5 highlight that cooperation and coordination between antitrust 
authorities can involve inter alia: discussions on the relevant market; procedural 
timetables; assessment of post-merger effects and efficiencies; discussion of 
suitable remedies, and joint meetings at key stages in the review process. It is 
clear however, that confidentiality waivers are essential to facilitate extensive 
cooperation and coordination, although receiving consent from merging parties is 
                                                 
18 See discussion at 5.4.1 supra and case examples such as that of GE/Honeywell: Commission Decision in 
General Electric/Honeywell, Case No COMP/M.2220 [2004] O.J. L48/1. Further discussion in E.M. Fox, 
‘Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and the Future of Merger Control’ (2002) 23 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 457, and A. Burnside, ‘GE, Honey, I Sunk The Merger’ (2002) 23 ECLR 107. 
19 See the discussion of case examples at 5.4.3 supra. 
20 See discussion at 5.4.5 and 5.5.4 supra. 
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unlikely to be problematic, in the context of cooperation between established 
antitrust authorities at least.21 
 
In spite of the regularity of cooperation in multi-jurisdictional merger review, 
there is evidence suggesting that it is limited to a core group of antitrust 
authorities, notably the EC, US, Canada and to a far lesser extent: Australia; 
Japan; and Mexico.22 Furthermore, extensive cooperation and coordination is 
likely limited to that between the EC and US, albeit the Canadian Competition 
Bureau often adopts a commendable deferential approach to multi-jurisdictional 
merger review. Bilateral cooperation and coordination involving a small clique of 
antitrust authorities is an insufficient means of diminishing the risk of conflict and 
reducing the burden upon merging firms, given the growing number of merger 
control regimes and the preponderance of ex ante notification requirements. In 
light of the limited capability and practice of bilateral engagement, it is an 
incomplete means of ensuring the international merger control framework furthers 
the primary objective. An additional multilateral dimension is required to prevent 
the current framework operating to further burden and inhibit legitimate M&A 
activity. The paradoxical position of international merger control can be resolved 
by ensuring there is a coherent and coordinated structure to multi-jurisdictional 
merger review, and multilateral initiatives may help to establish one. Before 
considering the multilateral dimension to multi-jurisdictional merger review 
however, several conclusions can be identified regarding bilateral cooperation. 
                                                 
21 See discussion of confidentiality waivers, and the factors taken into account by merging firms at 5.4.3 
supra. 
22 See discussion at 5.4.5 supra. 
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Conclusions and recommendations regarding bilateral cooperation and 
coordination in multi-jurisdictional merger review: 
• There is a lack of clarity and criteria for determining when antitrust 
authorities should engage in cooperation and coordination regarding 
concurrent merger investigations (see discussion at 5.5.4 supra). The 
circumstances that can ‘trigger’ cooperation, as well as the type of 
cooperation possible are well known, yet there may be too much 
discretion for antitrust authorities to determine when they will actually 
engage in cooperation in specific cases.  
• The ICN should develop a set of best practices setting out relevant 
factors for antitrust authorities when deciding whether to engage in 
cooperation and coordination of concurrent merger reviews. 
• There is a need for a transparent debate among antitrust authorities, 
NGOs and other interested parties on the merits and demerits of 
engaging in multilateral cooperation in specific merger cases. 
Multilateral cooperation and coordination may be infeasible for 
practical reasons, but could benefit merging parties and advance the 
primary objective and should therefore be seriously considered. 
• The EC/US joint mergers working group facilitated greater 
understanding and trust between the respective antitrust authorities, and 
enabled a more detailed structure for cooperation and coordination to 
develop. 
• In light of the regularity of concurrent merger investigations involving 
the EC, US and Canadian antitrust authorities, the EC/US joint working 
group should expand to include Canada. These jurisdictions could form 
a vanguard group under the auspices of the ICN, to test possible levels 
of cooperation and coordination, particularly in light of the Canadian 
willingness to advance deferential approaches to multi-jurisdictional 
merger review. 
6.2.3 Multilateral activities concerning international merger control have primarily 
sought to achieve greater convergence between antitrust jurisdictions, so as to 
further minimise the risk of conflict, i.e. reduce ‘system friction’, in multi-
jurisdictional merger control, and also to diminish the burden upon merging firms. 
Multilateral activities primarily focus upon achieving consensus with regards to 
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policies, procedural issues and substantive law. There are several sets of best 
practice recommendations, produced by the ICN, OECD and NGOs, which set 
benchmarks to facilitate convergence. The wide consensus among the sets of best 
practices on most issues sets key benchmarks, although this again highlights 
ongoing duplication of effort and resources, and does not necessarily result in 
universal implementation of the best practices. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
achieving consensus upon best practices as well as bringing about underlying 
convergence is insufficient to further the primary objective, because divergence is 
not necessarily the key problem. The key problem is often considered to be the 
number of concurrent merger reviews. More specifically, the key problem is the 
burden imposed upon merging firms as a result of multi-jurisdictional pre-merger 
notification filing requirements.23 The problem is particularly difficult as it is an 
inherent feature of the international merger control framework, given the lack of 
an international merger control regime (IMCR), and the globalisation of trade. 
The current solution is to attempt to set benchmarks on minimum nexus 
requirements, before jurisdiction can be asserted and notification required, so as to 
alleviate the situation. Many commentators would argue that an IMCR is the only 
solution, although it is clear that multi-jurisdictional notification filings are 
considered manageable by practitioners, and it is equally unclear that an IMCR 
would on balance reduce the overall burden upon merging firms.24 Building upon 
discussion at 5.5 supra, and comments immediately above, it is possible to outline 
                                                 
23 See the testimony of Barry E. Hawk to the ICPAC Hearings, Washington DC, 3 November 1998. 
Transcripts of Committee Hearings are available from http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/transcripts.htm.  
24 See discussion at 5.6.2 – 5.6.3 supra, and infra. 
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conclusions regarding the multilateral dimension of the international merger 
control framework: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations regarding multilateral activities in the 
international merger control framework:  
• There should be greater recognition of the principle of independent 
antitrust authorities and analysis, see 5.5.2 supra. 
• Greater procedural convergence is required. Efforts should focus upon 
the jurisdictional nexus and notification thresholds, in conjunction with 
the principle of transparency, so as to ensure that pre-merger 
notification filings are only required when there is a material link with 
the reviewing jurisdiction. While the ICN best practices already address 
this issue, there could be greater guidance on what amounts to a 
sufficiently ‘material’ nexus to the reviewing jurisdiction. There should 
also be a renewed effort to encourage implementation of the best 
practice recommendations. 
• A common filing form should be seriously considered, and could build 
upon the increasing convergence between key merger control regimes. 
If a common form was viable and could be effective, it should be 
developed within the ICN. A common form should only be introduced 
as a replacement for the standard form and not as an alternative means 
of notification (lessons should be learned from the common British, 
French and German filing form, see 5.5.3 (d) and 5.6.3 supra). A 
vanguard group of jurisdictions, likely including the EC and its 
Member States, the US, and Canada, should consider introducing such 
a form. The issue should be periodically reviewed. Discussions on this 
issue should involve NGOs and other interested parties. 
• There should be recognition that multilateral coordination regarding 
appropriate remedies should be undertaken where possible, irrespective 
of whether the merger investigation has involved extensive 
bilateral/multilateral cooperation. 
• The ICN should consider the efficacy of a work sharing mechanism to 
monitor joint remedies post-merger, and undertake greater post-merger 
reflection of the effectiveness and suitability of imposed remedies. 
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6.2.4 The failure of the ITO and subsequent efforts to establish an international antitrust 
regime, and an IMCR in the particular context of M&A, has undoubtedly created 
difficulties for the operation of international antitrust, and the need to support and 
supplement trade liberalisation. Ideally, the parallel approach to trade 
liberalisation would likely include international antitrust rules and an IMCR. 
Nonetheless it is unrealistic and unnecessary to seek to introduce such a system to 
replace the current combination of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral activities, 
which provide the current form of international antitrust, including international 
merger control. The crucial test that should guide future reform with regard to 
multi-jurisdictional merger review, is whether the proposed reform would provide 
for a more coherent and coordinated system of multi-jurisdictional review, and 
whether it would on balance lessen the burden upon merging firms, particularly in 
terms of providing for a streamlined clearance process. Most commentators would 
accept that substantive harmonisation coupled with a common pre-merger 
notification system under a supranational IMCR,25 is an unrealistic and 
unobtainable prospect, although weaker forms of IMCR, which would supplement 
the current framework, are often recommended. As discussed at 5.6.3 however, a 
weakened form of IMCR may simply act as a further layer of bureaucracy on top 
of the current merger control framework, and could operate to further burden 
merging firms by increasing the periods of review and legal uncertainty. Future 
reforms must operate to further streamline the international merger control 
process in order to advance the primary objective. Implementation of work-
sharing models are less controversial options for reform than IMCR proposals, 
                                                 
25 i.e. the third mode of international merger control regime discussed at 5.6.3 supra. 
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although these too are fraught with practical difficulties, which may require 
legislative amendments in order to be feasible. The key recommendations outlined 
below are as a result of the foregoing discussion, and particularly that at 5.6 and 
5.6 supra. 
 
Key recommendations:  
• Establish a clear and coherent framework for the operation of current 
activities within the international merger control framework, including 
a delineation of respective roles and responsibilities of international 
fora.  
• The ICN and OECD in particular, should enter into a memorandum of 
understanding so as to identify their respective roles and areas of 
responsibility in international antitrust, and ensure consistency and 
complementarity. 
• Reform initiatives involving international merger control should 
concentrate upon working towards the implementation of work-sharing 
models in multi-jurisdictional review, with initial steps likely to involve 
a small group of three or four jurisdictions.  
• Adoption of a ‘comply or explain’ principle to encourage greater 
implementation of ICN best practice recommendations. 
• Creation of a vanguard group of jurisdictions within the ICN, likely 
including the EC and its Member States, the US, and Canada, to engage 
in enhanced cooperation that can be observed and studied by 
international counterparts within the ICN. 
• Antitrust authorities and other interested parties should engage in a 
transparent debate regarding the merits and demerits of a ‘disinterested’ 
common pre-merger notification system, although it is not 
recommended that one should be introduced at the current time. 
• If a dispute settlement mechanism in the form of an IMCR is viable, 
likely under the auspices of the WTO, it should not facilitate direct 
appeals against merger decisions taken by antitrust authorities. Such a 
mechanism could however, resolve jurisdictional conflicts arising due 
to policy, procedural or substantive divergence, by reference to agreed 
international standards (this is in line with Taylor’s proposed IMCR, 
see 5.6.3 supra). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 353
Appendix: multi-jurisdictional merger review questionnaire 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Thank you for agreeing to assist with ongoing research into international merger control 
cooperation, this questionnaire merely presents an outline of the types of issues I would 
like to discuss and receive your views on at our meeting. The questionnaire is focused 
upon multi-jurisdictional merger filings and the associated costs incurred by merging 
firms. The information gained from this research will form part of my PhD thesis at the 
University of Glasgow. I would hope to talk through these issues and some others that 
may arise in the course of our meeting. Whilst providing written answers to the questions 
below could be useful, it is not a requirement and participants may simply wish to 
consider the questions before the meeting if time permits. While the questions deal with 
issues where better understanding and increased awareness would benefit the research, it 
is possible that some questions may raise issues of client confidentiality and commercial 
sensibilities, I apologise if this is the case and would respect any decision not to answer a 
question on that basis. Could you also please indicate during our meeting whether you 
would like your responses to be treated as anonymous. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
Jonathan Galloway 
 
Lecturer in Law, University of Newcastle 
PhD Candidate, University of Glasgow 
jonathan.galloway@ncl.ac.uk  
 
 
A FILING 
1) At what stage in seeking competition law approval for a proposed transaction, 
would the burden on the merging parties/law firm normally be at its most costly in terms 
of total resources? e.g. identifying notification jurisdictions; submitting merger 
notifications; immediately preceding competition authority decision at the end of Phase I; 
beginning of a Phase II investigation/responding to a second request. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2) Could you estimate as a percentage, how much of your M&A case load involves 
notification to more than one jurisdiction? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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3) In your experience do merger transactions often require notification to 
jurisdictions other than the US and EU (incl. Commission and NCAs)? If so, which other 
jurisdictions tend to attract a large number of notifications? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4) Is there any form of risk assessment involved in identifying which jurisdictions 
should be notified regarding a proposed transaction? If so, could you indicate possible 
rationale for such an assessment? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5) To what extent are costs incurred in investigating whether notification is 
necessary in a particular jurisdiction, for that not to be required. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6) In your opinion, does the current multijurisdictional notification burden operate at 
a fair level for business? If not, could you indicate possible reasons for the perceived 
unfairness? e.g. notification required in jurisdictions with weak/insufficient nexus to the 
transaction. Could you also indicate whether you are aware of the prevailing attitude of 
business to these costs, if different from your own. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7) Does it remain common to deal with jurisdictions with market share requirements 
or other subjective criteria that determine notification thresholds? Do you have any views 
on appropriate criteria for notification thresholds, or criteria that work well with 
minimised costs involved? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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8) Could you comment on the degree of convergence between jurisdictions often 
involved in a merger notification with regards to their filing requirements?  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9) Are you aware of the work of the International Competition Network? If so, do 
you believe the work of the ICN has improved convergence with regards to filing 
requirements and/or improved the ability of identifying jurisdictions requiring 
notification? 
(see:http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mergercontrollaws.html) 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10) Are any economies of scale possible during the filing of multiple merger 
notifications, or during multiple merger investigations by competition authorities? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11) To what extent is it necessary to recruit ‘local counsel’ to advise on filing 
requirements and assist with merger investigations? Does this amount to a significant cost 
in the overall multijurisdictional notification burden? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
12) Could you indicate the scale of the burden imposed by translation requirements in 
an average transaction requiring multiple filings? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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B MERGER INVESTIGATIONS 
13) Can you comment on the degree to which you believe it is possible to coordinate 
procedural timetables between reviewing jurisdictions? Does this occur regularly, and 
does it operate at a satisfactorily level? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14) It is common practice for firms to recommend that merging parties sign 
confidentiality waivers, enabling enhanced cooperation and coordination between the 
European Commission and US DOJ/FTC, when both are reviewing the same transaction? 
Are there any other jurisdictions capable of participating in this level of enhanced 
cooperation/coordination?  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15) What would you highlight as the key advantages and disadvantages of signing 
confidentiality waivers from the merging parties’ perspective? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16) To what extent do multiple merger investigations add to the complexity of 
econometric analyses and the associated costs? i.e. do differing theories of economic 
harm and analyses relied upon in jurisdictions impact upon the strategy and arguments 
advanced by merging parties? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17) Can you comment upon any experiences (omitting case names and identifiers) 
you may have had, or be aware of, concerning cooperation between competition 
authorities reviewing the same transaction, and any resulting difficulties/benefits? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 357
C CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES 
18) Have you noticed an upsurge in the number of jurisdictions that must be 
considered for merger filing, or that require notification of a proposed transaction in the 
last 3 years? If so, what has been the approach of these new merger review authorities to 
dealing with notifications? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
19) Are there any other changes/matters that have occurred in the last 3 years that 
have impacted upon the costs involved in multijurisdictional merger review? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
20) In your opinion, how beneficial is procedural convergence between competition 
authorities for merging parties? Would a common merger filing form reduce the burden 
upon merging firms? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
21) Do you have a view on the debate between Professor Barry Hawk and Professor 
Eleanor Fox regarding a clearinghouse for submitting merger filings? Prof Fox has stated 
“One way to achieve [efficient coordination of filings and reduce the burden on parties of 
multiple notifications] would be to permit the merging parties to file with a disinterested 
clearinghouse center on the day of the first filing”. Prof Hawk responded “A clearing 
house is out of the question”. Please include any personal views on other ways to reduce 
the burden upon merging firms. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Thank you for assisting with this research. 
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Principal Websites 
ANDEAN Community:   www.comunidadandina.org/endex.htm  
APEC:      www.apec.org  
ASEAN:     www.aseansec.org  
Australian Consumer and Competition Commission: 
      www.accc.gov.au  
Canadian Competition Bureau:  www.competitionbureau.gc.ca  
CARICOM:     www.caricom.org  
COMESA:     www.comesa.int  
European Commission Competition Directorate-General: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html  
European Court of Justice:   www.curia.eu  
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European Union homepage:   http://europa.eu/index_en.htm  
Financial Times:    www.ft.com  
FTAA:      www.ftaa-alca.org  
IBA Global Competition Forum:  www.globalcompetitionforum.org  
International Competition Network:  www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org  
Law & Technology Resources for Legal Professionals (international competition law 
webpage):     www.llrx.com/features/newhorizons.htm  
MERCOSUR:     www.mercosur.int (Spanish) 
NAFTA:     www.nafta-sec-alena.org  
OECD Competition Committee:  
www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_37463_1_1_1_1_37463,00.html  
UK Competition Appeal Tribunal:  www.catribunal.org.uk  
UK Competition Commission:  www.competition-commission.org.uk  
UK Office of Fair Trading:   www.oft.gov.uk  
UNCTAD:     http://www.unctad.org  
University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy: 
www.competition-law.ox.ac.uk  
US Antitrust Modernization Commission: www.amc.gov  
US Department of Justice Antitrust Division:www.usdoj.gov/atr/index.html  
US Federal Trade Commission:  www.ftc.gov  
WAEMU/UEMOA    www.uemoa.int (French) 
WTO Trade and Competition Policy Working Group: 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/comp_e.htm  
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